cyrano01

Russians increase number of bomb strikes and try to conduct such sorties already not only by single jet or pairs, but with flights. Four Su-35 dropped five UPAB-500 bombs (ER-JDAM analog) on village near Kherson. 
On the video probably aftermath of this or recent strike - the bomb hit the ground near private yard, damaging buildings. It's unknown what a reason to bomb a village without troops, but this can be just training of mass usage of avaiation for repelling of Ukrianian offensive. 
 
According to Kostianntyn Mashovets, Russians in own preparatins to UKR offensive made main bet on mass of aviation and artillery
Troops Grouping "East", which appointed to meet UKR offensive on southern direction from Orikhove to Vuhledar is regrouping now in two echelons battle order. Grouping in about 87300 of personnel has 392 tanks, 1238 of light armor, 763 artillery pieces over 100 mm, 216 MLRS and 12 ballistic missiles launchers.  
But looks like even this enough number artillery probably can play not a main role in comparison with aviation groupment, which Russian continiue to gather for operation on southern direction:
Nearest airfields in Crimea (Russians also, if possible disperse aviation among airfields)
Gvardeyskoye: 10 Su-24M, 12 Su-25
Belbek: 6 Su-35, 6 Su-34, 1 Su-30, 28 Su-27
Dzankoy: 4 Su-25, 4 Ka-52, 8 Mi-28, 2 Mi-24/35, 23 Mi-8
Saky: 9 Su-24M, 6 Su-30, 5 Su-27, 4 MiG-29K
Kirovske: 6 MiG-29, 3 Mi-28, 3 Mi-24/35, 2 Mi-8
Kacha: 1 Mi-8
Strilkove (Kherson oblast): 5 Ka-52, 3 Mi-24/35, 3 Mi-8
Total 97 combat jets (12 UPAB cariers Su-34/35) and 57 helicopters (i.e. 28 attack)
 
AIrfields in south of Russia and occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast:
Berdiansk (occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast): 6 Ka-52, 5 Mi-8
Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar region): 6 Su-34, 12 Su-25
Krymsk (Krasnodar region): 15 Su-30, 35 Su-27
Kushchevskaya (Krasnodar region): 7 Su-35
Yeysk (Krasnodar region): 4 Su-34, 6 Su-25, 2 Su-30
Korenevsk (Krasnodar region): 1 Ka-52, 2 Mi-28, 3 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26
Rostov-on-Don: 2 Ka-52, 17 Mi-8, 5 Mi-26
Taganrog (Rostov oblast): 9 Su-25, 3 Mi-28, 5 Mi-24/35, 6 Mi-8
Zernograd (Rostov oblast): 6 Ka-52, 7 Mi-28, 1 Mi-24/35, 26 Mi-8, 13 Mi-26
Toatal: 96 combat jets (17 UPAB carriers), 113 helicopters (i.e 33 attack)
 
Russian recon and ELINT aircraft actively monitoring southern direction by 2 A-50 AWACS, using as aerial communication center and ELINT four Il-22 and 2 EW aircraft Il-22PP. Operative-tactical recon/SIGINT/ELINT conducts with 6 Su-24MR and 2 Su-34 with UCR recon pods 
 

The Iroquois nation appreciates your support.

DesertFox posits that it would be great if the UKR counteroffensive happens May 8/9 -- I agree that would be funny to see Putin doing his Victory Speech while all the world's news orgs are cutting over to discuss UKR breakthroughs.
But I wonder what things will really be like in the counteroffensive.  I don't think it will be one big thing, at least not for a while.  I think it'll be increased corrosive activity in many sectors w raids and capturing of various forward RU defensive positions, plus increased destruction of RU logistics/HQ.  Then more corrosion and more and more..... then somewhere we find out UKR has pushed ~10km here and there.  But will that be 'the counteroffensive'?  I suspect UKR will keep Putin guessing as to where the real attack will be and I think this will go one for weeks, not days, before we say "oh look here's the counteroffensive".  Putin's brain will be like a rat shaken by a rat terrier after a few weeks of this. 

Year ago. It's claimed on this video the same launch of "Neptun" missiles, which thanking to lucky coincidence of many factors could sink "Moskva" cruiser
Recently, about four months ago only photos of this launch were issued.
PS. Name "Moskva" is unlucky for Black Sea Fleet. in June 1941 Soviet battle group of light cruiser "Voroshilov" and destroyer leaders "Moskva" and "Kharkov" has conducted a raid on Romanian port Constantsa. During duel with coastal battery and two Romanian destroyers, ships of battle group received damages and were forced to withdraw. During maneuver they sailed on minefield - the cruiser was damaged by explosion, but leader "Moskva" has blown up, broke in two parts and sank. 
On the photo leader "Moskva" (project 1 type)

Is it just me or does anyone else think that the British Army seem to have re-incarnated Brian Horrocks/Edward Fox from 'A Bridge Too Far' and he is currently cosplaying as a Royal Lancers badged Lt. Col?

Is it just me or does anyone else think that the British Army seem to have re-incarnated Brian Horrocks/Edward Fox from 'A Bridge Too Far' and he is currently cosplaying as a Royal Lancers badged Lt. Col?

I honestly have no concerns on if a UA offensive will succeed, too many factors working against the RA at this point.  The real question is: how much will it succeed?  How far can the UA push before the RA can establish a new defensive line?  They have to balance that limit with what they can support and sustain.  And then there is “how much is enough?”  Apparently all that ground taken back last Fall didn’t do it, so how much does the UA need to retake to convince Russia, the West and in some ways themselves, that this thing is not over yet?

Well, sometimes promotions can be quite rapid, but that is pretty much never good news.
 

Eh, the U.S sent a fleet in 1805 to North Africa, due to shipping losses on American flagged ships. I've never been a fan of this supposed notion of the leased tiger following the independence of the country being the U.S chained to a pole by far seeing statesmen, when the reality is the U.S was not a world power, not close to being one, and decided to act accordingly.
When acting against entirely faceable entities, Native American nations, etc, no less was the need for foreign movements "foreign expansion" reframed as manifest destiny.

Wow, just read this. As a Brit who voted for Brexit, I think maybe Steve should stick to military matters as this is pretty insulting and frankly bat **** crazy. My reason for voting Brexit, for the record, is that I believe in democracy and the EU is profoundly undemocratic. We got rid of a king in the 1600s because he was overruling our parliament. The EU over the passed decades has imposed thousands of laws on the UK we had to accept by treaty obligation. It was always about democracy and sovereignty for me and many others, not stupidity, irrationality, or Russian manipulation.

This mismatch between ISR/Hitting capability and ability to develop and conceal effective mass does seem to be fundamental.
It also seems to be a continuation of a long term trend. The latter part of the C19th and early C20th up to and including WW1 saw continuous attempts to square the circle of effective mass attacks against increasingly accurate, long ranged weapons. Breech loading, rifled artillery and magazine rifles may not be precision weapons by our standards but compared to a smoothbore musket they are and, when mass looks like lines of infantry in close formations, they present a real challenge.  Taking this through to WW1 the question for any general was 'how do I deliver an effective massed attack when my troops are spotted by these new-fangled aeroplanes, shelled by accurate artillery miles back behind the front line and can't move forwards in enough numbers to deal with a counter attack?'
In the end the answer (at a very simplified level) was dispersion of assets, concentration of fires, more mobility all around and try to shut down the enemy ISR with your own new-fangled aeroplanes and AA guns. I've no idea how you achieve even more dispersion of assets and concentration of fires, or how to shut down the ubiquitous ISR but the direction of travel seems clear.
 
 

Very interesting video of small unit tactics. Tanks seem to divide, probably trying to use this characteristic enclosed berm (at first I thought it was some kind of ancient structure, but it looks too fresh) as cover, each supressing one Russian-held position, one of them being famous trench. At 4:00 ATGM Fagot is shot but fortunatelly missed. At 10 Russsians desperatelly try to throw something (AT granade?) but miss the machine many meters. They seem to be obliterated by cannon at point-bnlank range. It sucks to be infantry...
Flags at those vehicles are interesting thing to see. Also tanks use cannons to supress infantry even at closest distance rather than MG-s (did anybody even saw in this war tanks shooting their onboard machine guns?). BMP with infantry is somewhere else, perhaps more videos will come of Ukrainian grunts clearening trenches.
[edit: basically crossposted with Haiduk].

On 3:40 Wagners shot with ATGM "Fagot", but in the same moment tank gunner shot HE in front of the tank and the smoke on the moment hide the tank from field of view of ATGM operator - the missile passed through the tank. Next, the tank approached to distance, where "Fagot" can't be used - less than 70 m.
What surprised me - how Wagners could survive after several almost direct hits in trench area. Of course, they were shell-shocked, but kept opportunity to move and even to throw grenades 

Part 3 of "Battle for the T" (UKR armor counterattacks position that was lost to Russians during night following previously repelled Russian assault):
 

This mismatch between ISR/Hitting capability and ability to develop and conceal effective mass does seem to be fundamental.
It also seems to be a continuation of a long term trend. The latter part of the C19th and early C20th up to and including WW1 saw continuous attempts to square the circle of effective mass attacks against increasingly accurate, long ranged weapons. Breech loading, rifled artillery and magazine rifles may not be precision weapons by our standards but compared to a smoothbore musket they are and, when mass looks like lines of infantry in close formations, they present a real challenge.  Taking this through to WW1 the question for any general was 'how do I deliver an effective massed attack when my troops are spotted by these new-fangled aeroplanes, shelled by accurate artillery miles back behind the front line and can't move forwards in enough numbers to deal with a counter attack?'
In the end the answer (at a very simplified level) was dispersion of assets, concentration of fires, more mobility all around and try to shut down the enemy ISR with your own new-fangled aeroplanes and AA guns. I've no idea how you achieve even more dispersion of assets and concentration of fires, or how to shut down the ubiquitous ISR but the direction of travel seems clear.
 
 

The problem will be the “flash”.  You will need to concentrate faster than an opponent can see and counter-hit, which frankly the laws of physics do not support well.  Artillery simply flies faster than a ground unit can move.
Another option is to stay distributed entirely and rely on corrosive warfare but speed up attrition and precision.

This mismatch between ISR/Hitting capability and ability to develop and conceal effective mass does seem to be fundamental.
It also seems to be a continuation of a long term trend. The latter part of the C19th and early C20th up to and including WW1 saw continuous attempts to square the circle of effective mass attacks against increasingly accurate, long ranged weapons. Breech loading, rifled artillery and magazine rifles may not be precision weapons by our standards but compared to a smoothbore musket they are and, when mass looks like lines of infantry in close formations, they present a real challenge.  Taking this through to WW1 the question for any general was 'how do I deliver an effective massed attack when my troops are spotted by these new-fangled aeroplanes, shelled by accurate artillery miles back behind the front line and can't move forwards in enough numbers to deal with a counter attack?'
In the end the answer (at a very simplified level) was dispersion of assets, concentration of fires, more mobility all around and try to shut down the enemy ISR with your own new-fangled aeroplanes and AA guns. I've no idea how you achieve even more dispersion of assets and concentration of fires, or how to shut down the ubiquitous ISR but the direction of travel seems clear.
 
 

This mismatch between ISR/Hitting capability and ability to develop and conceal effective mass does seem to be fundamental.
It also seems to be a continuation of a long term trend. The latter part of the C19th and early C20th up to and including WW1 saw continuous attempts to square the circle of effective mass attacks against increasingly accurate, long ranged weapons. Breech loading, rifled artillery and magazine rifles may not be precision weapons by our standards but compared to a smoothbore musket they are and, when mass looks like lines of infantry in close formations, they present a real challenge.  Taking this through to WW1 the question for any general was 'how do I deliver an effective massed attack when my troops are spotted by these new-fangled aeroplanes, shelled by accurate artillery miles back behind the front line and can't move forwards in enough numbers to deal with a counter attack?'
In the end the answer (at a very simplified level) was dispersion of assets, concentration of fires, more mobility all around and try to shut down the enemy ISR with your own new-fangled aeroplanes and AA guns. I've no idea how you achieve even more dispersion of assets and concentration of fires, or how to shut down the ubiquitous ISR but the direction of travel seems clear.
 
 

Given the situation in Venezuela (its oil infrastructure remains, in effect, crippled thanks to a lack of western and domestic investment), and the US's long term failure to solve the Iran situation, the only two major sources which could cover the oil gap would surely be either North America (US & Canada) or the Saudis. IDK how much surplus unused productions the Saudis are currently sitting on, if it would be enough to get Europe over the short term bump in prices. But IMO the Saudis would have a lot to gain by opening up the floodgates and keeping global prices relatively low. If not prices will rise. As I recall the biggest impediment to North American production is its locked up in shale deposits which are expensive to explore and establish, most oil companies wont do it unless oil is over a certain price per bbl. If the Saudis cant, then global prices will rise to the point where North American producers can turn a profit and stabilize the market. The only alternatives for the EU would either be to back down on a big oil sanction, or turn to another unsavory regime (say, Syria) for an easement. The EU has before been very skeptical of US sanctions on Iran, with the collapse of the JCPOA I could see some horse trading behind the scenes for the EU, "Sanctions on Russian oil or Iranian. Your choice." I don't know the numbers off the top of my head, but I bet that Iranian oil could pretty much replace Russian in Europe at not much different a cost. 
Regarding Russian strategy, I tend to agree with @CHEqTRO and others who say that Putin is now paying a MAJOR cost for just occupying two republics who were, in effect, already his. At the minimum I dont see how he can avoid pushing forward to securing their aspirational borders. Even then that would be a major price to pay for a cost that seems pretty heavy. Were there any rumblings that the breakaway republics might negotiate with Kiev or abandon Russia? If all this had happened in the course of a few weeks I think the calculus would be different, but now the US has had months to organize and denounce Putin. I dont think a limited invasion makes the US look like warmongers or weak, rather it would make Putin look like he backed down under western pressure. And I wonder if Ukraine is going to be so willing to retreat from its long established defenses to let the Russians have more territory. A war of positions would, IMO, be much more beneficial to them especially if the hammer of troops on the other borders never comes for the Anvil of the breakaway republics. Better than to fight for every hamlet and trench, where Ukrainian troops already know the positions and the ranges, then open up a war of movement with a bigger enemy. All thats to say I think the stage is set for a much bigger rumble coming up. Putin needs to make this into a win, the US needs to prove to the world this isn't Suez, and needs to prove to China that it will face the same punishment in a Taiwan crisis. 
Meanwhile the people on the streets of Kiev are the ones who suffer. 

Can we all just take a moment to enjoy the irony of an American calling for more action by the ICC 🤣

With all the other news this isn't getting enough attention.  Ukraines new Shaheed copies working isn't the most important part either, although it is a significant new capability. To hit these missile in transit implies Ukraine, or its friends, are literally reading the Russian military rail dispatch schedule in real time. Or that our satellite observation of the rail system is so good we might as well be. Either way that is a huge signal the Russians ought to be quitting now, because tomorrow will be even worse.
I wonder if the U.S. specifically forbade the Ukrainians from firing a bunch of them while Putin's body double was in Mariupol? I 100% agree with Ghirkin's bit about how to identify the real Putin by the way. Just examine the degree of paranoia on display.

My partner has an expression she uses whenever I say something dumb: "when you hear hoof beats approaching, is it zebras or horses?" In other words, from the evidence available (hoof beats), what is  the most likely answer (a herd of horses, or a herd of zebra). I don't live in Africa, so it's horses.
Soldiers crash vehicles all the time. All. The. Time. Combine testosterone with fatigue and pressure and poor handling characteristics and ****ty roads, and that isn't really surprising. There is, for example, any number of images of Abrams in the ditches and canals of Iraq, which probably weren't there due to poor training.
I'm happy this vehicle crashed (out of action is out of action, regardless of how it got to be that way) but I'd hesitate to put it down to a training issue.
Horses and zebras.

Well there will be three people missing from that next iteration - me and two MPs chasing me.

So we are talking conventional peer (or near peer) warfare in this context.  How well it translates into unconventional conflict is a very big question.  One of the big issues we had in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan is that our entire ISR enterprise was built for this war and not those ones.  So we brought ISR designed to find an opponents center of gravity and tried to apply it to a COIN setting where centers of gravity are totally different.
ISIL also found out the hard way that if you fight in the manner we are built for, it is bad.  Now if we meet someone who fights like Ukraine, more distributed, hybrid and unconventionally, we could face similar challenges as we had against the Taliban.  The UA is a far more conventional force than the TB but I can see how future conflict may drive opponents deeper into the unconventional space because they have observed what happens in an fully illuminated fight.
On our end, we need to learn to fight in that entirely illuminated battlefield, first step will be to take a hard look at our structures, which were built and designed in WW2.  What we take from this conflict as anomaly and what is trend is probably the biggest unknown of this war. 

Two thoughts:
(1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
(2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!