Jeff Duquette

Where did you find these reports, and do you have copies of the original test dtata?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Tero Said: Not really. I served in the coastal arty so the nomenclature is known to me. I just want to know the actual mean average and mean deviation, statistically speaking. How did you come up with the 50% zone ? Also, does the calculations apply to a single tube or a whole battery ?<hr></blockquote> As I indicated this information is laid out in TFT’s….Tabular Firing Tables. A weapons dispersion is determined by test firing. As I recall British Coastal Artillerists were the first folks to start employing something along the lines of firing tables. Surely you are familiar with firing tables. I had thought artillerists that rely on “Kentucky-Windage” died away sometime during WWI. An example of a circa-WWII TFT for 105mm Howitzer: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff10/artyTFT.html As my previous description does not seem to be taking hold with you I would suggest consulting your Field Manual for Coastal Artillery Gunnery. If it is laid out like US ARMY Artillery FM’s there should be a decent write-up on dispersion and exterior ballistics. In very lay terms the 50% zone is the length and width of two Probable Errors. One to the right of the mean deflection line…one to the left…one long of the mean range line and one short of the mean range line. Add um all togeather and you get the dimensions of the 50% zone. In the following schematic Each “X” represents one probable error…the “O” is the MPI. So for range error in which the line of fire is parallel to the line of X’s… line of fire -->..X-X-X-X-O-X-X-X-X 50% of the rounds fall within the two X’s immediately adjacent to the “O” 82 percent will impact within the four X’s immediately adjacent to the “O” (the two on the right of the O and the two on the left of the O) 96 percent will impact within the six X’s immediately adjacent to the “O” (the three on the right of the O and the three on the left of the O) and 100 percent will include all eight X’s Same again for deflection error. Each X equals one deflection probable error. The line of fire is perpendicular to the line of X’s. ....................X ....................X ....................X ....................X line of fire -->..O ....................X ....................X ....................X ....................X <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>To the best of my knowlegde most, if not all (well, at least the Finnish army did/does), armies kept a log book on arty pieces so they could monitor barrel wear and alter firing solutions to match it and get better accuracy.<hr></blockquote> This is my understanding as well. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>How many of them impact at the actual, absolute, target point ? By your reconing only 4 rounds come even close. 46 impact anywhere within the 50% zone BUT the target point proper. And the rest (50) outside it.<hr></blockquote> I don’t recall providing my reckoning on numbers of rounds that will hit the MPI. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>I have seen a 4 gun battery hit a target the size of a rowing boat at 2000 meters with the fourth salvo.<hr></blockquote> Your point on bringing this direct fire anecdote up eludes me. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>IIRC the Finnish arty used a square of 100x50 meters as the basis for its 100% zone at the battery level.<hr></blockquote> 100% zone for what specific weapon, firing what specific charge, and at what specific range? Sounds like your talking about a standard sheaf for a mortar platoon? I'm talking about systematic error inherent in the fire from one gun. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>What is the firing pattern you are assuming: all guns pointing at the target point, guns pointing at the target point by the section or guns pointing at the target zone by the battery?<hr></blockquote> I am talking about inherent systematic error of one gun firing at a specific range, using a specific charge. [ 11-24-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> When the ballistic limit falls with increasing hardness, the results are strongly suggesting that the armor brittleness is causing premature failure. High hardness armor is crystalline in structure, and is like a house of cards in that the structure is dependent upon a weird set up where molecular pieces are hanging by their edges. Once a sharp impact is made and one of the edges lets go, the armor fails suddenly and in a big way.<hr></blockquote> This of course assumes the round doesn’t shatter on face-hardened armor before penetrating. Presumably you are referring to homogenous hardness throughout the target plate resulting in brittle failure of the plate. As I know you are aware the British apparently had a very tough time of it in N. Africa during the initial years of the war in the desert. The penetrator on the 2-pdr was not initially fitted with a penetration cap, making it that much more difficult to penetrate FHA on the Afirka Korps MkIII’s and MKIV’s. By 1943 the cat was pretty much out of the bag what with most Anglo-American tank killing rounds being fitted with penetration caps. FH armor on German Panzer wasn’t really any sort of an advantage like it had been in 1941 and 1942.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Incidentaly: is there any correlation in CM between the 14" naval arty shell fall pattern and the rocket fall pattern?<hr></blockquote> I dunno. Could be. I have some old US Naval Range and Ballistic Tables laying about here somewhere. From the late 30’s. As I recall they include firing tables for calibers up to 14” guns. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>You say the 50% zone is 120m x 60m. As things stand it would seem that 85% of the rockets fall outside this zone.<hr></blockquote> This could be…like I say I have not played with CM’s rocket artillery much. I am typically on the receiving end of it I am speaking purely in generalities and attempting to explain that WWII conventional artillery typically delivers a much tighter pattern of rounds than WWII rocket artillery. I am less interested in the implications to specific wargames. Like I said above; "As to whether rockets are being accurately portrayed in any wargame, IMHO I think a wargame should reflect a tendency toward much larger dispersion zones for rocket barrages relative to more conventional artillery barrages". I don’t pretend to be an expert on CMBO’s game engine, so I wouldn’t presume to say it models artillery shot patterns well or not so good...at least not without conducting a large number of controlled tests myself. Even than I suspect I would want to hear what the designers intentions were or how they went about developing random dispersion patterns for artillery fire. This really should not be an exercise in mumbo-jumbo. TFT’s exist for just about all artillery ordnance used during WWII so there should be minimal requirements for pulling numbers out of ones ass. The info is all out there for those that have a budget for a bit of research. I would guess that REAL WORLD data on dispersion for different weapon types could easily be plugged into a wargames engine. But than I have never written code for a computer wargame.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>What is the propability percentage of occurrances on these errors ? 50 % ? Or 100 % ? Being "propable" would mean that not all rounds fired go wildly off target.<hr></blockquote> Tero: I suspect the nomenclature is perhaps different in the Finish Army. You might drop a note to Tommi for exact translation between US ARMY nomenclature and FINISH ARMY info. It will probably be clearer to you via that route. I will try to elaborate a bit here... Dispersion: If a number of rounds of ammunition of the same caliber, lot, and charge are fired from the same position with identical settings used for deflection and quadrant elevation, the rounds will not all impact on a single point but will fall in a scattered pattern. In discussions of artillery fire, this phenomenon is called dispersion, and the array of bursts on the ground is called the dispersion pattern. Probable Error: Probable error is nothing more than an error that is exceeded as often as it is not exceeded. Relative to dispersion zones for artillery fire it is an indication of what percentage of rounds fired will fall within a given area. It basically defines a weapons shot pattern based purely on systematic error. Using the 105mm Howitzer example again if you were to fire 100 rounds of the same caliber, ammunition lot, at charge 3 at a distance of 2700m…50 rounds would fall in an area of 33m x 3.6m. Of the 50 rounds fired 25 will in theory fall on one side of the mean range line (short\under) and 25 will fall on the other side of the mean range line (long\over). Same deal with deflection error. Twenty-five rounds will fall to the right of the mean deflection line, and 25 will fall on the left of the mean deflection line. The apex of the mean deflection line and the mean range line is the MPI: Mean Point of Impact....loosely speaking the MPI can sort of be thought of as the centroid of the target area you are trying to suppress or destroy. The actual shot pattern would trend toward an elongated elliptical shape. However a rectangular area is easier to quantify and I suppose close enough for HE work. It’s all based upon a normal distribution so I suppose if you were so inclined you could figure out the 2% zone if you really wanted to.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Germanboy Said: Hmm, not sure to be honest. I have almost all of them, but only because I managed to pick them up for £5 in bargain basement sales. He cribs a lot from other people's memoirs. Some of them have indexes, most don't. They are alright if you want to have the service history of a whole division. If you are after quality, you are probably better off getting the original works he is quoting from. He has definitely found a winning formula for writing this stuff.<hr></blockquote> Thanks Andreas.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Scipio Said: Ehm, if you mean the 'safty zone'<hr></blockquote> No, Actually I meant exactly what I said. The relatively large Danger Close zone for German Rocket Artillery, as I indicated before, is an indirect indication of the weapons erratic dispersion pattern. I don’t think that even the German Army was particularly keen on fratricide if it could help it. WWII rockets had fairly large dispersal patterns relative to conventional artillery. Here are the probable error numbers from a TFT for the 28cm Rocket Projector (Schwere Wurfgerat 40): Range = 600m…Deflection Probable Error = 10m…Range Probable Error = 80m Range = 800m….Deflection Probable Error = 10m…Range Probable Error = 75m Range = 1000m…Deflection Probable Error = 15m…Range Probable Error = 75m Range = 1200m…Deflection Probable Error = 20m…Range Probable Error = 75m Range = 1400m…Deflection Probable Error = 30m…Range Probable Error = 65m Range = 1500m…Deflection Probable Error = 30m…Range Probable Error = 60m Range = 1600m…Deflection Probable Error = 30m…Range Probable Error = 55m Range = 1800m…Deflection Probable Error = 40m…Range Probable Error = 40m Range = 1900m…Deflection Probable Error = 45m…Range Probable Error = 45m Max indicated range is 1925m So for example at a range of 1500m, and on the basis of a 100 percent rectangle, 50 percent of the rounds will impact within 60 meters (over and short) of the mean range line, 82 percent will impact within 120 meters (over and short), 96 percent will impact within 180-meters (over and short), and 100 percent will impact within 240 meters. In other words your 50% zone is 120m x 60m…82% zone is 240m x 120m….96% zone is 360m x 180m….and the 100% zone is 480m x 240m Now compare the 28cm Rocket Projector probable errors which is quite large even at 1900m with those of the US 105mm firing HE clear out to 2700m. Range = 2740m...Deflection Probable Error = 1.83m…Range Probable Error = 16.5m. The 105mm 50% zone for a range of 2740m is 33m x 3.6m...82% zone is 66m x 7.2m...96% zone is 99m x 10.8m...and the 100% zone is 132m x 14.4m. For those folks out there that have looked at a few TFT’s in there lifetimes, notice the odd trend for range probable error. It actually decreases with increasing range, and then only at the tail end of the table begins to creep back upward. Deflection error is pretty amazing regarding how large it is even at relatively short ranges. TFT’s I have for Schwere Wurfgerat 41 resemble the trends shown above for the Schwere Wurfgerat 40 [ 11-23-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

I don’t have a lot of game experience with respect to rocket artillery. Everyone I play seems obsessed with playing the Germans. However I am quite content to chug away as the Allied player. I would tend to agree with Richard Cuccia’s and some of the other folks here in their assessment that rocket artillery in reality is fairly erratic. I think the use of rocket artillery was typically for saturation barrages…drumfire barrage…a poor mans approach to “time on target” for large areal targets. Put the maximum amount of steel on a large target in the minimum amount of time. Accuracy is sacrificed in the interest of rapid saturation. I think what may be missing in your scenarios Scipio is perhaps the REAL WORLD tendency to employ multiple rocket batteries on the same target. Dispersion isn’t such a huge deal if you have 3 battalions of nebelwerfers all “zeroing-in” on the same target at the same time. As to whether rockets are being accurately portrayed in any wargame, IMHO I think a wargame should reflect a tendency toward much larger dispersion zones for rocket barrages relative to more conventional artillery barrages. An additional note on “danger close”: As a comparison to German prescribed danger close for rocket artillery (~500m…see my above post) I recall reading in J.Keegan’s “The History of WWI” that the British Army would employ rolling barrages preceding an infantry assault. Setback from an 18-pdr barrage line was prescribed as something like 75m from the assaulting infantry line. This is pretty close especially when considering the fire control standards and communication systems available to FO's\FOO's and FDC's during WWI. I’m off to eat Turkey. Everyone in the US have a good Thanksgiving. Everyone else in the world have a good day.

Hmmm…you changed the intent of your post while I was writing a reply to your original question which I believe was something along the lines of why is rocket artillery so inaccurate in CM…

Probable error is typically expressed in the form of both the range from tube to the Mean Point of Impact (MPI) as well as length and width of the impact zone. The figures you have indicated don’t include range to target. Typically with conventional artillery probable error increases with increasing range. Rocket Artillery is a bit odd in that probable error does not follow this trend. Rocket Artillery Probable error increases with increasing range to a certain point, than probable error actually begins to decrease slightly. However, based on firing tables I have seen for 28/32 cm rocket projectors the dispersion zone dimensions you pulled from that web-site seem reasonable. A couple things to bear in mind: [1]What was SOP for “danger close” of Rocket fire. Danger Close is sort of an indirect means of telling how accurate or inaccurate a weapon is while firing indirectly. There is a British War Office report indicating the German equivalent of “danger close” for rocket artillery was something like 500 to 600 meters. That’s a pretty good setback distance between freindlies and your potential target. I will find the exact reference if there is an interest. [2]How does probable error of rocket artillery compare with conventional artillery? Here is an example: US 105mm Howitzer M2A1, Firing shell, HE, M1 (charge 3): Range = 3000yrd….Deflection Probable Error = 2yrd…Range Probable Error = 18yrd Range = 4000yrd….Deflection Probable Error = 2yrd…Range Probable Error = 24yrd Range = 5000yrd….Deflection Probable Error = 3yrd…Range Probable Error = 30yrd Probable error for conventional artillery is quite tight relative to rocket artillery. Obviously all the above is purely systematic error.

I don’t have any of Delaforce’s work, although I have been curious as to how you folks might rate his unit histories. Are they worth the effort in obtaining…bear in mind they are a wee bit more expensive in the United States than they are in the UK? (When I say a wee bit more I mean a lot more expensive). Regarding British Army approaches to panzerfaust defense, I recall D.Fletcher going on a bit in “The Universal Tank” about the subject. What we refer to as “chicken wire” here in the United States was apparently drapped around an experimental Sherman in an attempt to “catch” the low velocity panzerfaust rounds before they would detonate. It’s a very “rigged” looking setup and was apparently found to be impractical under service conditions. See the picture I posted at: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff9/anti_faust.html From: David Fletcher’s “The Universal Tank, British Armour in the Second World War, Part 2”. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Although in Italy they probably never represented the degree of threat attributed to them in the later fighting in Germany, hand-held anti-tank weapons such as the Panzerfaust were quite unpleasant enough to warrant special consideration. Indeed it is rather surprising to discover that in Italy systems to defeat them were improvised a lot more swiftly than they appear to have been in a theatre that was closer to home. By nature, the Panzerfaust is a weapon of opportunity, fired at short range, with only modest velocity, and relying on the hollow charge principle, initiated by an impact fuse, to penetrate armour. Two methods were devised for dealing with it. One was to fit panels of armour, spaced away from the main body and turret of the tank, which would detonate the projectile but dissipate the effect of the hollow charge before it could do any serious damage. This was the method adopted by the Germans against Allied weapons such as the PIAT or Bazooka. The local British answer was to prevent the fuse from firing by, in effect, catching the projectile in flight and holding it. For experimental purposes a Sherman tank was covered all over with a web of wire netting, loosely held in such a way that it would give when the Panzerfaust round hit it. It took quite some time to work out the best method of attaching the material to produce just the right effect, and the result looked very untidy indeed. It looked a good deal worse after one or two unexploded Panzerfaust rounds had hit it, but at least under ideal test conditions it appeared to work. In practice, however, it proved absolutely hopeless. After the tank had been driven through a small wood, or a couple of vineyards, there was hardly enough wire netting remaining intact to protect it at all, so the idea was swiftly dropped.<hr></blockquote>

Lorrin: Great information…as usual. Interesting that the T33 APBC – in spite of its lack of a penetration cap – shows decreasing ballistic limits vs. increasing target plate hardness. Isn’t this somewhat ass backwards from what one might normally expect? T33 is a pretty large caliber AP round by WWII standards. Are you attributing this decrease in ballistic limit relative to increasing target plate BHN purely to T/D? Somewhat tangent to your posts but as you brought up APBC I have found yet another independent source discussing Soviet “artificial penetration cap” action for APBC. “Return of the breakaway nose and circumferential grooves on the ogive”. The following snippet seemingly implies Soviet APBC was not truly APBC. At least not in the same since that the US Army’s T33 round was. Soviet APBC is seemingly a hybrid between APBC and APCBC. The breakaway nose being monolithic with the penetrator can’t really be seen in the same light as true APCBC in which the penetration cap was a separate piece of steel…in some cases only lightly welded to the penetrator. However, clearly the intent of the flat-nose on Soviet APBC was an attempt at penetration cap action. From: Arthur G. Volz, “Soviet Artillery Weapons, Part III, 1941-1945. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Soviet ammunition problems lay less in lack of design capabilities than in industrial capacity. German armor-piercing projectiles employed armor-piercing caps. Soviet designers were well aware of this feature, which had been developed much earlier on the suggestion of the Russian admiral Makarov who was killed in the Russo-Japanese war. Manufacture of projectiles with armor-piercing caps was more complicated than the Soviet wartime practice of machining circumferential grooves on the ogive. The latter facilitated breaking away of the head of the projectile while leaving the remainder undamaged, thus giving something like a penetrative cap action and preventing the shattering of the projectile at high-impact velocities.<hr></blockquote>

Thanks for the further clarifications Steve. Have a good Thanksgiving.

Thanks Steve. Do foxhole and shell hole terrain features share common BMPs? Regarding primary and secondary fighting positions, unfortunately the game engine implementation does not really portray what is implied...at least not as described by FFE in his clever tactic. A squad would normally fight as a cohesive unit from its primary fighting position. Once things got a bit to hot -- in theory -- the squad would displace to its secondary position. It is also common for crewed weapons and tanks within prepared positions to ID primary and secondary positions as well as alternate positions. However what has been described is half the squad digs into one location…and the other digs into a second location. So half the squad occupies the primary fighting position and half occupies the secondary position. You than sneak the two elements to the primary fighting position during the course of the battle. Perhaps some might feel this is splitting hairs, however I think there is an important distinction in game implementation and the Real World implementation of primary and secondary fighting positions. But again this all implies a fair bit of preparation and forethought on the part of the average grunt. I think it just as likely that infantrymen thinking about primary and secondary fighting positions are just as likely to be thinking about concealment of their fighting positions. Just my two cents.

Thanks Ben. I can never seem to get the CM Forum search tool to work. Regarding that other thread I am less inclined to think there is an issue with extended operations. If foxholes have been discovered during a previous battle of an operation I think you should have that knowledge for subsequent battles of that operation. My bitch is with the first battle of an operation in which a player can get the lay of the land by a knap-of-the-earth scan of the bad guys potential positions. I don't disagree that human nature being what it is some folks will always go about concealment in a half-assed manner. But I also think that veteran soldiers probably know better and might be more inclined toward putting a bit of elbow grease into concealing their fighting positions. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Dan Said: I was in the army for a short time never went into combat. However it is SOP to keep men busy<hr></blockquote> Agreed. Foxholes eventually become trenches. Trenches lead to dug-outs and bunkers. Throw in some communication trenches, trench shoring, over head cover, barbed-wire entanglements, mines, etc, etc, etc. Given enough time in the same position an infantry unit will create a veritable fortress. But keeping idle soldiers busy extends to both continuously improving cover as well as concealment. Regarding some ones commentary on trenches, I too hope CMBB will include a somewhat more elaborate modeling of field fortifications. [ 11-21-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Galatine: Good questions which get to the heart of the matter. Question 1: Do you feel that you wouldn't have spotted those units if they were not in foxholes? In game terms I personally don't feel I would have known where my opponents MLR was until I bumbled into it with patrols. As the game played out no prelim patrolling\scouting was necessary. In non-game terms: The scenario was somewhat of a movement to contact type event. I therefore don't believe my Rifle Company's should have had any prior knowledge of "exact" squad level fighting positions of the enemy. Perhaps a general knowledge of where the enemy was but certainly nothing as precise as "there is a foxhole at grid reference 563241" (IMHO). Question 2: In what terrain were the foxholes located? My longtime opponent is a fairly competent player, and in all cases the fighting-holes were in light or heavy woods…perhaps 20 to 30 meters from the tree line. Undergrowth, foliage and duff are the friends of infantry digging into wooded areas. Concealment is a little easier prospect in such cases. Question 3: What kind of view did the your nearest infantry team have to the foxholes? What was their quality level? Mostly regulars with a few veteran rated leaders. Proximity info…dunno. Perhaps I will try some experimentation with this over the long Thanksgiving weekend. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>From what you've said nothing 'gamey' or out of the ordinary occurred. Sounds to me like your forces clearly spotted the dirt mounds indicating infantry dug in.<hr></blockquote> I disagree. The bad guys in the scenario I have been speaking of were crack SS kinder-jagers. Hard to believe that at least some of these folks wouldn't have taken the time to think about concealment of their fighting positions. Obviously CMBO does a good job at modeling careless soldiers that don't employ a bit of camouflage around their fighting positions. What about veteran level and higher experiance levels...soldiers that understand the benefits of concealment and don't leave trench spoils carelessly mounded up around foxholes in plain view of the enemy? [ 11-21-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Galatine Are you implying foxholes are spotted easier than just infantry /or/that foxholes are spotted first before the infantry in them?<hr></blockquote> To clarify, I noticed this purely by accident during a recent Operation I was playing. I was in the attack…US Rifle battalion strength with some support Shermans. Germans in defense…a couple grenadier companies I think.. I was scanning areas I felt might make good defensive positions and I noted "shellholes" where no shelling had occurred. Putting the targeting cursor of a Sherman over the "shellhole" I noticed the terrain indicator actually indicated "foxhole". On a whim I targeted one of these "shellholes" with a Sherman. A couple of rounds of HE latter I see a squad of PanzerGrenadiers rise up from the "shellhole" and start scampering away to safer environments. Well that opened the floodgates. I proceeded to scan the terrain around this first foxhole…sure enough I found another hole. I hammered away at this hole and low and behold a HvyMG42 Teams routs and runs for safer environments. In all cases I noted the foxhole bmp's long before I ever noticed any infantry. Infact I typically never saw the foxhole occupants until after they received some HE area fire and subsequently began running. I proceeded to pick this unsuspecting fellows position apart. He sent me an email asking how the hell I was spotting all of his positions. Since I have been playing this fellow in various email games for a couple years now I felt compelled to tell him that I was cheating and searching for foxholes than shooting them up with area fire. He said he thought that this was a fine tactic and sent me an email latter saying he was using it in some other PBEM game he was involved with. Personally I think its gamey, but I will continue to use it. [ 11-21-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Patrik Said: A second line of defence aint gamey. But do the foxholes represent the thing you dig when you have spare time, dont think so. I think it's the thing you dig when you've been orderd to hold a position and the enemy is soon to be there say 1-5 min of digging.<hr></blockquote> Agreed. It is not uncommon to have a lightly held outpost or listening post line in front of your MLR. The folks on OP duty would in theory "holler" in the event of an impending attack. It gave the folks in the MLR time to stand to. I don't think this was the intent of the original poster "FFE" regarding the two foxhole per squad trick. He was not presenting us with a historical dissertation on infantry defensive tactics as much as he was giving us his own approach to dealing with the games foibles….i.e. the player practice of hunting for foxholes and shooting them up with area fire. I think he was implying that the second foxhole was a dummy foxhole. The dummy foxhole makes the art of looking for foxholes on the map a tougher prospect. I like his approach, aside from the potential for assaulting infantry to now have a convenient ready made fighting position to occupy during a firefight with friendlies occupying non-dummy foxholes. Although this tangent discussion on gamey\not-gamey or one foxhole or two foxhole is interesting, it really does not addresses any of my original questions. In CMBO foxholes are typically visible long before the troops occupying these foxholes become visible. 1) Was this an intentional design feature of CMBO or is it a quirk in the game engine? 2) Are the BMPs employed for foxholes shared BMP's of shell holes? This same issue came up with ATOMIC's Close Combat IV and the designers were forth right enough to indicate that it was a programing bust...the neon beacon foxholes that telegraphed ones MLR to the opposition were eventually dealt with in a series of patches as I recall. [ 11-21-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Leta Said: Well, one man who often use this tactic was Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, the last defender of Berlin.<hr></blockquote> Leta: While I appreciate the fact that you have actually gone to the trouble to provide what you feel is actual evidence, I think you have somewhat misrepresented Heinrici's use of an operational level withdrawal to support an argument that German Infantry consistently dug two foxholes. From: BH Liddell Hart’s “The German Generals Talk” (also known to some folks as “The Other Side of the Hill”) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In this later stage, he said, he had further developed the defensive methods which he had already described. "When the Russians were found to be concentrating for an attack, I withdrew my troops from the first line under cover of night, to the second line—-usually about 2 kilometres behind. The result was that the Russian blow hit the air, and its further attack did not have the same impetus. Of course, a necessary condition of success was to discover the actual intended day of the assault, which I sought to do by using patrols to secure prisoners. After the Russian attack had been broken, I continued to hold the second line as my new forward position, while on the sectors that had not been attacked the troops moved forward again to re-occupy the first line. This system worked very well in the battle of the Oder—the only drawback was our scanty strength, after so much had been wasted needlessly by the rigid defense of positions impossible to hold. "I never suffered defeat during three years of defensive battles when I could base my plan on such methods—and I was proud that I never had to call on the Higher Command to spare me any of its reserves. I found self-propelled guns were of the greatest value in applying these defensive tactics. "In the light of my experience, I consider that your conclusion that the attacker needs a three to one superiority is under the mark, rather than over it. I would say that, for success, the attacker needs six to one or seven to one against a well-knit defence that has a reasonable frontage to cover. There were times when my troops held their own against odds of 12 to 1 or even 18 to 1. "The German defeat in the East was, in my opinion, due to one main reason—that our troops were compelled to cover immense spaces without the flexibility, in the command, that would have enabled them to concentrate on holding decisive points. Thus they lost the initiative permanently. I doubt whether we could have worn down the Russians by pure defense, but might well have been able to turn the balance by a more mobile kind of warfare, and by shortening our front so as to release forces that could be used for effective counter-strokes.<hr></blockquote> Heinrici is really talking about something on a somewhat grander scale than foxhole digging. If your looking for proper ammunition look at Depuy regarding a Green Rifle Platoon of GI’s digging in on a forward slope and leaving their digging spoils around the outsides of their foxholes. The brown dirt over white snow made these poor fellows easy pickings for a nearby German Stug. [ 11-21-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> IIRC the Germans did this an awful lot.<hr></blockquote> No offence Viceroy old boy, but I never believe anything posted on Internet forums unless it’s specifically referenced along with several examples. If you’ll elaborate a bit on the above it might be interesting. Two sets of foxholes imply a fair amount of preparation time. If you are bothering to dig two sets of fighting positions as a method of tricking the enemy maybe you might think about camouflaging one fighting position instead. Just a thought.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>"Experienced players will tend to split squads into teams to create empty and/or double line foxholes."<hr></blockquote> Good idea. Gamey...but what the hay its a game after all. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>"The only reason why it should be cheating or abusing a "feature", is if we presume that one shouldn't be able to spot foxholes from a distance."<hr></blockquote> Agreed. I think it is safe to assume that in the Real World holes in the ground will always be spotted long before living, breathing, moving, coughing, whispering, equipment-rattling soldiers would be. Than again maybe well disciplined, well-trained folks might hide the spoils from their recent excavation work, or cover the fresh earth with duff of foliage (or snow during those Christmas scenarios). I dunno. Do foxholes always appear before troops occupying them appear? Out of curiosity was this feature included on purpose? (I'll use "feature" since there is obviously some hyper sensitivity to the words "little cheat" ) . One last question: Is there a unique *.bmp for foxholes or do foxholes share a common *.bmp with shell holes? Why not include fake foxholes in the game. Sort of like the perpetual limited intelligence Tiger I that you always seem to spot when playing the Allied side. Ghost foxholes you think are there when you do your knap-of-the-earth, omnipresent flying TV-drone search for enemy positions, but they really aren't there. And when you get your own folks on the position the things disappear like….uhh….dust in the wind.

Foxholes and Area Fire I have noticed in several past games that I can locate enemy foxholes long before I ever get close to these foxholes. I suppose this has been discussed before…oh well…be that as it may. It's new to me. This little cheat makes it quite easy to locate the bad guys without expending precious troops on pesky reconnaissance. Look closely at those woods in front of you. You may be surprised by the presence of what appear to be shell holes in areas where you could swear you or your opponent have not shelled. These are foxholes concealing MG's or infantry or bazooka teams. Blast'um with long range area fire from your tanks...or sprinkle some steel rain on these areas. It's great fun because your opponent won't be able to figure out how you're spotting his troops and tripping his well-considered ambush locations. Course it isn't quite as much fun when your opponent figures out this little cheat.

I thought this might be interest to a few more hardcore WWII armor aficionados on the board here. This is a bit of correspondence I had with David Fletcher of the Bovington Tank Museum regarding British Army 95mm CS-Tanks…CS-Cromwell and CS-Churchill. The following is text of my email to him as well as Mr. Fletcher’s reply. ======================== Dear Dr. Fletcher: While reading various accounts on the famous tank engagement at Villers-Bocage, I had noticed a reluctance on the part of a Lt. Bill Cotton of the 4th County of London Yeomanry to employ his CS-Cromwell in encounter with Tiger I's of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 101 and MkIV's of the Panzer Lehr Division (even more reluctance perhaps than what might be typically expected from Allied Tankers forced to face Tiger I's). Apparently in post action reports and\or interveiws, Lt. Cotton indicated the CS-Cromwell was of little use in a Tank vs. Tank encounter. Cotton apparently dismounted his CS-Cromwell and directed the fire of the Firefly and Cromwell (6-pdrs) of 4Troop B Squadron while on foot. His unit’s tally by the end of the battle was apparently 4 Tigers and 3 MkIV's. I was hoping you could clarify several things regarding the CS-Cromwell (and I suppose the CS-Churchill). Didn't the 95mm CS gun have a shaped charge round? At what point in the war was the shaped charge round for the 95mm CS tanks first employed? If the Shaped charge round was available at the time of VIllers-Boccage what do you suppose motivated Lt. Cotton into thinking his CS-Cromwell would be of any less use than his 6-pdr Cromwells in the close quarter fight with German Armor that characheterized Villers Bocage ? One last question...somewhat unrelated...I am curious as to when a smoke round for the 95mm CS first began being fielded? Thanks very much for your time and consideration. Sincerely Jeff Duquette =========================== From Mr. Fletcher: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Jeff Not Dr Fletcher yet alas! Thanks for your message. I cannot find a date for HEAT but it was not available (apparently) when the stowage diagrams for 95mm tanks were compiled in May 1944. Smoke was probably available from the start, it is included in a stowage diagram for the Churchill V in November 1943. Even if it was available (HEAT that is) I am not sure they would have used it. In British service the Close-Support tank was originally intended to deliver smoke. HE rounds were available but the official stowage diagram dictated that the tank would carry about 95 per cent smoke and a few odd rounds of HE. I suspect that this narrow attitude continued. By 1944 undoubtedly HE had been adopted in a big way (although most 75mm gun tanks could also deliver it) so the tank would be stowed accordingly while troop and squadron leaders would be trained to instinctively employ dedicated anti-tank weapons against tanks. DavidF<hr></blockquote>

This was some REAL WORLD™ data I plotted and posted the last time this topic came up. British Army Test firing conducted during the war in order to compare hit probability against both hull-up and hull-down targets. At short range the benefits to a hull down target (relative to hit probability are low). As range increases the hull-down tank gains a lot of advantage over a hull-up tank. Intangibles not covered in the test data include reduction in visible target size at all ranges. Presumably this will result in decreased probability in spotting hull-down targets. http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff/hullup_hulldwn.html Two things that should be at work here: 1)Reduced ability in spotting of hull-down targets 2)Reduced hit probability against Hull-down targets at moderate to long ranges

This was some REAL WORLD™ data I plotted and posted the last time this topic came up. British Army Test firing conducted during the war in order to compare hit probability against both hull-up and hull-down targets. At short range the benefits to a hull down target (relative to hit probability are low). As range increases the hull-down tank gains a lot of advantage over a hull-up tank. Intangibles not covered in the test data include reduction in visible target size at all ranges. Presumably this will result in decreased probability in spotting hull-down targets. http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff/hullup_hulldwn.html Two things that should be at work here: 1)Reduced ability in spotting of hull-down targets 2)Reduced hit probability against Hull-down targets at moderate to long ranges