Jeff Duquette

Volume IV of the Anti-Armor Defense Data Study I had refered to (by Michael Bailey & Lloyd Karamales et al.) details the 99th ID and 2nd ID defense around the villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, December 1944. The antitank vs Panzer\Stug and tank or TD vs Panzer\Stug actions of 99th ID and 2nd ID described as occurring in and around Krinkelt-Rocherath are each detailed in Volume IV, and are broken out into 29 distinct antitank Actions. Each action represents one or more US Army anti-tank weapons, Tanks, or TDs vs. One of more Panzers or Assault Guns. The antiarmor actions included one or more of the following weapon types: 3“ towed TD antitank guns 57mm towed antitank guns Bazooka Sherman tanks Self-propelled TDs Of these 29 separate actions only two involved 57mm antitank guns engaging either Panzers or assault guns. Of these two actions, only one action entailed a Stug actually being destroyed by a 57mm antitank gun. These two separate actions include: Action 1: Assault Gun at Losheimegraben, 0715 Hours, 15th December, 1944. Here a 57mm ATG fighting with B-Co 394th Infantry Regiment (99th ID) engaged and destroyed what is described as a 75mm Sturmgeschutz (apparently attached to the 48th Grenadier Regiment, 12th VG Division). Typical -- "normal" -- ammunition load-out for the 57mm gun is described as: 100 rounds, 70% APC and 30% HE. The first 57mm APC round hit and immobilized the Sturmgeschutz. Two more 57mm APC rounds penetrated the flank armor and set the Stug on fire. There is no mention of 57mm SABOT being avaliable to the 394th 57mm gun crew, nor is it mentioned in the comments on typical ammunition load outs. Action 29: The End of Panther Five’s Saga, 0800 Hours, 18th December 1944. The action entailed a 57mm gun from Capt. James Love's anti-tank company (fighting alongside 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, 2nd ID), as well as a Sherman (most likely from 741st Tank Battalion), and a self-propelled TD from the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion. "Normal" ammunition load-out for the 57mm gun is described as: 100 rounds, 70% APC and 30% HE. As with the 394th’s account (Action-1) there is no mention of 57mm SABOT being employed by the 38th Infantry's 57mm gun crews. The Panther was hit by one round of APC. The 57mm APC round apparently damaged the turret traversing mechanisim on the Panther. However the Panther continued its advance through the village. The Panther was subsequently engaged by a Sherman – one round fired -- it missed. The Panther continued its advance and quickly moved out of the Shermans LOS. The panzer was finally engaged and destroyed by several rounds from a self-propelled Tank Destroyer. The remaining 27 Antitank Actions described as occurring during the battles around Krinkelt-Rocherath entailed Panzers and Assault Guns destroyed by 3" towed tank destroyers, Bazookas, Shermans or Self-propelled TDs. [ June 24, 2003, 10:26 AM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

You are suggesting that a US 57mm SABOT round was produced? If so what was the official projectile designation. Even projectiles still under development will have a designation. Or are we talking about a handfull of 6-pdr SABOT rounds rushed over from 21st Army Group stores by the British for these 1st Army trials? If British, how much SABOT ammunition was provided? 57mm firing trials were conducted in December of 1944 by the 44th ID against a combat damaged Panther. (Headquarters 776th TD Battalion, Effectiveness of fire of 57mm Anti-tank Gun on Mk V Tank, Capt. Louis Wable, Dec 11, 1944). There is no mention of 57mm SABOT; there is no mention of 6-pdr SABOT within the report either. Nor was SABOT used in the trials. If the round was so common within US Army inventories – as you are implying – why weren’t 57mm SABOT trials conducted by the 44th ID? Can I assume that you can’t produce anything more definative on these 2nd ID and 90th ID reports you mentioned regarding actual employment of 57mm SABOT in combat (or “lend-lease“ 6-pdr SABOT employed by 57mm ATGs)? Thus far we have seen only one combat account of 57mm SABOT use in ETO 44-45 (1st ID at Dom Butgenbach). Surely there should be more combat reports floating about for this ammunition type -- assuming of course it was commonly available.

Actually I am fixated on these after action reports you mentioned from 2nd ID and 90th ID and their organic 57mm antitank guns employing APDS. Can you be a bit more specific as to report date, and the name of the officer or NCO that authored these after action reports.

Rune: This isn’t an opinion I developed by looking over a few interent sites in a half hour of free time. It is typically much harder to prove the non-existence of particular ammunition type than its existence. But sooner or latter, after digging through enough gunnery manuals, ammunition catalogues, sending inquires to Soviet ammunition collectors, examining photos of ammunition, firing tables, etc one has to ask: Where is the evidence regarding this bit of ordnance that should seemingly be quite common. There have been errors regarding information posted on the Russian Battlefield web site before. These have been discussed on this and other discussion forums in the past. The site misidentified 76mm armored piercing ammunition types at one point...see my posts on this at the Yahoo Tankers Forum. In addition there was quite a stir regarding a Tiger-2 photo Valera had posted showing a large caliber penetration in the Tiger-2's glacis plate...see the Achtung Panzer Forum archives. This was about a year or two back. More recently there has been some hub-bub over RBF’s glacis plate thickness for the IS-2. I didn’t follow that discussion too closely and am not sure how it was resolved. I personally think the site is good for general information, but I never take it as the final word on anything, and I usually double check or triple check information if at all possible.

Lorrin Said: “Jeff had no trouble accepting Amedeo's fine research on Russian 76.2mm shrapnel use as cannister at close range, even though that was for a wargame (CMBB). But he readily dismisses McNamara's findings as wargame speculation. Will Jeff treat Amedeo's finding as a what-if wargame scenario?” The excellent work on Amedeo's part actually produced an official Soviet Army publication on Artillery Gunnery....not a wargames rule booklet. An Army gunnery manual is the type of primary reference material I had been referring to in several of my previous posts. So I'm not sure what your beef is in this regard. In my mind Amedeo’s digging efforts were only further proof of what I had already asserted on this forum several months back. You are welcome to go back into the CMBB archive to read my previous posts regarding how 76mm shrapnel shell was being misrepresented as canister. http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=000233 I believe the question of RKKA 76mm canister was put forth by several folks on this forum long before this thread ever took root. The use of shrapnel in a pseudo-canister role is corroborated by several WWI US Army and French Army artillery gunnery manuals I posses and have discussed at length here. See my previous posts on this thread. I had also conducted a fairly extensive review months back of both 76mm firing tables as well as several catalogues of Ordnance employed by the RKKA during WWII. None of these indicate the existence of a 76mm canister round. To top off my search for the elusive 76mm canister round, I obtained an original copy of the 1942 Artillery manual for the ZIS-3 76mm Field Gun “76-mm Luschka Obp. 1942 r. Rukovodstvo Sludschbui” Mockba. A list of ZIS-3 ammunition types, their descriptions and capabilities as well as sectional drawings are all detailed in the manual. There is no canister round indicated. In other words I have conducted a fairly extensive search and am not basing my opinion upon one piece of information. ======================================== An aside, but of additional interest is that even shrapnel appears to have been being phased out by the time of the 76-mm Luschka Obp manuals publication in 1942 (the exact month of the manuals publication isn’t indicated). I haven't brought this up yet as I am patiently awaiting additional information on the employment of shrapnel by the RKKA during WWII.

Thanks John. I had produced for Lorrin a similar reference regarding 57mm APDS usuage at Dom Butgenbach several years back. A short discussion on the CMBO forum. My post detailing this material may still be in the old CMBO archives. 1st ID’s impressive defense of the little Cheatau of Dom Butgenbach was described by Charles Bailey in his extensive Anti-Armor Defense Data Study, Volume III, US Anti-Tank Defence at Dom Butgenbach. This study was written back in 1991 under the auspices of the US Army’s Concepts Analysis Agency. Not something you’re likely to find at the local used book store Bailey indicates the following: “These rounds used a disposable sleeve, or SABOT, around the penetrator for the British 2-pdr. The result was a lighter projectile with increased velocity, about 4200 ft/sec vice 2900 ft/sec for normal 57mm round.” (pg 21 Anti-Armor Defense Data Study, Volume III) It may be of interest to note that one of the co-authors of the “Anti-Armor Defense Data Study” was none other than Lloyd Karamales coauthor of "Against the Panzers". In other words this may be another case of seemingly corroborating references that in fact represent the same root source. Moreover this still begs verification\corroboration. This is why I would like to see the material Lorrin brought up regarding 90th IDs use of APDS during August of 1944, and 2nd IDs use around Krinkelt-Rocherath (also during the Battle of the Bulge).

Lorrin Said: “Jeff's response starts off with some histrionics that miss the point. Robert McNamara researched U.S. documents and found references to consumption of 57mm APDS by U.S. forces in two theaters. Whether he did the research for a game is besides the point, but declaring research to be inadmissible because it was done for a game is an easy way to dismiss the conflicting material. Play fair, Jeff.” ============================= ASL is a game. The designer could have included APDS for a fun "what-if" scenario. Definitive historical proof would be production figures for APDS, ballistic testing reports, or inclusion of information on the projectile in standard ordnance catalogues. I will ask again, "wheres the beef"? Do you have Aberdeen generated drawings?…ballistic research from BRL…War Department training manuals detailing 57mm APDS….any sort of AGF testing or training information that verifies the existence of a US Produced 57mm APDS round? ============================ Lorrin Said: “With regard to U.S. production of 57mm APDS, many many posts on various forums have indicated that it was of British origin. Claus Bonnesen in his Yahoo! Tankers post on 57mm APDS indicated that you won't find any Txx or Mxx numbers for the ammo since it was British. ================================= Yes I have seen speculation on this before. Presumably you have since uncovered some sort of historical documentation detailing this fairly unique ammunition transfer? Documentation should be easy enough to uncover, after all we seem to be talking about the transfer of what…6 rounds of APDS to every 57-mm gun in the 1st US ARMY. How much was transferred to 3rd Army stocks? Was this a one time lump transfer, or were regular stores of APDS being transferred from 21st Army Group Stocks. This is a huge amount of ammunition being pulled from the 21st Army Groups own stocks of fairly specialized ammunition. I would love to see the historical material you have uncovered on this ammunition transfer. I would say the case would be closed if this could be brought from the realm of whimsical musing, to an honest to goodness 21st Army Group logistics memorandum. Can you scan this memo or letter and post it here. From my previous message; Can you post the 90th ID report detailing its use of 57mm APDS as well as the source? Like I say I have a large number of 90th ID after action reports from its operations in Normandy as well its operations during the breakout. While you are at it can you post the actual 38th Infantry report detailing its use of APDS during actions around Rocherath-Krinkelt.

Lorrin: Firstly, Advanced Squad Leader is hardly a primary source of historical information. A great game on par with CMBO & CMBB, but ASL is hardly a research tool. Secondly, your passion is admirable, but is unfortunately misplaced on this mater. This conviction of yours aside for moment, there has been no real evidence that has come to light on this or any other of your forums that the US ever produced 57mm APDS – aside from several vague GI war stories. But while we are on the topic perhaps you can post the entire text of the report from the 90th ID and indicate the exact source. I actually possess several manuals containing photo copies of 90th ID Action Reports from Normandy as well as the breakout period. I am also curious as to how you would explain the lack of any 57mm APDS evidence within all of the following references: 1) The US Army’s 57mm Antitank gun firing tables. 2) The US War Departments 57mm AT gunnery manual (FM 23-75). 3) The War Departments WWII Standard Catalogue of US Army Ordnance. 4) War Department TM 9-1900 Ammunition 5) War Department TM 9-303 57mm Gun M1 and Gun Carriages M1 through M1A3. 6) TM 9-1907 Ballistic Data, Performance of Ammunition (both the 1944 and 1948 editions). Even the voluminous 1946 BRL catalogue of US Army projectile ballistic testing data employed during the war lacks any evidence of a 57mm APDS round. Yet this same extensive catalogue details the capabilities of the ever elusive -- extremely limited production run – T16 57mm HE round (that’s a “T” …not an “M”). There isn’t even a “T” version of a 57mm APDS round on the books. If the US Army 57mm APDS had indeed ever been produced surely it would be rather simple to uncover Army generated technical data on the projectile. What was the BRL established projectile nose length?...what did BRL use for a form factor?...what reference drag function was employed...what was the drag coefficient? The Army, by this time in its history, wasn’t in the habit of producing projectiles without some form of ballistic testing. Where’s the beef? Perhaps a little less ice cream indulgence and a bit more research would be in order. If you would be kind enough to produce a US War Department firing table, training manual or BRL generated ballistic data that details anything associated with US Army produced 57mm APDS, I will be more than happy to admit that I am in error on this subject. [ June 18, 2003, 02:08 AM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

More medicine for insomnia... I too brought this up back in the days of the DEMO. I chalk up 76mm canister to urban legends ala US Army 57mm APDS and German Stug-III’s firing canister. From a gaming research standpoint, one has to wonder how Soviet 45mm and 57mm canister got lost in the mix, yet non-existent 76mm canister is quite prevalent and can even be employed by field guns outfitted with muzzle breaks. Information on both the Soviet 45mm and 57mm canister rounds is fairly abundant (like US Army 37mm canister). On the other hand tidbits like US Army 57mm APDS and German Stug canister can usually be traced back in time to one reference. Those of us anxious to find corroborating evidence, or additional source references would be hard-pressed to produce the like for either of these forms of ammunition. The use of a particular projectile should be well detailed\documented within standard army ordnance guides, army ammunition manuals, gunnery manuals, and\or army ranges tables. In theory such information should be easy to unearth, particuarly if the piece of ordnance in question was in common use. If the Army of interest wasn’t training its soldiers the use of a particular piece of ammunition, and that same army was not producing literature on the employment of specific forms of ammunition it’s a pretty good bet that either the projectile never existed, or the projectile was some sort of obscure experimental model that was never released to the army. For example 75mmL24 canister; the official H.Dv.Merkblatt for this weapon has sectionals of numerous ammunition types employed by this weapon including some rather odd forms of ammunition that I suspect the vast majority of us have never heard of before. However there isn’t anything in the way of a canister round. This question of the existence of a 75mmL24 canister round was raised earlier in this thread, and a URL was produced in the way of corroborating evidence for the existence of a Stug canister round. To digress a bit, the original legend of the Stug and early Panzer-IV’s canister round seems to be brought to us by a brief, fine print footnote, hidden in the tail ends of two books on German tanks. Both were written by F.M. von Senger und Etterlin and include: “German Tanks of WWII” & “Die Kampfpanzer von 1916-1966”. Doubtless the von Senger reference to canister was perpetuated by inclusion of Stug canister in several old mass consumption board wargames that also relied upon von Senger as a primary source of information. Thus the legend becomes accepted "fact". (I lost interest in AH's Squad Leader after Cross of Iron. Did any of the Advanced Squad Leader iterations include 75mmL24 canister?) Fast forward to 2003 and we find a Web site that seems to independently corroborate the von Senger fine print footnote regarding Stugs and early Panzer-IV's using canister. However close examination of the Panzer-IV Universe web site reveals that the Author of this web site is relying upon – that’s right, you guessed it -- F. M. von Senger und Etterlin, “Die Kampfpanzer von 1916-1966”. You will find several other references of interest on this web page to include the US WAR Department’s excellent TO 39B-1A-10; “German Explosive Ordnance”. Like the German Army’s Merkblatt, this extensive manual on German projectiles, ranging in caliber from 20mm to 150mm, shows no evidence of a 75mmL24 canister round. My question is can anyone produce a photograph, an official design drawing, schusstafeln, or an official Heer gunnery manual that details use of canister by the 75mmL24? [ June 17, 2003, 08:17 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Lorrin Said: “It's rather obvious that the casing would shatter upon detonation, or else the balls would not do their thing. The web site stated that the casing on early shrapnel was not designed to fragment.” It depends upon the shell. It is also probably obvious that shrapnel shell came in several forms. I won’t delve into shrapnel employed in an AAA mode…still a popular form of ordnance with anti-aircraft gunners even during WWII. Shrapnel balls were typically either packed in resin matrix or high explosive matrix. The former being the packing material of choice for the French and British; the later being the Germans choice du jour (and possibly the Russians\Soviets as evidenced by the amount of fragmentation within their particular brand of shrapnel shell). The Germans at least did count upon the HE packing for generation of casualty producing splinters from the bursting shell casing. This form of shrapnel projectile was used en masse by the Kaiser’s cannoneers. Regarding fuses, and the not so subtle differences between shrapnel and canister, most of the shrapnel producing countries installed what is called a combination fuse in shrapnel shells. This appears to have been a late-WWI tweak that continued to be a standard feature during the post-WWI period. The combination fuse included both a time action element and a percussion action element. The time action fuse, if functioning properly and set properly, would give shrapnel its airburst capability. However the unreliability of the time action fuse was such that a back-up percussion fuse became a standard feature in shrapnel. The percussion fuse ensured detonation of the shrapnel shell upon impact with the ground (or tree top or other solid object). The percussion mechanism is designed primarily to insure action of the shrapnel in case of failure of the time mechanism. Ideal burst height for 75mm Shrapnel was about 30-feet. This is evident at least from both US Army and French Army gunnery manuals of the period. However gun crews were typically trained to set their time fuse for a 60-ft airburst. Another example of the contrast between theory and practice. Deliberately setting for a 60-ft airburst was again a function of fuse slop\inaccuracy. The logic apparently being that a high airburst was still more effective against troops in the open than a ground burst. The long and short of it is that shrapnel isn't canister. At times folks in desperate straits used shrapnel in a pseudo-canister role...a wanna be canister projectile. But a single T-34 firing shrapnel isn't always gonna result in the mother of all big-assed 10-gauge shotguns. There is to much fuse action slop to say: "shrapnel is canister". Shrapnel fuse slop would result in a range of potential outcomes many of which would not resemble canister effect. The opposite ends of this spectrum being: 1) All works according to pland and the T-34's shrapnel shell acts like the mother of all big-assed shotguns or; 2) Shrapnel fuse slop results in shrapnel shell wizzing harmlessly by the intended infantry target at 600 m/s. It than explodes harmlessly 100-yards to the rear of the infantry target and sprays its pellets in the opposite direction as the intended target. This is the not so subtle difference between simple canister and fused shrapnel. Hopefully the above continues to help those amongst us that are suffering from bouts of sleep deprivation. [ June 17, 2003, 08:27 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Have no fear John. You are probably not suffering from an early form of Alzheimer’s. Your memory cells are likely calling up the results of the M1 Garand being cut loose against the same Nazi mannequin (still sporting a steel helmet). The training film I am referring to (and presumably sliced into interesting bits for the History Channel Program you refer to) goes on to demonstrate rifle fire against the German steel pot. The Garand’s Caliber .30 M1 Ball had an approx 172-grain boat tail bullet (allowable tolerance was 171.5 to 174.5 grains). It is my understanding some of the older .30 M1906 ball ammunition -- 150-grain bullet -- was also employed by the Garand. Muzzle velocity at standard conditions was 2,700 fps and 2,647 fps respectively for the 150-grain ball and 172-grain ball. About 823 m/s and 807 m/s. Well into the supersonic range...compared to the 0.45 cal round nose that never really even approaches transonic velocities. “Ball” is sort of a misnomer; a historical hold-over from days of yore. The M1’s “ball” ammunition actually has a bullet with a fairly pointy ogive. M1 ball is a much more “ballistically” efficient shape than the 0.45-Cal pistols round nose, and light years ahead of spherical shrapnel pellets. Anyway the training film shows the Garand’s ball ammunition cleanly punching holes through both sides of the German Steel Pot as well as the uber-mannequins head. Plenty of kinetic energy seemed to remain in the round even after passing through all of this material. The training film than goes onto to demonstrate the Garand’s .30 AP round capability. AP round being ~168.5 grains and 2,775fps muzzle velocity. The AP round punches clear through a 6 or 8 inch diameter tree and still has sufficient energy to pass through both sides of a steel bucket filled with water placed on the opposite side of the tree. This was probably pretty scary news for the average tree hugging infantryman watching this flick. [ June 07, 2003, 10:22 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Shrapnel casing does shatter upon detonation of the base charge. Examples of Russian 76.2mm Shrapnel shells exploded within some sort of enclosed sand-box and the shell casing fragments and shrapnel pellets subsequently collected and recorded can be seen in the following. http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Russ_76mm_Shrapnel_003a.jpg (copy and paste above url into your browser address box...hit enter to view the image) An 11-gram shrapnel pellet is about 170-grains. The original Colt cartridge accepted by Army Ordnance was a 230-grain round nose bullet. Muzzle velocity was about 830-fps, or about 253-m/s. The original 45 auto round nose is actually a much more efficient ballistic shape than the pseudo-spherical shrapnel pellet. Bear in mind that the original reference by LTC Bishop to shrapnel and the 45 pistol was to give the reader a ball park indication of shrapnel capability. In my mind it wasn’t intended to read: "45 round nose capabilities = ½-inch shrapnel pellet capability". Moreover velocity decay rate of the 45 round nose is much less with range than the rate of velocity decay of a shperical shrapnel pellet. Cd in the subsonic range for the round nose G1 projectile is about half that of spherical shrapnel. In other words, all things being equal the impact energy relative to range of the 45 slug will decrease at a much lower rate than the shrapnel ball. LTC Bishop goes on to indicate that the fully loaded standard issue WW-One US ARMY pack of the period (a monstrous contraption) was capable of stopping lower energy shrapnel pellets. Bishop suggested that the best thing for infantry men to do when under shrapnel fire was to either A: get under cover or out of the vicinity, or if you can’t do “A” than B: lay down on your belly with your ass facing the direction of shrapnel fire. Your helmet and pack will provide “some” degree of protection. Lighter bullets have since been produced for sportsmen using the 45 auto. Speer used to make two 45 Auto jacketed semi-wadcutters weighing in at 185-grains and 200-grains respectively. Both rounds were reputed to be very accurate bullets (by Speer ;o). In addition the BC of the Speer 45 jacketed semi-wadcutter is about half that of the round nose. Regarding helmets…I have always been under the impression that steel helmets drastically reduced the numbers of head wounds resultant from low velocity\low energy shrapnel and shell fragments. I have seen a circa-1943 training film on US Army Small arms (I watched part of the tape again this morning). “Training Film TF-7 1266, War Department, Army Ground Forces, Infantry Weapons and their Effects”. The film snippet of the 45 pistol shows the 45 round nose incapable of penetrating the German WWII steel pot. The helmet is perched on the head of an unfortunate Nazi mannequin. The films narrator indicates: “Beyond 50-yards the 45 will not penetrate even light armor.” Again bear in mind that impact energy of shrapnel will decrease with range from burst at a much higher rate than that of a 45 round nose. Presumably at point-blank or very short ranges the .45 slug might punch a hole through a German steel pot. On the grander scheme of things a massed shrapnel barrage could be very effective against troops in the open. Shrapnel was originally designed as a projectile to combat somewhat dense infantry formations in the open. These were the sorts of targets that an artillerist might expect to see during the Franco-Prussian War, Russo-Turkish War, Russo-Japanese War, or on early 1914’ish WWI battlefields. On the other hand shrapnel was not particularly effective against entrenched troops ... even light field works. Also within the grander scheme of things, I don’t think massed shrapnel barrages can be compared to single rounds of shrapnel fired in a self-defense role; pseudo-canister. Slop in fuse accuracy is somewhat masked during massed tube barrage fire. However a single tube firing shrapnel with questionable fuse accuracy and/or questionable crew training might result in that hoped for pseudo-canister effect of a shrapnel round not occurring till the round is some 200 or 300 feet down range from the intended target. [ June 07, 2003, 07:21 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Couple quick notes on RKKA WWII 76,2mm shrapnel. References I have access to indicate lead pellets\balls; about 11-grams per ball. The images are a bit rough but if I had to hazard a guess I would say dia was about 8 or 12 mm. About 600 balls per round (this is up from WWI’ish 76mm shrapnel shells used by the Russian Army -- ~260 larger dia balls in WWI shells). Bursting charge results in uncontrolled fragmentation of the shell casing. This adds additional splinters into the mix. Several images I have of fragments and pellets collected in controlled environment indicate fragmentation of the casing results in relatively large splinters…two such images yield an additional 50 to 70 splinters from the fragmentation of the shell casing. Combat load for a 76mm Divisional Gun: Battery limbers\wagons 212 rounds\gun Regimental Train: 96 rounds\gun Divisional + Corps Artillery Train 300 rounds\gun Combat load was about half the above by 1943. Typical distribution of Ammunition for 76mm gun (from 1936): 30% H.E. 30% Shrapnel 30% Gas 5% Incendiary 5% Star Shell The RKKA’s use of Shrapnel against ground targets seems to have been quite prevalent during WWII. And given the right circumstances, could be fairly effective. However manufacturing cost of shrapnel was considerably higher than the cost of HE shell of the same caliber.

Thanks for the link on M546. I almost thought I caught Janes in a boo-boo...after seeing the sectional drawing with 9-tiers of darts. I mis-read Janes it clearly indicates 9-tiers. According to Janes APERS was not only effective for close in defense. Although typically used in direct line of sight shoots, the projectile could apparently be tossed out to ranges of 9,500 to 12,400 meters dependent upon charge. The bursting charge fuse could be set for a minimum of 0.5 seconds for close in work\psudo-canister action or up to 100-seconds for more of a "sharpnel like" application. The following is an anecdote I came across somewhere on the web. Beehive in Vietnam... ============================================== "The exact results of the action will probably never be known; however, because of the damage done, the 3d Battalion, 2d North Vietnamese Army Regiment, avoided significant contact with allied forces for several months. The results were substantial considering there was no close contact between infantry units. Fire Support Surveillance Base FLOYD represented an economy-of-force measure employing a target acquisition system and immediate fire support in an interdiction mission. The terms "killer junior" and "killer senior" referred to direct fire defensive programs of the field artillery. Both techniques were designed to defend fire bases against enemy ground attack and used mechanical, time-fuzed projectiles set to burst approximately thirty feet off the ground at ranges of 100 to 1000 meters. The name "killer junior" applied to light and medium artillery (105-mm. and 155-mm.), while "killer senior" referred to the same system using eight-inch howitzers. This technique proved more effective in many instances than direct fire with "beehive" ammunition, because the enemy could avoid the beehive ammunition by lying prone or crawling. For example, in October 1967 during the battle of Xa Cat, which. involved an attack by several enemy battalions on the 1st Infantry Division's Fire Base CAISSON VI, artillery firing beehive ammunition had little effect on attacking enemy troops, because they approached the perimeter by crawling. However, a switch to timefuzed explosives stopped the advance. Another successful application of the "killer" technique was in clearing snipers from around base areas."

105mm M546 APERS-T is another example. APERS is more akin to shrapnel than canister. M546 is equipped with a time-fuse. The shell casing is designed for controlled fragmentation…4 fragments. The anti-personnel effect is created by six tiers of flechettes encased in the shell. There is a total of about 8,000 flechettes each weighing approx. 0.5g. The round is also equipped with a smoke-marker pellet to indicate point of detonation and ease the task of sensing ones own fire. Regarding High Explosive shell – circa-WWII US ARMY 105mm M38A1 HE will produce on average approx. 7,500 “effective” splinters from the uncontrolled fragmentation of the shell casing. The “effective” fragment weight ranges from 0.012-oz to 0.412-oz. and can generate casualties out to approx 600-ft from the burst. Effective fragment velocity ranges from ~2200-fps to ~400-fps. The burst pattern is also of some importance when determining the extent of “effective” fragments around the burst location. Killing effect doesn’t necessarily dissipate radially from the point of the shell burst. For example if the impact angle is about 30-deg the most lethal zone was apparently spread perpendicular to the line of fire. The most lethal zone sort of resembles a very elongated kidney bean emanating to either side of the line of fire. The shell detonation point is the the center of gravity -- so to speak -- of the kidney shaped fragmentation zone. [ June 03, 2003, 08:48 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

A bit more from material generated during the hay-day of shrapnel shells. ============================================== "Shelter against shrapnel fire is secured by interposing obstacles between the source of fire and the target which stops or so reduces the velocity of the individual bullets that they are harmless. The shrapnel bullet is spherical and upon leaving the case has the remaining velocity of the projectile itself plus the velocity added to this by the bursting charge. The muzzle velocity of the projectile is 1700 feet per second. This velocity falls to 1000 feet per second at 2000 yards, and to 780 feet at 6000 yards. The velocity imparted by the bursting charge is about 200 feet per second. Therefore the velocity of the individual shrapnel bullet upon burst runs from 1200 feet per second at 2000 yards range to 980 feet per second at 5000 yards. These bullets are effective (have killing energy) against man and horse at distances varying from 220 to 175 yards from the point of burst between these ranges (2000-5000 yards). The efficiency of the shrapnel bullet is, therefore, not comparable to a modern rifle bullet but more to that of a 45 calibre pistol, and the necessary thickness and character of shelter may be gauged accordingly. Plank, boards, canvas, or brush with a few inches of earth thereon, tree trunks, etc., will generally constitute effective shelter from the shrapnel bullet. As to the danger space of the shrapnel bullet: To the angle of fall at any given range must be added the angle of opening made by the bullets in the lowermost element of the cone of dispersion. The angle of fall increases with the range, also the angle of the opening of the shrapnel. The following table shows the angle of fall of the bullets in the lowermost element of the shrapnel cone for several ranges. (Three inch gun.) Table… ============================================= The burst pattern of shrapnel was an irregular oval. The long axis of the burst zone is parallel to the direction of fire. The bursting charge was made from black powder as it produced a readily recognizable ball of smoke upon detonation. It made sensing ones own fire easier. In addition to what JonS has already astutely pointed out, part of the problem encountered in WW-I’ish shrapnel shell was apparently the slop involved with the fuse. Fuse accuracy I guess. Even if the appropriate range to target was known and fuse set to the appropriate range -- and all other potential error sources were eliminated from the equation – the shrapnel fuse was only accurate to within about 0.2 seconds. So on the extreme side of error…A projectile moving along at an average velocity of say 1500 m/s could travel 300 meters beyond the intended target before the fuse activated. Not a big deal to massed fires against troops in the open. Entrenched targets were a different matter. To be effective a shrapnel air burst has to be pretty close to directly over head when engaging targets hunkered down in an open trench. Combine this with the tendency of say mid-1915’ish plus Western Front infantry to sit out barrages in dugouts with over-head cover it is easy to understand why shrapnel rapidly declined in effectiveness and use. WW-I on the Eastern Front was much more fluid than the stagnant trench war being played out on the Western Front. Russian Artillerists were often confronted with massed formations of Austrian infantry…in the open. An ideal target for concentrated shrapnel fire. This combined with the rude handling of massed Russian infantry formations at the hands of Japanese Artillery firing shrapnel during the 1904-1905 war may have left a longer lasting impression as to the effectiveness of shrapnel within the Russian Army. I reckon this may have contributed to the lingering use of shrapnel against ground target on the part of the RKKA during WWII.

Nice bit of work Amedeo. This topic has been brought up before: http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=000233 I have long suspected that shrapnel and canister were being confused with each other in the case of the Soviet 76mm (see John Salts post on transliteration). The TCH and SCH letters in Cyrillic are very similar. In addition, you will be hard pressed to find either circa-WWII drawings; photos; or firing tables for Soviet 76mm canister…i.e. if you dig through WWII Soviet Artillery manuals on the 76.2mm there are a fair number of references to shrapnel ammunition, but nothing that refers to canister. Translated Red Army AARs which refer to canister being employed by field guns with muzzle breaks simply reinforces the idea that shrapnel shells were being mistaken for some sort of canister round. Soviet Army tank manuals of the period discuss ammunition load outs for the T34/76. Typical load-out was on average five shrapnel shells...and again there is nothing that refers to a canister round being employed by the T34’s 76mm. Obviously typical load-outs can vary dependent upon numerous factors. I have long suspected that setting the fuze to zero on Soviet 76mm shrapnel shell was being confused with an honest to goodness canister round. This was after going through US Army artillery manuals for World War One. Amedeo’s findings have pretty much cemented my own opinion on this subject. Shrapnel could be employed as a pseudo-canister round for self-defense of the gun\battery against infantry rushes. From: “Elements of Modern Field Artillery, U.S. Service” by Lt. Col. H.G. Bishop, copyright 1917” (Bishop was an artillery instructor at Leavenworth): “The [shrapnel] fuse has two elements, time and percussion. The time element enables the fuse, when properly set to burst the shrapnel at any point along the trajectory in the air. If the fuse is not set for time fire, or, if so set and the time element fails, the percussion element causes burst upon impact. The fuse may be set at zero, whereupon the shrapnel will burst at about 20 feet from the muzzle of the gun giving canister effect. The common shrapnel is essentially a projectile for attacking personnel and has little or no effect against walls or even light entrenchments. Used in an attack of a field work of even temporary type, its function is to keep down the defenders until our infantry can advance sufficiently to warrant a rush on the position.” [ June 01, 2003, 12:28 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

So it appears that that your original velocity estimates for the 76mm F-34 firing BR-350B were in fact incorrect. I believe I indicated this to you several months ago on this forum and suggested that you research this further. So what are your penetration estimates for 1000m and 2000m for F34 firing BR-350B, and can you provide a sample calculation as to how exactly you are arriving at either the 1000m or 2000m figure?

I’m curious how the box clip ammo mix is modeled in the game? Moreover if a MkII is engaging a Soviet tank the HE rounds of the ammo mix would be less effective relative to the AP rounds…and vise versa when a MkII is engaging soft targets…the HE rounds of the box mix being more effective than AP.

I was in a National Guard Tank unit for six years. Our unit was equipped the old M48A5 with the 105mmM68 we carried SABOT, HEAT and HEP. The HEP round is High Explosive Plastic. I think this was similar to British HESH. It was supposed to be effective against bunkers, armored vehicles, buildings etc. It fragmented, but I dunno how it would stack up against HE for troops in the open. As JAWS relates we were also trained in battlesight engagements. I think we used something like 1200m for a preloaded SABOT round and 800m for preloaded HEAT…the preselected range in theory being variable dependent upon tactical situation, terrain, visibility, etc. Interestingly enough I have gone through old tank gunnery materials for some of the various belligerents during WWII … including the 1943, 1945, and 1950 editions of FM 17-12 and the War Office Manual "Sherman Tanks Armament Traing" Jan 1945. Only German tank gunnery training material elaborates on something like battlesight gunnery. German gunners were trained to use a preset range of 800m to ensure a decent first round hit probability. British, Canadian and US Army fire commands included a range command given to the gunner by the TC. [ February 28, 2003, 10:06 AM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

Actually The Russian Battlefield is talking about AP and anti-concrete rounds, not SAP. The M10 did indeed employ this particular piece of ordnance, as well as AP and Anti-Concrete rounds. The US Army translated numerous WWII Soviet Firing tables following the war. One Being FT-F-152-2 (FT-F-27) Foreign Firing Tables for Soviet Howitzer, 152mm, M-10. Ballistic tables are indicated for: Fragmentation HE Long Range Steel Projectile, Fragmentation Long Range Iron Projectile, COncrete Piercing Gun Projectile, Concrete Piercing Howitzer Projectile, Armor Piercing Tracer Projectile, and Semi-Armored Piercing Projectile. Ordnance Intelligence, US ARMY Ordnance Corps.

KV2 was equipped with the M1938 152mm Howitzer. The 152-mm M1938 employed semi-armored piercing naval ordnance (SAP): projectile designation was apparently BF-536M. German wartime information on the round indicated Vo = 1417fps with penetration stats of 90-mm at 0-deg, at 100-m.

I would be curious to have a look at these online sources. Can you post the link\links. Thnx.

Agreed...I don’t think anyone has been able to figure out a way to attach a virus to a BMP file (knock on wood). However in some of the older CMBO MOD packages there were small executable files that allowed players to switch between various vehicle schemes without having to rename a series of BMP’s. Dunno if this has been done with CMBB as I haven’t down-loaded any CMBB MODs yet. The stock BMPs provided by BTS seem pretty darned good to me so far. Anyway, a virus could easily be written into an executable file that is “supposed” to give players an easy way to switch back and forth between BMPs. I would look to these files as potential sources of problems in the realm of catching a virus.

Just did a quick search through my references regarding this topic. From: Wolfgang Fleischer’s “Russian Tanks and Armored Vehicles. 1917 – 1945” Pages 37 - 38 Regards Jeff Duquette