Forever Babra

Commisar, Greg Gorusch has done an excellent Eylau mod for the BG series. New map, new units, everything. Check it out. If you have any of the ACW titles, there's a Mexican War mod for those too. I'm not sure what info I'm allowed to give out, but look for more age of musket titles from John Tiller in the forseeable future. They won't be CM with Napoleonics, but they'll fill a void. I had the pleasure to research the OOB for one of the battles, so it is coming...

Has anyone factored in the ammo here? Sure, me and a few drunken buds could run the gun, but who brings the ammo?

I think I have to chime in again and reiterate that my criticisms of 21st AG fall at the staff and operational level. I do hope people stop interpreting this as me saying "Pommies suck, Jerry rocks". -- Lt. Col. Dr. John English, Failure in High Command - The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign. [This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]

My, my, such tempers and flames today. For the record, I did not say, or even imply, Commonwealth troops were bad soldiers. I said their performance was less than stellar; and by "their", I am referring to 21st Army Group's performance. Not exactly a damning criticism. Just so it's perfectly clear: Commonwealth troops weren't bad; their opponents were just better at the task of making war. History is useless if we don't learn from it.

I understand and pretty much agree with BTS's reasoning on it, but making it scenario-designer optional doesn't seem unreasonable to me.

Oooh, good eye

There was, primarily, the lack of staff training for most officers, which led to every sort of logistical and operational malfunction at all levels. Corps and Army level artillery was not on call when it was needed, and seldom in sufficient quantity. Tactics in light of previous experience had not progressed to reflect the absolute need for close infantry/tank cooperation. As a result, dangerous animosities developed between the infantry and the armour, as each blamed the other for not supporting. Such in-fighting hindered combined operations as neither could (or felt they could) rely on the other. Most of the units involved in the Normandy fighting were trained in doctrine from 1942, that is when they were sufficiently trained at all. Many divisional commanders were lax in this regard; and most of the training for Normandy consisted in how to get off the beach -- insufficient attention had been paid to forseeable conditions after that, with the result that once ashore, confidence waned. As a consequence of this poor leadership, changing leadership, heavy enemy resistance, and "victories" measured in yards and heavy casualties, morale plummeted, desertions went up, courts martial went up, and further operations suffered. Not surprisingly, after the eventual breakout, morale improved, as did combat efficiency. For a more detailed examination, explained much better in 300 pages than I can do in a paragraph or two, I would refer you to Lt. Col. Dr. John A. English, Failure in High Command - The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign ISBN 0-919614-60-4. If you just want to read how great the good guys are, try Whitaker, Whitaker & Copp, Victory at Falaise - The Soldiers' Story ISBN 0-00-200017-2 No. [This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]

In poor visibility scenarios I'll frequently have to retarget units who are targetting friendlies. Poor arty is the big killer though. I'm pretty careful about it, but others think nothing of calling down 155s on danger-close targets.

I spent six months in a combat zone, though I was never in a position of command. I have eaten earth when the mortars fell. I have heard myself yell meaningless things when the bullets were snapping. And lest you think I levy criticisms unjustly, I have levied them equally harshly against myself and my comrades, because, to be frank, we sucked at soldiering and I was glad to be quit of it. Of course it was miserable in Normandy. When you cram a few million men into a small corner of the globe, give them guns and artillery and aerial bombs, it cannot be otherwise. ALL combat is a misery. From the dawn of time it has been a nasty, bloody, painful experience. But a unit defines itself on whether it can perform in spite of the discomforts. I don't believe the Commonwealth units were up to par, any more than I was up to par on the Litani. I'm sorry you (or G. Blackburn) are "irritated" or "enraged" by my statement that Commonwealth forces were "less than stellar" in their performance. Do you think I'm a German apologist or revisionist? Those who know me, know THAT's not the case . It's just my assessment based on a) what info I've read over the years; and experience. Shalom. [This message has been edited by Forever Babra (edited 02-18-2001).]

Blue Öyster Cult - Secret Treaties (on 8 track cassette, of course)

hmmm.... compare pic of my nephew (centre below) with Foobar above. Coincidence? I think not. The truth is out there....

It could, and probably does, but the notation "Discipline was a sham; the NCOs were poor. The division did not have time for thorough training before the invasion..." would imply other problems.

You may only get the game from BTS. Why would you want to pay a middle man?

Schweppenburg's analyses imply a degree of autonomy in German divisional commanders which is surprising to me. Regarding the performance of the Commonwealth units in Normandy, I would rate it as less than stellar. Even after four years of experience in Africa and Italy, tank/infantry cooperation was almost universally poor. Were it not for a staggering superiority in air and naval assets, the outcome would have been very different IMO. I'm not surprised at the rating given the LAH -- like the 7th Armoured Division (The Desert Rats), by 1944 they were "spent". A soldier can be too experienced. Sometimes it takes a green unit to get a job done. A green soldier has something to prove. A green soldier is worried what others will think of his performance. A green soldier still believes it will be someone else who gets hit. The veteran suffers none of these positive delusions, and is usually less willing to take risks. And a young replacement will look to his NCOs. If those NCOs are shy, the replacement is not going to take over for them.

I'd buy it.

Minefields (and pillboxes and bunkers) don't have wheels. It takes an enormous amount of time to lift mines and re-lay them somewhere else. Is that rationalization enough? Oh, and all your base are belong to us

Heheh... start all the tanks back to back at any reasonable range.

Leibstandarte? That's German for "over-priced hamster" isn't it?

Friday afternoons.

Trucks that don't look like they all came from Detroit.

Hundreds of really BIG images by some very good artists can be found here. All periods from Colonial to Desert Storm. Strictly US Army themed, so don't expect much else. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/art/A&I/artwork.htm

hmmm... sturmgruppen. Literally, "assault groups". Any body of infantry (esp. Pioneers/Engineers) delegated to an assault task. Typically armed with the usual complement of infantry weapons plus specialty tools such as satchel charges, grenade bundles, &c. Were they in Italy? I would say so.

Email is finally working again and net access is now above 400 Bytes (yes, bytes) per second. I am ready to resume kicking your collective cessy (sissy?) asses (assi?). Lawyer, your turn is inbound and involves the death of one of your squads and the rodgering of the rest of same platoon. Herr Oberst and Shug, please resend your last turns. They were deleted off the server. But it won't help you....

Great Horny Toads! I've teched Northern soil! I'll have to burn my boots! Kiwi Joe looks like my kinda people

I dunno what "verklempt" is, but I feel gypped.