Jeff Duquette

The Unit Diary of the 4th County of London Yeomanry, Lt. Cotton’s Military Cross Citation, and Daniel Taylor's research are quite clear on this point. All three sources indicate Lt. Cotton directed 4Tp while on foot. However I would encourage you to conduct some research on the battle yourself and draw your own conclusions. There is a huge amount of reference material out there on this battle. If you can only get one book on Villers…get Daniel Taylor’s “Villers-Bocage Through the Lens”. Excellent book. It can be read in probably 4 hours (but I read slow in order to digest each word ). There is a slight difference in the Tiger I kill totals for Villers-Bocage between Taylor’s research and the 4th Yeomanry Unit Diary. This appears to be a function of recoverable losses. Looking at the Combat history of 101st Schwere Abteilung (see W. Schneider) it indicates 3 Tiger I’s as irrecoverable losses during for 13/6/44. However it appears that 1.Kompanie.101 lost five machines during the fight..recoverable and irrecoverable (The Tiger Wittmann was TC'ing as well as the four KO'd by Lt. Cotton's 4Tp and supporting inf\ATG's) 2.Kompanie.101 didn’t loose any tanks during Villers. 3.Kompanie.101 had still not arrived in the area of Villers by 13/6/44. The 4 Tigers indicated in the 4th County of London Yeomanry would no doubt not reflect the two Tigers that were later recovered and repaired. And for Iron Chef Sakai: D. Talyor Puts the British losses at: 16 Cromwells 4 Shermans 3 Stuart's 13 Troop Carriers 2 Anti-Tank guns

Sorry…correction to my previous post. Review of the War Diaries For 4th County of London Yeomanry (The Sharpshooters) regarding the engagement at Villers-Boccage indicates: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>1035 Hours - All stations go off the air. B Sqn ordered to hold village at all costs. 4 Troop B Squadron, along with infantry and A/Tk guns under Lt L Cotton MM, after a 6 hour street battle, destroy 4 Tigers and 3 Mark IV.<hr></blockquote>

Here it is: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Service Intstruction Book Churchill VII and VIII of June 1944 lists Shell, Q.F. High Explosive, 95mm, Tank and S.P. Howitzers Mark IA Shell, Q.F. H.E./A.T., 95mm Tank Howitzer Shell, Q.F. Smoke Emission, 95mm Tank Howitzer Mark I Claus B<hr></blockquote>

I saw someone referring to a CS Cromwell fleeing or buggering off from Villers-Boccage…not sure what tank crew that might have been. As I understood it all the CS-Cromwells were commanded by Troop leaders. As I had indicated before Lt. Bill Cotton’s tank was a Cromwell CS, and he certainly didn’t “bugger off”. He simply dismounted his CS Tank. In his own words he felt the vehicle possessed little value in a stand-up fight with tanks. Lt. Cotton -- a veteran tanker from N. Africa --parked his CS Cromwell at the back of his Troop and proceeded to direct the fire of his Troops Firefly and Cromwell-6pdrs while on foot. Lt. Cotton won the Military Cross for his work at Villers-Boccage. His Troops tally when all was said and done included two Tigers from the 101st SchwerePanzer Abteilung and a pair of MkIV’s from the Lehr Division. So his lack of confidence was restricted only in the CS tanks ability to kill other tanks. To whomever asked the question regarding smoke ammunition capability of the 95mm, I did get independent verification from Claus Bonnesen who dug out some old wartime service manual for the Churchill…A smoke round was indeed listed in the types of ordnance employed by the 95mm CS gun.

"*See: Parker Danny S. Battle of the Bulge p.239" oophs...forgot to check Parker as well thnx John.

Hmmm....interesting test results. Maybe you do have something here, especially with respect to the frontal kills on a Panther. One in three hits resulting in a kill seems pretty high. Perhaps some AAR research is in order?

I can only assume that Jason’s reference to WO185/178 “Tank Armament Versus Armour, 1943” is based upon the extremely abridged version of the report provided by John Salt on his web site. The actual document is quite voluminous and spans a period from Oct 1942 to April of 1943. Much of the content focuses on the tough time the British were having with German Armour in North Africa. The first mention of the 95mm CS weapon and its HES round doesn’t really appear until the tail end of the report...April of 1943. It is evident that the 95mm was still under development at that time. The actual report indicates the following with regards to penetration performance of the 95mm HES round: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Performance against Homogeneous Plate at 30 degrees Angle of Attack “Minimum of 90mm at all ranges”<hr></blockquote> Clearly the “minimum” indication should raise some flags regarding what this number represents. It is a conservative estimate that presumably was put forth by engineers unwilling to hang their hats on data for test firing that was probably still being conducted coincident with the generation of WO185/178. I had obtained an original copy of WO185/178 about a year ago from PRO, Kew. There are only about 3 pgs of the unabridged report that actually elaborates on the 95mm and its shaped charge capability. Bear in mind the whole report is about 120 pages long and contains numerous letters, tables and graphs. I have scanned the pages that actually address the 95mm and posted them at: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff8/95mmHES.html This document is real history…not watered down stuff. There are actually letters in this report addressed to Winston Churchill. The real issue IMHO has been briefly touched on by the rather erudite comments of Lt. Tankersley in his post on pg 6 of this thread. There are other issues at play here which should reduce the “Real World”TM effectiveness of the 95mm. It is also pretty evident from Lt. Cotton’s account of Villers-Boccage that the 95mm was not the weapon of choice in a tank on tank engagement...even at extremely close quarters.

Report WO 185/178, 1943...never mind.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The only actual data on the 95mm HC round is the British one quoted by Jason<hr></blockquote> What is the exact reference here and what exactly does it say. If it is one of Jason's typical Internet based references what is the URL? Or is this a military secret. With respect to some of the AAR's eluded to regarding the 105mm M67 HEAT round KO'ing Tiger II's what are the exact references...perhaps scanning and posting these AAR's would help the non-believers and fence sitters on the merits of some of the arguments being presented here. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Because we don't know how much the 95mm was rifled (maybe not at all) so the test data could reflect reality for the 95mm, but not for the 105mm. In that case the CMBO would be correct...<hr></blockquote> The 95mm was based upon a cut down barrel of the British 3.7 inch anit-aircraft gun married up with the breech of a 25-pounder field gun. It was supposed to fire rounds being manufactured for the British 3.7 inch Mountain Howitzer. And yes the weapons barrel was rifled. A real piece of work rigged together from spare parts if one believes David Fletcher’s description of the thing. It is interesting to note the reluctance of Lt. Bill Cotton to employ his CS Cromwell in the close-in fighting of Villers-Boccage (post Witmann rampage). One would presume that the closed nature of the Village would have made his “uber” 95mm HES the ideal weapon for engaging the Tigers of Schwere Abteilung 101. Instead, this experienced N. African tanker reveals his faith in the 95mm’s tank killing abilities by dismounting his CS tank parking it away from the impending fray and subsequently directing the fire of his Firefly and 6-pdr Cromwells while on foot. From “Villiers-Boccage Through The Lens” by Daniel Taylor…”Cotton’s Cromwell CS, being armed with a 95mm Howitzer was of little use against armour so he decided to dismount and direct the fire from his other tanks from the ground”.

Penetration stats for 0 degree obliquity From: L. Bird & R. Livingston’s “Armor & Gunnery” UK 95mm HES….127mm US M67 105mm HEAT…128mm ================================ Penetration stats for 0 degree obliquity against RHA From: Hunnicutt’s “Sherman” US M67 105mm HEAT…4 inches (~102mm) =================================== Penetration stats from “Handbook and Engineering Data For Ammunition. Vol 2 76mm to 105mm, Army Ballistic Research Lab, Aberdeen” US M67 105mm HEAT vs. RHA 0 degree obliquity…4.5 inches (~114mm) ========================== A post war study conducted by Office of Science and Research and Development Washington DC, on Explosives indicates: US M67 105mm HEAT @ normal incidence (0 degree obliquity for normal folks) against RHA…4 inches (~102mm) =========================== P. Chamberlain in “British and American Tanks of WWII” indicates UK 95mm HES….110mm RHA @ 30 degree obliquity. =========================== “US ARMY Catalogue of Standard Ordnance Items”, 1944 indicates: US M67 105mm HEAT will penetrate 4.5 inches of RHA armor. ============================ “Fire and Movement”, RAC Tank Museum, Bovington, 1975: UK 95mm HES….110mm RHA @ 30 degree obliquity. US M67 105mm HEAT…100mm RHA @ 30 degree obliquity.

Måkjager: I share your weaknesses for spending money on weighty (and expensive) books on WWII German Armour & Units. Unfortunately my weakness also extends to weighty and expensive books on WWII US, Soviet, and Commonwealth Armour & combat histories ;( Regarding Niklas Zetterling’s book “Normandy 1944”, I have a copy and can highly recommend it as well as his statistical study on Kursk (co-authored by Anders Frankson). Both are gems with a wealth of archival research information all condensed for those of us that can’t hop into our cars and head on down to the Bundesarchiv. Unfortunately I disagree with some of Zetterlings conclusions regarding various aspects of the Normandy Campaign, however the data presented makes this book quite valuable. Regarding Zetterling's "Normandy 1944" providing any additional insight on the Lehr’s Tiger I’s, it does not. This was one of the first references I checked. I did inquire to Zetterling directly regarding Lehr’s Tiger I’s and got the following response: <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>There are at least two documents that indicated that the 316. Pz.Kp. was with the Pz.Lehr up to the end of June. One of these is the strength report to the Inspector-General of Panzer Troops, 1 July 1944, which shows that the division had 38 JagdPz IV and StuG III. Since the division had 31 JagdPz IV and 10 StuG III of the 316. Pz.Kp. on 1 June, and no indication new shipments have been found for June, it seems most likely that the 316. Kp. brought its StuG III to Normandy. I have found no strength report showing Tigers with the Pz.Lehr after 1 June. On the other hand, I have found no source explicitly stating that they did not go to Normandy, except Ritgen. Possibly it was regarded as impractical, for maintenance purposes, to have only three vehicles of this type with the division in Normandy. But if so, why did not that idea occur when the unit was formed (possibly it could have been assumed that it should have more than three Tiger I). On the other hand, the Pz.Lehr was intended to be part of I. SS-Pz.Korps, which had the 101. s.SS-Pz.Abt., with maintenance capabilities. In any case, I have nothing indicating what happened to the three Tigers. Possibly they were sent to Mailliy-le-Camp to be used by other units forming. One alternative would be to check the records of 302. Pz.Abt. (Fkl), but I have not done that.<hr></blockquote> ======== Regarding FKL units, I guess I thought you had JJF’s massive book on the subject (a mere 100.00 dollars ) I have seen this beast at a local bookstore but was never particularly interested in leafing through the thing. It is quite huge…on par with JJF’s combat history of schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 653. Perhaps I will swing by the bookstore today and leaf through the FKL study to see if there is any info on 316th FKL.

John: Great info. Thanks for posting it. Makjager: Still hoping you can give a brief dissertation on FKL Tiger tactical doctrine. Thanks.

I checked the scenario editor again, and it appears the German Side receives a Company of Panzer Grenadiers with half-track transport on battle 3 of the operation. The Germans also receive about a company of assault guns at the start of battle 3. However, the US side also received major reinforcements on battle 3. A rifle company, 2 platoons of Shermans and a platoon of Wolverines and a platoon of 57mm anti-tank guns...plus some FO's. I am guessing that point wise the two sides received about a similar amount of reinforcements. One interesting bit I noticed was that of the three Stugs I knocked out in battle 2, only two showed up as destroyed on the next battle. The two Stug hulks remaining on the set-up for battle-3 both burned during battle-2. I had continued to fire at two of the Stugs with a 76mm ATG until the Stugs exploded and began to burn. The third Stug I fired at with a 57mm ATG even after it was KO’d. It never did explode. Is there something built into the tank recovery alogorithim that makes burned tanks unrecoverable…or was this purely coincidental?

I checked the scenario editor for the operation…the size of “no mans land” is set at 0 (zero) meters.

So I am playing a CM Operation with a friend via PBEM. The operation is called “We Stand and Die Here”. The setting for the operation is the The Battle of the Bulge. The operation portrays The Battle of Dom-Butgenbach between US 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st ID, and the 12th SS Panzer Division. The scenario designer is Frank Rad. The operation sports an impressive set of references in the write-up and seems to have been well researched. I am playing the 1st ID and I am in defense. Here is my bitch…ok its really a whine…and yes I like cheese with my wine: The first battle is somewhat of a draw with myself perhaps getting a little bit of the worst of it. Second battle I set-up on the reverse slope of a fairly prominent ridgeline that dominates the eastern half of the map. My logic is that I will limit the advantages of his numerous assault guns (and other heavy direct fire weapons) by making the German Player move his tanks over the ridgeline in order to support any infantry assault. I set what AT assets I have (several towed tank destroyers) on the forward slope of the next ridgeline to support my infantry line. All goes as planned and I hammer my opponents infantry assaults in a series of ambushes as his panzergrenadiers cross over the crestline. When his assault guns try to move up to support his infantry assault I succeed in Knocking out 3 Stug’s as they cross over the ridgeline. No more armor comes over the ridge during the battle. After taking a very heavy toll on his attacking infantry and armor I counter attack to secure some territory preparatory to the next battle in the operation. The counter attack lasts about 7 or 8 turns by the end of which I have destroyed, captured or routed his attacking force. By the end of the battle I feel pretty good about my potential terrain advantages for the next battle. At the very least I feel I still hold the critical ridgeline and can use the reverse slope again on the succeeding battle. When it is time for me to set-up for the next battle I find that the game has arbitrarily moved the start line well beyond the positions I had grabbed in my counter attacks…in fact the start line was even pushed past my reverse slope position that I had defended successfully during the previous battle. The following is an image of the last turn of my battle. The ridgeline I had been initially defending is shown in blue…my counterattack has pushed my positions well in advance of my original defensive position. My start position for the next battle is the yellow line. I am somewhat screwed as the computer has give the German player the crest line of the ridge I was employing for defense. My opponent was even taken aback by the starting line and indicated his force was practically destroyed during my ambushes and subsequent counterattacks. http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff7/CMoperations.html My question is why does the CM Operation's engine give the attacking side such an advantage in starting positions between battles?

Måkjager: Great set of posts on your part. Can I assume from your commentary that you would recommend getting a copy of J.J. Fedorowicz’s publication on the Combat History of the 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung? 80 bucks is steep. Just an added bit on Tigers with the Lehr Division. Looking through Jentz he indicates Lehr strength returns include 3 Tiger I’s on Jul 1, 44 (presumably the same info John posted earlier). Jentz goes on to indicate the “the fate of the 3 Tiger I’s and 5 Tiger II’s of the 316th FKL remain a mystery”. The fate of these 5 Tiger II’s mystery is solved (see Durruti’s and John’s posts on pg 1). The fate of the 3 Tiger I’s seems to be in the air. One additional question: Sounds like you own JJF’s work on “Funklenkpanzer”; How did employment of Tiger’s assigned to FKL units differ from the employment of Tiger’s in a normal Schwere PanzerAbteilung?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>John Said: From what i can find all of s.Pz.Abt.503's Tiger II's except for 2* of the 14 issued to 3/503 were lost by the end of August 1944. *See: Jentz, Thomas L Germany's Tiger Tanks pp. 111<hr></blockquote> Thanks John…completely forgot about looking at Jentz I guess I was interested in the fate of the original 12 Tiger II’s issued to 1st Kompanie of the 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung. It seems reasonable to assume that none of these machines survived Normandy\Falaise. The few that may have squeezed through the Falaise noose were no doubt abandoned on the wrong side of the Seine. It is possible that the 2 Tiger II’s turned over to 101 SS Schwere PanzerAbteilung on 25/8/44 were remnants of 3rd Kompanie 503. However the unit history for the 3rd Kompanie seemingly accounts for all 14 Tiger II’s issued to 3rd Komp (W. Schneider’s Tigers in Combat I)….12 either destroyed\damaged by air attacks and subsequently destroyed by their crews, or broke down and were destroyed by their crews. 2 suffered mechanical breakdowns during some sort of propaganda demonstration in Mailly-le-Camp and were apparently entrained and shipped back to Germany 24/8/44. Tigers in Combat II indicates the following: 1st Kompanie, 101st SS Schwere PanzerAbteilung 25/08/1944: Airstrikes in the area of ST. SOUPLETTES; several dead and wounded. 2 Tiger II tanks (Porscheturm) of 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung are incorporated into the Unit. oh well...hair on a gnats ass sort of information I suppose.

Jeeze! Anyway it seems that: "I have come up with the following accounting, which I think is exhaustive." might really mean..."I got tired of internet searches so I sat down to watch TV."

In the initial post on this thread a claim of 15 Tiger II’s being knocked out in Normandy is indicated. I can find mention of only 12 Tiger II’s ever being present with any Schwere PanzerAbteilung during the Normandy Campaign. These twelve Tiger II’s were present with the 1st Kompanie of the 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung. It is possible that 2 of the Tiger II’s from 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung may have survived Normandy/Falaise and were turned over to 1st Kompanie 101st SS Schwere PanzerAbteilung around St. Souplettes/Limay…Near the Seine 25/8/44. These two Tiger II’s are mentioned in the 101 Abtl’s history, but curiously no mention is made in the 503 Abtl’s history (W. Schneider’s Tigers in Combat I & II). In Panzer Aces II there is mention of at least one Tiger II from the 503 Abtl. surviving Normandy (The TC of this sole survivor was apparently none other than Kurt Knipsel). I’m curious if anyone can verify the survival of either one or two Tiger II’s from 503’s original allotment in Normandy. Although 14 Tiger II’s were issued to 1st Kompanie of 101st SS Schwere PanzerAbteilung at the end of July and early August they apparently never made it to Normandy but were diverted to Mailly-le-Camp. 1st Kompanie (Tiger II equipped) doesn’t see action until 23/8/44 when it becomes involved with counterattacks against the US 79th ID’s bridgehead of the over the Seine River (near Limay). No Tiger II allotments are indicated for the 102nd SS Schwere PanzerAbteilung for the Normandy Period. First Tiger II’s issued to this battalion appear to have been around 27/12/44. Fourteen Tiger II’s were also dispatched to the 503rd Schwere PanzerAbteilung in late July but apparently did not arrive in time for Falaise. One flips over during in air attack on its transport train 12/8/44…2 Break-down in Mailly-le-Camp 11/8/44 (these are eventually railed back to Germany)…1 breaks down and is blown-up by its crew in Paris …9 are knocked out (or damaged and subsequently destroyed by crew) from air attacks in the vicinity of Beauvis, France (North of Paris) 12/8/44?...the last Tiger II breaks down and is destroyed by crew in Amiens 24/8/44.

***bump*** heh heh

Zetterling’s strength returns for Lehr include no Tiger I’s other than the Jun 1, 44 strength return which also includes the 5 Tiger II’s (All eight vehicles being organic to 316th Pz.Kp. (FKL) at that time). Unfortunately Zetterling does not detail the activities of 316th Pz.Kp. (FKL) aside from a brief note regarding the battalion buried in the write-up for the 302nd Pz.Kp. (FKL). To add insult to injury W. Scheinder details the activities of the 316th Pz.Kp. (FKL), but has no write-up on the 302nd Pz.Kp. (FKL).

The 316. Pz.Kp. (Fkl) did not bring its Tiger II tanks to Normandy. These vehicles were actually prototypes with technical deficiencies and it was ordered that they should be sent back to Germany. Since the rail net was damaged and the transfer of these vehicles had low priority they remained in Chateaudun. They were subsequently blown up to avoid capture. H. Ritgen, Die Gechichte der Panzer-Lehr-Division im Westen 1944-1945 (Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 1979)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>On several recent threads, there has been some discussion of causes of loss of German tanks, with some putting everything down to air, others to lack of fuel, some saying tanks were mostly abandoned instead of KOed, and the like. I think such claims are often false and even where true are usually misleading, especially to those without a detailed knowledge of unit histories. Not because "abandonment" wasn't a leading cause, or fuel a cause of abandonment, or air a cause of shortages of fuel - all are half truths.<hr></blockquote> Is it just me or does the contention and conclusion seem to be detached from the "evidence". There is very little information regarding AFV casualties. What were the numbers of AFV's knocked-out by tank or anti-tank gunfire?Number of AFV's knocked-out by mines?Number of AFV's knocked-out during air attacks?Number of AFV's knocked-out by artillery fire?Number of AFV's knocked-out by bazooka fire? There is only one statement toward the end of the post regarding any casualty numbers, and it suggests only that some folks abandoned their vehicles due to lack of fuel "With 28 running tanks left but no fuel, vehicles abandoned,"… Is the point simply that most German vehicle casualties were due to abandonment from lack of fuel? What German Panzer Unit is being referred to? What are the exact dates covered in the blurb provided? What was the original reference for the blurb cited? Surely this isn't another internet quote is it? [ 11-09-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>ok here is a small fact for you, on the western front, during 44-45, 90% of german tiger tanks were knocked out by aircraft<hr></blockquote> WHISTLE! Man! I'd love to see you produce a reference for this out of the hind-end statistic. Your not even close.

Amedeo…thnx for the second reference. I went through my own copy and it is interesting regarding the use of “Anti-Tank Rocket launcher’s for Anti-Tank Rifles. Krivosheev also indicates a production figure of 17,700 ATR’s for 1941 The 1939 Soviet Rifle Division TO&E is worth some additional pondering. Rifle Divisions were -- “on paper” -- equipped with 60ATR’s. In 1940 the allotted ATR TO&E drops to zero. One has to wonder where all these pre-1941 ATR’s disappeared to. The Red Army apparently had a habit of hording obsolescent equipment and ammunition…”In Case of Emergency Break Glass”. I wonder if these depot stashed ATR’s began making there way into Infantry Units prior to the official TO&E change in December of 1941? Than again maybe these thousands of pre-1940 ATR’s were dumped into the Black Sea to form new reefs and fish habitats for sturgeon.