Forever Babra

The frontage for the Canadian divisions involved in Totalize was 900m. Depth of the attacking column was about 3 to 5 km.

Oh, great, the fecking Bermuda triangle no less. Now I'll NEVER get a turn out of Herr Oberst....

Over to you, Rexford... Shadow, chill. It's just another way to bump a topic. I guess if everyone who didn't know the answer didn't respond, you'd soon be on page 27 and S or C may well not have seen it.

I have to meet his tailor -- those pants fit like a glove...

I really (really) hate the old "comfort of our chairs" argument. It's no argument at all, as I've already pointed out. However, just to prove that nothing is as simple as it seems, here's an article from Legion Magazine. Pay special attention to the lecture Simonds gave his senior officers on July 30th, a week before Totalize. Eerie stuff. http://www.wlu.ca/~wwwmsds/341copptotalize.htm

I would consider the loss of nearly 100 tanks (47 BCR, 22 Polish, 26 GGFG), an unspecified number of other armoured vehicles, and the quantity of killed, wounded and captured among the infantry, for an objective which was never an objective, was not on the line of advance, and had no value, a debacle. And it was because of a mistake, and a very avoidable mistake. Other units were trained in night navigation -- the BCR were not, yet they were asked to lead because they were fresh. In the first stage of Totalize, the tanks were formed up so close together that one officer was literally able to walk the entire length of the two-mile force, walking over 1000 tanks and armoured vehicles, without ever touching the ground. The dust from this force made navigation impossible, but it was accomplished because they used Oboe (a radio beacon developed by the RAF for night bombing) and coast defence lights aimed at the clouds to produce artificial moonlight. That was on August 7th. A day later, another armoured force was sent into the night without any navigational aids at all, with the result that they lost 100% of their tank strength to enemy action. When dawn came and Worthington Force reported themselves on the objective, did any of the officers present pull out a compass and take a bearing? That's SOP, and if even one of them had, their artillery wouldn't have landed four miles away. Why weren't the air recognition panels deployed? Why, even after survivors had straggled in, weren't the Poles able to advise of Worthington Force's location? Language trouble? The whole operation reeks of amateurism. I hate to harp on the dead though. I mention that one incident as just an example. There are others.

All things (weapons) equal, they will perform identically.

Why a unit untrained in using the Oboe navigation system was sent on a night route with compasses baffles me. I believe Worthington would have been quite in the right to disregard his orders and approach the problem his own way. Anyway, I'm sure the Germans suffered their share of similar balls-ups.

Excellent read, machineman. Thanks. That account indicates the Poles did try to intervene, but abandoned the attempt after the loss of 22 tanks. Another thing which struck me was why Worthington Force, involved in the very point of a offensive, did not have air recognition signals deployed BEFORE being strafed by RAF Typhoons. It just strikes me as another example of unprofessionalism, though in this case it could likely be chalked up to inexperience. A well written AAR. Thanks again.

Sorry -- momentary lapse. I just got a new job today

Who is Russell?

There is no field version that I can find reference to. Based on info on the 12.8cm FlaK 40, I think it highly unlikely one might have been fielded anyway. For this gun, the whole unit was suspended for transport on an articulated truck -- not really conducive to battlefield use.

That is the designation of the gun mounted on the Jagdtiger. I'm not aware of a field version but I will check and reply again if someone doesn't first.

You gamey bastard, you It doesn't happen all the time, just often enough that I notice it. When it happens I just repurchase my forces anyway, so it's not crippling or anything.

I like the flexibility inherent in an unrestricted force. With a fixed force point allocation, I too often find myself with a significant number of unspent points in various categories, points which together would have gotten me that one more Sherman or Badger. I hadn't considered the increased FOW aspect, and that's another plus for unrestricted force types.

Good quotes, Jeff. I was hunting for something along similar lines, and it demonstrates some of the staff shortcomings I was alluding to. For weeks, months really, the primary complaint among the allied tankers was that they had been, in some cases for years, trained on open English moors and were totally unprepared for the close Norman countryside. Yet, once the Bocage had been breached, Caen taken, and the Shermans ready for their perceived mobile breakthrough across the wide plains to the south, the tankers discovered that now they had no cover, and suffered even more than they had previously. Then the complaint became that the country was too open. It becomes apparent when analyzing any isolated action, that the commanders of the armoured units in particular just weren't up to scratch. I think it was Simonds himself who summed up the situation by saying "The best tank country is the one with no anti-tank guns." Hill 195 is a stark example. Worthington, untrained in night moves with tanks, attempted a surprise night march to take this objective to begin phase II of Totalize. Somehow disoriented, he begins a bizarre night ride through the German Army, and finally reports the succesful capture of the objective -- except he is some four miles away from his reported location, completely beyond support, and amongst an aroused and enraged SS. His force is destroyed utterly, partly by the RAF, the few survivors fleeing to the safety of some nearby Poles, who failed to provide supports to the embattled Canadian tankers, though they witnessed the fight. Some 47 tanks of the BCR were lost, almost their entire tank strength. Commanders too often didn't seem to have the tactical wherewithal to change orders they deemed unreasonable or unworkable. Simonds was a very notable exception, but the men around him seldom displayed his ingenuity. Meanwhile, the A&SH, binned their orders to take Hill 195 and devised a plan of their own. Unaided by tanks at all, they used their superb scouts to infiltrate the entire regiment inside German positions on the position, surprised them, and took the objective without a single casualty. Unfortunately, almost every Canadian, Polish and British action between June and August has a similar story; some achievement marred by some other tactical or operational fiasco. The pattern is too prevalent to ascribe it all to "conditions" in Normandy or the fanatacism of the Germans; there was mismanagement too, and the record of 21st Army Group reflects it.

Why do they do it? I don't know. In truth, I've done it myself once or twice over the years, though it was never deliberate. Sometimes interest just wanes. If you're like most of us, sooner or later you'll narrow your playing field down to people you know you'll enjoy a game with and view strangers with deep suspicion

How are you going to update it while you're out risking life and limb so I can have lox for brekkie, eh?

The BG engine and its offshoots were flawed, to be sure. But for a while, a long while, they were the only Nappy titles to be had anywhere, from anyone. I got many, many enjoyable hours out of them. Still do when the mood strikes.

I'm glad somebody somewhere is still using towed pieces and can shed some light on it. I've never seen any outside of museums. The concept of a few men carrying forward the ammo might be problematic in the CM engine. The bearers would have to be modelled, as would the ammo supply. Not that I wouldn't mind seeing it, as long as it was completely A/I controlled, but I don't know how keen C&S will be on the idea. My <u>guess</u> is not at all.

No, they have not, and I did not say they did. I said "with luck".

With any luck at all (fingers crossed 'til the knuckles turn white here), once CM2 is done, BTS will be able to import CMBO-specific data into the new engine and release it as a patch. I think I'll go knock on wood, throw a penny in a well, find a star to wish on...

Ropey, you should definitely hunt down this book -- fits right in with what you're doing. http://www.missing-lynx.com/reviews/allied/nz.htm

I forget whether a confirmation email goes out or not. Re your question on where to start, just try out a particular size (small, medium, large, huge) and see if it fits the bill. If it seems hard to follow, try a smaller size. You'll be red-eyed and groggy in no time

Okay, so which one got his commission first?