cyrano01

Lemme clarify a bit here as it looks like we are at the point of the concept being tested.  First off @LongLeftFlank has said he is a Canadian expat; however, it is clear he does not hail from Atlantic Canada or he would know the term by heart - "fog eats the snow"  (in fact I get a whole central-Canada urban vibe off him, for which I may be totally off as we are a country of a rich and diverse cultural tapestry which we get very good at hiding - I, for example, hail from the far North originally but I have buried the hints of my somewhat 'wildling' roots quite well, I even use cutlery on occasion)
So what is this fog-snow thingy?  Not quite as JonS outlines but I kinda like the imagery.  So this idea was one we came up with way back as a possible method for offensive operations given the context of the overall conflict - peer forces, no air superiority, defensive-centric thanks to ubiquitous ISR and smart weapon systems.  It was an attempt to answer the question of: "how the hell is anyone supposed to attack in this environment when the other side can see you form up from space?"
In reality as far as I can tell fog-snow is the third step in an operational approach, which I am sure someone will (or has) turned into a flowchart and checklist:
1.  Establish pre-conditions.  Gain ISR/cognitive superiority - know better and faster than your opponent.  Neutralize enemy air superiority - this whole party is over if they can own the sky.  Logistics - build a system that can be put in place without getting hammered before you can even get into place, here lighter is better than iron mountains.  I am sure there is more here with respect to force generation, psychology and a bunch of higher level stuff but you get the idea.  I think it is fair to say that the UA spent the summer getting these in place over the Kherson area while holding off whatever that leg-humping the RA was doing in the Donbas..."just eating snow" maybe.
2.  Project friction.  This was where the RA completely failed in the Donbas.  They slammed fields and fields with HE -  careless in their affairs and focused on causing stress but not really projecting friction.  "What do you mean by that The_Capt?" - well friction is a Clausewitzian concept (I am pretty sure the Chinese masters also speak to it) that "war is a very large human organizational problem, and once you collect us in a group larger than about four we become horny cats to organization.  So friction is the "badness" that got in the way of order and formation.  Here Uncle C and myself diverge a bit as I do not see friction as the product of order rubbing up against order - an unfortunate byproduct.  I see it as an actual force on the battlefield that can be applied as projected uncertainty, or chaos; those deep strikes into the Crimea are a classic example. 
Regardless, the next operational phase is to project that friction upon your opponents operational system, and here the UA has done a breathtakingly good job over the last two months - on par with what they did during Phase 1 of this war.  They have hit Russian logistics, infrastructure as well as the morale and conative centers of the Russian military thru strikes on leadership and C2.  We have talked a lot about indicators and a big one has been the fact that the RA was never able to get out of that "operational pause" back in Jul.  My theory is this was because the UA hit them so well and created so much friction that the RA was only able to do disconnected symbolic pushes and never really got their operational feet back under themselves.  Hitting the bridges is an example of just how much they stressed the RA system, and now that system is theoretically fragile, or at least not anti-fragile. 
So once the UA had those first two where they needed them - and that is a sign of a military that knows what it is doing btw - they moved onto to step 3.
3.   Add Pressure - "Fog Eating Snow".  A square kilometer of fluffy cloud weighs about a half a million kilograms (https://www.usgs.gov/special-topics/water-science-school/science/how-much-does-cloud-weigh) which is not a bad analogue for fog.  It is not weightless by any stretch, it is how that weight is distributed and holds/exchanges its energy that makes it different, same goes for warfare...again, theoretically.  Once you have done steps 1 & 2, your opponents system is vulnerable but you have not changed the context enough for traditional manoeuvre warfare, this approach may work.  We saw hints of it on the UA defence at the battle of Kyiv.  Essentially the idea states that one employs highly distributed mass to:
Infiltrate your opponents defensive lines - you have already mapped out where the enemy is in detail as part of Step 1.  Further here it is best that your opponent is employing traditional conventional mass defence, which the Russians appear to be obliging.  ("Fog on fog" is a really interesting concept and could be the future of peer-to-peer warfare but lets leave that one.)  You use your ISR advantage to infiltrate in and around your opponents conventional mass concentrations, essentially filling in the 'gaps and seams'.  We know the RA has lots of these because they simply do not have the force density to create a uniform defensive line.  So UA has made a multi-prong set of advances along broad areas, which are looking "infiltration-y" - fog is not in one place, it is everywhere and gets into everything.
Isolate tactical "bites" - A few maps done by Grigb are showing what suspiciously like tactical isolation of some forward pockets of RA strongpoints.  Isolation means the removal of mutual support between positions.  If you can do that, particularly by eroding artillery support, you are in business.  Further this obviously has a significant psychological effects along with logistical implications. Once the enemies tactical positions are fully isolated....
Finish.  Pretty self explanatory but you want to quickly remove these tactical positions from the field either by surrender or annihilation, preferably by precision weapons systems as they are faster.  Rinse and repeat - Fog eating Snow. 
The whole "Adding Pressure" step is cyclical and the idea is that by repeating this process enough times, fast enough, the entire enemy operational system will collapse - this is the essence of attrition-to-manoeuvre, which is the opposite of what our doctrine says.  Key here is tempo.  This is weird as one is now employing attritional tempo instead of positional, but the rule still applies, one has to Finish faster than an opponents operational system can recover - which is why you did Steps 1 & 2.
And here we come to more questions than answers:
- Will it work on the offensive?
- Can you Finish fast enough, and how does one rationalize the fact that as you advance deeper this gets harder?
- When can traditional manoeuvre/annihilation take over?
- Have you gauged the enemies system correctly?  If it is more resilient than you thought you can bog down very quickly.
- Do you exploit success and go for a spearpoint, or do you keep doing broad system pressure?
I have no idea, these we can only observe and watch for indicators. The UA does look like they are trying a version of the idea, which explains all the "this won't look like a 'normal' offensive" and why we have suspected that the offence actually started back when we saw clear evidence of Step 2 over a month ago.  I suspect if this works that it won't look like much, and even bogging down...until it does.  If they have done this correctly, or if it will even work at all, the RA operational system north of the Dnipro will likely collapse suddenly after continuous pressure - think jiujitsu not boxing.  So I would not get too excited if the UA is not in Sevastopol by the weekend, that is not how this kind of warfare works.  We are way too biased by our western experiences on this one - this is system based warfare and the metrics are different. 
Anyway, sit back and keep eyes and ears open.  If this works like I can envision it, it may break modern military doctrine as we know it.  If it fails, the UA may not get too many more chances and this may turn into frozen conflict because the Left Hand of Mars (Defence) is back in charge...we shall see.
    

Some clarifications about todays "cottons" in Crimea.
1. Ammunition depots were struck not in the center of Mayske village (16 km SE from Dzhankoy) but on the village outskirts, were ammo dump was established on the territory of abandoned cow sheds. Locals, which were evacuated from Mayske and Azovske told after detonations began, "soldiers ran away on tanks". So, part of vehicles near railroad had time to escape. But anyway, part of them were destroyed/damaged, because ralway was damaged.
Here the first satellite photos of this place before and after attack


Almost simultainously with this attack a transformator blew up in Dzhankoy town. Maybe diversion too, maybe accident.
2. Attack on Gvardeyskoye airfield 20 km NW from Simferopol (also you can meet the name Sarabuz - this is old Tatarian name of this settlement, when after deportation in 1944, all Tatarian names in Crimea were substituted on Russian names andSarabuz became Gvardeyskoye). 37th mixed avaition regiment of Black Sea Fleet deployed there with 12 Su-24M and 12 Su-25SM. Information is veru contraversal. Locals wrote they heard loud explosion at 6:35 and then several minor detonations. Some locals wrote the didn't hear anything. Some wrote airfield AD shot down kamikadze drone. Some wrote there were two drones - one was shot down, other hit target and  set on fire something (a jet, a truck, a roof in barrack - different versions). After explosion helicopters took off from airfield.
Here the single photo with smoke in direction of airfield. No fireballs and huge detonations. But looks like locals can't write what exactly happened.

I more and more think this is work of SOF teams with Phoenix Ghost loitering munitions and probably dierct diversions

Very big assumption, and not surprising coming from a western analyst, is that “more metal” will work.  Russia had all the metal and we saw how that worked out.
Now I am not sure if the problems with mech would go the the other way against the Russians but I have my suspicions.  The problem with metal is its support chain and here Ukrainian might be as vulnerable as Russians.  
I am not sure but I have seen this before and it is a western biased weak assumption that “if the Ukrainians could only look more like us, this would be over quickly”.   Russian ISR is not at the level that the UA has access to, but a mech unit/formation is very hard to hide and getting much easier to hit.
I am growing more and more convinced of the idea that operational manoeuvre is becoming deep strike.  I am not sure giving the UA a bunch of metal is the right way to go.
 

Welcome, Maciej, to the swelling ranks of CM's elite Polish brigade! 🇵🇱🇵🇱🇵🇱
I won't repeat my post above, but I'll venture to guess that UKR losses have NOT run 200 KIA per day for at least 6 weeks now, if indeed they ever did.  And the Russians definitely aren't giving better than they get.
...I know this sounds awfully trite, but as you know of course, the only way to kill and maim enemy infantry in bulk day-by-day is to be spotting and shelling concentrations of them, preferably on the move and up front, in range of your mortars and direct fire ordnance (not just your heavy guns).
And the main way to force them to concentrate that way is by concentrating your own forces. On the move and up front. Bite and hold / 'grab the belt', or by other methods (probes, infiltration). Which is costly.
...That's why almost by definition, an attacker generally loses a lot more than a defender, unless he can achieve a payoff in terms of a rout or encirclement. The latter appear to be fairly few in number since February, thanks to generally superior Ukrainian tactical mobility (not tied to AFVs), NCO initiative and situational awareness.
Arithmetic on the Frontier, FWIW.....

Fresh Girkin assessment but with map. Because you know everything is better with map.

 

Map time! Main intrigue of the day - nope, Pisky is not taken yet. 

 

Their operational art does seem to have regressed to that of 1915/16 and with rates of advance that make Haig look like Guderian.
 
Almost impossible, 24 hour rolling media coverage of a retreat like that would be un-survivable for a Western government, doubly so given the far lower degree of trust in politicians amongst the general polity today.  That said we shouldn't lose sight of how close the UK came to throwing in the towel on May 1940, it would only have needed Halifax to become PM rather than Churchill I suspect.

This, absolutely, and it has been around for a fair while. I recall watching news coverage of Gulf War 1 in the UK (can't recall whether it was BBC or ITV) with a report from a journalist accompanying the leading dismounted elements of a British Army infantry recce unit. They had come under machine gun fire and were in good cover waiting for artillery support  to do their thing but the journalist was rattling on dramatically about the attack grinding to a halt under heavy enemy fire, woe and catastrophe etc. I remember thinking at the time that reporter clearly had no historical or military context within which to recognise this as the 'small change' of day to day operations (although clearly important to the guys actually being shot at).

They probably just got too used to covering colonial   anti-terror warfare.

This, absolutely, and it has been around for a fair while. I recall watching news coverage of Gulf War 1 in the UK (can't recall whether it was BBC or ITV) with a report from a journalist accompanying the leading dismounted elements of a British Army infantry recce unit. They had come under machine gun fire and were in good cover waiting for artillery support  to do their thing but the journalist was rattling on dramatically about the attack grinding to a halt under heavy enemy fire, woe and catastrophe etc. I remember thinking at the time that reporter clearly had no historical or military context within which to recognise this as the 'small change' of day to day operations (although clearly important to the guys actually being shot at).

This, absolutely, and it has been around for a fair while. I recall watching news coverage of Gulf War 1 in the UK (can't recall whether it was BBC or ITV) with a report from a journalist accompanying the leading dismounted elements of a British Army infantry recce unit. They had come under machine gun fire and were in good cover waiting for artillery support  to do their thing but the journalist was rattling on dramatically about the attack grinding to a halt under heavy enemy fire, woe and catastrophe etc. I remember thinking at the time that reporter clearly had no historical or military context within which to recognise this as the 'small change' of day to day operations (although clearly important to the guys actually being shot at).

This, absolutely, and it has been around for a fair while. I recall watching news coverage of Gulf War 1 in the UK (can't recall whether it was BBC or ITV) with a report from a journalist accompanying the leading dismounted elements of a British Army infantry recce unit. They had come under machine gun fire and were in good cover waiting for artillery support  to do their thing but the journalist was rattling on dramatically about the attack grinding to a halt under heavy enemy fire, woe and catastrophe etc. I remember thinking at the time that reporter clearly had no historical or military context within which to recognise this as the 'small change' of day to day operations (although clearly important to the guys actually being shot at).

Map time. Today unfortunately only evening Map

@sburke
Intersting person.
Probably major Sergey Kononov, commander of mixed unit, created on 18th July from spetsnaz company of 331st VDV regiment of 98th VDV division and PMC. I wrote that Russians as far as after Popasna seizing operated with mixed groups of VDV and PMC. Looks like they desided as experiment to form mixed special purpose units under VDV command instead just combined units of VDV and PMC acting together, but with own commanders.
Kononov already in 2014 was retired veteran of spetsnaz. Participated in the war on Donbas in 2014-2015, then enlisted in Wagner PMC and participated in combat actions in Syria and Lybia. Was awarded personally by Bashar Assad. 
He participated in this war since Feb 24th. Was near Kyiv and Kharkiv. His familiar told already in that time he was enlisted back to 331st VDV regiment as spetsnaz comany commander, but officer rank he returned back only on 18th July, when on the base of his company, the battalion was established (VDV+PMC?). He also was good specialist in mortars, so his last fight in Kherson oblast was on 22th of July, when he had been fired with mortar, but his position was hit by UKR kamikadze-dron (by other version the mortar shell exploded in the barrel)
He also was some sort of "guru", so was known also as Sudarshna Prabkhu
 

Morning map time (I know I am a bit late, but have to deal with you know this thing called life outside). Keep in mind that the Morning map is not about what is happening right now. 
I am removing settlements that became inactive and add where offensive action occurs. 

Notes:
For a second day I see a significant decrease in RU Nats interest in offensive. So, not many updates from RU side (yes, it is good indication that UKR resistance is much stronger than RU expected). Today I marked the first settlement Pokrovske as lost. Have no info but Deep State mark it as lost between 30 and 31. Still, I believe UKR are contesting the area as RU made airstrikes there (not that I care much - holding settlements just to hold them is not a wise tactics) 

Massed precision beats everything.
We have been seeing precision deep-strike as manoeuvre in this war and it is likely how to break the deadlock.  Once a side can 1) establish information superiority and learning superiority, 2) link that to mass precision deep strike capability and 3) integrate an infiltration-isolation-destruction cycle - the other side is in serious trouble.  The UA appears to have #1.  Is working on #2, and we have yet to really see #3 but it was employed by the UA on the defensive in Phase 1.
Another concept to consider with respect to #3 - https://theconversation.com/john-keats-concept-of-negative-capability-or-sitting-in-uncertainty-is-needed-now-more-than-ever-153617
 “being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.”
A military negative capability does not seek to impose order, it instead employs chaos as a means. This also follows the trend that this is a war of denial-to-attrition-to-decision.  In order to do #3 a level of negative capability, which again we saw in the dispersed self-synchronized light infantry actions in phase one holds promise.  The trick will be setting pre-conditions to enable it.
And people were all worried about tanks….

Now everyone is beating up on Clausewitz.

Evening Donbass Map

 

Donbass Morning Map.
 
 

Today's morning map

So, today's map of Donbass area up to 10 PM. Unfortunately, it became very convoluted (and I still could not cram some additional info). Looks like I will have to separate it into two maps. Also, I apologize for mistakes/some rough translation - do not feel well lately, probably got sick.

Bold red border - new info. Dotted arrow - failed attack/withdrawal.
Regarding Kherson there is very few new detailed info from both sides. RU Nats as usual are claiming big UKR losses but mostly keep silent regarding bridgehead. 

Map time. From Girkin so far nothing. For balance I used UKR MOD morning update + couple of Nats.
  

New map - this time Kherson. Added scale and time.

The US spends a LOT on testing, both computer modeling and non-nuclear physical testing, plus the money spent on maintenance, to ensure the nuclear arsenal is "ready."  This is because we also, while not ratifying the CTBT, abide by it and have not tested a nuclear weapons in a long time. I know that people who do that work will say the verification that they do assures the weapons will work. I don't know much about the Russians, unfortunately.
Someone a bit back (sorry I didn't quote it), mentioned observer verification. What was said is correct. They are verifying launch vehicles and warheads, but not anything about whether they will work or not. That's a very involved process (see above about spending a LOT 🙂 )
Part of the research work I did was to come up with better ways for inspectors to verify stored, disassembled warheads. Say you can't physically touch them, weigh them, take a sample, etc, but you CAN from a reasonably close distance read the gamma radiation they give off. Can you then verify that the entire warhead is there? You want to know that it hasn't been opened and the whole inside taken out and left only a shell so that it appears visually to be whole. Verifying non-diversion of nuclear material. Securing this material is something we (the US) spent quite a bit helping the Russians to improve. It's been a good investment. Turns out this is an extremely hard problem to solve and requires some sophisticated mathematical techniques to converge to a reasonable answer. One of my technical papers could be summarized as: "Here are 4 new ways we tried to solve this and none were completely satisfactory. One was sort of ok, but not great"  It actually went over pretty well, because no one had tried these before but several in the audience had wondered. Negative data is still good data, and people won't waste time!

Dave

@The_Capt @Battlefront.com
So, what changed from enemy side on Kherson direction according to Konstantin Mashovets info. 
Russian comamnd is really concerning about anounced UKR offensive on Kherson and continue to saturate this area with reinforcements. 
Previous reinforcements about which I wrote here about dozen days ago, played own stabillizing role - Russians could stop UKR advance in most problem zone in triangle Arkhanhelske - Vysokopillia - Novovoznesenske. In particular, they repelled attempts of UKR trrops to develop own success after liberating of Potiomkyne village in direction of Novovoznesenske to choke supply of Vysokopillia. Also enemy troops reiforced own "red thin line", defending positions from Myroliubivka along T2207 road and to Zolota Balka on the bank of Dnieper. UKR troops recently was conducting probes from Osokorivka to Zolota Balka, so this forced enemy to move additional troops and in this backwater district. Thus, in present time in this northern sector Russian troops have 7-8 BTGs of 205th MRB (almost in full composition), 34th MRB (mountain), 11th air-assault brigade, 10th Spetsnaz brigade and aditionally to this 7-8 BTGs they have here at least two rifle battalions of LDPR conscripts.
Going south. This is sector of UKR attempt of Inhulets crossing: Velyka Oleksandrivka - Davydiv Brid - Snihurivka. As I've written recenty, Russians could completely stabilize situation here. Units of UKR 36th marines brigade and 28th brigade withdrew behind Inhulets back after several weeks of desperate Russian counter attacks and artillery shellings, but part of bridgehead in the bend of Inhulets between Lozove  - Velyke Artakove - Bila Krynytsia - Bilohirka still under UKR control. In this place Inhulets has become shallow, so troops can cross through the fords. Our artilelry and ATGMs continue to shell enemy through the river, Russians do the same, but they didn't do any visible actions to take this remains of bridgehead. In this area Russians have now about 5-6 BTGs from 7th air-assault division (moutntain) and 1-2 "shortened" BTG, combined from different motor-rifle units of 49th CAA. Two weeks agor Russians hd here 6-8 BTGs, but two BTGs (one of them likely from "firemen team" of 11th air-assault, but I can be wrong) Russian command moved from this sector futher to the south, where due to UKR tactic now appeared new flash of UKR activity - Kyselivka area.   
Separately some words about southern point of this sector - Snihurivka. Small town, which plays important role, approaches to which Russians turned out in heavy fortified place. Since my previous post, no significant activity here - both sides are making probes and hammerd each other with artillery. UKR troops have not yet been able to crack Russian defense here.      
Next zone is Kherson-Berislav area. Russians have here 7-8 BTGs from 126th coastal defense MRB, 127th recon brigade, 33rd and 255th MRRs of 20th MRD, probably 11th air-assault brigade.   + two battalions of LDRP conscripts. In this area in last days UKR troops could advance northern from Blahodante and Kyselivka, but Russian troops, using reinforcements are continuing to counter atatck from Shmidtove on Liubomyrivka - Ternovi Pody section, trying to break through here and to come in the rear to our grouping, which advance aside M-14 road. This forced our troops to slow down and to turn own left flank toward the enemy. Though, situation can turn out in such way, that Russian spearhead in Shmidtove can get our troops in own rear too and here about two weeks we canm see limited tactical actions like a game who takes the back of opponent faster. Russians have plans on Shmidtove area, because in case of success they will receive good start positiosn to jump on Posad-Pokrovske - Shevchenkove section, pumping this area with troops and repeating own offensive on Mykolaiv. 
Exactly on this part of own defense Russians in last several days moved almost all own reserves, concentrated recently on left bank - 2 BTGs of 4th military base (occupied Abkhazia),  BTG of 429th MRR + combined tactical group of 42nd MRD (moved from Zaporizhzhia oblast), about 5 BTGs of 98th VDV division (moved from Luhansk oblast). Likely 1-2 BTGs of unknown units still in reserve on left bank. Except this Russians have been reinforcing own strike capabilities, moving here 3 tactical groups of MLRS in addition to 4 tactical groups of 944th SP-artillery regiment of 20th MRD of 8th CAA and 227th artillery brigade of 49th CAA
Russian AD in this area also was reinforced - SAM battalion of S-300V and SAM battery of S-300VM were deployed in addition to SAM battalion (Buk M2) of 90th AD brigade of 49th CAA and SAM batteries of 1096th AD regiment (Osa-AKM) of 22nd Army Corps (Black Sea Fleet) and 358th AD regiment (TOR-M2) of 20th MRD
 Russians also conducted many engineer works along the roads and on positions. For this, additionally to sapper units of brigade/divisional level Russian comamnd moved here there tactical groups of 32nd engineer-sapper regiment of 49th CAA.