Jeff Duquette

So Paul: Since you’re ignoring my question on the yahoo forum but are intent on giving the occasional glance here, what was the original source of the RKKA Ordnance drawings you posted on yahoo so many moons ago? I have been advised by what I consider a reliable source that a long standing error in some US Army Foreign Ordnance recognition manual has preptuated the idea that the Soviet 85mm BR-365 was pointy-nosed uncapped AP-HE-T. Apparently the round was actually blunt-nosed APBC-HE-T. The reason I ask is the two yahoo drawings I.D.'d respectfully as BR-365 and BR-365K both show uncapped ogival ammunition. minutia...yes...but of some interest to me. Regards Jeff

Paul: 2 seconds per round seems pretty darned fast. That had to have involved some cheating during gunnery training ;o)…particularly for two-piece 120mm ammunition. I reckoned that I could load one-piece 105mm ammunition at about 5 to 6 seconds per round…granted I was only in the Guard. A gunner with a couple of live fire exercises under his belt was typically giving me an "ON THE WAY" within probably two to four seconds of me giving an "UP". Sometimes a lot quicker. I recall one exercise in which a particular crew was short handed by a gunner and loader. I filled in as the loader and one of the platoon sergeants of my company filled in as the missing gunner. This platoon sergeant was as fast or faster than I could load; And was consistently firing one or two round engagements on plywood targets at 1000m to 2000m . He was quick and accurate, and the gunners sight on the old M48A5 is far closer to its ancestors in the Sherman or T34/76 than the GPS on the M1A2. More like the GAS sight on an M1A2. In addition we didn’t have the advantage of an LRF. I think by far the biggest chunk of time involved in a particular engagement is the initial target acquisition. First the TC has to spot the target. Than he has to get his gunner to recognize or identify this same target. The gunner than has to perform the appropriate tweaks on his controls. After all of this than you finally get an ON THE WAY. Now your in the aquired ROF mode. What I am speaking of is practical rate of fire against an acquired target. Not a "mad minute" of un-aimed fire. I recall an excerpt from “La Panther” (French Army 1947? Report on performance specs of the Panther). The mad-minute was rated at 20 rounds per minute. Could these French tank crews hit anything at 20 rounds per minute…well yes…French crews could...but normal folks probably couldn’t. Beyond what I have already indicated above I see no practical reason why a T34/76 could not obtain an aimed ROF of fire of 1 round per 8 to 10 seconds. Again contingent upon blah blah blah(see above for blah blah blah). A little tangent here but one of the discrepancies of many tactical level wargames is the seemingly similar rates of fire between towed anti-tank guns and tanks. I was recently watching some old timie’ Aberdeen Proving Ground films of 57mm gun crews. These guys were incredibly fast and accurate. Course the fact that a standard 57mm gun crew consists of one gun commander, one gunner, and about 8 loaders and loaders assistants didn’t seem to hurt their rate of fire.

Paul: I think it is probably important to separate out variables here so that we are not arguing about two different things. Obviously, as I have already indicated, crew training is a potential variable that will influence ROF. Availability of normal complements of crews is also a potential variable that will influence ROF. Platoon and company commander’s vehicles would likely have been equipped with radios even in 1941. Turret layout and ammunition storage is another potential variable that will affect ROF. How much ammunition has already been expended will influence ROF of fire (i.e. if a T34/76 is down to its last ten rounds of ammunition it is likely that these rounds are in the most inconvenient areas under the floor mats.) Distinguishing between target acquisition by a tank crew, and a crews ability to maintain a fixed rate of fire on a known target are two different aspects of gunnery that, for the purpose of my point, somewhat mutually exclusive. There are a myriad of additional variables that we could get into regarding things that will accelerate or retard target acquisition time. The layout of the T34's turret as well as prescribed crew duties were both severe detriments to rapid acquisition and rapid engagement of targets. On the other hand the TC acting as gunner eliminates the middle man (the gunner). No need to get the gunner to recognize the target you wish to engage. However, with the T34 TC glued to the gunner’s sight, situational awareness goes into the ****er. In addition absence of a honest to goodness gunner means you don’t have an extra set of eyes on board scanning for bad guys. On the opposite side of the playing field German TCs tended to fight heads up…unbuttoned (no their schlong wasn’t hanging out). This option wasn’t available to the T34/76 TC who would rapidly become a slave to the gunners sight during actual combat. But ultimately mixing and matching sustained ROF with disadvantages in acquisition introduces a multitude of additional variables than are not necessarily associated with sustained ROF. So in summary ROF is conditional and optimum ROF is only sustainable in the T34/76 for very short runs. Worst-case scenario for a T34/76 crew: zero rounds per minute while the crew scrambles to uncover ammunition under floor mates. Best-case scenario: eight rounds per minute. Beyond that I reckon we’ll just have to agree to disagree. Regards Jeff D.

Paul: The method that you have adapted for presenting this information could only bring one to the conclusion that it is rather anecdotal. It is doubtful that such a measurement could have been conducted reliably under combat circumstances. I went through Zaloga’s “T-34/76 Medium Tank, 1941 – 1945” as well as his work “Red Army Handbook 1939 – 1945” and can’t locate the information you are referring to. What Zaloga title are you referencing? Having said that I certainly do not doubt that trained crews could out-shoot untrained crews at a rate of 3:1. However it is easy enough to find T-34/76 rates of main-gun fire peaking at 8 rounds per minute. The ROF ratings I have found make no stipulation as to the tank crew requiring Guard Status. Charles Sharp in “Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II” (page 34) indicates the following regarding the T34/76: It should be noted that the T34 Model 1940 had a different turret ammunition layout than the latter T34 model 1942 with the hexagonal cast or welded turret. Sustained high rates of fire in the Model 1940 were probably not possible simply because of the ammunition storage layout. The nine ready racks in the turret of the M1940 were…3 on the loaders side hull wall, and six on the TC\gunners side hull wall. The remainder of the ammunition being stored under the rubber floor mats of the turret or in other locations that were not rapidly accessible to the loader. Incidentally neither the T34/76 M1940 or M1942 had turret baskets. Assuming one round “up the spout” it seems reasonable to assume four rounds fired at a rate of 1 round per 8 to 10 seconds was possible for a Model 1940 turret crew with proper training. After the first four rounds have been expended the ammunition storage arrangement was such that a pause in firing or dramatic decrease in ROF would naturally occur. However I have read that the radio operator\co-driver (if available…i.e. crew was not fighting short-handed…and the radio operator\co-driver was not busy firing the hull MG) would pass main-gun ammunition up to the loader in cases where sustained fire had depleted the ready-rack ammunition available in the turret. Now the T34/76 Model1942 with hexagonal turret is perhaps a different animal all together regarding main-gun ROF. Fourteen ready rounds were available on the walls of the fighting compartment, in racks and metal bins. So 8 rounds rapid fire (again assuming one up the spout for rapid battle-sight engagements)…one round per eight to ten seconds does not seem to be an unrealistic rate of fire. Following the initial eight rounds of fire, rearrangement of ammunition supllies and subsequent decrease in ROF would presumably occur as the loader either lifted the floor mates to access additional main-gun ammunition, or ready rounds from the TC/gunners side of the tank were handed to the loader. The above exercise is applicable to ammunition arrangements in any tank. So ROF is very conditional. A somewhat off topic tangential digression; The “Guard” entitlement and its natural association with “elite” status is perhaps misrepresenting a particular units skill\training\experience level in some circumstances. Guard units draw replacements to fill holes in their ranks just like any other unit. A “Guards” Tank Brigade that has suffered 100 casualties in a recent engagement and has drawn replacements to fill these gaps is perhaps no longer in the realm of “elite” or “crack” status. [ May 11, 2002, 04:02 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

I think that is a photo of Guy Sajer. However his GD arm band appears to be on the wrong sleeve.

A little bit of additional digging indicates that the loaders seat\stool was hung by two armatures. One attached to the right side of the main gun-housing below the right side trunion. The other arm was attached to the turret ring cover. The stool was apparently hinged and could be retracted toward the hull wall. In other words if the loader has his head out of his turret hatch for air-watch or is simply getting a breathe of fresh air he is basically suspended from the turret and “traverses” along with the turret. No shuffling required. I am willing to bet the TC step\stool was arranged in a similar manner. While suspension from the turret is much more “ergonomic” relative to stools and the like being attached directly to the hull floor, there are still numerous disadvantages to turret crew activities when compared with turrets with honest to goodness turret baskets. The lack of basket vastly increased potential for getting limbs and appendages pinched off during a rapid traverse. And the "loader" shuffle required during the traverse of "basketless" turrets could not have helped with target engagement proficiency. The British Army experimented with a similar system of “suspended” turret crews. During early development and production of the Churchill it was felt that both production time and expense could be reduced considerably by loosing the turret basket. The basketless design, after a fair amount of proving ground trials, was determined to be a far less efficient than the Churchill with turret basket. Regarding ROF for the T34/76, 3 to 4 rounds per minute sounds on the low side. Charles Sharp's book on Soviet Tank Combat Tactics – derived heavily from Soviet wartime manuals and wartime operational studies – indicates that 3 to 4 rounds per minute was consistent with T34/76 employing a movement/short-halt and fire technique. Tanks employing stationary precision gunnery could easily double this rate of fire. I think what wargames typically get wrong is the initial acquisition time required. Personally I believe a tank without TC override capability should be at a disadvantage in acquisition time. Tanks in which gunners and loaders were not equipped with honest to goodness viewing periscopes should be at a disadvantage in acquisition time. Tanks that are not equipped with radios should be at a disadvantage in acquisition time (unit cohesion….buddy system…watching each others back…blah blah blah...these can't be effectively communicated within the platoon). Unfortunately without some sort of variable spotting routine built into the game, the real disadvantage in not being able to communicate with your “track-mates” will not really become apparent to mouse wielding generals. [ May 09, 2002, 12:32 AM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Regarding the gunners position within the T34/85 being attached to the hull floor, I have never read this bit of information before, and would be curious as to the source. Design schematics I have examined show the gunners seat to be supported by an armature which was attached to the main gun housing just below the left side trunion…i.e. the gunner's position traverses as the turret traversed. I haven’t seen a schematic showing the right side loaders position, but doubt that a hull floor mounted chair\stool would have made it beyond the preliminary design or testing state for the vehicle. However a T34/85's loader would have had to perform his work while standing on the hull floor, and would thus be required shuffle about during each traverse. Extremely inconvenient and dangerous in high rpm traverses as the turret and all of its accoutrements and protrusions are rotating independently of the hull floor. However the T34/85 was designed with a twelve round ready rack in the turret overhang area…backside of turret. This is a central location within the turret, and appears to have been easily accessible to the loader regardless of shuffling or his position in the turret following a traverse. One of the problems for the loader occurs as expended shell casings begin accumulating on the hull floor during engagements. These add to his trip hazards particularly during a traverse. [ May 11, 2002, 10:29 AM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Brian: An experimental version of the T-34/76 was being run through it paces at Kubinka in 1943. Designated the T-43 and founded heavily in the old -- abandoned -- T-34M project. The T-43 was intended to right some of the problems of the original T-34/76 design. One aspect of improvement for the T-43 was to have been a larger three-man turret. The project was abandoned before it went to production. The summer of 1943 battles around Kursk, Belgorad and the Orel Salient convinced the Red Army that the T-34/76 would require both up-gunning as well as a larger turret crew. Result being the T-34/85.

Neither had I....thnx Mike.

Thnx Måkjager, and thnx AndrewTF.

Very nice. Where can one find the camo-mod for German tank crews?

I find the present CMBO manual to be superior to many computer wargame manuals. Quite comprehensive actually. For those that owned the original Talonsoft EastFront game (not East Front II, but the original) you probably know what a truly bad game manual looks like.

Thanks Mattias.

Some squad level figures for German Infantry: Originally From: "The German Squad in Combat" with large excerpts included in "German Squad Tactics in WWII" by M. Gajkowski: Gruppen Fuhrer (Squad Leader) 1 Machine Pistol, 6 magazines LMG Section MG Schutz: Soldier #1, LMG and drum magazine 50 rnds each, Picked for their shooting skills. He is also the leader of the LMG section. LMG Soldier #2 One spare MG-34 or 42 spare barrel, 4 drums of 50 rnds each, 1 box 300 rnds ea., side-arm pistol. Assistant gunner. LMG Soldier #3 One spare MG-34 or 42 spare barrel, 2 boxes 300 rnds ea., also armed with a K-98. LMG Ammo bearer. Rifle Section Soldiers 4 - 9 (Gewehrshutzen), K-98 rifle, two 3 section ammunition pouches, had grenades, smoke grenades, explosive charges, ammunition, and tri-pod for LMG. [Note: ammunition is not defined…could be additional LMG ammunition, could simply be additional rifle ammunition J.D.] The Riflemen execute close combat fighting with rifle fire and bayonet. The most senior rifleman is the Truppfurher (assitant squad leader)

What was the reference on the above figures?

Very Nice ....and thanks for the URL.

Hey Future! How have you been? Any word from Eric Y. regarding that real time 3D game he'd been designing? Nice CMBO screen. Perhaps a bit too heavy on Jerry. How bout' including a Tommy or a grimy GI-Joe.

This has less to do with the tangent discussion on close assault, brass-knuckles, bayonets, and the psychology of closing with the enemy. This goes back to page 1 & 2 regarding some information Andreas and Jason were touching upon regarding German MG ammunition expenditure. From: Sydney Jary's "18 Platoon", pages 53 - 54.

From a internet cache...and a quick run through a translation program...found this quite by accident.

Period Maps for the US Army in ETO are indeed available from NARA (down to 1:10000, although 1:25000 is more typical). In addition, US ARMY Divisional AARs sometimes include snippets of 1:25000 maps as well as copies of overlays. After action interviews for the US ARMY are available for just about every major action occurring in ETO 44-45 (and presumably other periods and locations of the war as well...for example I have seen some very detailed AARs for the 4th Marine Division and the battle for Iwo Jima). The ETO AAR interviews were apparently coordinated through the efforts of SLA Marshall, although numerous US Army Historians were obviously involved with this rather monumental record keeping undertaking. Daily reports for units down to battalion (and perhaps lower) can be obtained as well from NARA. Quality and content for both Daily reports and AAR varies considerably, and seemed to have been a function of the actual Division collecting such data. Ala 30th ID records are quite excellent relative to 2nd AD which seems to contain gaps in critical periods of action. 7th AD has extremely detailed AARs for its defence of St. Vith in late 1944. The average reader might consider much of what is contained in Daily reports as “mundane”. However there are insights to be had from such documents if you’re willing to dive into them. My suggestion would be to focus on a specific Battle or Operation…say 4th Infantry Divisional Actions on the Cotentin Peninsula (or whatever strikes your fancy) than focus your research efforts in this area. Topo Maps…AARs…unit histories…unit daily reports…text from oral interviews…air photo coverage of various battlefields…etc. There are numerous US Army Divisional Associations in the USA. Most have divisional historians that are worth seeking out via mail or email. They can help you along in locating where unit information is cached. Regarding German Records…NARA also has archived a huge amount of wartime material on microfilm. Microfilm copies can be ordered from NARA for a price (It used to be $39 US per reel…one reel contains about 1000 pages. You should be aware that three are literally tens of thousands of Microfilm reels on German Army Records archived at NARA. There are hundreds of catalogues that just document what is contained in the numerous Microfilm records. Records down to German Divisional level are available, as well as Korps and Armee level reports. Most of these original documents have been returned to the BundesArchives although NARA has retained microfilm copies of the whole ****terie. As I recall German Heer documents ended up in the USA and German Naval Documents ended up with the British. I would suggest contacting NARA directly via mail or email to determine the process for obtaining catalogues or local libraries (University of City Libraries) that may have NARA catoluges. There were also several thousand interviews conducted by SLA Marshall and his staff of captured German Officers conducted after the war. Under the auspices of this same post war interview program, Marshall had numerous German officers recording their or their unit’s involvement in various battles\operations and campaigns. Many of these have been translated and are available in various publications. Greenhill Books has published some of these reports in various books ala: “Fighting in Hell The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front”. US War Dept. has also published a number of these interviews\reports in various historical study manuals ala “Small Unit Actions on the Eastern Front”.

I can cite several examples of Bayonet Charges conducted by either US ARMY Infantry or USMC Infantry during the Korean "Conflict" if this will add at all to the discussion. The effect of a bayonet charge is very much psychological for both the attacker and defender…as already indicated in John Salt's erudite post earlier on in this thread. Even the days of what might be considered classic bayonet charges; Napoleonic Era, Crimean War, American Civil War, etc the incidence of actual bayonet wounds was relatively miniscule when compared with artillery and small arms inflicted wounds. However this did not detract from the psychological impact of the bayonet charge. Typically one side or the other breaks before "physical' contact actually occurs; Butt strokes and bayonet thrusts are rarely occurring in melee. It is apparently the anticipation of such nasty things occurring which triggers the flee instinct.

thanks

Operations and Number of Battles. Say for example you're playing a five-battle operation. Alternating day & night rounds. The attacking side has the option of avoiding night rounds. If a night round is avoided does that mean the operation will last only four rounds of battle? Thanks for any replies. Regards Jeff Duquette

This is indeed an interesting engagement. One that I have been seeking additional reference material on this battle since I first read the article on RBF about a year ago. The second map in the RBF article is a bit unclear to me. The way I interpret the nomenclature and notes is there were at least 12 KO'd, captured or burnt-out Tiger-II's from Schwere Panzer Abteilung 501. This doesn't seemingly jive with strength returns and loss totals from the battalion history for the 501st (see Tigers in Combat I, W. Schneider) that place irrecoverable Tiger losses at 4 machines for the 12th and 13th of August, 1944. This same source indicates that there were only eight total Tiger II's available\operational at the statrt of the action on the 12th of August. The action is described briefly in the tail-end of Jentz's Tiger I & II Combat Tactics. Presumably the excerpts are derived from Lt. Osjkin's & Capt. Iwuschkin's AAR's? My reaction to what I have read of the engagement thus far is that the 52nd and 53rd Tank Brigades gave the 501st a lesson. The Soviet tankers employed the better speed and maneuverability of their T34/85's to advantage. They also utilized terrain to its best advantage, weaving in and out of woods and ambushing and engaging the Tiger-II's with flank and rear shots from close range. Best Regards Jeff Duquette [ March 19, 2002, 04:21 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Thanks for posting the URL Croda. I did the quick look over and was interested enough to book mark the page for a more serious return look. These old vet's stories are always great to read through. Best Regards Jeff Duquette