Zitadelle

I'll take the first stab at providing you some insight. For infantry organizations, the more common Soviet AT gun was actually organized around the 45mm AT gun. It was not until mid-1943 that the 57mm started to be equipped to troops, and even still, the 45mm continued in the TO&E through the end of the war. Although the 45mm was based upon the German 37mm, it was capable of firing a large HE round, and thus, the Soviets continued to use the weapon in that role throughout the war. As for CMBB unit purchase and inherent TO&E structures, I cannot give you any insight since I have not seen the game.... The Soviet automatic rifle (at work so right now I cannot provide the name) was actually equipped to some troops- typically squad leaders or some veteran units- in the beginning of the war (1941). This rifle proved to be unpopular with the troops- since it was difficult to maintain, inaccurate, and costly to manufacture. It was slowly removed from service. Automatic fire was eventually provided by the assortment of SMGs. You are correct regarding the Soviet squad LMG. There were two versions provided to the troops- the DP and the DT. The DP model was the standard infantry LMG. The DT was the same weapon, but actually the version developed for tanks. This version was initially supplied to troops due to shortages of the DP. However, troops preferred the DT since it was lighter (metal stock) and easier to handle. The Maxim was really the only infantry machine gun provided to infantry units. It was based upon the original German Maxim machine gun developed in the early 1900s which was the model MG for the Vickers, Browning, and others as well. It was a water-cooled, belt-fed MG, and the TO&E set the standard crew at six (I believe). Compared to the MG34 an MG42, it definitely showed its age. The Soviets did have the DsHK heavy machine gun (12.7mm). However, this weapon was considered too heavy to be used for infantry use. Some units were equipped with the monster, but for the most part it was mounted and used for AA duties.

Wooo Hooo! Its getting closer. Ya know, if ya sleep 12 hours every night it will only be 18 days. That cuts the time in half!</font>

So the Parachute Divisions Göring ranted about were not actually Luftwaffe divisions but only manned by former Luftwaffe personnel? This must have confused me. Okay, something I didn't know... I always thought the 9th Para was a Luftwaffe division... The problems it faced seem quite similar. Durrr. Well, you learn every day (if you read the BTS boards, that is, otherwise I'm not sure). I also have to point out I'm very low on the "grog scale" and can and will mix up different arms </font>

Very interesting account, and would probably make for a great CMBB scenario/operation. However, the Luftwaffe infantry divisions should not be confused with either the Herman Goering Division nor the parachute divisions. The Luftwaffe infantry divisions were distinct, and suffered from their own problems (as discussed above) as they were understrength and badly organized/trained. The Luftwaffe 9th infantry division, for example, was mauled in February, 1944 near Leningrad and disbanded thereafter.

Alright, the name will get the uber-grogs going, but I think I identified the gun (although there is an outstanding question, see below). Paraphrased from _German Artillery of World War II_ (Ian Hogg, 1975), the gun is a: 75mm Panzerabwehrkanone 41, or 7.5cm Pak 41. And no, I am not confusing this with our other Pak 41 (88mm). I can't fully identify the gun, because the photo does not include a view of the muzzle brake. The muzzle brake on the 7.5cm Pak 41 was a multi-baffle design. However, the rivet shield, the size of the breach, the spoked wheels, and the unusual mounting arrangement make me think this is the beast. The 7.5cm Pak 41 incorporated both a "coned bore" and tungsten-core ammunition to realize a high velocity and exceptional killing capability. Unfortunately (or fortunately), only 150 were built before the project was canceled due to a shortage of tungsten. Thereafter, the guns were scrapped or the carriage modified to support the Pak 40. The carriage and shield was a unique design. The shield was not simply added, but actually served as a means of mounting the gun. It was part of the assembly and the gun was carried in a cradle assembly that was suspended in the shield by a gimbal and vertical trunnions. So, with the correct guess do I win a free copy of CMBB delivered today for beta testing??

M. Dorosh has it correct. Luftwaffe Division’s were born out of the manpower shortages from 1942. The German high command recommended transferring troops from the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe to the army for replacements. Of course Goring wanted to control his own fiefdoms and responded with the idea of creating Luftwaffe infantry divisions- based upon the ad-hoc defensive organizational structures from 1941 (more on that if necessary). Hitler, of course loved the idea, since it fit into his game on the value of the number of divisions and party loyalty. [sidenote, another discussion. During the end of the war Hitler demanded that undermanned divisions maintain their individual standing, and not be integrated together. Of course, this required more logistical/command structures and probably resulted in weakened units especially compared to what would have been the result of combining elements of a depleted divisions under a new division. Discuss.] In the end 22 Luftwaffe divisions were created, and they all met nasty ends on the battlefield. Initially, they were to assigned to quiet fronts, but circumstances required that they be placed in crisis areas to stem holes in the frontlines. Based upon what I’ve read, I would argue that the divisions weaknesses were two-fold. 1)TO&E- the units were smaller and equipped like a light infantry brigade versus a division. There was also a lack of supporting units- such as recon and engineering. Supporting artillery and mobile elements were lacking; furthermore what was available was commonly captured equipment. The captured equipment was prone to breakdown and increased logistical complexity trying to provide ammunition for all sorts of calibers. 2)Command- the units’ command structures were composed of Luftwaffe officers that had little experience in combat- especially in larger organizations. Furthermore, units used some German army officers which did not have the cadre with the troops. Also, these officers weakened the available pool of officers for the army as well. One source of this information is an article by Steven Sandman in _Command Magazine_ (“The Luftwaffe’s Field Divisions;” Fall, 1995).

Yes, I agree. The BFC gentlemen previously explained in detail why full movie functionality would not be included in CMBB; along with the balancing of development time that such an endeavor would take versus the other features added to the executable modules. Time is limited for design and development, and I think many individuals would rather have some of the enhancements that have been seen in the beta sneak-previews versus the capability to have full movie playback. So, here's to: Enhanced MG and artillery functionality Armored command Single-man turret limitations Non-gamey flakgun halftracks Wind effects on smoke Spreading fires Capability to load QB maps Trenches Extreme fog-of-war Death clock Health/fitness Rarity factors etc....

And, you don't even have to be 1000 meters from the vehicle and it located in trees to lose sight of the vehicle. Here's an exercise on spotting: When driving down a road notice how far away you notice another vehicle (either parked or even moving toward you). Then, check the odometer and track the distance traveled before reaching the point where you first spotted the other vehicle. You will probably be surprised how close the range really is. And, this is even considering that: 1) The other car is in the open 2) The other car is moving 3) The other car is probably not camoflauged 4) You are not trying to keep your head down (at least I hope not while driving) and dodging incoming rounds. 5) You are looking through a full windshield versus a vision slit. Much like MikeD refers, camofluage is not necessarily a case of subtle colors for blending into the surroundings. Early German color schemes were the infamous 'Panzer Grey' which was to blend into the local environment by the vehicle picking up the localized dirt and dust and the vehicle blending in. Take a look at weathered Panzer Grey vehicle photos from the Desert or Eastern Front. Also, the color was chosen because it blended into shadows as well. Of course, the Germans encountered problems when the vehicle was in snowy conditions. An even more bizarre example has been some recent studies using a brighter surface for camoflauge. Lights have been mounted on a vehicle with a similar bright intensity of the daylight. At a distance, the result is not a bright vehicle, but rather the vehicle blending into the horizon. I have seen coverage of this approach with a vehicle parked on a crestline disappearing to visual observation about 400m away. The human eye cannot tell the difference between the normal brightness and the vehicle silhoutte. Which brings the discussion full circle. Camoflauge is only to work at a distance. At close ranges, I would hope that a target can be spotted. At a long distance, the vehicle cannot be spotted simply based upon the abilities/limitations of the human eye and battle conditions. I would argue that the goal is for that middle range. (And, then there is Jentz's opinion that vehicle camoflauge serves two purposes: 1)morale booster- the troops don't think they are seen; and 2)to keep the gruts busy as they paint and re-paint their vehicles.)

For a combined arms group consisting of infantry and armor where the battalion commander is infantry, such command structure would be highly unrealistic during World War II. Armor and infantry units did not combine command structures. While there was some interaction between units- such as 'please Mr. Tank, take out that pillbox for us'- the command structures between armor and infantry units were not integrated. In fact during Operation Cobra (July-August, 1944), US infantry and armored radio sets were even a different frequency and could not be used for communication between the two units. And, that is not even considering Russian armor/infantry TO&Es nor deployment patterns. I would hope that unit bonuses would not be linked between an infantry company/battalion HQ and an armored unit.

Well, there's more to it than that. It doesn't do you much good to know what the enemy is going to do unless you have the means at hand to thwart his plans. The game that British intelligence was playing had many more layers to it than just ULTRA. They employed elaborate deception schemes to keep the Germans looking in the wrong direction and off balance. They were steadily feeding them false but credible information. A piece here and a piece there, all from different sources, and let the Germans connect the dots and feel real proud of themselves. And even when the truth finally became evident, it was never obvious that they had been misled all along, it just looked as though the Allies had changed their plans. Michael</font>

What made them superb at this?</font>

Gentleman- An excellent discussion, and once I get some of my opinions, learnings, and evidence collected I hope to contribute as well. So far, you've avoided the trolls and I hope that continues. Grisha- I think a connection between Barbarossa and Bagration is an excellent comparison (and I will even leave out the date connection). Operation Bagration, I would agrue was as a stunning blow to the German Army as the great encirclements was to the Russians in 1941. Even the general strategy taken by each side in 1944 was a mirror of the 1941 strategy. The German army was held by Hitler's hold the ground policy- limiting their use of a mobile defense (sound familiar in 1941?). The end result was of course, massive encirclements and losses of 400,000 odd troops that the Germans could not afford. I would have to say, however, that Berlin was an operation's objective prior to the Russians deploying on the Oder. Stalin's initial plans was to take Berlin as a part of the offensives beginning in January, 1945 when the Russian army was still in Poland. Based upon the successes of the winter operations in '44 against Army Group South and Operation Bagration, Stalin and the army commanders believed that it would be possible to take Berlin with the January, 1945 offensive (trying to remember the name of the operation...). Events were to prove that this was not possible. While the offensive initially made good ground, the length of the logistical lines proved to be too long. Additionally, German defenses proved to be stronger than anticipated; and in fact, the Germans were able to take advantage of an extended Russian exposed flank in Northern Poland and stage an offensive. This offensive made Zukhov realise that his position was not as strong as he initially viewed and he had to consolidate his front before beginning the Spring operations on the Oder. Fortunately, the Russians were able to establish a series of bridgeheads across the Oder including major rail junctions that proved to be advantageous to the final offensive. (Drat, I need to keep some documentation in the office so that I can actually use individual names, operation/offensive titles, etc....) Edit: according to Glantz, the name of the January/February operation was simply the Vistula-Oder operation. Somehow I think a definition does not make for a name. [ August 06, 2002, 09:08 AM: Message edited by: Zitadelle ]

[Edited to save BFC diskspace.] Alright, we'll discuss "the influence of the cold on the morale of troops exposed to it during [a] fight." Troop morale is heavily influenced by weather conditions- particularly miserable conditions. Whether (no pun intended) it is hot, cold, wet, muddy, or many other variants, conditions will affect troop morale. Read about the impact winter conditions had on the German troops in Stalingrad. Of course, you can argue that was due to a lack of supply. So, here are several other examples: For the Russian Front two come quickly to mind- the Korsun Pocket and the ill-lead final defense by "Field Marshall" Schoerner (both in the Kurland pocket and in the final defense of the Reich). Read about the affect of winter conditions on the morale of the US Marine 2nd Division in 1950 (Korean War). Or, the Russians during the Winter War in 1940 (when they were not equipped for winter fighting). Another example would be the retreat of Napoleon's army from Russia and the defense of the only river crossing at Deresinia (sp?). The Napoleonic Wars have several other examples, along with a multitude of other European Wars (30 Years, Fall of Rome, Roman Conquests, etc...). Back to the United States, there are examples during the War of Independence and the various wars against the Native American Indians (both Indians and the US Army). And, I am only giving a few brief examples of the cold. We could also discuss other weather conditions and its impact on morale for: desert conditions, rain, monsoons, deep snow, etc....

And what is your documented proof of this event??? History abounds with examples of the impact of weather and climate on fighting ability. Without taxing half a brain cell, I can easily think of a dozen campaigns/wars where the overall effectiveness of the combatants was dramatically affected by weather conditions- especially the cold (and leaving out rain, fog, snow, extreme heat, etc....).

To quote Hamlet (Act III, Scene II): "The lady protests too much, methinks." Countdown to the visit of the Great Bald One and his dreaded padlock.... Anyone want to start a pool? Better yet, can we do it (citizen's lockdown) so that he is not bothered with this little stuff and he can continue coding. [ August 01, 2002, 12:14 PM: Message edited by: Zitadelle ]

No Elefants nor Ferdinands by Spring, 1945. They were all lost on the steppes of Russia or in the mountains of Italy. Battles in the Seelow Heights and Berlin will be primarily StuGs, PzKW IVs, and Panthers- with a occasional Tiger II.

Pronounced like 'ya'; not 'eye'. And, can we discontinue this discussion. The box art is done. It looks aright; we're all more interested in the contents anyway. If the splash screen gets you- as others said mod it or click on the 'New Game' button so quickly you're not looking at it for long. The only reason you would want to keep the box is if you plan on selling an unopened/mint condition copy of CMBB on eBay to some crazed collector- who is looking for another fix beyond Beany Babies. Hell, I probably won't even get a box in the United States.

Check your e-mail in about a minute....

I have already made a challenge to a respectable opponent for a PBEM battle, and we will discover the new features of CMBB through an embarassing battle. "Ah, so that is what that command does. So much for that platoon...." Thereafter, we will send an AAR to each other (perhaps the forum as well without spoilers) and discuss what we've learned, what worked, and what failed (miserably). We've choosen sides- Soviets for me considering that I have been waiting over a year for this- and he'll choose the scenario. To start, we are keeping it somewhat simple- no battles in deep mud, the dead of winter, or deadly street fighting. We have allowed each other to play against the AI in another battle, because there is no way that we will be able to hold ourselves back as we wait for e-mails and turns. "Za Rodina Matz" Yankee Dog!

Hey Grisha, add me to that list for the maps if you please....

Hey Grisha, add me to that list for the maps if you please....

Here is a quick idea. Verify your setting for the CD-ROM drive, and whether it is set for "auto-run" or not. It is possible that if the drive is set for auto-running CDs once they're loaded into the drive the drive is finding the setup.exe application rather than the combatmission.exe application. To prevent this from happening, try turning off the auto-run functionality for the CD-ROM drive. Otherwise, I would recommend posting a message on the Combat Mission Technical Support forum.

This must be some VIP at Gamestop.com, since the company only supports on-line purchases through their page or purchases at their United States stores like: Software Etc, Babbages, Funcoland, etc.... I did a search on their page, and their search engine had no idea what "Combat Mission" is; although it found me several copies of something called Command and Conquer. Now, since CMBB (and CMBO) can only be purchased on-line via BFC in the United States, this VIP is either: 1) Is in really, really close with KwazyDog, Madmatt, Steve et al., or, 2) Is pulling your leg, or, 3) Doesn't know what he is talking about. Any votes? To quote the Gremlin in the classic Bugs Bunny cartoon (on the airbase with the diabolical sabotage): "I like this guy. He's funny."

Sorry "bulletproofest," but I don't think you are going to find any converts here for something that is not CMBO nor CMBB. On top of that, the realism for the upcoming title is in serious question. Much like a Steven Ambrose novel, umm, I mean historical fiction (no, that's not correct either...). The crowd that you are going to find here are grogs and wargamers. They are not interested in RTS, FPS, nor pseudo wargames like.... Well, you know- I won't give the other titles the "honor" of even being mentioned here. Remember you are in the Combat Mission forum. If you want to discuss another product, may I suggest you go to the "General Forum." (Sorry if I took the wind out of your sails Madmatt...).