Vanir Ausf B

Personally I don't know how I feel about tanks being on the way out vs not but probably good to bring up these tweets. Makes sense to me, if offensives can't happen and you need something to use against enemy pushes and everything else is in short supply....is it ideal? Guess not but better than dead friendlies.
Random poster I follow but he brings up a really good point that does not just apply to Abrams but to just in general the mindset of full on conventional conflict and the amount of losses expected and the fact the West haven't had the type of playing field in forever and the last time comparable was a cakewalk (ish).
So....what was the expected tank losses in a full on conventional NATO vs USSR conflict?
 

I was frankly stunned by the graph I saw passed around yesterday.
 

I was frankly stunned by the graph I saw passed around yesterday.
 

Looking for an updated look at Russian armored forces? This thread breaks down the latest numbers on production, refurbishment, and what it means for the ongoing conflict.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1785973906026713172.html?utm_campaign=topunroll

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Guess precision took a hit...ugh. hey, great, a lesson for the future. Can we please just get 3rd party ammo sourced worldwide to Ukraine now? (I will assume with U.S aid unblocked this will resume, but a pox on certain European countries for insisting on EU based manufacturing at the expense of Ukraine.
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116957/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS35-Wstate-PattD-20240313.pdf
 

And to bad news. As was posted above, Syrskyi several hours ago made a statement, UKR troops withdrew west from Berdychi. This was logical step after Russians managed to expand own Ocheretyne salient and capture neighbour Novobakhmutivka village and part of Solovyove. So, elements of 47th brigade had a risk to be outflanked and even semi-encircled. 
Video of Russian progress by DeepState map
Concerning to Ocheretyne breakthrow, in Ukrainian media is starting a scandal about inconpetence of brigade commanders and HQ high-officers. Approaches to Ocheretyne were well fortified - personnel of 52nd separate rifle battlion for about six months did own work well with support of engineers. But higher command decided to rotate this unit and moved it to more cal Lyman direction (yes, in conditions of personnel lack there is usual "rest" - to be moved not to rear, but to the sector with less intensive warfare). On their place 115th mech.brigade had to be moved. This is the same brigade, which personnel in May-June 2022 in mass was abandoning positions near Severodonetsk, cuasing collapse of defense. Despite since that time two commanders were substituted, by words of brigade servicemen, there are no any changes - it still one of worst brigades in ZSU. 
No proper combat training. Brigade HQ and battalion HQs were indiffernt to own duties. Officers mostly absolutely indiffernt to soldiers. One guy told, he have seen own battalion commander only two times and their company commander treated them like sh...t and did nothing what he had to do according field manuals. Actually in his company only deputy commander of morale&psychological support tried to tow all duties, including duties of commander and at least a little to prepare own personnel to fight. 
It's no clear infirmation  what happened - one say brigade command didn't control situation and didn't know battlefield, so lost control. Other - that because of disrupted control and timing, brigade elements hadn't time to seize all positions at once, so forward units, which seized them were just smashed by Russian attack, remaining without support. By the rumors 4th company was almost completely eliminated with KIA and MIA. Other personnel (which has low training and motivation levels with such attitude in own brigade) jsut didn't seize positions or just fled from it. During next three days brigade command tried to stop Russians already inside Ocheretyne, but their incompetence and throwing people to thoughless actions led to new casualties and complete dismoral of personnel. 
47th brigade sent some fire teams on Bradleys, but they couldn't save situation. Higher command decided in the midst of battle to move 115th brigade to the rear and substitute them on 100th mech. brigade (was formed from 100th TD brigade, so it almost hasn't armored vehicles and in real is infantry brigade). Until this substitution took place, Russians, having 3-times advantage in manpower here, expanded own salient and captured most of Ocheretyne. Though 100th brigade fihgts tough and could for some time slow down Russian advance, which threatened so far to grow in operative breakthrow.
But story with 115th brigade command didn't finished. There is a rumor that by old post-Soviet tradition (because in Soiviet army for such fails comamnder can turned out under tribunal) higher command decided "to punish" brigade commander... with promotion in the duty. If this true, this bastard will sit in OTUV HQ and maybe develop plans of operations, without understanding of situation and just drawing arrows on the map, shouting on lower commanders "Take this fu...g treeplant immediately! I don't care your artillery hasn't shells! This is an order!"
And other obvious reason of steady Russian successful advance - WE HAVE A LACK OF THEESE FU...G SHELLS! Mass US and EU shell supplies probably will feed the whole front only through two weeks or a month. Reportedly our artillery still be limited in fire capabilities. So, during this weeks you can expect news about next UKR withdrawals. 
PS. Just for notice. 115th was enough well-equipped brigade - it has BMP-1 (or some Eastern Europe produced analogs) and some M113.

The squad of 115th in M113. Right machine-gunner has Czechoslovakian UV vz.59 LMG

Ukrainian forces dismiss as fake information about withdrawal of Abrams tanks from battlefield due to drones
 
 

Have Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs Been ‘Thrown Aside’ By Ukraine? - A senior Pentagon official has alluded to a recently deployed long-range ground-launched weapon suffering from Russian jamming and other issues.
 
 

Hard sitauation we have also in Krasnohorivka town north to occupied Maryinka. Several days ago Russians could break through of our rare artilery fire and drones and despite some losses in vehicles landed infantry in southern and south-eastern part of the town. Russians seized railway station area - this is area of dachas and private cottages, also Russian infantry was too few to continue advance. But we also had few infantry to clear this territory. Russians became to use their usual tactic of gradual forces accumulation in captured area for new further burst. Reportedly yesterday UKR troops again threw out Russians from SE part of Krasnohotivka and partially from southern part, recapturing railway stattion. But today Russians again slightly advanced in southern part of the town. BTW southern part is the contested area, because there too hard hold the ground for both sides. Main stronghold of UKR trrops (by Russian opinion) is a local fireproof structures plant, which Russian aviation "processes" with 500 kg and 1500 kg KABs. 
 

Meanwhile frontline situation still hard.
On Vuhledar direction Russians seized western part of completely destroyed Novomykhailivka village

On Avdiivka sector after UKR successfull conter-attack 2-3 days ago, allowed to recapture lost positions in eastern part ot the Ocheretyne town, yesterday unnamed UKR unit in front of the face of next Russian attack along railways just abandoned positions and Russians again seized part of Ocheretyne, but in this time in south-eastern part. UKR command was forced to throw in the battle elements of 47th mech.brigade, which was partially moved to second line for short rest. 
Russians have choosen Ocheretyne as priority objective now and use here the same tactic like in Chasiv Yar. Unlike Wagner during the battles for Soledar and Bakhmut with a tactic of multiple small group attacks, with continous changing of these attack directions, Russians now use strong flanks pressure - this doesn't lead to decisive results without concentration of forces on one direction, but in conditions of personnel and aartillery support lack of UKR forces, this method hampers our reserve manuevers. 

Russians after short rest have thrown in the battle units of 41st CAA on the section Novokalynove - Ocheretyne - Berdychi.  This did for consolidation of battle orders and widening of offensive line in area where 30th motror-rifle brigade of 2nd CAA operates on Ocheretyne and create a narrow salient, which can be in theory attacked by UKR forces from north and south. To avoid this 35th motor-rifle brigade of 41st CAA now entered in offensive line of 2nd CAA from the north in Novokalynove area and 74th motor-rifle brigade in Berdychi area on the south  
Around Chasiv Yar Russians desperately try to breakthrough toward two sections of canal, where it flows under the ground, so there are two section about in 1 km wide each, where they can cross the canal and outflank the town from north and south. Soldiers report from there Russians gathered there many "meat", likely their command has an order to seize Chasiv Yar on 9th of May. 

Russians gradually have been learing of Ukrainian experience of artillery fire control. If in 2022  - mid 23 we have seen typical Soviet style of whole batteries and even battalions of side-by-side standing guns simultainous work, that now Russians are more and more shifting to dispersing of artillery and work by single guns of a battery with individaual targeting for each.
Here is google-translated post about changes since 2022. "The work was carried out in areas with a low coeeficient of UAV use" - means "ineffective area fire with low UAV usage", though for summer 2022 it's not always could be true, or soldiers then reported about dozen Orlans and Zala, ajusting fire. Probably ajusting was inefefctive or come on too long command chain, which made it ineffective.

 
And addition to this post by other Russian artillerist with my translation:
I'l throw my 5 cents:
Regimental artillery tied on artillery chief (of regiment). He, sitting on command post (let's call it in such way) together with chief of recon, watch streams from UAVs (and intercepted streams of the enemy). Spotting the target chief of artillery transmits it to battery commander or senior battery officer  [he is commander of 1st artillery platoon also] and they transmit this data to the gun. 2-7 minutes for targeting of the gun, the bird [drone] in the sky. First shoot - the fire ajustment from artilelry chief directly to the gun. Or artillery chief opens the map, come into communication with gun commandr through the radio and gives the targeting (angle, azimuth, lines). The gun crew lives on position 2-5 days, further a rotation is coming. Nobody drink on position, it's taboo, else they go to "zakrep" [probably those who have to hold the ground after assault] - and this is more scary than to stormers. 
We don't work with mortars since new year. This is no longer relevant becaus of crews life preservation purposes. Drones already fly on 10 km in the rear, so they clicks them at once  

And here Russian feedback about CAESERs

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Chief of GUR Kyrylo Budanov told in own comment to BBC Ukraine, that AD and GUR have been waiting Russian Tu-22M during a week in the ambush. The bomber was shot down on the range 308 km.
Budanov told some thing was used, deeply upgraded by Ukrainian enginners. Some OSINTers on the GUR video recognized interiror of S-200, but with complete changed equipment.
If true, looks like we could extend the range of missiles much more than 180-240 km of Soviet S-200V/M variants
PS. Ukraine hadn't latest S-200D system with range 300 km. USSR had a time to produce and deploy only several complexes of this type in the late 80th, and they were only in Russia and were withdrawn from service in the mid of 90th. 
Ukraine had S-200V with 180 km range and S-200M with 240 km range (255 km on AWACS planes). They were withdrawn from service in 2011-2013


https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c3g58qn2jvgo?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR2AfBzV1Eh_3H9H3O2ycqZbVOnB3WvjlLJhYLm5Fh4_3lVpdQphJ-pBTRU_aem_AdlSS5xReobUX09lrT-tHx8agDHkU2b3y0ncsvUX982bv2sWMivU_F_W5V7t4OaV4MVejUFjlmfwVQc283wuhDYP
 

Russian HE and cluster submunitions strike (likely Tornado-S MLRS/ Iskander-M ballistic missiles) on Dnipro city airport and 5 km out of it. It's theoretically possible to reach airport with Tornado-S from Enerhodar area.
It's claimed three MiG-29 got damages (it's unknown about their operational conditions before strike) , hangars with aviation ordnance was hit and some S-300 complex equipmemt destroyed. The time of strike is unknown, but more likely during last week.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

Heard about this tactics before, but don't recall the clips from it:
This war provides never-ending stream of challanges as how to siumlate it for potentiall future Combat Mission games.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.

Mick Ryan's take on the war after returning from Ukraine.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-war-how-check-russia-s-momentum
Russia is now a more dangerous adversary than it was two years ago. This calls for change in how the war is fought.
There is a compelling and urgent need for NATO to change from a “defend Ukraine” policy to one of “defeat Russia in Ukraine”. At the same time, Ukraine needs to develop and share with its supporters its theory of victory. One official in Kyiv told me there is no clear vision of how Ukraine will win. A new Ukrainian theory of victory must be a foundational element of any revised Western strategy.

New update from General Oleksandr Syrskyi:
https://t.me/osirskiy/650
 
 

I don't know if anyone has posted this yet, but  RUSI just published a paper on the present and near future state of drone warfare.
Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces
by Justin Bronk and Jack Watling
Excerpt:
Swarming capabilities are commonly touted as the most significant area of capability development in the small UAV defence sector. However, the requirement to swarm introduces significant hardware and software complexity, which in turn drives cost growth and reduces the number of individual assets that can be fielded for any given budget. Massed UAV groupings, as seen regularly in light shows at civilian displays, rely on a ground control station tracking the position of all UAVs in a formation at all times and a central mission computer sending commands to each one to coordinate their movements. This allows large numbers of very simple small UAVs to fly in a coordinated fashion, but it is not a practical approach for military UAVs and weapons in a contested battlespace, due to terrain masking, EW, signal range and emissions control challenges – the ground control station would be struck, decapitating the whole swarm. Instead, for a mass precision strike complex to be capable of swarming tactics, the individual assets involved must have onboard sensors and low-latency datalinks that are resistant to hostile EW disruption. In addition, each asset must carry a mission computer powerful enough, and software complex enough, to fuse the information about terrain, threats and targets received from its own  sensors and those of other UAVs in the formation through datalinks, and to react to that information dynamically in real time. These capabilities are not inherently new, nor are they reliant on advances in AI or complex machine learning models. However, what the requirements for sensors, datalinks and advanced software do is raise component costs, even if used with an inherently cheap airframe/engine combination.
Furthermore, if a mass precision strike system is premised on swarming tactics for its effectiveness against its core target sets, then the number of assets required to use it in a sustained fashion will be increased, due to the need to consistently project sufficient assets into the target area to swarm. In conjunction with the increased hardware and software complexity required, this requirement to sustainably field swarming UAVs in large quantities over time means that fielding this sort of system as more than a ‘Night One’ theatre entry tool is likely to be uneconomical.
In terms of where swarming capabilities are likely to add value commensurate with the additional cost implied by their inclusion as part of a precision strike complex, the primary application will be to improve the capability to overwhelm air defence systems... Other advantages of swarming capabilities are that they can help reduce wasted warheads by deconflicting target selection so that multiple assets do not hit the same target. However, doing so in a way that can differentiate between a target having been hit and successfully disabled versus a target having been hit ineffectively and thus requiring a repeat strike with another asset requires significantly more advanced sensor and processing capabilities than simple deconfliction. Ultimately, for target deconfliction and strike optimisation, the value added question will come down to whether the additional efficiency against defended and undefended target sets gained from functional swarming capabilities outweighs the strike weight foregone by the increase in individual asset cost and the resultant reduction in quantity.