Simon Fox

Technical proficiency marred by disorder and incomprehensibility is unfathomable. By your reply I note that your stream of google style is accompanied by poor comprehension. The source of information is irrelevant, it's the delivery that's the problem. I am interested in the discussion in this thread and in my opinion your discordant and disorganised modus operandi is perverting its' benefit and pointlessly distracting some other participants. A number of other threads have received a similar ruinous deluge of grogspam. I don't like it and now I've said so. Furthermore, I think your characterisation of redwolf as a waffler was both pompous and egregiously hypocritical. As far as I'm concerned these types of threads have an audience far greater than the participants. It's not a private conversation you're having here, it's a public discussion. The audience, who might be interested in learning something, also have stake in the intellectual dividend. Just because they're not clogging up the ether endlessly harping on doesn't mean they might not contribute in due course, as long as the thread doesn't take a nosedive. "The Ranting Troll": time honoured internet cop-out overused by querulous thin-skinned sooks. [ February 12, 2004, 03:08 AM: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

I think you're being quite unfair Emrys in characterising him in that way. As an aside I have a question for you. If you go and stand somewhere can you quickly ascertain your field of view or are you constrained to do it while peering through a tube?

For someone who deluges the forum with grogspam that any halfwit with the nous to employ the forum search function or google could cobble together, this is the height of hypocrisy. I don't always agree with redwolf or JasonC for that matter but they seem to generally make an effort to present their arguments coherently, in stark contrast to yourself.

Souvenir of a particularly lucrative ambulance.

Historically, was the German armour restricted to road movement at Anzio?

Well done. What's it called?

As slouch hats were not typically worn in battle in North Africa then it would be somewhat unrealistic to have them in. Most Commonwealth infantry wore tinhats when fighting. Some exceptions would be the Sikh troops but they're not included in CMAK anyway.

Geez, you're the voice talent, if the script is, "oh whats that word again...?oh yeah, CRAP, yeah thats it," then don't stick to it! Maybe Baldy thought that if he just put any old "CRAP" in then someone with talent would get pissed off soon enough and mod it. Pretty clever really.

Clearly not scripted by an Aussie either. There is no historical evidence that any Aussie uttered such an insipid phrase in battle. More like "We're all going to die of flamin' thirst if we don't get some bloody beer!".

Would they have made use at all of turretless Stuarts in the recce role?Maybe. Depends on the Regt. More likely they would be used in the Intercommunication troop. As a general rule it seems that light tanks like the Stuart weren't really favoured in the recce role. Scout cars festooned with MGs were more popular. And would they have had an anti-aircraft troop?Yes. Crusader AAs. 6 of them. Withdrawn some time in 1944. Exactly what role did the Churchill equipped regiments play in the ETO? I know about the specialty units, such as the funnies, but what about the regular armored regiments such as the 107th.The 107th Rgt RAC was of course a battalion, the 5th Bn KOR, Lancs. to be precise. As such it was one of 3 tank Bn/Regts in the 34th Army Tank Brigade. The tank brigades were generally attached to an infantry div. Were they a carry over from the 'I' tank brigades from earlier in the war?Basically yes. The Churchill was an 'I' tank after all. Why were they the only tank regiments in the 21st army group not equipped with Fireflys (not counting recce)?A multitude of reasons but one was a justifiable aversion to mixing tank types. In the main Fireflys went to Sherman equipped units. The only reason Cromwell units had them was the Challenger wasn't available in time. They were not the only units which did not have Fireflys, Crab and DD regiments didn't have any either.

The equipment of the 107th RAC in the period in question is impossible to replicate in CMBO due to the absence of the Churchill types with which they were equipped. The Firefly would definitely not be present. Otherwise all tanks would be Churchills apart from the Stuarts used for recce which wouldn't have seen much action. Each troop would comprise 3 tanks and the Sqn HQ would have 3-4 tanks with 2 of them being the V/VIII (95mm CS variants). [ August 13, 2003, 04:43 AM: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

Not according to the Soviets, it wasn't. </font>

Its pretty obvious you know bugger all about the Littlejohn adapter, amongst other things. Tony Williams website, which you linked to earlier and which is very good, is actually quite informative. Well, I had no trouble comprehending it. No, the Littlejohn adapter should not be in CMBB as there is no evidence that the ammunition was supplied to the SU. This should have no impact whatsoever upon 2-pr penetration in the game. The Littlejohn adapter is not a gun, its a thing which fits on a gun and it can be removed or attached quite readily depending on the preference of the crew. They are not distinctly different weapons. As already pointed out it was introduced in 1943 when most 2-pr tank and AT guns were being supplanted. At best it should be seen as extending the life of the 2-pr not as a stopgap prior to the 6-pr. Although indications are that the Littlejohn adapter was widely available to Brit armoured car and light tank crews by 1944 its not entirely clear as to how widely used it was used. It was sufficiently unusual that the war diaries of Brit armoured car units in NWE remark upon instances of its use. Brit tank gunners are not so ill trained that they don't know what combination of gun, adapter and ammunition they are using. Littlejohn may be seen referred to as "2pdr squeeze" in Brit accounts. I will point out that if it's got the Littlejohn not only can't it fire HE but it can't fire AP or APC either.

That would be the 2/4th AT regiment. In fact when they encountered Jap tanks near Bakri, Malaya in 1942 they found that the tank armour was so thin that the 2-pr shot was going straight through causing insufficient damage and they had to use their HE rounds to effectively knock them out. Reference to that can be found in David Horners "The Gunners" and Neil Smiths unit history "Tid-Apa" the extract below is from the latter: "At dawn on the 18th five Japanese tanks leading infantry advanced down the road to the positions now occupied by McCure and fellow Australians from the 2/29th Battalion at Muar. McCure had sited one section of C Troop guns with one gun on the road opposite Headquarters 2/29th Battalion and the other about 600 yards towards Muar. The forward Australian anti tank crews under Sergeants Freddie Peake and Clarrie Thornton engaged the enemy tanks with armour piercing shells which again appeared to have little effect. The tanks continued to advance, firing with all guns as they came. Veterans recall the rapidity of the ensuing action. Fear did not seem to be a factor, rather they were too busy getting on with the job of fighting armoured vehicles. This was exactly what they had trained for and they knew their work well. The leading tank was level with the foremost anti tank gun when the gun sergeant, Clarrie Thornton from Berrigan, NSW calmly changed to high explosive as the tanks passed by; the troop thus knocked them out one by one. Although he was wounded in the thigh by shrapnel during the engagement, Thornton prepared his gun for further action and three more tanks that followed were also destroyed. Lieutenant McCure and his batman Tich Morley repeatedly carried ammunition forward by hand to Thornton's gun under heavy fire. Any tanks that started to pass through the defensive position were finished off by the two guns sited further to the rear and manned by Sergeants Harrison and Parsons." Note: Lt McClure, the troop commander, was never captured by the Japanese and spent the next 3 1/2 years in Malaya with guerrilla forces. From his own account of the action: "In the early morning light, all hell suddenly broke loose. Clarrie had opened fire on a convoy of Jap tanks moving along the road and his crew were pumping armour-piercing shells into the tanks as fast as he could fire them. The shells disabled the tanks, but their crews were still able to use their guns. Captain Bowring of the 2/29th Infantry Battalion, then came running over to me, calling out that Clarrie wanted high-explosive ammunition, and to hurry up with it. My batman, Titch Morley, and I raced over to Clarrie's gun, with the containers of high-explosive shells. Each time I dumped a container at their gun, I gave Clarrie a slap on the shoulder and urged him on. He was doing a great job and his crew seemed to be crazily enjoying the action, completely ignoring of the dangers of the battle raging on around them. It was our first encounter in action. Everything was happening so fast, gunfire and explosions were going off all around us, mortars were falling everywhere, we didn't have time for things to sink in. There was no time to be afraid. Clarrie kept pumping the high-explosive shells into the tanks as fast as he could. Titch and I just kept on running to his gun with containers of ammunition until he had knocked out all the eight tanks. The first two tanks which Clarrie had hit with armour-piercing shells had rolled on toward Charley Parson's gun in the cutting, where Charley finished them off with high-explosive shells." From Sgt Thornton's account: "As members of 13th Battery it was our job to stop any enemy tanks from breaking through our lines. My gun crew - Claude Brown, Ray Cooper, Jim Flowers, Lance Gilbert and Keith Fletcher, was assigned to support Colonel Robertson's 2/29th Infantry Battalion to hold off the Jap assault. On our way north, the 2/29th Battalion decided to rendezvous on the road between Bakri and Muar for the night. Under the direction of our Troop Commander Bill McCure, we set up our gun emplacement well concealed behind a mound, on the corner of a bend facing straight down the road with an uninterrupted view of any Jap tanks that might come toward us. The intermittent rattle of gunfire warned us that the Japs were not far away and we settled down to a rather restless night. As the day dawned, we heard the rumbling and clanking of tanks moving slowly down the road. Our hearts thumping, we quickly but quietly manned our gun, aligned our sights, loaded and were ready for action. As the tanks moved slowly toward us, I let them clank noisily past our gun position. When the first three had turned the bend and were side on to our gun, we gave them a burst of fire, hitting all three with armour piercing shells and stopping them in their tracks. The armour piercing shells however went straight through the tanks but did not destroy them so I promptly sent a runner to Bill who quickly arrived with a container of high explosive ammunition which we hastily pumped into the Jap tanks, demolishing them. The tanks were closely followed by another two, which we briskly dispatched with the high explosive ammo. It was all very thrilling and the adrenalin was coursing fast in our veins. By the time we stopped firing, the harassing Jap forces we had been sent to halt, turned out to be 12 000 select troops from the crack Imperial Army Japanese Guards, who were turning everything they had at us. Shells and mortar bombs exploded all around and we were under heavy fire and sniping from their infantry. Suddenly we saw three more tanks heading toward us. This time one attacked us on our flank from the jungle. The situation was tense and frightening, for we knew that the Japs were now fully aware of our position. After an exciting duel with them, we managed to knock out the three of them too. When all eight tanks had been destroyed and were burning along the roadside in front of us, we just had time for a short breather as the Jap infantry began to close on us. Throughout the action, my gun crew had performed magnificently, madly excited and cracking jokes as they loaded and fired the gun."

I don't think there was a hollow charge round for the 3in, leastways I have never heard of it. In January 1942 first orders were placed for conversions of Matilda II from 2 pdr to 76mm tank gun following trials at factory No 92 in December 1941. Kolomiets and Ilya Moshchansky have the following to say on this subject in "Matilda in the Red Army" "It Is possible, that reequipment of the Matilda with the F-34 gun (not sure of designation, could be Zis5) was not made at all. You see since the spring of 1942 the infantry tank MK.II " Matilda CS " began to arrive in our country, being armed with a 76,2-mm howitzer, having available high explosive shells that allowed more effective combat with strongpoints of the enemy."

Sorry, I only have tank and some other equipment shipping data for the earlier period (41-43) and I better not reveal too much of that or Jim will start raving on about why the Blacker Bombard isn't in the game Regarding the 75 conversions (Churchill NA75). I think it was tried out initially in North Africa (Tunisia) as a result of experience there. Consideration has to be given to the existing British experience with the Sherman and its 75mm round. The conversions were in no way "redundant" because 75mm HE was vastly superior against strongpoints or AT guns than the 6-pr round. That was particularly useful in the kind of fighting that occurred in Italy. Issues of 6-pr supply involve a multitude of factors including logistics, RAC doctrine and RA/RAC demarcation issues in addition to merely manufacture. Evidence seems to suggest that the HE round first became available in North Africa (NA) some time in 1943. But that doesn't really give mush of an indication regarding availability in the UK or shipments to the Soviet Union. Sometimes it seems that decisions were taken in the UK regarding the necessity of sending particular items to NA which didn't correspond the the priorities of those actually in NA.

No

There's nothing more satisfying to an Aussie than a Pommie making an idiot of himself. They do it on the cricket pitch, they do it on the soccer pitch and now you're doing it on BTS's pitch. Most people know better than to assert that their opinion is a fact when there seems to be a bit of contradictory evidence floating around. Or at least if they do so they cite some good hard evidence to back up their bold assertions like other people have in this thread. The quote John posted from Ian Hogg does nothing whatsoever to support your position. Quite the contrary. If you actually want to be informed I suggest you try: "Jane's World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide" by Leland Ness who has something to say on the subject. or "Fighting, Support and Transport Vehicles, and The War Office Organization and Their Provision" The War Office Publication, 1951. Available at Bovington I understand. or "Lend Lease Tanks 1941-1945" by M. Kolomiyets and I. Moshchanskiy, Moscow, Russia, 2000 The absence of 2pdr HE in CMBB has nothing to do with BTS "getting it right" nor wrong either for that matter.

Most people when faced with irrefutable evidence contradicting their boldly made statements would perhaps temper the tone of their future assertions. But alas, not yourself. MikeyD has already pointed out to you the antecedance of the British 75mm gun, which is fairly commonly known and not exactly a secret. I guess like myself he was suprised that an expert in the field such as yourself was unaware of this. In the period 7/43 to 6/44 the British shipped 55,070 rounds 2-pr HE rounds and 99,375 6-pr rounds to the Soviet Union. One wonders at the Soviets reaction to receiving these vast shipments of fictitous rounds. As for the Canadian Valentines I guess BTS decided that the IV was sufficiently close to represent those marks which do not differ from it in any significant regard in game terms (though of course I wouldn't presume to know their actual thinking on the matter).

Websites and pictures posted therein may not be the best method to determine shipping data for lend lease equipment. Failure to locate high quality pictures on the web does not indicate absence of supply. Original British records for numbers are altogether more useful. It is pointless to speculate regarding quantitative data based upon first person accounts and a few old photos when concrete primary sources are readily obtained. Chris Shillito has kindly supplied me with the figures for lend lease tank shipments. This data comes from the following document: D.R.A.C. Library Serial 001066, Progress Report No.2 (the page in question comes from an Appendix to Chapter III). I also have a copy of an original British report which gives the same data courtesy of Leland Ness whose new book incoporates lots of supply data for armoured vehicles. Tanks Shipped to Russia from Great Britain and Canada, 1st October 1941 to 30th. June 1944 TYPE....................SHIPPED.........SUNK............ARRIVED Tetrarch................20..............---.............20 Matilda III.............113.............---.............113 Matilda IV..............915.............221.............694 Matilda IV.CS...........156.............31..............126 Valentine II............161.............25..............136 Valentune III...........346.............---.............346 Valentine IV............520.............71..............559 Valentine V.............340.............113.............227 Valentine VII(Canadian).1388............180.............1208 Valentine IX............836.............18..............818 Valentine X.............74..............8...............66 Churchill II............45..............19..............26 Churchill III...........151.............24..............127 Churchill IV............105.............---.............105 Cromwell IV.............6.(in transit)..---.............--- Valentine.Bridge.Laying 25..............---.............25 AFV.Spares..............19,611.tons.....1,966.tons......17,588 tons(excl. 57 tons in transit) These documents also demonstrate that the Soviet union was supplied with various types of 2-pr and 6-pr ammunition, including substantial quantities of HE for both guns. BTS is aware of this data

These densities are intended as a basis for comparisons of army sectors only and may not be relevant to CMBB. These deployments should be seen in the context that they are echeloned in depth of up to 30km, although of course greater strength is generally found in the first defensive belt. It is not entirely clear from the source whether they represent first echelon units and their assigned support only or the entire depth of the first three belts. Even if they did the depth of the first belt might be 5 or more km. For CMBB you would need to delve into divisional and regimental frontages to get a more accurate estimate. The available artillery support may be more relevant as supprting arty may have been deployed forward to support the first defensive belt. You would also of course have to add in the very considerable obstacles including 1-2,000 AT mines per km. [ January 16, 2003, 02:11 AM: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

Andreas, Thanks. The level of knowledge from the German perspective is high and that from the Soviet perspective is poor. In the case of Kursk that's rather mystifying because it's rather easy to get a hold of. Even within the area of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies themselves the progress made by the 2nd SS Pz Corps relative to the 48th and 3rd Pz Corps isn't very mysterious when you look at Red Army dispositions. Hortlund, To be quite honest I haven't given much attention to overall numbers. Given that most Red Army units were pretty much up to strength at the time I find units, their type and deployment to be altogether more informative. Raw numbers can also be somewhat deceptive. The Central Front seems to have adopted a somewhat different posture than the Voronezh Front as I have already alluded to. This applies not just linearly across the front (ie correctly anticipating the point of main German effort) but also in depth between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defensive Belts. The Central Front had a greater proportion of it's armour in independent brigades and regiments operating in support of rifle corps in the 1st and 2nd defensive belts. In contrast the Voronezh Front had more of it's armour in the 3rd defensive belt.

It's all perfectly simple. Zhukov was correct, the Soviets mistakenly anticipated the heaviest German attacks in the North. Crudely speaking the Central Front (North) comprised 42 Rifle Div whereas the Voronezh Front (South) comprised 35 Rifle Div. Exacerbating this disparity was the dispositions made within the respective fronts. Rokossovski (North) adopted a more defensive posture putting more of his force 'up front' in his first echelon and reserving only the 2nd Tank Army for the counterattacking role, in contrast Vatutin arranged his forces differently reserving a stronger second echelon comprising 1st Tank Army and 69th Army. I haven't mentioned the disparity between the German dispositions North vs. South as I am sure one of the coterie of Wehrmacht idolisers can quote the entire OOB of the top of their heads As a consequence the MLR in the North was considerably stronger than that in the South. This was compounded by the fact that Rokossovski correctly anticipated the location of the main German effort whereas Vatutin expected it somewhat to the south of where it actually occurred. To consider this in more detail, the 13th Army bore the main brunt of the German attack in the North. It defended a 32km frontage with 12 Rifle Divisions (some sources say 11), 3 Tank Brigades, 5 Tank Regiments, 2 AT Brigades, 1 SU Regiment and 1 Tank Destroyer Div. It was further bolstered by an entire Artillery Corps of 2 Artillery Divisions and 1 Guards Mortar Division. The estimated density of heavy weapons in the 13 Army sector was 23 AT guns and 91 artillery guns (Guns and mortars) per kilometre of front. In the South the 6th Guards Army which faced the attack of 4th Panzer Army defended a front of 60km with 7 Rifle Divisions, 1 Tank Brigade, 2 Tank Regiments, 3 AT Brigades and 1 SU Regiment. Additional artillery was 2 Hvy Howitzer Regiments and a Cannon Brigade. The estimated density of heavy weapons in the 6th Guards sector 9 AT guns and 26 artillery guns (Guns and mortars) per kilometer of front. The arithmetic is simple and compelling. The relative progress of the two pincers reflects generally the forces assigned to them and those they fought. Now let's move along the rather mistaken characterisation of Model's infantry attack vs. Manstein's armoured juggernauts or as the consumers of pop history would have it: Model's Somme offensive vs. Manstein's "Blitzkrieg". Firstly, let's consider Model's dilemma: realistically speaking he just doesn't have enough Panzer Divisions use them to bash through the Soviet MLR and keep going. In reality, both North and South "pincers" were combined arms offensives with, on a unit by unit basis, fairly similar weight of armour. For example in the North the 86th and 292nd Infantry Div were supported by 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Abteilung (45 Ferdinands), 654th Heavy Panzerjäger Abteilung (44 Ferdinands), 216th Heavy Panzer Abteilung (45 Brummbars), 177th Assault Gun Abteilung (36? StuGs) and 244th Assault Gun Abteilung (36? StuGs). In terms of supporting AFVs this compares quite favourably with the typical Panzer Divs complement of around 80-120 tanks at Kursk. In fact the Soviet defenders considered they were under attack by Panzer Div. Some may quibble with specific figures here but the basic point remains the same: Model's infantry divisions were hardly less well supported by armour than the Panzer grenadiers in the south and by organisation they were better able to absorb the kind of casualties the infantry suffer in this kind of assault.

WO 291/129 "Lethality of 3" mortar HE bomb" [ January 12, 2003, 08:25 PM: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

Actually, the British shipped large quantities of 2-pr HE to the Soviets. For example for the period 7/43-6/44 55,070 such rounds were shipped. The only question that arises is the time at which such rounds became available.