Vanir Ausf B

Hard sitauation we have also in Krasnohorivka town north to occupied Maryinka. Several days ago Russians could break through of our rare artilery fire and drones and despite some losses in vehicles landed infantry in southern and south-eastern part of the town. Russians seized railway station area - this is area of dachas and private cottages, also Russian infantry was too few to continue advance. But we also had few infantry to clear this territory. Russians became to use their usual tactic of gradual forces accumulation in captured area for new further burst. Reportedly yesterday UKR troops again threw out Russians from SE part of Krasnohotivka and partially from southern part, recapturing railway stattion. But today Russians again slightly advanced in southern part of the town. BTW southern part is the contested area, because there too hard hold the ground for both sides. Main stronghold of UKR trrops (by Russian opinion) is a local fireproof structures plant, which Russian aviation "processes" with 500 kg and 1500 kg KABs. 
 

Meanwhile frontline situation still hard.
On Vuhledar direction Russians seized western part of completely destroyed Novomykhailivka village

On Avdiivka sector after UKR successfull conter-attack 2-3 days ago, allowed to recapture lost positions in eastern part ot the Ocheretyne town, yesterday unnamed UKR unit in front of the face of next Russian attack along railways just abandoned positions and Russians again seized part of Ocheretyne, but in this time in south-eastern part. UKR command was forced to throw in the battle elements of 47th mech.brigade, which was partially moved to second line for short rest. 
Russians have choosen Ocheretyne as priority objective now and use here the same tactic like in Chasiv Yar. Unlike Wagner during the battles for Soledar and Bakhmut with a tactic of multiple small group attacks, with continous changing of these attack directions, Russians now use strong flanks pressure - this doesn't lead to decisive results without concentration of forces on one direction, but in conditions of personnel and aartillery support lack of UKR forces, this method hampers our reserve manuevers. 

Russians after short rest have thrown in the battle units of 41st CAA on the section Novokalynove - Ocheretyne - Berdychi.  This did for consolidation of battle orders and widening of offensive line in area where 30th motror-rifle brigade of 2nd CAA operates on Ocheretyne and create a narrow salient, which can be in theory attacked by UKR forces from north and south. To avoid this 35th motor-rifle brigade of 41st CAA now entered in offensive line of 2nd CAA from the north in Novokalynove area and 74th motor-rifle brigade in Berdychi area on the south  
Around Chasiv Yar Russians desperately try to breakthrough toward two sections of canal, where it flows under the ground, so there are two section about in 1 km wide each, where they can cross the canal and outflank the town from north and south. Soldiers report from there Russians gathered there many "meat", likely their command has an order to seize Chasiv Yar on 9th of May. 

Russians gradually have been learing of Ukrainian experience of artillery fire control. If in 2022  - mid 23 we have seen typical Soviet style of whole batteries and even battalions of side-by-side standing guns simultainous work, that now Russians are more and more shifting to dispersing of artillery and work by single guns of a battery with individaual targeting for each.
Here is google-translated post about changes since 2022. "The work was carried out in areas with a low coeeficient of UAV use" - means "ineffective area fire with low UAV usage", though for summer 2022 it's not always could be true, or soldiers then reported about dozen Orlans and Zala, ajusting fire. Probably ajusting was inefefctive or come on too long command chain, which made it ineffective.

 
And addition to this post by other Russian artillerist with my translation:
I'l throw my 5 cents:
Regimental artillery tied on artillery chief (of regiment). He, sitting on command post (let's call it in such way) together with chief of recon, watch streams from UAVs (and intercepted streams of the enemy). Spotting the target chief of artillery transmits it to battery commander or senior battery officer  [he is commander of 1st artillery platoon also] and they transmit this data to the gun. 2-7 minutes for targeting of the gun, the bird [drone] in the sky. First shoot - the fire ajustment from artilelry chief directly to the gun. Or artillery chief opens the map, come into communication with gun commandr through the radio and gives the targeting (angle, azimuth, lines). The gun crew lives on position 2-5 days, further a rotation is coming. Nobody drink on position, it's taboo, else they go to "zakrep" [probably those who have to hold the ground after assault] - and this is more scary than to stormers. 
We don't work with mortars since new year. This is no longer relevant becaus of crews life preservation purposes. Drones already fly on 10 km in the rear, so they clicks them at once  

And here Russian feedback about CAESERs

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Chief of GUR Kyrylo Budanov told in own comment to BBC Ukraine, that AD and GUR have been waiting Russian Tu-22M during a week in the ambush. The bomber was shot down on the range 308 km.
Budanov told some thing was used, deeply upgraded by Ukrainian enginners. Some OSINTers on the GUR video recognized interiror of S-200, but with complete changed equipment.
If true, looks like we could extend the range of missiles much more than 180-240 km of Soviet S-200V/M variants
PS. Ukraine hadn't latest S-200D system with range 300 km. USSR had a time to produce and deploy only several complexes of this type in the late 80th, and they were only in Russia and were withdrawn from service in the mid of 90th. 
Ukraine had S-200V with 180 km range and S-200M with 240 km range (255 km on AWACS planes). They were withdrawn from service in 2011-2013


https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c3g58qn2jvgo?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR2AfBzV1Eh_3H9H3O2ycqZbVOnB3WvjlLJhYLm5Fh4_3lVpdQphJ-pBTRU_aem_AdlSS5xReobUX09lrT-tHx8agDHkU2b3y0ncsvUX982bv2sWMivU_F_W5V7t4OaV4MVejUFjlmfwVQc283wuhDYP
 

Russian HE and cluster submunitions strike (likely Tornado-S MLRS/ Iskander-M ballistic missiles) on Dnipro city airport and 5 km out of it. It's theoretically possible to reach airport with Tornado-S from Enerhodar area.
It's claimed three MiG-29 got damages (it's unknown about their operational conditions before strike) , hangars with aviation ordnance was hit and some S-300 complex equipmemt destroyed. The time of strike is unknown, but more likely during last week.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

Heard about this tactics before, but don't recall the clips from it:
This war provides never-ending stream of challanges as how to siumlate it for potentiall future Combat Mission games.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

New update from General Oleksandr Syrskyi:
https://t.me/osirskiy/650
 
 

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

Its a strange list.  Some of the battles listed are explicitly included, some listed are really parts of larger battles/operations, some are dead links in wiki, and at least 1 or 2 are air battles.  Not a great deal of due diligence might be why no one cares.
 
edit:  Several of them don't really translate to a good CM battle.  There were Allies meeting a little resistance and then pulling back and shelling a town into rubble.  A few are really operations that were more about organizational changes to support other units.

So the way I think through this is that the country with the biggest drone budget wins. Whoever can field the most UAV and C-UAV will control the battlespace and everyone else is toast. Therefore if you aren't the largest economy in the world you need to figure something else out. So the natural response will be nuclear proliferation as that is the only trump card left in the deck at that point and if you don't have nukes you are defenseless. 
I guess this is a good thing for defense budgets as all other systems can be scrapped and most countries will only have to maintain a few ICBMs. I reckon we can all look forward to a unprecedented period of peace among mankind or nuclear annihilation. 

Interesting post from Russian telegrammer:
https://t.me/rogozin_do/5657
 
 

UKR troops could push back Russians (11th air-assault brigade) from the forest on eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar. Reportedly, Russians yesterday managed to seize several houses in the eastern part of the town, but were thrown back by counter-attack. Despite this Russians continue assault actions and increased number of airstrikes and artillery shellings of Chasiv Yar.

Kostianntyn Mashovets believes, the same "Russian summer offensive" more likely will took place on Donbas, not on Kharkiv ot somewhere else. Russians long time have been claiming a coming on administrtative borders of Donbas as one of SMO goals. 
For success Russians need to capture Sloviansk and Kramatorsk agglomeration. In own turn for this they have to capture (or at least come to Kostiantynivka town) on the south and elimynate Siversk bulge on the north. Current Russian assaults on Chasiv Yar direction are obvious intentions to approach Kostiantynivka to take initial positions for Sloviansk offensive. On Siversk direction Russians also began more intese assaults not only in Bilohorivka area, but on more wide section of the front. Though, these assaults look more like probes.

Northern outskirt of Kharkiv. Crews of two UKR "Bureviy" MLRSs (UKR modernized BM-27 "Uragan" on "Tatra" chassis) made a stop to rest and buy a coffee on refueling station nearby. Russian drone spotted them and targeted with Isander-M both launchers and security car, standing too close each other. Again a carelessness cost valuavle equipment and, alas, maybe servicemen lives.