Sgt Joch

Of course, part of the reason they went in with such a small force was political. The Bush administration wanted to do the war on the cheap to make it easier to sell to the american people. They also really seemed to have believed that they could just kick the door in, hand the keys to some pro-american government and drive right back out.........unfortunately Iran (and a few others) had other ideas.

I have the full 15 volume set and it is very good since the U.S navy was involved in almost all operations of the pacific war. It also covers in detail all aspects of every amphibious landing done by the U.S navy. Of course, the focus is on the naval war, land operations and the british side are skimmed over. Its big advantage is the immediacy since Morison and his team actually covered the war while it was going on and had access to most of the participants. For example, on august 8-9, 1942, the U.S. navy suffered a major defeat in the battle of Savo Island just off Guadalcanal, when they were ambushed by a IJN task force. Within weeks, Morison's team were interviewing survivors on the Allied side for their version of the events and after the war he travelled to Tokyo to interview the japanese admiral Mikawa for his recollections. Another very good book about the naval war in the pacific is Clay Blair's Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan which covers in great detail U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific.

I never really understood the big push behind FCS. The eight manned FCS vehicles have more or less the same function as their Stryker vehicle counterparts, but the Strykers are still brand new, most of models only became operational in 2003-05. The FCS vehicles would require brand new technology, which either only exists on the drawing board or is brand new and untested. The only real advantage of the FCS over the Strykers that I could see was the FCS (BCT) network which certainly makes for great videos: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-Gh6-_9J4M but again, the software and most of the hardware and systems to run the network do not exist yet and no one really knows how long and how much it will cost until they can actually make it work. even though the Stryker was only meant as an interim vehicle, it makes more sense at this point to stick with what is now proven technology, even with its current faults, than keep pouring money into a brand new program. It does look though as if the unmanned vehicles and other technologies which can actully be used by soldiers will eventually make it into the field. http://news.cnet.com/2300-1008_3-6246291-1.html?tag=mncol

are you sure you did not hit "alt+k" by mistake and turn the smoke/dust off? Syrian AFVs have thick black smoke which they use liberally.

To expand on that final point, the published specs say the Javelin should have a PK of 95%. However, since most info on the Javelin is classified and since the US military and the manufacturer have an interest in making the Javelin look as powerful as possible, there has been an ongoing debate on whether that number is entirely accurate in actual battlefield conditions. No piece of equipment is perfect, you will always have a certain number of duds or equipment malfunctions, which was factored in, but at a very favorable rate. Also, since CMSF tracks the actual trajectory of the missile, you may have situations where the Javelin hits the tank at such an angle or specific point that the energy is deflected away from the tank resulting in little damage. This is the situation you sometimes see where a tank may require 2-3 missiles before it is actually knocked out. When you run a test under ideal conditions, you may achieve a PK of 90-95%, although in most scenarios the PK is probably closer to 80-85%. Worse than the published numbers, but IMHO probably closer to the Javelin's real life effectiveness.

I have no doubt that the Russians and Chinese are working on a Javelin "clone" of their own, although I think in the worst case scenario (for the US), it would be at least 5 to 10 years before such a clone would appear in the hands of potential military enemies of the US in sufficient numbers to be a real concern. In terms of pure killing power, the AT-14 is equivalent to the Javelin. The reason why the Javelin is such a threat in game is because US forces have Javs coming out of their ears. When first looking at the TO&E, there were questions as to whether there really were so many available, but based on experiences in Iraq, the US Army really does hand out Javelins like candy. When you move on to the marines (and the British Army) which have a more limited budget, the number of javelins available is much smaller. It should also be noted that as much as the javelin is a killer in-game, its performance is actually dumbed down compared to the actual published numbers, through the use of duds, misfires, misses, acquisition time, although no one has complained that this is not realistic.

that is what I thought also, when you fire at an "empty" AFV, you get more this effect:

Without turning this into another heated debate about whether Russian or American hardware is better, is there any credible evidence that CMSF's modeling of American and/or Russian tank capabilities is fundamentally wrong? The M1 Abrams (and Challenger2 ) in game is highly vulnerable to any flank or rear shot, whether RPG, ATGM or main tank gun. I have seen M1s knocked out by frontal shots from T-72s, T-90s, even a BMP-3 in one case (lucky shot :mad:). Although US tanks generally tend to have the upper hand over Russian tanks in CMSF, that is more due to the fact that in many scenarios: 1) most Syrian tanks (T-55s, T-62s, early T-72s) are obsolescent; and 2)US tanks generally have higher experienced crews than Syrian tanks. and when you look at something like this.. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SuMO3gqAJLY ..I doubt Kontakt or Relikt would make a huge difference.

It would be neat if US units were easier to spot to due to too much verbal commands as opposed to German units. I supposed this might also depend on unit training. In "Band of Brothers", US paratroopers were shown as using hand signals when enemy troops were around, although this might be artistic license. As an aside, regarding the US civil war, although the large napoleonic style battles did occur and this is still a popular image, small unit tactics very quickly took on a modern flavor with small group of men operating on their own and using terrain as cover to fire at the enemy. Going back even farther, I am currently reading "Fusiliers", a fascinating book about the British Army in the American Insurrection of 1775-81. Although, the British used european tactics in '75, suffering frightful casualties at Bunker Hill, they quickly developped quite modern tactics with light troops fighting in small groups, using flexible formations and taking advantage of the terrain. They even developped lightweight, less cumbersome uniforms more adapted to the north american battlefield. Everyone remembers Washington crossing the Delaware in dec. '76, but the British and Insurgents fought a no holds barred Guerilla/anti-Guerilla campaign in the winter of '77 which matches the ferocity of the ww2 Ostfront, Vietnam or Afghanistan, with much the same results. I am now up to dec. '80, Cornwallis has pacified South Carolina and is planning a counter-insurgency campaign in North carolina...I can't wait to find out what happens...

Quite the fascinating video, both strangelly compelling and repellent since four lives are snuffed out in an instant. That 30 mm cannon is extremely effective... They appear to have either not noticed or ignored the helicopter. Could it be so far away that they would not have heard it?

I use Gmail and I never had an issue with file sizes.

I believe this is the footage Flanker 15 is referring to. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6f9cqhuARrM&feature=related it is hard to tell what causes the fire or even what type of tank it is (is it a Tiger?). It also looks like the pilot had to make multiple passes to cause the fire. One point I would like to make again is that the tank is caught in the open on a road in daylight, ideal conditions for the P-47, but not typical of what you would encounter on a battlefield.

Its hard to tell from the air, even looking at guncam footage, what damage was inflicted on ground vehicles. Here is some footage of Rudel in action on the OstFront against Soviet Armour. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRUj6RiCj4w&feature=related You will also notice that most kills occur in wide open terrain where it is easier to spot enemy vehicles which was not the case in most of normandy.

On the whole, I would think airpower in CM:normandy should be more or less as in CMx1 in that the player will have no or little control over it. The bigger issue is the effectiveness of air power. In CMx1, Air Power was way too deadly. I can remember one CMBB game where stukas took out 12-13 of my 16 t-34s in the first 20 minutes. In actuality, CAS had a very limited impact on the battlefield. Again, if you look at the experience of the Canadian Army in Normandy, artillery was an integral and essential part of every offensive and defensive plan. CAS however was infrequently used. It was rare enough that it would be mentioned as a special event whenever it was available. When it was used, the results were often disappointing since the RAF generally attacked pre-planned targets and units on the ground generally had no way of communicating with the aircrafts. The other issue was finding targets, although it was easier to spot vehicles on roads, it was very difficult for a pilot to spot enemy vehicles or troops hidden on a battlefield. The RAF did a test in, I believe, 1943, when they setup a mock German unit and used it for target practice. Even though the pilots knew where the target area was, most FBs were unable to spot any of the targets and of those that did, most again were unable to hit any of the targets. The "Unit" survived the experience with pretty light damage. And this was a test, you would expect that the results against a live target with fully functioning AA would be even worse. So although we can't leave out CAS from CM:Normandy, its effectiveness should be pretty low.

my understanding is that "cab rank". altough it looked good on paper, was useless in practice. From my reading on the subject, air power should not play a significant role on the Normandy june-august 1944 battlefield. WW2 Airpower had the biggest impact on the strategic and operational sphere. Operationally in the normandy campaign, allied air power tried to seal off the battlefield, attacking supply choke points, such as railway yards to delay and limit supply and reinforcements.On the tactical battlefield however, air power had a very limited impact. I have not seen one documented case where a german tank, deployed on a battlefield, was knocked out by an allied aircraft in 1944. Even though the Allies had total air superiority, german divisions were still able to move to Normandy with minimal losses and disruption. Terry Copp's "Fields of Fire" provides a lot of detail on the Canadian Army in the Normandy campaign. This is the experience of tactical fighter-bomber air support ("TAC air") in the Canadian/British sector, june-august 1944. On D-Day, TAC air were given predetermined targets on JUNO beach, namely german strongpoints along the shoreline. In all cases TAC air (and naval gunfire) either completely missed or barely scratched the targets forcing canadian infantry to take out the strongpoints themselves with no air or artillery support (which they did, with no muss or fuss, in typically canadian fashion ). After D-Day and during the drive on Caen and then Falaise, TAC air provided limited support on the battlefield. RAF commanders were reticent to use their fighter-bombers in Close Air Support missions ("CAS"). It was difficult for pilots to spot and hit camouflaged german positions on or immediately behind the front line. In addition, most allied fighter-bombers, including the main RAF/RCAF FB, the Typhoon, had liquid cooled engines which were very vulnerable to ground fire. Since front line targets were usually heavily defended by AA guns, CAS missions lead to heavy losses in aircraft and pilots while yielding questionable results. RAF commanders much preferred to use their fighter-bombers for interdiction missions in the operational sphere where they could shoot up trains and road bound supply/reinforcement columns which were easier to spot and lighly defended. CAS missions were also strictly controlled. All requests for air strikes had to be submitted in writing the day before to be reviewed and approved by RAF commanders in consultation with the army, since under the typically informal british command arrangements, air forces worked in collaboration with, but not under the command of land forces. This inevitably led to limited and tightly controlled use of air power on the battlefield. Heavy/medium bombers also saw very limited use. In the few cases where they were used however, huge safety zones were setup and they dropped their loads on predetermined targets, usually reserve forces well behind the front lines. Although ground based Forward Air Controllers were used on a limited basis by the British Army in North Africa and Italy, it does not appear that they were used in Normandy on a regular basis in the canadian/British sector during the june-august battles. Airborne FACs were used and ground troops did not have the proper radios to communicate with fighter-bombers overhead. Only after the breakout in august-september 1944 were dedicated ground based FAC teams used on a regular basis. The FAC teams would typically be made up of a RAF or USAF pilot using VHF radios to communicate and control dedicated fighter-bombers overhead, using a jeep to move around the battlefield. So how does this translate to the CMx2 WW2 Normandy battlefield IMHO: 1. the effectiveness of air power on the battlefield should be severely reduced, although if the proper level of inaccuracy is built into air strikes and air dropped munitions, this should be a natural result. 2. In june-august 1944, the player should be able to give air strikes command only at the beginning of the game (similar to a prep bombardement), indicating to the AI air the principal targets of interest; 3. ground based FACs with the ability to control air strikes during the game should only appear beginning in august 1944. The number of teams available, their reaction time and accuracy would gradually increase until the end of the war in may 1945. this book: http://books.google.com/books?id=0Eb_uqFyWBgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=close+air+support&ei=ldgASuTIOoLszAST3ImNAg answers all the questions you may have about Canadian & allied practice on the western front 43-45.

they have a Lanc on display at the Canadian Air museum in Ottawa. It is smaller than you expect when you see one in real life. http://www.aviation.technomuses.ca/collections/artifacts/aircraft/AvroLancasterX/

plus that terrain looks fairly flat to have any problem with bogging, certainly would not be an issue in CMSF.

Now that the "bogging/immobilisation discussion thread" is bogging down...I look forward to the upcoming "effectiveness of Bocage Cutter thread"...

good work on the testing. If anything, that shows that the bogging/immobilization rate in CMBB is actually more favorable than real life. I tracked down a report in Panzertruppen, vol 2. about a unit of 14 tigers which drove from Rome to Anzio and back in may 1944 (about 120 km total) and lost 12 tanks to complete mechanical breakdown. That is basically one immobilization every 10 km on dry, paved roads.

I am still playing CMBB after almost 7 years and I have never seen bogging/immobilizations as more than a minor nuisance (just like CMSF). Of course, I did learn over the years to become very leery of driving my AFVs over terrain or at speeds that increase the chances of bogging. .. ... basically, if you stay off the problematic terrain: mud, deep mud, light snow, snow, deep snow, scattered trees, rocky terrain, wet terrain, soft ground, marsh... ...basically, if you stay on the roads and drive slow, you should be ok... The modeling in CMSF is already more refined and it is easier to predict the chances of bogging, although I had a game recently where I managed through careful planning (and a bit of luck) to get 4 humvees over soft/marshy low ground only to have one bog down and become immobilized driving down the main road of the next village :mad:....but then, dealing with vehicle breakdowns is as much a part of modern warfare as shooting up the enemy.

It depends how you measure return on your investment, by supplying food and armament to Britain and the USSR, the USA kept those countries in the war fighting Germany which lowered american casualties in the long run. The USSR lost 10,700,000 military dead in ww2, while the US lost 416,800, so you could say it was actually a very good investment for the US.

Interesting thread. I have no issue with the way bogging is handled in CMx1 or CMSF. If anything, I agree with Steve that bogging could in fact be higher. I just wanted to address Redwolf's point that, based on bogging rates in CMBB, the German Panzer forces would have run out of tanks before the end of july! I do not believe you can just apply the bogging rates in a linear fashion. AFVs in ww2 did break down regularly, but they were just as regularly put back in service, within a few hours or days through repairs. Even knocked out tanks were regularly put back into service, only tanks which were beyond redemption or burned out were written off. So for every 10 tanks that becomes immobilized in a CMx1 battle, you might expect that 9 or even all 10 would be put back in service quickly after the battle. You also have to take account that the battles in CMx1 are extraordinary events. They represent probably less than 1% of the service life of a vehicle. The other 99.9% of the time, the AFVs would be moving strictly on roads where the chances of bogging were much less. In ww2, you can also find numerous anecdotes of extreme bogging. Just a few from memory: -In august 1944, the King Tigers went into action for the first time. 20 left the start line, 11 broke down before they even came into range of Soviet forces; -in spring 1944, at the hight of Rasputitza, a Soviet mechanized force entered a town in western Ukraine and found 200 abandoned german AFVs, hopelessly mired in the mud, in and around the town; -in spring 1944, the Germans assembled a Armor Dream Team around Anzio. However, they had little effect on the battle since any AFV which moved off the roads was almost certian to become mired in the mud. As a result most of the german armor stayed on the roads and out of the battle; -in may 1944, a unit of 14 tigers was ordered to drive down from Rome to Anzio. After a few days, they were ordered to drive back to the depot in Rome, at which point only 2 were still operational. 12 broke down on the trip. 4 were abandoned and destroyed, the other 8 were towed back to the depot where they were also abandoned and destroyed in late may, as the Allies were approaching Rome.

What is interesting about Eddie Chapman is the fact that the war made him a hero. If WW2 had never happened, he would most likely have spent his whole life as a career criminal in and out of prision, but because of the war, the british government could make use of his "unique" skill set. You often see that phenomena in wartime, individuals who in peacetime cannot integrate in normal society because of their sociopathic tendencies, but thrive in a combat environment. Regarding the attempt on Hitler's life. I have seen a few references over the years that the British government seriously looked into it, but came to the conclusion that it was better to leave Hitler in place making military blunders rather than taking him out and risking that someone more competent would take over.

cool..beautifully written as well, for a government report. what is the old saying?... "politics makes strange bedfellows", I guess you could say the same thing about war.

Habs is short for "Habitants", the french word for "people who live here" or "original settlers". This was the nickname the english minority gave to the french population in Quebec in the 18th and 19th century. Since the Montreal Canadians used to be made up mostly with french-canadian players, this became the team's unofficial nickname. The word "Habitant" itself has completely disappeared from common usage since it has a negative connotation, similar to, although not as harsh as the "N" word for African-Americans. of course, these days, the Habs have more Russian than french-canadian players...