The_Capt

So your theory is that if Kyiv falls Poland, the Baltics, Finland and Sweden are going to do what?  Switch sides?  If we lose in Ukraine it is definitely a western defeat a la Vietnam (but no where near as personal) but we can live with it.  There hasn’t been a single signal out of any NATO nation that the alliance is in doubt if Ukraine falls.  In fact I suspect it will be quite the opposite, we will likely double down on the one mechanism that keeps Russia in check.  In fact the entire theory of an Eastern Europe schism in light of a Russian victory doesn’t make any sense but you keep rolling it out like Armageddon.  Further, you seem to imply that it is an outcome so bad that we should be willing to start playing fast and lose with the nuclear equation.  
You do realize that you are promoting reckless courses of action that if they slide are going to hurt Ukrainians first?  If Russia either loses control, has a misunderstanding or simply says “nope” Ukraine is very likely going to the demonstration venue.
As usual you are going off without a shred of proof behind your own opinion.  Show me one declaration from any of the states you mention that they are willing to start taking the risks you are advocating or that Ukraine is the central issue in their continued partnership.  FFS we are putting a Bde in Latvia, I am sure of Ukraine falls the first thing then Latvians are going to do is tell us to leave.
You are over inflating a Ukrainian loss to the point that WW3 makes perfect sense. This is not good analysis, it is hyperbolic propaganda.  Of course we do not want Ukraine to lose.  We have spent billions trying to stop that from happening.  But we also do not want an uncontrolled escalation…and my proof is self-evident by the lack of western air or land power direct involvement in this war.  Ukraine is simply not worth this whole thing expanding or escalating into a broader regional or global conflict - we already did that sort of thing in 1914 and do not need a repeat.

So your theory is that if Kyiv falls Poland, the Baltics, Finland and Sweden are going to do what?  Switch sides?  If we lose in Ukraine it is definitely a western defeat a la Vietnam (but no where near as personal) but we can live with it.  There hasn’t been a single signal out of any NATO nation that the alliance is in doubt if Ukraine falls.  In fact I suspect it will be quite the opposite, we will likely double down on the one mechanism that keeps Russia in check.  In fact the entire theory of an Eastern Europe schism in light of a Russian victory doesn’t make any sense but you keep rolling it out like Armageddon.  Further, you seem to imply that it is an outcome so bad that we should be willing to start playing fast and lose with the nuclear equation.  
You do realize that you are promoting reckless courses of action that if they slide are going to hurt Ukrainians first?  If Russia either loses control, has a misunderstanding or simply says “nope” Ukraine is very likely going to the demonstration venue.
As usual you are going off without a shred of proof behind your own opinion.  Show me one declaration from any of the states you mention that they are willing to start taking the risks you are advocating or that Ukraine is the central issue in their continued partnership.  FFS we are putting a Bde in Latvia, I am sure of Ukraine falls the first thing then Latvians are going to do is tell us to leave.
You are over inflating a Ukrainian loss to the point that WW3 makes perfect sense. This is not good analysis, it is hyperbolic propaganda.  Of course we do not want Ukraine to lose.  We have spent billions trying to stop that from happening.  But we also do not want an uncontrolled escalation…and my proof is self-evident by the lack of western air or land power direct involvement in this war.  Ukraine is simply not worth this whole thing expanding or escalating into a broader regional or global conflict - we already did that sort of thing in 1914 and do not need a repeat.

So your theory is that if Kyiv falls Poland, the Baltics, Finland and Sweden are going to do what?  Switch sides?  If we lose in Ukraine it is definitely a western defeat a la Vietnam (but no where near as personal) but we can live with it.  There hasn’t been a single signal out of any NATO nation that the alliance is in doubt if Ukraine falls.  In fact I suspect it will be quite the opposite, we will likely double down on the one mechanism that keeps Russia in check.  In fact the entire theory of an Eastern Europe schism in light of a Russian victory doesn’t make any sense but you keep rolling it out like Armageddon.  Further, you seem to imply that it is an outcome so bad that we should be willing to start playing fast and lose with the nuclear equation.  
You do realize that you are promoting reckless courses of action that if they slide are going to hurt Ukrainians first?  If Russia either loses control, has a misunderstanding or simply says “nope” Ukraine is very likely going to the demonstration venue.
As usual you are going off without a shred of proof behind your own opinion.  Show me one declaration from any of the states you mention that they are willing to start taking the risks you are advocating or that Ukraine is the central issue in their continued partnership.  FFS we are putting a Bde in Latvia, I am sure of Ukraine falls the first thing then Latvians are going to do is tell us to leave.
You are over inflating a Ukrainian loss to the point that WW3 makes perfect sense. This is not good analysis, it is hyperbolic propaganda.  Of course we do not want Ukraine to lose.  We have spent billions trying to stop that from happening.  But we also do not want an uncontrolled escalation…and my proof is self-evident by the lack of western air or land power direct involvement in this war.  Ukraine is simply not worth this whole thing expanding or escalating into a broader regional or global conflict - we already did that sort of thing in 1914 and do not need a repeat.

So your theory is that if Kyiv falls Poland, the Baltics, Finland and Sweden are going to do what?  Switch sides?  If we lose in Ukraine it is definitely a western defeat a la Vietnam (but no where near as personal) but we can live with it.  There hasn’t been a single signal out of any NATO nation that the alliance is in doubt if Ukraine falls.  In fact I suspect it will be quite the opposite, we will likely double down on the one mechanism that keeps Russia in check.  In fact the entire theory of an Eastern Europe schism in light of a Russian victory doesn’t make any sense but you keep rolling it out like Armageddon.  Further, you seem to imply that it is an outcome so bad that we should be willing to start playing fast and lose with the nuclear equation.  
You do realize that you are promoting reckless courses of action that if they slide are going to hurt Ukrainians first?  If Russia either loses control, has a misunderstanding or simply says “nope” Ukraine is very likely going to the demonstration venue.
As usual you are going off without a shred of proof behind your own opinion.  Show me one declaration from any of the states you mention that they are willing to start taking the risks you are advocating or that Ukraine is the central issue in their continued partnership.  FFS we are putting a Bde in Latvia, I am sure of Ukraine falls the first thing then Latvians are going to do is tell us to leave.
You are over inflating a Ukrainian loss to the point that WW3 makes perfect sense. This is not good analysis, it is hyperbolic propaganda.  Of course we do not want Ukraine to lose.  We have spent billions trying to stop that from happening.  But we also do not want an uncontrolled escalation…and my proof is self-evident by the lack of western air or land power direct involvement in this war.  Ukraine is simply not worth this whole thing expanding or escalating into a broader regional or global conflict - we already did that sort of thing in 1914 and do not need a repeat.

I mean, Ukraine crossed a line and parties are trying to contain it. Poking holes in nuclear tripwires could easily be misinterpreted as a prelude to something else by Russia. Having Ukraine "accidently" degrade their nuclear warning system could easily be misinterpreted by the more paranoid factions as cover for some bigger play by the West. 
I am getting annoyed at the migrant assessment of Russia, which basically gets tailored to fit any situation as opposed to being held as an objective frame. One minute Russian's are blood thirsty maniacs, cynical mercenaries the next.  Paranoid reactionists one day, then pragmatic apathy the next.  None of this is remotely helpful.
The realty is that Russia likely has factions as paranoid as our own.  Let's not make things worse by creating uncertainty error bars on the freakin nuclear equation. 

Wow, talk about a tune change. You have ranted for pages on how ineffective the Biden admin has been because they have not sent every M1 in the US inventory, yesterday.  You have railed against Biden and co being too risk adverse about the nuclear threshold.  But now everything is “a ok”.
Blinken is Dept of State and is the signalling agent in this whole thing, not the military policy maker. Ultimately this is a conversation between the Joint Chiefs and CinC as to what controls and limitations there are going to be on employment of US weapons in Russia.  The main leverage the US has is that the strategic ISR needed to fight this war is largely held by the US, a major piece of the support-stick.  So I suspect that there will be pointed conversations on what is on the acceptable target list, and what is not.  I will bet a paycheque that Russian nuclear systems are on the “not” list.
This was a disconnect between Ukraine and its supporters.  It is not a good thing or something Ukraine wants to repeat.  My guess is that this was an error. Some over ambitious commander likely thought they were going after an IAD site and didn’t check the pink sheets.  Likely why Russia is playing it down, they do not want to get too close to this edge either.  But I suspect there were a lot of back-channel phone calls this week to defuse this thing.
The reality is that for some this war is “total”.  It is definitely for Russia towards Ukraine.  For others this war is limited - Russia does not strike into staging areas into Poland, we don’t hit certain target sets in Russia.  This is not “fair” but since when is war ever fair?  We cannot have a total war against a nuclear power…it is the very point of nuclear deterrence.  

So after two years of this thing, you have not noticed that the Russians tend to up-play things they do not care about and stay silent of stuff they do?  An apartment building gets taken down and it is all over the RUS-IO sphere but things that actually hurt - like deep strikes on oil infra - they really don’t make a fuss. Ya think maybe it is a bit of a ploy?

You really do not understand the risks or dynamic here do you?  So the entire nuclear equation is designed around mutual deterrence through mutual destruction.  In order to sustain mutual deterrence one needs to have full and open visibility of all the facts surrounding that situation.  Fog, false signals and  blind spots create uncertainty in that mutual assurance/deterrence is always unacceptable.  Why?  Because these are human systems and errors are going to happen naturally, we do not need to add to these error probabilities when the stakes are this high.
Attacks on Russia’s nuclear architecture - in this case, their detection tripwires - create uncertainty in the one arena which we cannot have it.  So we don’t care if the Russians are using them as dual use because…and try to follow me here…Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  Your problem has been that for some time now you have lost objectivity on this whole war to the point that the ends are justified by pretty much any way and means.  You have demonstrated this on many occasions and expressed vigorously your frustrations.  I can sympathize but in this case, you, and any whom may be tempted to go down the same path are very wrong.  The deliberate calculated release of nuclear weapons is very low.  The accidental or uncontrolled release is low but can change very quickly.  We have enough examples of this during the Cold War.  
To your point on Russia  “troop stripping”; this makes the situation worse.  It means Russia is likely down to nuclear deterrence as the sole means of guaranteeing their security…and now Ukraine is hammering their tripwire…that is a phenomenally bad idea.
So, no, it does not matter in the larger strategic equation if these were dual use. It may matter to Ukraine, and even this war, but in the larger picture of global security those radars are as sacrosanct as our own North Warning Systems under NORAD. The West will not support any playing around in this field. They will likely let Kyiv fall first.  So if Ukraine wants support for deep strikes into Russian, of which many are merited…I think we are at that point, strikes on Russian nuclear architecture are off the table entirely even if they are dual purpose.  Agree with me or not.  Stamp your feet and call the US and NATO “cowards” but there is an entire defence and security world out there that no one under the age of 40 really understands.  It faded into the background over the last 30 years, to the point an entire generation of policy makers, diplomats and academics have grown up thinking that it was all over.
It is not.  It never was.  The nature of warfare changed in 1945, not the character, the very nature of it.  Learn to live with it because what comes next is going to make this entire war look quaint, and it will be ruled by this harsh calculus.

You really do not understand the risks or dynamic here do you?  So the entire nuclear equation is designed around mutual deterrence through mutual destruction.  In order to sustain mutual deterrence one needs to have full and open visibility of all the facts surrounding that situation.  Fog, false signals and  blind spots create uncertainty in that mutual assurance/deterrence is always unacceptable.  Why?  Because these are human systems and errors are going to happen naturally, we do not need to add to these error probabilities when the stakes are this high.
Attacks on Russia’s nuclear architecture - in this case, their detection tripwires - create uncertainty in the one arena which we cannot have it.  So we don’t care if the Russians are using them as dual use because…and try to follow me here…Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  Your problem has been that for some time now you have lost objectivity on this whole war to the point that the ends are justified by pretty much any way and means.  You have demonstrated this on many occasions and expressed vigorously your frustrations.  I can sympathize but in this case, you, and any whom may be tempted to go down the same path are very wrong.  The deliberate calculated release of nuclear weapons is very low.  The accidental or uncontrolled release is low but can change very quickly.  We have enough examples of this during the Cold War.  
To your point on Russia  “troop stripping”; this makes the situation worse.  It means Russia is likely down to nuclear deterrence as the sole means of guaranteeing their security…and now Ukraine is hammering their tripwire…that is a phenomenally bad idea.
So, no, it does not matter in the larger strategic equation if these were dual use. It may matter to Ukraine, and even this war, but in the larger picture of global security those radars are as sacrosanct as our own North Warning Systems under NORAD. The West will not support any playing around in this field. They will likely let Kyiv fall first.  So if Ukraine wants support for deep strikes into Russian, of which many are merited…I think we are at that point, strikes on Russian nuclear architecture are off the table entirely even if they are dual purpose.  Agree with me or not.  Stamp your feet and call the US and NATO “cowards” but there is an entire defence and security world out there that no one under the age of 40 really understands.  It faded into the background over the last 30 years, to the point an entire generation of policy makers, diplomats and academics have grown up thinking that it was all over.
It is not.  It never was.  The nature of warfare changed in 1945, not the character, the very nature of it.  Learn to live with it because what comes next is going to make this entire war look quaint, and it will be ruled by this harsh calculus.

You really do not understand the risks or dynamic here do you?  So the entire nuclear equation is designed around mutual deterrence through mutual destruction.  In order to sustain mutual deterrence one needs to have full and open visibility of all the facts surrounding that situation.  Fog, false signals and  blind spots create uncertainty in that mutual assurance/deterrence is always unacceptable.  Why?  Because these are human systems and errors are going to happen naturally, we do not need to add to these error probabilities when the stakes are this high.
Attacks on Russia’s nuclear architecture - in this case, their detection tripwires - create uncertainty in the one arena which we cannot have it.  So we don’t care if the Russians are using them as dual use because…and try to follow me here…Ukraine is important, but it is not that important.  Your problem has been that for some time now you have lost objectivity on this whole war to the point that the ends are justified by pretty much any way and means.  You have demonstrated this on many occasions and expressed vigorously your frustrations.  I can sympathize but in this case, you, and any whom may be tempted to go down the same path are very wrong.  The deliberate calculated release of nuclear weapons is very low.  The accidental or uncontrolled release is low but can change very quickly.  We have enough examples of this during the Cold War.  
To your point on Russia  “troop stripping”; this makes the situation worse.  It means Russia is likely down to nuclear deterrence as the sole means of guaranteeing their security…and now Ukraine is hammering their tripwire…that is a phenomenally bad idea.
So, no, it does not matter in the larger strategic equation if these were dual use. It may matter to Ukraine, and even this war, but in the larger picture of global security those radars are as sacrosanct as our own North Warning Systems under NORAD. The West will not support any playing around in this field. They will likely let Kyiv fall first.  So if Ukraine wants support for deep strikes into Russian, of which many are merited…I think we are at that point, strikes on Russian nuclear architecture are off the table entirely even if they are dual purpose.  Agree with me or not.  Stamp your feet and call the US and NATO “cowards” but there is an entire defence and security world out there that no one under the age of 40 really understands.  It faded into the background over the last 30 years, to the point an entire generation of policy makers, diplomats and academics have grown up thinking that it was all over.
It is not.  It never was.  The nature of warfare changed in 1945, not the character, the very nature of it.  Learn to live with it because what comes next is going to make this entire war look quaint, and it will be ruled by this harsh calculus.

It might work.  This “peace summit” really reads like a push to have allies sign onto an “unconditional Russian surrender” situation. I am not sure the allies think that is realistic or are on board for another 10-20 year war.  I think we all know Russia is full of it, but it may provide an opportunity to Korean Peninsula this thing leaving Russia to become the new NK - bat sh#t crazy but contained.

There is no way the US green lit a strike on Russian strategic deterrence architecture.  Unless this was a whoopsie, and if it was it was a really big one.  No responsible (or sane) strike authority is going to sign off on this, any more than a Russian commander or politician is going to green light strikes on our own NORAD architecture.

There is no way the US green lit a strike on Russian strategic deterrence architecture.  Unless this was a whoopsie, and if it was it was a really big one.  No responsible (or sane) strike authority is going to sign off on this, any more than a Russian commander or politician is going to green light strikes on our own NORAD architecture.

It really does matter if it was dual purpose.  The US and West are not going to support a partner who actively targets Russia’s nuclear architecture. Actively targeting a nations strategic deterrence is a serious escalation we do not need. I understand if younger generations don’t get it but having grown up in that era the underlying risk calculus has not changed. This action - if confirmed as UA, which I suspect it was - demonstrates a clear gap between Ukrainian and Western targeting disciplines that may very well have been the primary reason we have been very deliberate and cautious about deep strikes into Russia. It is not “cowardice” or whatever emotional reason people throw around, it is a fundamental disconnect on targeting controls and authorities.

And to resurrect the autonomous debate:
Seriously, spend some time on this channel…holy crap this technology is a lot further along then I thought.

It might work.  This “peace summit” really reads like a push to have allies sign onto an “unconditional Russian surrender” situation. I am not sure the allies think that is realistic or are on board for another 10-20 year war.  I think we all know Russia is full of it, but it may provide an opportunity to Korean Peninsula this thing leaving Russia to become the new NK - bat sh#t crazy but contained.

This is a mistake we have seen western pundits make repeatedly, these are far too large muscle movements for the RA of 2024.  First off, there is no "surprise" left anymore.  It has been reported that the UA saw this one coming well out but were either restricted by ROEs or simply did not have the resources to stop right at the border.
The RA is not able to do "drives" at this point.  They do not have the logistics nor combat power to sustain it.  Nor do they seem able to exploit any "fixing".

Good lord, I think we have been too close to the problem on all this.  This entire Kharkiv thing may be far simpler than we have been thinking.  What if the RA realized it simply can no longer sustain the losses of playing smash face down south and shifted to Kharkiv in order to “stay on offensive”?

This is pretty much where I am at for this war at least - manoeuvre is essentially dead (or perhaps dormant).  We know western-style manoeuvre did not work last summer and likely will not under these conditions.  Even if the RA could manage a breakout, modern ISR would pin it pretty quickly and those deep battle forces would effectively be surrounded by a bunch of PGM armed resistance.  The UA is too connected and integrated in defence.  And here is the thing, I am not so sure the UA would not risk suffering the same fate at this point if they managed to achieve breakout.  The RA may have different emphasis but their ISR is still effective and they have PGM too.
So we are really back to WW1 games here - attrition/exhaustion. This is really engineering systemic collapses on an opponent through longer term front end attrition or corrosive warfare in depth.  Neither side is going to be able to pull off a "drive" anywhere until the other side suffers catastrophic internal failures.

Possibly.  But how far does China want to get pulled into this thing.  Sustaining a half a million Russians in the field in the modern environment costs billions.  I don’t think China is interested in free loans and aid on those levels.  They are willing to sell but how long can Russia buy?

This is a mistake we have seen western pundits make repeatedly, these are far too large muscle movements for the RA of 2024.  First off, there is no "surprise" left anymore.  It has been reported that the UA saw this one coming well out but were either restricted by ROEs or simply did not have the resources to stop right at the border.
The RA is not able to do "drives" at this point.  They do not have the logistics nor combat power to sustain it.  Nor do they seem able to exploit any "fixing".

So the Russian military strategy really is feeling like a Big Bluff by this point.  Look mean, big and bottomless.  This has led to an "always attack, always be seen attacking" approach in order to keep the "weak kneed west" shaking and doubting - we saw it here on this forum.  So if the RA is starting to run out of any or all of those elements they need to shift "always be seen attacking" to another area where they can get juice for squeeze.  This Kharkiv thing was noted for being largely dismounted and light on support, it was low hanging fruit.  Now we may see RA bites elsewhere as they keep trying to take nibbles and sell them as bites.  This all makes a lot of sense if they are running out of gas on the main effort down south.
So the next question - how long can they keep this up?

Good lord, I think we have been too close to the problem on all this.  This entire Kharkiv thing may be far simpler than we have been thinking.  What if the RA realized it simply can no longer sustain the losses of playing smash face down south and shifted to Kharkiv in order to “stay on offensive”?

This is pretty much where I am at for this war at least - manoeuvre is essentially dead (or perhaps dormant).  We know western-style manoeuvre did not work last summer and likely will not under these conditions.  Even if the RA could manage a breakout, modern ISR would pin it pretty quickly and those deep battle forces would effectively be surrounded by a bunch of PGM armed resistance.  The UA is too connected and integrated in defence.  And here is the thing, I am not so sure the UA would not risk suffering the same fate at this point if they managed to achieve breakout.  The RA may have different emphasis but their ISR is still effective and they have PGM too.
So we are really back to WW1 games here - attrition/exhaustion. This is really engineering systemic collapses on an opponent through longer term front end attrition or corrosive warfare in depth.  Neither side is going to be able to pull off a "drive" anywhere until the other side suffers catastrophic internal failures.

Good lord, I think we have been too close to the problem on all this.  This entire Kharkiv thing may be far simpler than we have been thinking.  What if the RA realized it simply can no longer sustain the losses of playing smash face down south and shifted to Kharkiv in order to “stay on offensive”?