Sgt Joch

well, the Seven Year's war was also referred to as a world war and I'm sure we could find a quote that said the same thing about the war of the Spanish Succession.

I am also not a big fan of the CMSF "Hunt" order since AFVs will stop dead as soon as they spot something. Of course, the old CMx1 "Hunt" order was not perfect either since your AFV could get itself into even more trouble by continuing to move forward. Lately, I have been eschewing the "Hunt" order altogether, experimenting instead with an ersatz "Shoot & Scoot" order: "Quick" to an overwatch position, followed by "Pause" for 20-30 seconds (long enough to spot&engage 1-2 enemy targets/short enough to minimize the risk of loss to enemy ATGMs), finishing off with "Reverse" out of LOS.

Here you go: German BB Schleswig-Holstein shelling Westerplatte, september 1, 1939 German and Soviet troops shaking hands following the successful invasion of Poland.

I think it is important to clear some misconceptions that exist about the Vietnam War. Looking at the 65-69 period when U.S. forces were the most active: 1. assymetric warfare: The Vietcong (south vietnamese guerillas) were trained/organised around military lines. Most of the interesting battles involved regular North Vietnamese Army units in the central highlands and the north. They fought conventional warfare backed up by artillery/mortars; 2. U.S Air Power: B-52s were deadly, but suffered the same problem heavy bombers had when used in a tactical role in WW2. They were deadly when they hit enemy troops, but they often blasted nothing more than empty forests. Fighter Bombers, like the F-4 were deadlier, but again as in WW2, pilots had to rely on their Mk I eyebal to spot targets. The NVA was very good at camouflaging itself, its supplies and equipment, although the U.S. FAC system was much improved over WW2. AFAIR, the U.S. dropped something like 2-3 times the tonnage of bombs over Vietnam that it dropped in all of WW2 without appreciably slowing down the number of men and suppplies which infiltrated into the south. 3. U.S. won every tactical engagement: Based on an often repeated, but inaccurate quote. U.S. forces were very good and with the amount of firepower they possessed could take and hold any piece of ground in Vietnam they set their mind to, but there were many platoon/company sized actions where the NVA got the upper hand. For example, every knows about Hal Moore's victory in the Ia Drang valley in november 65 which was glorified in Mel Gibson's "We Were soldiers...", but one month later another U.S. battalion was chewed up in an ambush by NVA troops in the same valley. 4. Cavalry charging Helos: Helos did not land in a hot fire zone right on top of enemy troops. As early as jan.63, when the U.S. lost 5 helos in one battle to ground fire, it was known that helos were too fragile and vulnerable to ground fire. By 64-65, the Vietcong/NVA had equipped its forces with heavy MGs specifically to shoot down helos. U.S. forces used helos like trucks: you land your forces in a safe area, far enough away from the action and your troops hump overland until they establish contact. As it was, the U.S. still lost something like 7-8,000 helos over the course of the war AFAIR. 5. All battle were in the jungle: Only a minority of battles were fought in jungles, you can't maneuver or control your troops in a jungle. For example, here are photos of the battlefield of Dak To where a series of engagements were fought in November 67, which were characterized as "heavy jungle fighting":

I have never read Carell's works, mostly because of his reputation as an apologist of the Nazi Regime rather than a serious historian. You have to take into account the fact that he was a member of the Nazi party, the SS and served as Ribbentrop's press secretary in ww2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Carell He is also very much part of the old school approach that the German Army was superior but was defeated by the Allies because they had masses of men and equipment. For example, dealing with the Ostfront, which I am more familiar with, you have a lot of much more superior books that have come out since then, including Erickson's "Road to Stalingrad"/"Road to Berlin" and especially since the Soviet Archives have been made accessible. Glantz alone has released this year the first volume of a three volume series on the Stalingrad campaign. http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1251986832&sr=8-1

And that game is the most successful around, with something like 6-8,000,000 players paying $15-20 every month to play. Obviously, posters complaining has nothing to do with how successful a game is, but is an integral part of the forum dweller sub-culture.

after reading the internet reviews, I also ordered: Beyond the Beachhead Six Armies and Cinderella Army, Copp's latest book which follows the canadians from Normandy to the end of the war. I am also tempted by D'Este's "Decision in Normandy", which appears to be well researched but Copp in "Fields of Fire" was very critical of his analysis and conclusions. Anyone have a second opinion? Regarding Keegan's book, considering the continuing interest in NWE 44-45, I am surprised there are not more recent campaign level books covering the whole normandy campaign. Keegan's book was published in 1982 and D'Este's book in 1983.

I have been pushing for a CM:Vietnam game for years and would buy one immediately. It is actually well suited to CM since you have everything from platoon level skirmishes to full blown regimental/divisional assaults. Most actions did not take place in the jungle, but in or around populated areas, although some notable actions did take place in fairly wild terrain. For example, here is the terrain around Hill 881, close to Khe Sanh where fighting took place in 67: The Vietcong and NVA were well trained/disciplined infantry, better quality than the Syrians anyway. The NVA were well supplied with artillery/mortars and very good at building fieldworks. For example, in the same fighting around Hill 881, the NVA on one hill had dug about 250 mg bunkers almost bomb proof and invisible from the ground. The only thing that would be missing would be tanks, since they were rarely used by the NVA in the South before 72. BFC has said repeatedly that they would never do a Vietnam game (something about marketing suicide ), but now that there is the "other" track, there is the possibility that one may yet see the light of day.

If I look at a detailed map of Syria, I see three villages that may fit the bill: "Jayrud", "An Nasiriyah" a bit to the north or "Ar Ruhaybah" a bit to the south. Check it out yourself, you may have better luck narrowing it down: http://www.sacred-destinations.com/syria/images/maps/cia-2004-pd.jpg Your coordinates took me a few km east of the Damascus-Hims highway, between Ma'lu'la and Yabrud, along the M5 secondary road.

yes, too bad there's none around...

This issue had been raised and discussed in the beta forums while working on the USMC module and one Marine stated it was correct for LAR platoon commanders. All squad/platoon leaders wear the CVC helmet while mounted to stay in communication with the rest of the unit and are supposed to switch to the combat helmet when they dismount. Whether, in practice, they keep the CVC helmet on when dismounting is something only actual servicemen can answer.

It might be of interest to post this again, pulled it out of Panzertruppen, vol.2: According to the "official" TO&E, each 44 Panzer division was supposed to be equipped with a Panzer Regiment composed of a Panther Battalion with 88 Panthers and a Panzer Battalion with 88 PzIVs.

That was my understanding as well, the helmet is the correct one. The XO and certain other officers spend most of their time in a vehicle communicating with the rest of their unit, so the CVC helmet is more practical than a combat helmet.

very nice!

There were a lot of Panthers available in 44. These are the figures for tanks available on the western front in june 44: 39 Pz III 758 Pz IV 655 Panther 102 Tiger I 158 Stug 179 Captured tanks According to the official TO&E, the ratio of PZ IV and V in a 44 Panzer division was supposed to be 50/50. It was more like 60/40 in RL, but still more than enough Panthers to go around. A lot of people love the Tiger, but the Panther has always been my favorite German tank.

It's a bit early to see what will happen with "special cases", obviously we all want the TO&E's to be as historic as possible. If you look at what happened with the USMC module, BFC originally went with the "official" TO&E for the marines module, but Marines ignore their own TO&E and group units based on the "task" at hand, so they went with the current "task oriented" TO&E in the release version which was the most practical and realistic solution. The Normandy 44 situation is way more complex since no German divisions, except SS divisions, were staffed at anything close to the "official" TO&E and almost all divisions brokedown into Kampfgruppes as soon as they suffered substantial casualties. I'm sure BFC will be able to come up with a solution that will please most people, if not, I'm sure there will be a long line of people ready to point this out.

another nod for Copp's book, best one-volume history on the Canadian campaign in Normandy.

"don't mention the war!..." http://vids.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=vids.individual&videoid=22575815

I don't think people realise to what extent artillery was such a prominent feature of the Normandy battlefield. 21st Army Group had more gunners (around 18%), than infantry (around 14%). 70 % of casualties in the commonwealth sector were caused by german artillery/mortars, and this on a front where the germans were chronically short of artillery. Of course, playing a game where your troops spend most of their time hunkered down waiting for the enemy bombardment to lift, is not much fun...

I think we are all looking forward to getting back to WW2. I miss these debates..

One common theme that keeps coming back is that the German Army was very good on a tactical/operational level, but poor on a strategic level. Again, I beg to differ: case in point: German defensive doctrine. The german army had a standard defensive tactic which they used almost all the time, namely: 1) hold the front line with a small number of troops, backed up by MG nests and strongpoints; and 2) keep the main forces in reserve for an immediate counter-attack, before the attackers could consolidate. The German response was so predictable that the British/Canadian Armies in Normandy built their entire offensive doctrine around it, namely: 1) Artillery bombardement to suppress the defenders; 2) Infantry attack supported by armour to take out the MG nests and strongpoints; 3) Once on the objective, dig in, bring up AT guns and pre-register artillery on likely counter-attack routes. When everything clicked, it was almost impossible for the Germans to recapture the objective. Yet, the Germans stuck to this tactic even after it was clear that it was not working and was causing heavy losses to the counter-attacking force. Again, this does not show the tactical flexibility/expertise which the German Army was supposed to possess. This is more the type of inflexible brain-dead response that you would expect from...the Syrians.

It has'nt helped the Syrians.... ....... I personally think the capability of the WW2 German army/equipment has been way overblown. In large part, the aura of the German army was based on their early successes in 1939-42, which had more to do with the weakness of their enemies, coupled with an era of un-critical histories which came out in the 1945-65 period. When you look at the evidence critically, which a new generation of historians are doing, its hard to make a case that the German army in 1944 was "better" than the U.S., U.K. or Canadian Army. Case in point, "Panzer Meyer" and other german officers had developped tactics of attacking Soviet villages at high speed with battlegroups composed of armour and halftracks, which worked well enough on the eastern front. The 12th SS and Panzer Lehr tried the same thing against the canadians on june 7-10th, 1944 and were stopped cold, suffering heavy losses in the process.

I played this one as BLUE PBEM against a very good opponent. Its tough since the Syrians have a good force and there is only one way in. All you can do is grit your teeth and keep moving forward. ------SPOILERS BELOW------------------------------- I used my infantry to move forward and spot enemy strongpoints and BMPs which I would then take out with mortars, AT weapons, SMAWs and tanks. The RED commander used his AFVs on my flanks, hitting buildings with my troops in it, causing horrendous casualties and pulling back and repositioning before I could move AT assets/tanks in to deal with them. I lost one M1 at the gate to frontal fire by a BMP2. Another was immobilized during a duel with 2 T-90s (I got one). Once my troops had secured the first line of buildings, I was able to slip my 2 reinforcement tanks in and hunt down his remaining AFVs, using pincer movements. I KOd 2 T-90s and his last BMP before losing one of my tanks to his last T-90. Once the Syrians main line of resistance is broken, it is then just a matter of mopping up and occupying the 2 objectives. As a tip, remember you can use your SMAW teams to BLAST walls. I used this to get in to the objective on the right through the back, since my opponent had positioned his last tank to cover the entrance in the far right corner of the map. results: USMC: 41 KIA, 31 WIA, 2 tanks lost; SYRIANS: 74 KIA, 33 WIA, 20 missing, all 10 AFVs lost.

...Go Habs, Go...

Penetration may not be an issue, but accuracy should be. The chart linked above shows, at 500 yds, a 5.56 round is dropping rapidly, averaging 48" down in its flight path (if I read the chart correctly). It drops off very rapidly after 300 yards. How accurate would a SAW (or even M4 or M16) be past 300-500 yds?