Jeff Duquette

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Andreas Said: The first of the two highlighted Canadian quotes could just mean that teh FOOs continued to operate, but had to go through the division net, instead of the artillery net,<hr></blockquote> Yup...first time I went through the report I think I read it as the FOO's were killed. Sounds like they survived but their radio sets were KO'd. They seemingly proceeded to battalion HQ and employed the battalion sets. I am wondering if in the case of Commonwealth observer\command tanks their function -- from an artillery usage stand point -- were as receptacles for FDC folks. Regardless, the point of all this is that armored FO's operated from armored vehicles. From what I have been able to dig up this practice was consistent within all the major belligerents. [ 01-20-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

A couple of additional bits on a Canadian operations report I came across. It would seemingly suggest that Commonwealth armour and infantry officers were trained (ala German Army and US Army folks) in the black arts of calling for fire. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>REPORT NO. 165 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OF 1 CDN INF DIV AND 1 CDN ARMD BDE IN ITALY 25 NOV 43 - 4 JAN 44 85. After two hours' fighting the attackers withdrew (W.D., P.P.C.L.I., 6 Dec 43). For them, the effort had been costly, the prisoner count was over 40; the estimate of dead over 100 (Ware: op cit). Five tanks were destroyed, and the heap of booty included one anti-tank gun, three motorcycles, six 81-mm mortars, several machine-guns, rifles, pistols, wireless sets and telephones, and considerable clothing, blankets, food and cigarettes. The mortars and anti-tank guns were later put to use against their former owners. During both attacks artillery support was called for through Battalion Rear Headquarters, since early in the fighting both sets of the forward observation officer were destroyed by shell fire. 207. Two hundred enemy from a fresh battalion, it was estimated, took part in this counter-attack supported by artillery and tanks. The Companies contracted to withstand the shock and to allow some sort of safety margin for the artillery fire which was so hastily requested. "C" Sqn's Commander directed the fire of 98 Fd Regt, R.A. (S.P.); in fifteen minutes 1,400 rounds of 105-mm shells were centred on the enemy. By 1545 hrs the counter-attack was crippled, and the enemy withdrew leaving many dead and one Mk IV Special which had been hit by a shell from a "C" Sqn tank. (Ibid; and History of 11 Cdn Armd Regt, p. 20.<hr></blockquote>

This is another bit suggesting Commonwealth armored units were using tanks as OP's for forward observation officers. From: Patrick Delaforce's "The Black Bull, From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armored Division" (pages 37 -38) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>3 RTR were in action most of the day with 13 RHA FOOs bringing down divisional barrages and Typhoon fire on Tigers dug into woods. Captain Philip Kinnersley, 13 RHA, brought down fire on his own OP since the tanks were so close. His tank was hit, mortar bombs rained down on him, his wireless set was smashed, all his crew including himself wounded, so he crawled to a hilltop with another wireless to continue bringing down 'Uncle' targets. Captain Nicoll, Ayrshire Yeomanry FOO, engaged four enemy tanks with his OP Sherman and lived to tell the tale. Over 300 enemy tanks were now attacking the salient from three sides, and fifty Nebelwerfers rained down their noisy mortar bombs incessantly. Sergeant Buck Kite of 3 RTR reported: 'The first thing we get at daybreak are the 'moaning minnies'. Jerry knew the range to a T and the bombs were stroking the top of the hill as they went over. HQ got the worst of it and we lost four NCOs who'd been caught outside their tanks. One a good chum, Dick Brill, who'd been right through the desert.' At Baron 4 KSLI had stood to at 0430 hrs and were getting quite blasé about snipers and 'moaning minnies'. Lieutenant 'Jenny' Wren noted: 'We did no patrolling, so just had to sit in our slit-trenches all day which was very demoralizing.' Their CO, 'Mossy' Miles, was relieved, 'a classic case of battle exhaustion', and replaced by Major Max Robinson. The 2 i/c Major Ned Thornburn complained bitterly of a shell fragment which passed through his shaving kit, but nevertheless 4 KSLI passed a relatively peaceful day.<hr></blockquote>

While hunting through various references on Red Army armor and artillery I came across a pertinent snippet from Charles Sharp's "Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II" (Red Army Armor Tactics from Individual Vehicle to Company, Combat Regulations of 1944) Again there is a fair amount of added fluff to the following. The fluff is there only for those interested in additional context. I have italicized the passages, which I feel are most pertinent to the subject of this particular thread. From: Charles Sharp's "Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II" (pages 73 - 74) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE ORDER No. 325 Dated 16 October 1942, Moscow: The war experience against the German Fascists has shown that in the use of tank units we, thus far, have shown large shortcomings. The main shortcomings are as follows: 1. Our tanks when attacking the enemy defenses separate from the infantry and lose contact (with them), they fail to maintain cooperation with them. Infantry, cut off from the tanks by enemy fire, cannot support our tanks with their fire and with artillery fire. Tanks, losing contact with the infantry, face enemy artillery, tanks, and infantry in single combat, suffering great losses for this. 2. Tanks throw themselves at enemy defenses without proper artillery support. At the start of the tank attack the artillery is not suppressing antitank weapons on the forward edge of the enemy defenses, guns are not always employed in support of the tanks. When approaching the forward edge of the enemy defenses, tanks meet with enemy antitank fire and suffer great losses. Tank and artillery commanders are not coordinating their activities on the terrain by natural, objects and boundaries, and they are not establishing signals for ceasing artillery fires. Chiefs of artillery in support of a tank attack, direct artillery fire by remote observation posts and do not use radio-equipped tanks as mobile forward artillery observation posts. 3. Tanks are committed hurriedly to battle without reconnaissance of the terrain bordering the forward edge of the enemy defenses, without studying the terrain in the depth of the enemy positions, without thorough study by the tank crews of the enemy fire systems. Tank commanders, not having time to organize a tank attack, do not inform tank crews of their tasks; as a result of the ignorance of the enemy and of the terrain, the tanks attack with uncertainty and at a slow speed. Fire from the move is not conducted, organize weapons fire from the halt, and even then only the cannons. As a rule, tanks on the battlefield do not maneuver or use the terrain for hidden advances and surprise strikes into the flank and rear (of the enemy), but, most often, attack the enemy head-on. Combined arms commanders do not take the necessary time to technically prepare tanks for battle. They do not prepare the terrain, with respect to engineers, in the direction of the tank operation. Mine fields are poorly reconnoitered and are not cleared. Passages are not created through tank obstacles, and the necessary help is not rendered in overcoming difficult and crucial terrain sectors. Combat engineers are not always assigned to accompany the tanks. This results in tanks being blown up by mines and getting stuck in bogs and in antitank obstacles, so they cannot participate in the battle. 4. Tanks do not fulfill their basic objective of destroying enemy infantry, but wander into combat with enemy tanks and artillery. The growing volume of experience shows that to oppose an enemy tank attack with our tanks and become involved in tank battles appears incorrect and harmful. 5. Tank combat operations are not being provided with sufficient air cover, air reconnaissance and air support. Aviation, as a rule, does not accompany tank formations into the depth of the enemy position, and the tank attack is not accompanied by combat aviation. 6. Control of tanks on the battlefield is poorly organized. Radio, as a means of control, is insufficiently used. Commanders of tank units and formations, located at (fixed) command posts, are removed from the combat formation, and they cannot observe tank actions in battle or influence the course of the tank battle. Company and battalion commanders, moving in front of the tactical combat formation, do not have the capability to follow the tanks and to control the combat by their subunits and turn into the line tank commanders, and the units, lacking control, lose their orientation and wander around the battlefield, suffering unjustified losses. I order the following instructions be obeyed in the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations. I. COMBAT APPLICATION OF TANK REGIMENTS, BRIGADES AND CORPS 1. Separate tank regiments and brigades designated to reinforce the infantry in the primary direction and operate in close cooperation with them as direct support tanks. 2. Tanks, operating with the infantry, have as their primary mission the destruction of enemy infantry and must not be separated from the infantry by more than 200 - 400 meters. In combat the tank unit commander organizes observation for his infantry's combat formation, If the infantry goes to ground and does not advance behind the tanks, the tank unit commander designates some of the tanks for destroying firing positions that hinder the advance of our infantry. 3. Infantry for securing tank operations must place all the weight of their fire, as well as the fire of their accompanying guns, on the enemy's antitank weapons, must locate and clear minefields, assist tanks in overcoming antitank obstacles and swampy terrain sectors, fight German tanks, determinedly follow behind the tanks in attack, quickly consolidate lines seized by them, ensure tanks are supplied with ammunition and fuel and help evacuate damaged tanks from the battlefield. 4. Before the commitment of tanks to the attack artillery must destroy antitank weapons in the enemy's defense. During the attack on the forward edge and in combat in the depth of the enemy's defense, it must fire on firing positions that hinder the advance of the tanks on signals from the tank commanders, by which the artillery commanders must direct artillery fire by forward mobile observation posts from tanks equipped with radios. Artillery and tank commanders together establish signals to call for the initiation and cessation of artillery fire. 5. When enemy tanks appear on the battlefield they are primarily engaged by artillery. Tanks engage enemy tanks only in cases where they have clear superiority in forces and advantageous conditions. 6. Our aviation's actions subject enemy antitank defenses to heavy fire, binders the commitment of his tanks to the battlefield, protects the combat formation of tank units from the influence of enemy aviation, and secures the combat operations of tank units through constant and continuous air reconnaissance.<hr></blockquote> [ 01-19-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

There is some added fluff to the following, but I felt the context may be of interest to some of the more serious students of military history here. My main point in posting the following is that it indicates British Army Armored artillery observers in the Western Desert would also occupy common troop tanks ala the US Army methodology described above. For those folks with things to do besides lurk at the CM forum the paragraphs I would like to draw your attention to have been italicized. From: "Artillery in the Desert" Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1943 (pages 40 - 43) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr> b. Methods of Observation Although the desert is not completely flat, suitable vantage points for observation posts are never very high. This lack of height, together with the heat waves rising from the hot sand and rocks, sometimes reduces visibility in the desert. Mid-day is the least satisfactory period for observing Fire. Both sides endeavor to gain what high ground does exist in the desert. It has been noted that the German infantry in Libya, as elsewhere, have launched attacks for the purpose of obtaining observation posts for their artillery. In one instance such an attack was made to gain ground only 3 feet higher than the surrounding terrain. Similarly, German artillery officers have been known to ride on top of tanks in order to gain height for observation. In both German and British armored divisions the artillery has its own armored vehicles for observation posts. However, even artillery with unarmored troops utilizes methods similar to those of the armored divisions. Forward observers are well out in front with those covering forces, armored cars, or carriers which arc deployed for reconnaissance and outpost duty. Often these mobile OP's must be with the armored-car screen, and they are then in an armored car or scout car. Many British officers have spoken highly of the U. S. M-3 Scout Car for this work. Its chief advantage is that it accommodates the entire OP party, whereas the armored car has room for only three persons. Armored cars or scout cars are assigned to and maintained by artillery units. Enough cars must be provided so that all radio sets allotted to a battalion can be mounted in such vehicles; these can then be used by forward observers. The advisability of providing more than a few such cars has been quickly realized, because they wear out soon and have a high casualty rate. Unless the OP is the same type of vehicle as that used by the supported troops, the enemy will concentrate its firepower on the OP vehicle. The British have found it to be impossible to assign tanks to artillery regiments for OP purposes. But they do have arrangements whereby each regiment of tanks modifies and, on occasion, reserves for artillery observers a certain number of tanks. A problem of observation was revealed in one fast-moving situation which occurred during the winter of 1941-1942. The battery commander was traveling with the tank regimental commander. Two observers, one per troop, were directing fire while traveling with the forward elements of the regiment. When contact was actually made, the observers had their tanks stay on the flanks and drop back slightly from the front in order to avoid becoming directly engaged. All control was by radio and the observer had his own radio operating in the artillery net, separate from the tank radio which operated in the tank net. Because of the limited number of frequencies available, it was necessary for all artillery units in a battery to be on the same frequency. The effect of this single frequency was unfortunate, for only one troop could be fired by one observer at a time, and a great deal of confusion occurred. When all control by observers breaks down, artillery support deteriorates into direct laying by individual pieces. In addition to the armored OP's, gun towers have been used to gain height for observing Fire. These OP ladders are used both as dummies to draw fire and for observation. They are mounted on trucks or may be removed quickly and set up at an OP. The British observing towers are generally about 25 feet high. The Germans have a two-piece telescoping tube mounted on the side of their armored OP, which can be cranked up into observing position. To employ these gun towers effectively there must be a number of them-at least one to each four guns. These, like the tanks and the slight rises in the ground, aid in overcoming the flatness of the desert. Other difficulties arise in the desert which only keen eyes and training can surmount. There is the real problem which a forward artillery observer has in identifying his own bursts among the dust and heat waves when other units are also firing. Judging distance in the desert is as difficult as on the ocean. Lack of familiarity with the size and appearance of armored vehicles at various ranges is a frequent cause for misjudging distance. The fact that the enemy opens fire does not inevitably mean that the enemy is within range, for he can misjudge distance also. But it is even more important to remember that all tanks are not equipped with the same type of gun. German tanks armed with 75-mm guns can open effective firing at a range of 2,000 yards. Antitank guns with a smaller range waste ammunition by returning fire and, what is worse, give away their own positions.<hr></blockquote>

JonS: Great information. I hadn't thought about spreading my search to Chamberlain. I did run across a reference to a proposed Artillery Observation Panther. Jentz's "Panther Variants" elaborates on a Panzerbeobachtungswagon that was apparently never fielded. The standard 75mmL70 was removed and replaced with a 50mm Kw.K.39/1. This AFV also sported a series of add-on telescopes and periscopes for observing from turret down positions. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>JonS Said: Finally, the reason all nations chose their stock tanks was to make the FOs inconspicuous alongside the other panzers/tanks, so these vehicles shouldn't necessarily be bullet-magets, the way AT and FT teams are.<hr></blockquote> Agreed...I will post some additional reference material on British Army Armoured FO's in the Western Desert tomorrow. This issue is discussed specifically.

Hey Kip. Actually my intent is more to look at reference material available for Armored FO's and how they functioned. I think I would personally have a fair bit of confidence in the average German or US Army company commander or even senior NCO's abilities to call in fire missions. Since your here perhaps you have run across information detailing Red Army Armored FO practices. I have run across late War references to Red Army use of Air liason officers for close air support, but nothing on armored unit FOO's. Here is a bit more on the US ARMY... And from FM 17-32 "Tank Company Tactics", November 1944 (pg 48) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>52. Use of Supporting Arms and Weapons a. It is normal for the fires of the tank company to be coordinated with the fires of the tank battalion mortars and assault guns, supporting artillery, infantry, chemical mortars, other tank units and with available air bombardment. The tank company commander must have full knowledge of the supporting fire plan so that his company may take full advantage of this support in accomplishing its mission. (See fig. 33.) Nearly all such fires are prearranged by battalion or higher headquarters. FM 17-33 and 17-36 explain more fully the coordination and employment of supporting fires. b. The following are fires over which the company may have some control: (1) Artillery. Fires of supporting artillery are requested for large area targets and to screen distant points. (See FM 6-105.) Artillery time fire in front of or over tanks neutralizes gun crews and tank hunters. (See fig. 33.) During combat the company commander, platoon leaders, or even tank commanders may request artillery fires. They normally make the request through the battalion commander and the artillery forward observer and may observe and adjust the fire themselves if necessary (See FM 17-12). It is possible for radios to be netted with the artillery fire direction center for direct requests. The following are normal artillery missions: (a) Support fire during movement to the attack position by counter battery fire, neutralization of antitank guns and supporting or screening of mine removal parties. ( Support during attack. The primary targets are antitank weapons, observation posts, and any hostile troops, weapons or areas of resistance holding up the advance. Tanks may operate directly under time fire (air bursts) on the objective. (See fig. 34.) After the objective is occupied, supporting weapons are prepared to fire on the target beyond it. © Support against counterattack. Massed fires are used to break up enemy formations, especially armored threats. These normally are previously prepared defensive fires for the protection of the objective when taken.<hr></blockquote>

For the sack of brevity I felt the need to bring these previous postings of mine over from the "Using Tanks as Howitzers" thread…. Within US ARMY Armored units in ETO artillery forward observers were typically attached at the company level. An FO would occupy a standard light or medium tank equipped with command radio sets….SRC-508's I think was the official designation. Within US Tank company's there were typically eight to nine tanks equipped with SRC-508's. These included both tanks of the HQ section, each of the platoon leaders as well as each of the platoon sergeants tanks (six Total). In addition the company assault gun -- if present -- was also equipped with an SRC-508 (this was a Sherman 105mm). Digging through Hunnicutt's "Sherman", I have found no evidence suggesting a specialized Sherman, or Grant\Lee was built for US Army artillery FO's. FO's apparently employed standard light and medium tanks equipped with the SRC-508. It appears the FO would typically take over the TC position from a platoon sergeants or one of the HQ sections tanks...any of which were equipped with the more powerful SRC-508's as standard TO&E. US Army Platoon Sergeants, Platoon leaders as well as company CO's within armor and infantry units were trained in the black arts of calling for artillery fire. References: Hunnicutt "Sherman" US Army Small Unit Actions Series, "The Battle of Singling, Dec 1944" American Tank Company Tactics (FM 17-32), November 1944 [ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

This is a spill over from another recent thread. The topic of this recent thread was rather vague and seemed to jump back and forth between the use of tanks as an indirect fire element and the use of armored FOs\FOOs. The subject of armored unit artillery observers was of most interest to me. I know the topic of Armored FO's has been brought up before so no need to direct me to a search. My intent is simply to present additional information on the use of armored FO's by various WWII Armies. The following regards German Army FO practices for Panzer Units. Of primary interest is: German FO's accompanying panzer units appear to have conducted their work from SPW's…half-tracks.In the absence of honest to goodness FO's, platoon & company commanders were trained to perform FO functions. From: Wolfgang Schneider's "Panzertaktik" (pages 362 - 364) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In spite of all their firepower, tanks are dependant on the support of extensive indirect fire. That is especially important in attacking deeply echeloned defenses or preventing the prompt reinforcement of the enemy in defense. As a rule, the battalion has several artillery forward observers under its operational control to coordinate the supporting fire. They are assigned to individual companies based upon the Schwerpunkt of the operation. The respective company commander involves the forward observer comprehensively in the total planning and command and control of the operation. Highest priority goes to choosing his position in the attack or his dismounted observation position. The forward observer must know: Enemy situation Concept of the operation (including Gelandetaufe, signals and emergency signals) Positions of friendly troops and planned movements Dead ground Obstacles and Location of the commanding officer. The forward observer orients regarding: Missions received Target reference points (Zielpunkte), engagement areas {Feuerraume) and interdicting fire (Sperrfeuer) Times and areas for adjusting fire {Einschiessen) Time, location, type and duration of fires for effect (Wirkungsschiessen) Changes in amount of support available (for example, priority to neighboring units). The forward observer accompanies the tanks in his SPW, moving from cover to cover, skillfully taking advantage of the terrain while considering opportunities for observation. He is a member of the company command net on the radio. In combat he keeps close contact with the commander, puts in requests for fire, reports results of the observations of other forward observers and passes on information on the course of the artillery battle. On his own he makes recommendations for the use of artillery. Calls for fire from the platoon leader and company commander should contain: Target location (where is the enemy?) Target description (which enemy, what is he doing?) Desired effect (e.g., destroy, pin down, interdict) Time (when to fire and, if necessary, for how long). If fire is requested for several targets, the company commander prioritizes the sequence of engagement. The decision for artillery commitment is made by the artillery battalion itself in coordination with the tactical commander. Artillery can be assigned the following missions: Destroy (Zerschlagen): Degrade the enemy's combat strength so that, for a limited time, he can not engage in operations or, as a minimum, can no longer carry out his intention. Pin (Niederhalten): Force the enemy to take cover for a limited period of time and, in so doing, prevent him from fighting. Blind (Blenden): Take away the enemy's vision for a limited time - to include firing smoke rounds - block his observation, prevent him from delivering observed fire or interfere with his movements. Interdict (Abriegeln): Halt an attacking or retreating enemy in his movements for a limited time or prevent him from passing through a specified sector of terrain. Cover {Uberwachen): Observe a specified area and be ready to combat an enemy with observed fire as soon as he enters it. Harass (Storen): Harass the enemy, interfere with his operations and, in so doing, possibly cause him losses. Illuminate (Beleuchten): Use of pyrotechnic illuminating rounds with parachutes. All the details of the artillery plan are expressed in the fire plan {Feuerplan). If no forward observer is available, the platoon leader or company commander can direct indirect fire. That kind of call for fire is called line-of-sight method (Sehstreifenverfahren). The prerequisite for that method of firing is a radio link to the firing position of the battery doing the firing, the exact target distance (e.g., obtained From a range card) and the determination of ones own position and the direction to the target (e.g., by using a compass). If a fire plan is already worked out with the artillery (e.g., in the defense), target reference points can also be given. If necessary, place locations can DC given, so long as they are not too large in area. Map coordinates (Planzeiger -- SWAG) are more exact.<hr></blockquote> [ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Just an addendum to my previous post regarding forward artillery observation within US ARMY tank units during WWII: From FM 6-135 "Forward Observation", August 1944 (pg 27) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Conduct of fire in support of a tank attack will be almost entirely by forward observers in tanks furnished by the supported tank unit. The forward observers should accompany the leading elements and must have communication with the tank commanders and the artillery fire-direction center. The tank is equipped with a 500-Series radio set. Communication with the tank battalion and company commander will be on the unit's normal channel for command or fire control, and presents no problem. Communication with the artillery fire-direction center may be obtained in one of several ways. (a) The tank unit may provide a 500-Series set to remain at the artillery fire-direction center. Communication is then direct between the artillery observer's tank set and the tank unit's set at the fire-direction center. Fire commands to the batteries are sent over the artillery battalion's normal fire-direction channels. ( If the tank provided for the forward observer is provided with an SCR-508 radio set and a spare channel is available, the spare channel can be used for the adjustment of fire. This requires that the forward observer's radio set and the SCR-508 or SCR-510 at the fire-direction center be tuned to the spare channel. The second receiver of the observer's set would betuned to the tank unit's command frequency. Fire commands to the batteries are handled as in (a) above.<hr></blockquote> And from FM 17-32 "Tank Company Tactics", November 1944 (pg 48) <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>52. Use of Supporting Arms and Weapons a. It is normal for the fires of the tank company to be coordinated with the fires of the tank battalion mortars and assault guns, supporting artillery, infantry, chemical mortars, other tank units and with available air bombardment. The tank company commander must have full knowledge of the supporting fire plan so that his company may take full advantage of this support in accomplishing its mission. (See fig. 33.) Nearly all such fires are prearranged by battalion or higher headquarters. FM 17-33 and 17-36 explain more fully the coordination and employment of supporting fires. b. The following are fires over which the company may have some control: (1) Artillery. Fires of supporting artillery are requested for large area targets and to screen distant points. (See FM 6-105.) Artillery time fire in front of or over tanks neutralizes gun crews and tank hunters. (See fig. 33.) During combat the company commander, platoon leaders, or even tank commanders may request artillery fires. They normally make the request through the battalion commander and the artillery forward observer and may observe and adjust the fire themselves if necessary (See FM 17-12). It is possible for radios to be netted with the artillery fire direction center for direct requests. The following are normal artillery missions: (a) Support fire during movement to the attack position by counter battery fire, neutralization of antitank guns and supporting or screening of mine removal parties. ( Support during attack. The primary targets are antitank weapons, observation posts, and any hostile troops, weapons or areas of resistance holding up the advance. Tanks may operate directly under time fire (air bursts) on the objective. (See fig. 34.) After the objective is occupied, supporting weapons are prepared to fire on the target beyond it. © Support against counterattack. Massed fires are used to break up enemy formations, especially armored threats. These normally are previously prepared defensive fires for the protection of the objective when taken.<hr></blockquote> Regarding the US Army's use of Tanks and Tank Destroyers as pseudo-indirect firing elements this seems to have been fairly standard practice from as early as 1942 and the battles in Tunisia. At CM's level I would agree with whomever indicated earlier that handling such a thing within the present game engine is best modeled via use of a few 75mm Artillery spotters. [ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Lorrin: I have run across references to 1941 & 1942 T34/76's having appliqué armor welded onto the glacis (and I think the Turret as well). I will scrounge about in my references to see if there is anything definitive on the type of plate employed. I am guessing that the herky jerky nature of Soviet tank production during 1941 & 1942 would have encouraged the use of whatever scrap steel plate happended to laying about for appliqué. However this is only my opinion.

Within US ARMY Armored units in ETO artillery forward observers were typically attached at the company level. An FO would occupy a standard light or medium tank equipped with command radio sets….SRC-508's I think was the official designation. Digging through Hunnicutt, I have found no evidence suggesting a specialized Sherman, or Grant\Lee was built for US Army artillery FO's. Standard light and medium tanks were apparently employed by FO's. Hunnicutt does indicate the British Army was fond of altering the innards on Shermans as well as Grant\Lees for command tanks. However, there is nothing at all regarding speacilized Sherman FOO tanks that I was able to find. Modified command tanks were used by battalion level(+) commanders with Grants being particularly prized due to there roominess. These battalion level command vehicles were the AFV's that typically had their main-gun removed to make room for additional radios and other command level do-dads. An aside…Within US Army (WWII as well as today), Platoon leaders as well as company CO's with armor and infantry units were\are trained in the black arts of calling for artillery fire. In addition, circa-WWII US tanks occupied by Platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and the company HQ tanks were all typically equipped with the more powerful SRC's that were apparently capable of accessing artillery radio nets (this according to FM17-32). References: Hunnicutt "Sherman" US Army Small Unit Actions Series, "The Battle of Singling, Dec 1944" American Tank Company Tactics (FM 17-32), November 1944 [ 01-17-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Lorrin Birds and Robert Livingstons armor penetration book is available from Angelray Books. Try: http://www.angelraybooks.com/books/hw/0017hw.htm [ 01-11-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Lorrin Birds and Robert Livingstons armor penetration book is available from Angelray Books. Try: http://www.angelraybooks.com/books/hw/0017hw.htm [ 01-11-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

I am not sure why you have decided to drag this thread from the Tankers Group to CMBO? My personal opinion on the matter is it would be hard to imagine German armor quality not degrading during the war. However, -- for me at least - the use of firing trials to support an armor quality degradation argument needs to be tempered with a knowledge of what sort of condition target panzers were in prior to commencing with test firing. German Panthers in Normandy would have -- in general -- seen a fair bit of combat related abuse during the campaign. By the time of the Isigny tests most of the Panzer Divisions from which the Isigny test Panthers might have been drawn would have been present in Normandy for two to three months of hard campaigning. Two to three months of relatively intense tank combat. I suppose it is even conceivable that some panzer division's vehicles may even have seen combat in Russia prior to being transported to France. As I know you are aware tanks are often knocked out during combat, and subsequently recovered and repaired. Penetration holes are plugged, welded, ground down and repainted and the vehicles are pushed back into combat. By most accounts the German Army was particularly adapt at recovering and getting their KO'd tanks back into combat. On the other hand there is no recorded assessment of the pre-test condition of the three target Panthers within the Aug 30 Isigny report. There is therefore no way of knowing what condition the target Panthers armor was in. Had the test Panthers frontal armor been impacted or even penetrated one or even multiple times during previous combat? Had any of the vehicles brewed-up during combat? A popular motivation for abandoning Panzers to the Allies was a brew-up. It has been said that the ordnance folks\tank experts proctoring the Isigny tests would have known better than to have used brewed-up vehicles. Yet the Robba Road Tiger-I was subjected to some fairly serious abuse by "tank experts" prior to being subjected to firing trials. Based upon the recorded evidence, it is purely speculation to imply that the three Isigny Panthers were in pristine condition at the time of the firing trials. Considering what has been recorded for posterity within the Isigny Documentation, it is also pure speculation to imply that all 1944+ Panther Armor was at some arbitrary 85% quality factor. Why exactly 85%? Why not 75% or 95%? If indeed armor quality was degrading why a constant quality variation? Why not a range…75% to 100%? If you haven't parted with BIOS you should be aware that there was in fact more than one manufacturer producing armor plate for AFV's. Is it possible that quality of plate between differing manufacturers varied? Consult BIOS for the answer.

Well said Kip and Greg. Wargaming without studying history is like trying to eat French Fries without Ketchup…uncivilized behavior at best.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said: For either side, although the Soviets would use it more often, to have the ability to construct Fireplans assuming they were included in the scenario design. The way this may work is for there to be a type of spotter that is only available in set-up and turn one. The spotter indicates targets as in Prep Barrages, but importantly, also the timing of the barrages which "need not start" in turn one. A spotter of this type could indicate a target to be fired on from, say, turn 16 to turn 22, then another target from turn 28 to turn 34 and so on… until the battery had no more ammo. Once set, the Fireplan could not be changed. The spotter disappears.<hr></blockquote> Great post Kip. I think you hit the nail on the head regarding how to best model some of the limitations facing Red Army Artillery during the war, and how to best model it within the constraints of a wargame. I guess I would add that generation of pre-game artillery fire plan would be applicable to all folks...Germans, American or Commonwealth armies. The biggest distinguishing feature is perhaps the ability of varying armies to engage surprise targets or targets of opportunity. I would be curious if you could elaborate somewhat on how to best integrate an artillery fire plan approach in wargames with surprise target engagements. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said: The Soviets could not swing around Corps and Army artillery fire the way the British could, but nor could the Germans and the Americans. Scott Replied: Germans no, Americans yes. That one's been discussed, and as yet I haven't seen any convincing arguments placing US or CW artillery beyond the other in practice. Which is for another thread anyway.<hr></blockquote> I have to agree with Scott regarding the real lack of conviencing evidence, although as already indicated this is seemingly a topic for another thread.

Donald Graves resume appears to consist primarily of histories focusing on the War of 1812. Graves holds only a "co-authorship" status in "Normandy 1944: The Canadian Summer" (this title is seemingly only an illustrated history?). Given this foray by the author into what might be perceived as an area of limited previous expertise, why should someone consider obtaining this book over any of the plethora of unit histories dealing with Commonwealth Armored units that served in Normandy\Northwest Europe? "South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War" is after all not cheap.

This maybe somewhat tangent to this thread (I really haven't followed this discussion at all), but it is an interesting series of observations by J.N. Rickard in his book "Patton At Bay, The Lorrain Campaign, September to December 1944" <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The Civil War had a profound impact on U.S. Army doctrine. One philosophy in particular survived the Civil War to be taken up by American officers for the wars of the twentieth century. "Despite the veneration of R. E. Lee in American military hagiography," states Russell Weigley, "it was U.S. Grant whose theories of strategy actually prevailed." Grant chose to offset Lee's Napoleonic manoeuvre sur les derrieres, brilliantly conducted at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville, by locking Lee's army in continuous battle where a trade-off in casualties favored his superior resources of men and equipment. Grant's strategy of attrition was virtually codified into Army doctrine in the years between the world wars by the various service schools. As the American Army followed the British lead and began to codify principles of war, highest priority was placed on one particular principle, that of the objective. Grant's principal objective had been to destroy the main Confederate force. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. American doctrine thus came to reflect Clausewitz's teaching that the ultimate objective in war is the destruction of the enemy's main body. The American concept differed markedly from the Europeans in one important aspect, however. Weigley notes that in comparison to the Germans, the American doctrine was different in the "extent to which they expected overwhelming power alone, without subtleties of maneuver, to achieve the objective." By 1939 a commentator on the revised army field manual FM 100-5, which outlined the army's doctrine, could declare with little thought of professional censorship that "no matter what maneuver is employed, ultimately the fighting is frontal. . . . One must accept the formula or not wage. Here was a blatant belief in the correctness of Grant's strategy. Patton the cavalryman did not accept the formula. Patton was well acquainted with the teachings of Clausewitz, having fully annotated his copy of On War by 1926. His notation that one should always "go the limit" in the destruction of the enemy's forces' reflected Clausewitz's principal thesis. Similarly, he wrote in Herbert Sargent's The Strategy on the Western Front that "the only end of war and strategy is the destruction by battle of the enemy. Yet he was never swayed by those in the army advocating frontal assaults as the only means to cripple an opponent and achieve the objective. He believed frontal assaults were justified only when circumstances dictated no other course of action. Specifically, they became valid operations beyond circumstantial necessity when used to flank an opponent. In Moltkean terms, a frontal assault designed for this purpose was a "fixing" attack. In Pattonesque terms, this became Patton's famous dictum, "Hold them by the nose and kick 'em in the ass." Moreover, Moltke noted that "which attack [the frontal or flanking] is to be viewed as the main attack and which as the secondary attack will depend on the general operational intention, the disposition of hostile forces, and the terrain.""' Patton, however, clearly favored flanking movements. The key to avoiding limited tactical situations where frontal assaults offered the only solution was mobility, but the lesson was so obvious that few picked it up. The vast bulk of Patton's contemporaries adopted the attrition strategy of Grant, and therefore, according to Blumenson, were "bland and plodding . . . workmanlike rather than bold" in their operations in World War II. Patton, however, though he would display Grant's bulldog tenacity, leaned more towards the indirect approach of Stonewall Jackson and William Tecumseh Sherman. British historian and theorist B. H. Liddell Hart suggested that Sherman's methods of fighting "fired Patton's imagination-particularly with regard to the way that they exploited the indirect approach and the value of cutting down impedimenta in order to gain mobility."<hr></blockquote>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Lorrin Said: On many issues 100% assurance is not possible due to the variations in data and information available to each individual researcher, so one offers a conclusion that may not be accepted by all.<hr></blockquote> It would be interesting to know if any of the Isigny Panthers had suffered hits on their glacis plates prior to being captured and subjected to controlled testing. Metal fatigue induced from non-penetrating hits suffered during actual engagements would presumably skew field test results reported in the infamous Isigny tests. There is no mention of the condition of the target Panthers within the version of the report I have access to. There is not even an indication as to whether any of the Isigny Panthers had been brew-ups prior to being drug to the Isigny "bone-yard" for testing. Of interest is a sentence on the first page of the Isigny report indicating that the results of the test were urgently required. It is possible that this urgency resulted in some essential background information being inadvertently left out of the final document. It has been awhile since I read the Kubinka Report. I don't recall if the condition of the Panthers or Tiger II prior to commencing test firing was noted or not. Had the test Panthers burned prior to being captured\recovered by the Red Army?

Osprey books always have 8 or 10 pages of color plates. These are relatively affordable booklets and informative. "Armor at War Series" by Concord Publications Company typically have several pages of color plates in each booklet. I have the Concord booklet: "Soviet Tanks in Combat, 1941-1945, The T-28, T34, T34/85 and T44 Medium Tanks. It has about 10 pages of color plates.

From: Belton Cooper Death Traps, The Survival of an American Armored Division in WWII" Cooper was an ordnance officer serving with the 3rd Armored Division. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Following General Rose's death, confusion was rampant among our leading elements. The general was trying to get Task Force Doan to secure our left flank when he was struck down. German groups of tanks and infantry counterattacked our task forces whenever possible. One major engagement just south of the Paderborn airport exemplified the tragic inferiority of our tanks". One of our columns proceeded up a slightly inclined straight road. A narrow, winding road met the straight road about half a mile from the point where our column entered it. Heavily wooded, rolling hills lay on the right side of the road, and a level, open field was on the left with woods set back about three hundred yards. The column consisted of a company of M4 Sherman tanks followed by a company of armored infantry in half-tracks. These were followed by several GMC trucks and Jeeps and three M36 tank destroyers. Suddenly, seven King Tiger tanks appeared along the crest of the forward slope on the left side. As the tanks advanced toward our column, they turned to the right into a column formation and opened fire. We had no time or room to maneuver, and the Shermans could not utilize the advantage of our gyrostabilizers. Three more King Tigers emerged from the hilly woods road to the right. Our tankers and infantrymen were faced with their worst fear: to be caught in the open by King Tiger tanks at close range, without the ability to maneuver or seek cover. The seven King Tiger tanks on the left proceeded down the entire length of the column, then turned around and came back. At extremely close range, a hundred yards or less, they raked the column from stem to stern. Some observers said it was more like a naval engagement than land warfare. The infantry immediately took cover in the ditches on both sides of the road. One of the Sherman tanks, with a 76mm gun, broke out of the column and took cover behind a small stucco farm building to the left, just off the road in about the middle of the column. As the Tigers came down on their first pass, the Sherman crew swung their 76mm gun 180 degrees to the rear and let go at close range. The Tiger's thinner armor over the engine compartment was penetrated, and the tank started to burn. The victory for this brave crew was short-lived, however, because the Sherman was knocked out by another Tiger on its return pass. Although the entire column was trapped, some of the veteran crews stayed cool and utilized their advantages. One of the crews of an M4 Sherman with a short-barreled 75mm M2 gun was near the middle of the column when the three King Tigers appeared on the right side. The alert tank commander immediately saw two possibilities. First, he knew that the King Tiger had a slow traverse, and it would be extremely difficult and time-consuming for him to swing the turret and elevate the gun to zero in on him. Next, our tank commander knew that an armor-piercing shot from his low-velocity 75mm would just bounce off the King Tiger. In a split second he told his gunner to load a white phosphorus round. It struck the glacis plate right above the driver's compartment with a blaze of flames and smoke. Although there was no possibility of penetration, the shock in the tank must have been terrific. The entire faceplate in front of the turret was covered with burning particles of white phosphorus which stuck to the sides of the tank. The smoke engulfed the tank, and the fan in the engine compartment sucked the smoke inside the fighting compartment. The German crew must have thought the tank was on fire and immediately abandoned it. Although the tank suffered little damage, had the crew stayed inside they would have been overcome by the deadly fumes. The Sherman immediately turned its gun on the second tank in the column and fired white phosphorus, with the same result. Although the ingenious tank commander knocked out two King Tiger tanks (without ever getting a penetration), his tank was then knocked out by another Tiger. The King Tigers on the left proceeded all the way to the end of the column, where they knocked out one of our M36 tank destroyers, which blocked the rear of the column. The lead tank in the column had already been knocked out and trapped the entire column. As the German tanks returned to the front of the column, they swung their guns around to the other side and picked off the remaining tanks and half-tracks. It was like shooting ducks in a pond. The remaining King Tigers withdrew, leaving our entire column bleeding and burning. When our maintenance crews arrived on the scene, we found a catastrophe. The Germans had knocked out seventeen M4 Sherman tanks, seventeen half-tracks, three GMC trucks, two Jeeps, and one M36 tank destroyer. The column had been annihilated. Fortunately, the personnel casualties had not been as high as the appearance of the wrecked column indicated. The German tanks were so close that the machine guns in the turrets would not depress low enough to reach the men in the ditches. We immediately started dragging back those vehicles that had not been totally burned. The burned-out vehicles were pushed off to one side of the road and abandoned.<hr></blockquote> [ 12-04-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

Hello Bob: Thanks for digging into your references and coming up with some actual production numbers.

This may be of some interest to folks following this thread. Some reference material I have laying around here. A Military Intelligence Report circa-March 1945 regarding German Rocket Artillery. Of particular interest are the final two pages that discuss accuracy. http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff2/rocket.html

Lorrin: Any probability of getting Kurt to part with a copy of those firing tables he had mentioned. FT-57 is not an easy manual to obtain. My FM23-75 has very abbreviated tables for AP and APCBC. Might be interesting to examine the whole ****erie. Aren't you curious as to whether there are any dispersal contrasts between the 6-pdr and 57mm?