The_Capt

“Dismounted infantry”, now that is interesting.

Bit of a gross oversimplification here. I am thinking of a new combined arms team of an integrated network of indirect fires, PGMs, unmanned systems and lighter fast moving infantry - all linked into an ISR architecture from ground to space. To my mind how much stripped down mechanized we retain will be negotiated over time. Investing billions in hot, heavy new platforms that will not provide demonstrable advantage is a bad strategy to my eyes. A better tank is like a better sword in WW1.
As to visibility, even if one can hide a vehicle burning hundreds of litres of fuel an hour just to keep systems going, one cannot hide its entire logistics chain (eg the fuel trucks carrying all that fuel).  This is the problem with the tank.  It is very large, loud (acoustic sensors are coming along as well) and made of hot metal - any number of ground FLIRs and systems are tailored to find these platforms, the problem is that the modern battlefield connected them all.
As to being caught out in 2035, well this war is pointing in the other direction.  The UA was down to “a bunch of guys with ATGMs and FPVs” and has held off the larger more conventionally armed opponent.  To my mind, I do not want to be stuck in 2035 with a bunch of high density, expensive, heavy metal that we have to spend billions more to try and keep alive while being cut to pieces by the system I describe above.  My best guess is that we will create C-UAS bubbles, out of other unmanned systems. But the role of mech remains largely in question.
The one thing we have not seen is anyone operationalize the new combined arms system into offence. How this will look I do not think we know yet. Will it be mech wearing an unmanned hat?  My money is, “no”.  My money is on doubling down on higher levels of massed precision until a sides bubble collapses. And then the new combined arms system will exploit that.
As to UGVs, well I am no expert, but considering the advances in robotics we have seen in the last 10 years, cheap lightweight unmanned ground systems that can deny an area are a certainty.  How autonomous is a detail.  I can say all this with a high level of confidence because the whole world is watching a nation that should not have lasted more than a few weeks hold off what was a world class military.  And they are not doing it with tanks or mech.  Every nation on earth that considers itself a power is going to be jumping on this race, there is too much to lose not to.

I wish I could say that love of a platform or system is only an amateur wargamers disease.  I have already seen the reflexive signs of the upcoming arguments.  We will dress them up but in reality we have built identities around these platforms/systems.  Asking someone to change a strong identity, one designed to weather war, is a tall order.  We have generations of senior officers who grew up with the tank as the core of the land warfare tactical system.  Hell, we were still counting them as a metric of combat power in the lead up to this thing.  Even now, I think they are still a threat, but more like nukes...if conditions get to the point that they can be employed, this war is already over.  If the UA collapse and we see a ring of steel outside Kharikiv, or if the UA drives tank columns into Crimea, these are not a sign that "tanks work!" They are a symptom of a much larger collapse. A collapse that had little to do with the tank, or even mech itself. 

You know it is funny, the military conservative crowd really has basically the same three arguments:
- Ukraine War is an anomaly.  A “real” war with the US will be “different”.
- Someone will figure out this drone/ISR thing and we will be back to where we started.
- We will need to keep doing it the old way because there is no new better way.
Ground forces do not advance as fast as you can move people.  They move as fast as one can deliver effect and see.  The core of ground warfare is pulling away from the human being.  At its core is a complex system of ISR and automation.  We already see this in air and maritime domains - when was the last time two warships had to board each other and cross swords on the quarter deck?  The days of the dogfight are now competitive sensing and launching long range missiles 100+ kms away from each other.  Why the land domain thinks it is any different is beyond me but “unless my infantry can still press the bayonet it is not land warfare.”  
Land warfare is evolving. It is what warfare does. The worst answer to it is “let’s spend a ridiculous amount of money preserving the old system”. Spend a ridiculous amount of money on a new system that can keep up. The reality is that direct fires are becoming secondary and the exception, not the rule.  Indirect and over the horizon precision fires are becoming the primary mechanism through which ground warfare is fought. Hell, the signs were there for years as we know artillery and indirect fires are the primary effect component in ground warfare for decades.
This entire tank-thing is simply pressure being put on direct fires by systems that can engage, when plugged into a modern C4ISR architecture, at ranges with which direct fire systems cannot compete.  And here is the thing, I think they may have been right - those that said the tank is dead with the advent of the ATGM. It just took us 40+ years to realize it.
 

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

Yeesh, I do not even know where to start on this one.  Autonomous unmanned systems aren’t 21st century pigeons we send over the trees to see in a few hours. The whole thing is still hooked into an integrated C4ISR network. I mean if you deny that then the guns or anything else are just as useless.  
As to “calling them up”, well couple ways to do this much faster than guns. First is to do battlespace management as opposed to in the loop human targeting.  This would see a glorified JTAC building kill boxes and then assigning resources to them.  Fully autonomous UAS carry their own ISR and targeting abilities and would be let loose within a kill box. Deconfliction and prioritization are going to be tricky but nothing algorithms cannot solve in time.  This is basically a mobile flying minefield.  One can do it with both air and ground systems.  Or you let them off the leash in hunter killer mode and do sweeps along an entire frontage.  See something, kill it.  That nightmare is right around the corner.
So basically one automates the entire OODA loop at a certain level.  There are variations of this - last mile etc, but the concept is essentially the same. Endurance is the other issue but here the individual platforms are more akin to ammunition. Ukraine and Russia are putting hundreds of thousands of these systems per month into the air right now, that is how they are solving for persistence.  Future systems could be hybrid, waiting on the ground pulling in solar power, while spotters fly up to illuminate and receive any new peer to peer targeting data.
Everyone seems to be getting all wound up on the platforms and hardware, this is a mistake.  The revolution is the impact data and processing is having.  Smart everything’s are hunting individual Russian soldiers down right now. Ukraine built an ad hoc JADC2 hooked into western C4ISR that is denying a bafflingly large frontage, ground and air, to a much more conventionally powerful opponent.  UAS are the new bullets, but it is the underlying C4ISR system that is going to shift warfare forever.  How long until we see unmanned guns?  Mortars?  ATGMs?  The combination of networking and cheap, light powerful forward data processing is the big “wow” here.  It is what makes what we are seeing with UAS possible.
Finally back to OODA loops.  So I think it is the other way.  The side clinging to human-in-the-loop down at too low levels is going to lose the OODA race.  Autonomous systems can detect and react faster than a human based system - it is why we invented missiles.  So while one side is happily holding onto the good old radio and gun crews, the other has already released loitering systems that can target and strike without the need for a human being.  Who do you think is going to win that race?

Bit of a gross oversimplification here. I am thinking of a new combined arms team of an integrated network of indirect fires, PGMs, unmanned systems and lighter fast moving infantry - all linked into an ISR architecture from ground to space. To my mind how much stripped down mechanized we retain will be negotiated over time. Investing billions in hot, heavy new platforms that will not provide demonstrable advantage is a bad strategy to my eyes. A better tank is like a better sword in WW1.
As to visibility, even if one can hide a vehicle burning hundreds of litres of fuel an hour just to keep systems going, one cannot hide its entire logistics chain (eg the fuel trucks carrying all that fuel).  This is the problem with the tank.  It is very large, loud (acoustic sensors are coming along as well) and made of hot metal - any number of ground FLIRs and systems are tailored to find these platforms, the problem is that the modern battlefield connected them all.
As to being caught out in 2035, well this war is pointing in the other direction.  The UA was down to “a bunch of guys with ATGMs and FPVs” and has held off the larger more conventionally armed opponent.  To my mind, I do not want to be stuck in 2035 with a bunch of high density, expensive, heavy metal that we have to spend billions more to try and keep alive while being cut to pieces by the system I describe above.  My best guess is that we will create C-UAS bubbles, out of other unmanned systems. But the role of mech remains largely in question.
The one thing we have not seen is anyone operationalize the new combined arms system into offence. How this will look I do not think we know yet. Will it be mech wearing an unmanned hat?  My money is, “no”.  My money is on doubling down on higher levels of massed precision until a sides bubble collapses. And then the new combined arms system will exploit that.
As to UGVs, well I am no expert, but considering the advances in robotics we have seen in the last 10 years, cheap lightweight unmanned ground systems that can deny an area are a certainty.  How autonomous is a detail.  I can say all this with a high level of confidence because the whole world is watching a nation that should not have lasted more than a few weeks hold off what was a world class military.  And they are not doing it with tanks or mech.  Every nation on earth that considers itself a power is going to be jumping on this race, there is too much to lose not to.

Yeesh, I do not even know where to start on this one.  Autonomous unmanned systems aren’t 21st century pigeons we send over the trees to see in a few hours. The whole thing is still hooked into an integrated C4ISR network. I mean if you deny that then the guns or anything else are just as useless.  
As to “calling them up”, well couple ways to do this much faster than guns. First is to do battlespace management as opposed to in the loop human targeting.  This would see a glorified JTAC building kill boxes and then assigning resources to them.  Fully autonomous UAS carry their own ISR and targeting abilities and would be let loose within a kill box. Deconfliction and prioritization are going to be tricky but nothing algorithms cannot solve in time.  This is basically a mobile flying minefield.  One can do it with both air and ground systems.  Or you let them off the leash in hunter killer mode and do sweeps along an entire frontage.  See something, kill it.  That nightmare is right around the corner.
So basically one automates the entire OODA loop at a certain level.  There are variations of this - last mile etc, but the concept is essentially the same. Endurance is the other issue but here the individual platforms are more akin to ammunition. Ukraine and Russia are putting hundreds of thousands of these systems per month into the air right now, that is how they are solving for persistence.  Future systems could be hybrid, waiting on the ground pulling in solar power, while spotters fly up to illuminate and receive any new peer to peer targeting data.
Everyone seems to be getting all wound up on the platforms and hardware, this is a mistake.  The revolution is the impact data and processing is having.  Smart everything’s are hunting individual Russian soldiers down right now. Ukraine built an ad hoc JADC2 hooked into western C4ISR that is denying a bafflingly large frontage, ground and air, to a much more conventionally powerful opponent.  UAS are the new bullets, but it is the underlying C4ISR system that is going to shift warfare forever.  How long until we see unmanned guns?  Mortars?  ATGMs?  The combination of networking and cheap, light powerful forward data processing is the big “wow” here.  It is what makes what we are seeing with UAS possible.
Finally back to OODA loops.  So I think it is the other way.  The side clinging to human-in-the-loop down at too low levels is going to lose the OODA race.  Autonomous systems can detect and react faster than a human based system - it is why we invented missiles.  So while one side is happily holding onto the good old radio and gun crews, the other has already released loitering systems that can target and strike without the need for a human being.  Who do you think is going to win that race?

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

I think you are confusing numbers with combat power.  I would argue that the UA has the higher levels of combat power and the benefit of being on the defence.  This is not some master-bold Russian play, it is far more likely a gambit to draw away some of the incoming western support to a side-show to take strain off the main RA effort in the south.
You are also viewing this thing through a skewed lens.  “Russia get all upside and Ukraine all down.”  Russia is going to lose a lot of people and equipment if they try much more than nibbling, and even that is going to cost them.  But of course if one has bought into the “bottomless Russia” narrative it is easy to simply discount Russian losses…right up to the point you can’t.  Russia is not “bottomless.”  It has a breaking point, we know this because we have seen it.  
We have sat through more “uh oh, this is it” noise in the last six months than the entire war.  Yet was Russia really have to show for it?  A few more small towns. A few more chunks of ground.  No operational breakthroughs, no major positional advantage. The closest we got to “very bad” was when the UA started running out of AD and artillery, but that appears to be easing off.  “Ukraine is desperately short troops!”  Who says?  Do we really know Ukrainian troop numbers?  What is in the force generation pipeline?  
Now, another push near Kharkiv is the sign they are going to encircle and cut supply lines.  If the RA could do that why are they not doing it down south?  This is freakin dance floor grinding in slow motion.  If something does really happen we will see it.  Until then at least try to keep a level of objective assessment.

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

Ok.  I guess my first question is “what does this really give us?”  I like the idea of mixed potent light tanks but these are still 1) highly visible, 2) will have long logistics tails and 3) very expensive - you specifically are porting tech from F-35s (eg transparent hulls).  So for all that money we get:
- a 105 direct fire gun
- a 40mm gun
- ATGMs 
- and a drone control platform
The problem immediately is that I can get all that effects-wise with distributed light infantry, PGMs and drone swarms at much less cost and far harder to see and hit.  We just had a video of the drone control platform being four guys in a basement.  The direct fires support is already being replaced by PGM artillery and FPVs…and ATGMs are..well already man-portable.  Why stick them on a heavy vehicle when I can simply put them on fast dismounts all over the place?  I can put them on a quad bike for mobility. Or better yet a UGV.
To my mind this is a novel re-think of the system that assumes we still need the overall system to deliver effects when it is becoming clear we really don’t.  I do not see how this new tank platoon is going to fare much better in say 10 years. Drones will be fully autonomous by then with new forms of stand-off attack. ISR will be even more ubiquitous. PGMs will be everywhere. These are lighter than current MBTs but still are 30t hot steel that rely on ground movement and direct fire. This kind of looks like trying to invent a better horse in 1918.

Ok.  I guess my first question is “what does this really give us?”  I like the idea of mixed potent light tanks but these are still 1) highly visible, 2) will have long logistics tails and 3) very expensive - you specifically are porting tech from F-35s (eg transparent hulls).  So for all that money we get:
- a 105 direct fire gun
- a 40mm gun
- ATGMs 
- and a drone control platform
The problem immediately is that I can get all that effects-wise with distributed light infantry, PGMs and drone swarms at much less cost and far harder to see and hit.  We just had a video of the drone control platform being four guys in a basement.  The direct fires support is already being replaced by PGM artillery and FPVs…and ATGMs are..well already man-portable.  Why stick them on a heavy vehicle when I can simply put them on fast dismounts all over the place?  I can put them on a quad bike for mobility. Or better yet a UGV.
To my mind this is a novel re-think of the system that assumes we still need the overall system to deliver effects when it is becoming clear we really don’t.  I do not see how this new tank platoon is going to fare much better in say 10 years. Drones will be fully autonomous by then with new forms of stand-off attack. ISR will be even more ubiquitous. PGMs will be everywhere. These are lighter than current MBTs but still are 30t hot steel that rely on ground movement and direct fire. This kind of looks like trying to invent a better horse in 1918.

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

These comments do not make any sense:

First off the RA would need to push an encirclement nearly 200kms long.  That is being attacked from without while trying to take a city of 1.4 million and 350 sq kms of urban terrain.  For reference, Mariupol was 166 sq kms and the Russian were controlling it for hundreds of kms both land and water side...and it still took them over 3 months and an ungodly number of losses to take.  In fact there are some theories that Mariupol tied down so many RA forces that their summer '22 failed and it set the conditions for the losses in Fall '22.  Kharkiv is 3-4 times the problem, and the UA was nowhere near as well armed and experienced back in '22. "Encircling Kharkiv" is so militarily stupid that the Russian's might even try it but it may cost them so much as to create conditions for operational collapse elsewhere.
As to LOCs, one need only look at the map to see all of the interior lines that are still open. There is both MSRs and rail.  As to terrain, a quick look shows that the terrain to the west of the city is the same rolling tank country we have come to suspect...with no tank play likely.  To the east there is a major water obstacle that will tie in a right flank tightly.
I mean unless the UA collapses completely this is a major operation to pull off...think a couple hundred thousand troops and air superiority.
Finally, this is the double standard.  The UA establish a bridgehead south of Kherson and it is "a minor raid".  The RA make some minor bridgehead gains on the border and "they are encircling Kharkiv!" In reality this is a secondary front that the RA is trying to open up, likely in the hopes it can take some pressure off the south.  But like everything else, RA offensive-wise, these will likely be nips and bites.  Unless the UA collapses completely, at which point this is all pretty academic in the entirety of Eastern Ukraine.  Of course we have no indications of impending UA collapse, but hey why let that stand in the way?

Damn, almost nostalgic…

Consistent elements about Trump:
- Needs to look like a "winner" at all times.
- Control freak.
- Onion skin ego.
Putin had better damned well care about how Trump looks because his entire freakin plan is resting on Trump as president actually moving in directions that support Russian interests.  If Trump makes a deal and then gets screwed by Putin, I will put money on the bar that the outcome will not go well for Russia.  

This sounds about right.  The reality though is that this is a poor strategy in many ways.  This is betting a lot on a single highly chaotic horse.  Not only does a Trump admin need to sign off on forcing Ukraine into a disadvantaged peace, it needs to begin renormalization with Russia under a Putin regime - this may or may not happen.  And even if it does, the EU still gets a vote.  The EU has already pulled away from Russian energy (at least directly) and no western company is going to be eager to jump back into Russia after watching what happened to companies stuck holding the bag back in ‘22.  And forget about loans to Russia from the West, or possibly anyone else for that matter.
So Russia’s military and economy are seriously degraded from ‘22 levels and they may very well remain isolated. That is not a good start point for planning a second invasion in 4-8 years.  An invasion would need to be after Trump leaves office otherwise Putin risks making him look like a weak chump who got duped, and Putin definitely does not want to do that.  So Russia winds up in an overall weaker and more vulnerable position post-war while gaining literally meters of blasted wasteland that have no real strategic significance.
This could very well be the beginning of a slow motion Russian collapse in the making…and this is Putin’s best scenario.  In reality Russia and Putin are the ones running out of time.  Most assessments put a 2026 best before date for Russia before things start to really fall apart.  So what happens if Biden wins?  What happens if Trump decides he can make a better deal elsewhere?  Basically this reduces Russian option spaces down to a singularity, which historically is never a good thing.

Consistent elements about Trump:
- Needs to look like a "winner" at all times.
- Control freak.
- Onion skin ego.
Putin had better damned well care about how Trump looks because his entire freakin plan is resting on Trump as president actually moving in directions that support Russian interests.  If Trump makes a deal and then gets screwed by Putin, I will put money on the bar that the outcome will not go well for Russia.  

Damn, almost nostalgic…

This sounds about right.  The reality though is that this is a poor strategy in many ways.  This is betting a lot on a single highly chaotic horse.  Not only does a Trump admin need to sign off on forcing Ukraine into a disadvantaged peace, it needs to begin renormalization with Russia under a Putin regime - this may or may not happen.  And even if it does, the EU still gets a vote.  The EU has already pulled away from Russian energy (at least directly) and no western company is going to be eager to jump back into Russia after watching what happened to companies stuck holding the bag back in ‘22.  And forget about loans to Russia from the West, or possibly anyone else for that matter.
So Russia’s military and economy are seriously degraded from ‘22 levels and they may very well remain isolated. That is not a good start point for planning a second invasion in 4-8 years.  An invasion would need to be after Trump leaves office otherwise Putin risks making him look like a weak chump who got duped, and Putin definitely does not want to do that.  So Russia winds up in an overall weaker and more vulnerable position post-war while gaining literally meters of blasted wasteland that have no real strategic significance.
This could very well be the beginning of a slow motion Russian collapse in the making…and this is Putin’s best scenario.  In reality Russia and Putin are the ones running out of time.  Most assessments put a 2026 best before date for Russia before things start to really fall apart.  So what happens if Biden wins?  What happens if Trump decides he can make a better deal elsewhere?  Basically this reduces Russian option spaces down to a singularity, which historically is never a good thing.

Consistent elements about Trump:
- Needs to look like a "winner" at all times.
- Control freak.
- Onion skin ego.
Putin had better damned well care about how Trump looks because his entire freakin plan is resting on Trump as president actually moving in directions that support Russian interests.  If Trump makes a deal and then gets screwed by Putin, I will put money on the bar that the outcome will not go well for Russia.  

I dunno, maybe.  I think Trump learned a lot from the pandemic, it basically killed his second term.  Public screw ups one cannot blame on someone else easily, stick.  I am sure Putin is confident he can handle Trump but the stakes are extremely high if he gets it wrong.
Putin's best bet is that Trump is so focused on revenge and retaliation which will result in a tidal wave of law suites and counter-suits, the US becomes even more dysfunctional.  We are likely to lose the US as a global leader because it is all caught up in its own sh#t.  
We can definitely agree that Russia will be in no position to take on NATO - even a reduced NATO in less than 5-10 years.  Hell, if we are smart we keep piling onto Ukraine an bolster them to a deterrence via denial situation.

I dunno, maybe.  I think Trump learned a lot from the pandemic, it basically killed his second term.  Public screw ups one cannot blame on someone else easily, stick.  I am sure Putin is confident he can handle Trump but the stakes are extremely high if he gets it wrong.
Putin's best bet is that Trump is so focused on revenge and retaliation which will result in a tidal wave of law suites and counter-suits, the US becomes even more dysfunctional.  We are likely to lose the US as a global leader because it is all caught up in its own sh#t.  
We can definitely agree that Russia will be in no position to take on NATO - even a reduced NATO in less than 5-10 years.  Hell, if we are smart we keep piling onto Ukraine an bolster them to a deterrence via denial situation.