LongLeftFlank

This has come up before, even back in the old CMBO days when CM was closer to its hex wargame roots, but in Elite and Iron modes it would be interesting to introduce a limit on the total number of units (% of total in play) the player could issue commands to each WeGo turn. Not sure of the RT equivalent, but it could mitigate the 'speed chess' clickfest issue that makes RT H2H a rarity for most of us. 1. The limit would be set based on: (a) formation quality (reflecting likelihood of units to take initiative); (b) comms, using a 1-5 scale set by the designer to reflect radios/wire, visibility, terrain, atmospherics etc. (emplaced defenders would usually be a point higher?) 2. Units in command all the way up to the top HQ (the player) would be exempt from the limit. This could also tempt the top dog to go forward and get things moving.... at his own risk, which speaks to the thread topic. 3. Elite status units (exceptional self-reliance) and units not yet in contact (Rested, zero Alerted status) might also be exempt, so the entire formation can advance to contact before all hell breaks loose. 4. Emergency cancel/bugout commands, Hide/Unhide or Face would not count against the limit; units would always be allowed basic self preservation orders. Specialized orders like artillery direction could also be exempt. 5. Not everyone would dig these limits of course, as it would discourage excessive micro and squad splitting, and place greater reliance on the TacAI. But it would arguably be more realistic, and the "in command" exemption would make CM much more of a Command game, as opposed to shoving orders at 300 'should be' Audie Murphies each turn. Men take fire, go to ground, defend themselves. They aren't necessarily keen to get up and going again all at once. Thoughts? EDIT: I have no expectation whatever of this being introduced, it's just for discussion.

"We're paratroopers, lieutenant. We're supposed to be surrounded." If the above happens to be where you're headed with that thought, sure, that's part of why paras and marines are elite troops, preferably hand picked for aggressiveness initiative and resilience. But I see no reason that they'd choose to organize and deploy for combat too much differently than regular Infantry, other battle conditions being equal. Happy to be proven wrong.... In fact you might argue that para COs might see *less* action sometimes, given that unlike regulars deployed on an established front line, they've dropped behind the lines and aren't getting shelled by anything heavier than mortars, at least for a while. Artillery is the true reaper of souls in war, as you know. Fwiw. These aren't questions that lend themselves to ready answers....

Merci beaucoup for the kudos, mon copain. But I did this work back in 2011 and now in my dotage have no recollection of how it was done, lol. I will have to take a look again sometime, but work (la vice Américain) permits me very little CM time. Désolé.

This was your original query. @Combatintman, who does this for a living in RL, gave you a series of very useful and documented answers. You could at least have the good grace to thank him for his efforts before getting cute with corner cases (if those are your Likes, fair enough). (Thanks, CIMan!)

The cathedral and Sauron tower are pretty damage resistant, even to heavy FP. (That's why I was sad they couldn't get something of that nature into CMSF2. But anyway.... ) Sink the structures a metre into the surrounding earth and you have additional cover. Prone soldiers in there are nearly immune though I haven't tested that rigorously.

My ADD/OCD fidelity mapping project for tonight: Claies de Vire. 1. Overview 2. A nice back door into the German anchor position at St. Martin for Company A, 119th Infantry? 3. Simple. Just cross this weir, single file. 4. ... and hop the open barge lock (US engineers subsequently shut it btw, flooding German footbridges upstream as far as Pont Hebert). 5. ....But wait, it gets *better!* You then cross the dam and take the solid stone powerhouse/mill by the old mill pond. (No chance the Krauts have turned that into a blockhouse or anything).

One of the best CM videos I've ever seen. Terrific mods and filters, very well choreographed and 'filmed'. You have a gift! BFC should send this to its DoD contacts. I'm tempted to reach out to contacts in the Philippines Armed Forces who recently went through all this in Marawi... Tactically though, men who have gone to ground (pinned) inside hard cover, even flimsy mud brick shouldn't be so easy to kill off. (My usual hobby horse). But this is a game engine gripe, not a critique of your vid.

Glad multiple forum members are getting use out of that map!

More source material on the attack The first combat order of the 137th Infantry during World War II called for an attack at 0600 the following morning, 11 July 1944, on German positions from the Vire river near St. Gilles, extending southwest through la Petite Ferme toward le Carillon. During the night of 11 July 1944, the 1st (A,B,C) and 2nd (E,F,G) Battalions were in position for the attack, with Company G in reserve. The 3rd Battalion (I,K,L,M) was held as Division reserve, due to their late debarkation and arrival in the area. In the early morning, both 1st and 2nd Battalions received enemy mortar fire. Company C encountered an enemy patrol, which was driven off, in the first actual contact with the enemy. Company F also encountered an enemy patrol during the night. The attack jumped off at 0600 after an artillery preparation from 600 guns. Corps artillery was in support of the operation. With the attack scarcely begun, the 137th encountered a fortified church on Highway 3, north of St. Gilles, and for most of the morning was pinned down by heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. Regiment commander, Colonel Layng was wounded in the face and leg by machine gun fire at 0715. At the same time the commander of the supporting 219th Field Artillery Battalion and artillery liaison officer, were killed, and the first platoon of Company G suffered heavy casualties. After being pinned down for over two hours, when an artillery barrage forced the German machine gunner to take cover for a brief instant, Lieutenant Simpson was able to drag a wounded fellow officer to the slight protection of a tree and some hedge. On 11 July near St. Gilles, Company M medics rescued an injured soldier of the 219th Field Artillery Battalion who was enveloped in the flames of a burning quarter-ton truck after a direct hit from enemy artillery. Medic Sergeant Spengler, attached to Company F, at 1000 on 11 July ignored enemy machine gun and sniper fire and left the concealment of hedges to rescue a wounded soldier from an open field. Despite pounding by artillery, the fortified church north of St. Gilles could not be taken out. This, together with a fortified chateau in the same vicinity, held up 1st Battalion most of the day. 2nd Battalion made advances up to 400 yards, with Company F making the greatest gain until a shortage of ammunition held up their advance. 3rd Battalion was committed at 1830. The first enemy prisoners captured indicated that the Division was facing elements of 897th, 898th and 899th Infantry regiments, and composing Kampfgruppe (Colonel General) Kentner. Throughout the day the regiment was subjected to heavy machine gun and mortar fire from well dug-in positions, and from 88mm and 150mm artillery fire from the rear. Due to allied aerial superiority, no enemy air attacks were encountered. Casualties in the 137th for the first day’s operations were 12 killed, 96 wounded and 18 missing in action The regiment again attacked at 0800 on 12 July 1944, with 2nd and 3rd Battalions in the leading echelon. The weather remained cloudy, with intermittent showers. Tank destroyers were attached to the regiment and heavy artillery support was continued. Enemy fire continued from the church north of St. Gilles, and at 1045 1st Battalion stormed that stronghold and took it and the surrounding buildings. 1st Battalion then moved on and contacted elements of 3rd Battalion, which had cut in behind these strong points. 1st Battalion cleaned out remaining hostile resistance in the vicinity of St. Gilles by 1400. 3rd Battalion pushed on to Highway 3 southwest of St. Gilles, where they were held up by machine gun fire, mines and booby traps. At 1600 a strong enemy position was captured about 1000 yards south of St. Gilles. Company I. On 12 July, after his Platoon Leader had been killed, Sergeant Gonzales took command of the platoon, which had been under heavy mortar and machine gun fire. Using sound judgment and quick thinking, Gonzales commanded an attached Tank Destroyer, whose crew had been reduced by enemy fire, and blasted out a gun nest. When this TD bogged down, he returned to bring up another which pulled the first to safety. The Sergeant then blasted out the remaining nests and his platoon was able to advance. Heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire continued, and snipers were active. Casualties for 12 July 1944 were 7 killed, 74 wounded and 7 missing. On 13 July 1944, the regiment attacked at 0800, with the 3rd & 2nd Battalions again leading. Visibility was poor, and aerial support was called off, but the artillery support remained excellent. The 3rd Battalion moved 500 yards before being held up by machine gun fire. The 2nd Battalion on the right, received heavy shell fire and made no marked advance. After being held up in the early part of the day, the 2nd Battalion broke through for a gain of 500 years. An enemy counterattack forced the 3rd Battalion back to its original position at 2200. Company M. On 13 July, after several unsuccessful attempts of his platoon to cross a field which the Germans had well covered with machine gun fire, and after his Platoon Leader was killed, Sergeant Hupp determined the location of the enemy emplacements, obtained a light machine gun, and firing from the hip, killed three Germans. This neutralized the first nest. He then led his platoon to clear out the remaining two nests. The entire battalion was then able to advance. During the afternoon of 13 July, southeast of la Meauffe, two members of Company A observed a disabled tank in an area in which they knew an artillery barrage was due to fall. A wounded member of the crew was still in the tank.... Private Nichols was wounded during the barrage, but after he and Sergeant Blair evacuated the three wounded men, Nichols joined his platoon in the attack until ordered to the aid station by his commanding officer. Executive Officer of Company A, assumed command of a provisional platoon on 13 July and carried out an attack upon a position where all previous attacks had failed. Exposing himself to enemy machine gun fire, he pointed out enemy emplacements from his position at the head of the platoon, and five emplacements were successfully disposed of. Eight of the enemy were killed, twelve taken prisoner, and a large amount of enemy materiel captured. Late in the afternoon of 13 July, two platoons of Company L were pinned down by machine gun fire. After the company radio man had been killed, Sergeant Hughbanks removed the radio from the dead soldier, called the battalion OP and requested artillery fire on the German position. For almost an hour he directed the fire, until the enemy emplacements were neutralized. These forces received heavy fire from enemy 88mm artillery regularly during the day, although at 1145 our own artillery knocked out two enemy mobile 88’s. Time burst was also used by the Germans. It was evident that the hedgerows so common in Normandy were being used to the maximum in the plan of the German defense. Forty-seven prisoners were taken during the day. Our casualties on this day were the heaviest yet, with 21 killed, 87 wounded and 17 missing in action. On Friday, 14 July 1944, the regiment attacked again at 0800, with one platoon of medium tanks in support of each battalion. By 1300 the 1st Battalion had advanced up to 300 yards, but were meeting stiff resistance at la Pte Ferme. By 1630 the 1st Battalion was attacking the enemy stronghold at la Mare, where German troops had assembled in the stone buildings in that area. The 3rd Battalion, on the right, had established contact with forces on the strongly held road junction of Highways 2 and 3. All elements were encountering heavy minefields and 88mm fire. Casualties in the regiment totaled 127. Of these, 17 were killed, 106 wounded and 4 missing. Forty prisoners were taken. Some of the prisoners reported that many German soldiers wanted to surrender, but were being closely watched by officers and non-commissioned officers. On 15 July 1944, the regiment attacked, for the fifth consecutive morning, and were met by heavy artillery fire. With the 3rd Battalion established 200 yards north of Highway 2, main road to St. Lo, Company K pushed forward to the road at 0910, but was held up there by machine gun fire. No large gains were made by any battalion during the day. (The main effort for the Division was made by the 134th Infantry). Our 1st Battalion turned back a strong German counterattack at noon. The loudspeaker method of contacting the enemy troops was again used, and 25 prisoners were taken. The 137th lost 16 men killed, 100 wounded and 1 missing in action. On Sunday, 16 July 1944, the battle slowed down considerably. The weeks attack and the heavy artillery pounding was beginning to tell on the enemy forces, and reports began to come back of their units attempting to operate with a drastic reduction of men, with no replacements; of a shortage of food, water and ammunition; and of extensive use of horse-drawn vehicles due to lack of gasoline. Our forces consolidated and strengthened their lines during the day. The 2nd Battalion operating in the vicinity of le Carrillon, advanced 600 yards at one point. Casualties in the regiment showed a marked decrease as the action slowed down and as the men were becoming more battle-wise. On the 16th, 5 men were killed, 23 wounded and 2 missing in action.

I toyed once with doing an artillery shattered treescape using modded phone poles but soon gave it up.

I am also pasting this very useful post by the ever ingenious @Kaunitz here, for my own reference. I used a similar approach of gapped bocage segments to represent dense jungle undergrowth in my PTO Makin scenario.

Found another rare free evening for mapmaking over Christmas. Unfortunately my Macbook doesn't offer a Prtscrn, so a low rez phone shot will need to do to show progress. The white text area is the 11 July attack frontage of 137th Infantry, as viewed from the left flank of the German MLR (897e Grenadiere), anchored on the Vire. 119th Infantry had occupied the left bank on July 9th, but not in enough force to support this attack.

As a Stable Genius once said, "take the oil" (Gulf side, leave them the Hejaz). But that's getting political...

Another workaround could be to introduce a capacity limit of 2 men (eg rocket or MG team) on balconies. Those tend to be the kinds of units you want to go out there.

With Turks you'd get Western tanks fighting for RED. Maybe Israel unexpectedly grabs Lebanon and Sinai and triggers a pan-Muslim alliance or sumfink. If you really want to put a thumb on the scale, say climate change or a volcanic eruption triggers massive dust storms throughout the region, messing up optics and engines and neutralizing air support. WITNESS ME, SHOCK FORCE!!!

Balconies can be your friend if you want to spot/shoot obliquely up a street, but if you're directly facing an enemy they indeed suck. I suspect designers should do a kindness and eliminate doorways so balconies are cosmetic only. I always hoped for a workaround like this, but it may be a TacAI programming nightmare:

Yeah, you definitely don't need our approval to go what-iffing around the game. Go for it. I once floated a what-if concept on the CMBS board that had French and US forces shooting at each other in Ukraine. Pretty damn unlikely, but wev, it's a game. Would you consider some kind of Cherkassy type "Lost Legion" breakout, where a ragtag mix of US forces pushes for Beirut under a gauntlet of fire from a Turko-Syrian-Uncon alliance? That way, you get more meeting engagements which tend to be more balanced and fun. Any way, enough advice. Have fun with your project and good holidays.

Don't get us wrong, Ridaz, if you want to re-engineer a modern day Manzikert or Ain Jalut or other make glorious victory of Islam believers over arrogant infidel pi-dogs, fly at it! We are all keen to learn. But since CMSF2 is a realistic wargame, the toolbox for doing that is finite. You might try the Hezbollah approach, backed by dug in tanks. Once BLUE is in among the hidden rocketeers it can be tough not to show a flank....

Your backstory posits an event that has not happened since Dien Bien Phu, 1954: the systematic siege, encirclement and destruction of a modern Western army by indigenous forces. So fine, it happened then. What would allow it to happen today? So what conditions or sudden technical innovation would create such an outcome? There is nothing in Assad's army (or the CMSF2 force set) capable of heavily blooding US mechanised main forces in open combat. And US air power ensures that any such forces rarely reach the field intact. A Mosul 2016 type of house to house city fight might create a charnel house for the Americans, were they to persist in it, but what would impel them to do so after the trap became apparent? Do you envision die Trumpenfuhrer pounding the table: "I will not abandon the Volga!" Let's assume US forces are caught outnumbered and overextended by a spontaneous unification of all local forces, including nominal allies. What prevents them from resisting, rallying and withdrawing, or reinforcing and counterattacking? They're trained to do that, even outnumbered. It would take some time to get them to believe help wasn't on the way. (Let's also pretend Israel does not exist, btw) 1. How are rebel forces suddenly able to defeat heavy mechanised US units? Or alternatively, restrict US mobility and prevent them from breaking out of the traps they find themselves in. 2. What deus ex machina allows RED forces to neutralize US air power? which would otherwise level those newly seized rebel bases, and also allow resupply to the besieged forces. (Don't say Russian/Chinese air power, because them taking an active role in destroying a US division is WW3 and pretty much nuclear war at that point. In which case you have a Twilight 2000 fantasy which is more FPS than wargame stuff). .... A 1918 style epidemic might do the trick. Maybe a virulent gastro bug that weakens everyone, but tough local peasant boys used to bad water rally quicker than white bread Americans. Hard to man those advanced weapons in searing heat when you've lost 20 pounds through your bowels. That doesn't cancel the airpower but it might level the field on the ground.

FWIW, I made my peace with CM's massively ahistorical casualty levels by presuming many casualties are not in fact hit, but rather gone to ground and unavailable for further orders in game terms. In the same way, I mentally reconcile CM and historical timetables by presuming 'lulls' in the action during which neither side is doing very much beyond skulking around, observing and medevacing. Not every minute is an on the clock mad minute. I don't know if that helps anyone else. Perhaps it's my hex wargaming background that lets me comfortably apply these filters and not take the visual literalism of CM2 too, umm, literally. Those brought up on FPS might have their own.

Indeed. 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 3 Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. 4 Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

Agreed, it seems "Mac" was very popular with his men (other than the aforementioned 2 divisions "Dugout Doug" left in Bataan in 1942). And 8th Army indeed pulled off a bevy of spectacular maneuvers and coups de main in Luzon in 1945, aided by the functionally infinite matériel being supplied by the Arsenal of Democracy. .... This set against the utter bankruptcy of the Japanese war machine; the stubborn dedication of its starving light infantry being all that kept it in the field by then. Of course, minimizing casualties did not extend to Filipino civilians, alas, and still less to their property. If a structure was even suspected to have Japanese in it, it got flattened, no questions asked. Nobody wanted to be the last GI to die in a victorious war, so too bad for the "Flips". (... that same casual attitude of Uncle Sam, especially USAF, toward collateral damage persists to this day). Meanwhile, the boys on Iwo and Okinawa couldn't solve their problem with either firepower or maneuver. That created some serious morale and psychological problems in the field. And led to some soul searching back home. Which led in turn to Hiroshima.... So harking back to my new friend's earlier comments on a distinctive American diffidence re casualties, there's definitely a great deal in that observation, but a bit different than he suggested IMHO. Happy to explore that further, civilly.

Hmm. Instant resort to ad hominem attack, plus entirely fanciful assertion that I have spent significant time commenting on your posts seems... faintly familiar. Mr. Tittles, is that you?

Wow, I disagree with pretty much every word you have written here on prevailing American doctrine and public opinion. This is a post-Vietnam revisionist lens, buttressed by some postwar Generalstabs ax-grinding. Neither early loss of the US army in the Philippines nor heavy casualties in the 1943 bomber offensives, then Tarawa and Anzio, triggered defeatism at home, or timidity in US field commanders. Quite the reverse! Early US debacles at Midway, Guadalcanal or Salerno are readily imaginable, but they weren't about to drive Uncle Sam to down tools either. Both Nazis and Japanese learned the hard way that American people and soldiers were far from the 'weak-kneed cosmopolitans' that their agitprop (and its pre-1941 Comintern equivalents) made out. And any Moon of Alabama crank standing up and declaiming 'Our Boys are dying like sheep for British imperialism and the Rotschilds!' would have been tarred and feathered by an angry mob. There is plenty to criticise in America's conduct of the war, but nothing like you've claimed here.

Yes, splendid work here. I guess the next step would be to ask: what kinds of combat actions might we expect to take place here? 1. A raid or ambush by commandos or uncons could readily be envisioned, for all sorts of reasons. 2. A coup de main by regular forces to secure an airbase is also plausible, though also problematic in a theatre bristling with modern antiaircraft weapons. In a CMSF type setting, no problem. 3. If it's regular forces dug in to defend against other regular forces, then why here? What's the rationale for establishing a MLR or strongpoint in a built up area, rather than open country? No doubt one could develop reasons (denial of facilities to the enemy for either military or political reasons, sectarian divide in the adjoining area, etc.). But that will have material impacts on the scheme and objectives of the combatants, so it's worth thinking about. In general, it's hard to envision Aachen or Stalingrad type fights these days involving modern mech forces on *both* sides. Uncons prefer built up areas because dense cover and concealment negates the enemy's superior ranged firepower, a la Mosul, Fallujah, Aleppo, Grozny etc. Would the same apply to a SovBloc type mech force facing superior Western tanks and airpower? (It didn't seem to work for the Iraqi mech forces in 2003...) Anyway, good luck with the project!