US shortcommings and how did they win.

[JasonC]

"as you take his primary premise—that the sole reason for the Allied victory was that they out-produced the Axis"

Miss a negative there? That certainly isn't his premise, more like the straw man he is trying to demolish. That the outcome of the war was predetermined and the allies won automatically because they had a bigger overall economy - is exactly what he vigorously disagrees with. Instead, he believes the outcome was less than predetermined, and the allies' success depended on their getting definite things right. Yes one of those things was a better performance in the organization of production. But also technology, intelligence, grand strategy, etc.

The Brits didn't win the battle of Britain by having 10 times the German economy. The Russians didn't win the Stalingrad campaign by having 10 times the German population. The US and UK didn't win the battle of the Atlantic just by building ships faster than the Germans sank them (though a bit of that helped survive the worst periods). Instead, technology and military planning in the air, operational handling on the ground in the east, technology, intel, and experience in naval warfare in the Atlantic - etc - all swung close run things that could have gone the other way, but didn't, because the Allies did a good job at what they needed to do.

The inevitablists like to pretend, say, that Normandy was a forgone conclusion because of Allied numbers. Um, Germany had those numbers over the UK in 1940, but it never got to Britain. Somebody won their battle of Britain going the other way (the defeat of the Luftwaffe in early 1944). Many such examples can be found throughout the war...

[Georgie]

During the early years of the war the US was supplying a part of the British needs by sea and in the process the US and the British lost many ships which were replaced by the industry of the Americans and the British. What was the survival rate of the US and British crews whose ships were sunk at sea? Who manned these new ships that were produced? I have read that in many instances when US tanks were destroyed and their crews killed or wounded that infantry men who had no tank training were used to man the replacement tanks and this resulted in a dismal performance by these replacement tanks. Where I read about the tank replacement crews I don't remember. Maybe some one else has read this and they do remember.

[PanzerMiller]

Good stuff, guys -- will definitely check out this book.

Michael: Author typo duly noted.

[JonS]

Other books in a similar vein (albeit with different conclusions) are Ellis' "Brute Force" and Murray and Millet's "A War to be Won"

[winkelried]

And then there was the Enigma ... and Turing's crew.

[Magpie_Oz]

So really what it comes down to is that Nazi Germany was simply beaten at every level, economically, technologically, politically, strategically and tactically?

[JonS]

Eventually, yes.

[Michael Emrys]

So really what it comes down to is that Nazi Germany was simply beaten at every level, economically, technologically, politically, strategically and tactically?

Pretty much, yeah. The whole German strategy depended on being able to take on one opponent at a time and defeating him in a quick war. Since that proved to be impossible (the Allies figured out his game plan about as soon as he began to implement it and took the necessary counter measures), it was a very ill-conceived strategy.

Michael

[winkelried]

Pretty much, yeah. The whole German strategy depended on being able to take on one opponent at a time and defeating him in a quick war. Since that proved to be impossible (the Allies figured out his game plan about as soon as he began to implement it and took the necessary counter measures), it was a very ill-conceived strategy.

Michael

The whole strategy was biased by the Nazi view of the world. On one side the superior German race and on the other side the weak democracies and the slavic Untermenschen. Unluckily enough this view was strengthened during the years leading to war (e.g. at Munich).

But then there was Churchill - the first person who wouldn't yield. I believe that he was the strongest allied asset.

[Michael Emrys]

But then there was Churchill - the first person who wouldn't yield. I believe that he was the strongest allied asset.

Up until the middle of 1943 I would tend to agree with you. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff. After the middle of 1943, I tend to think that the USSR taken as a whole became the center of gravity for the Allied side. After spring of 1944, it was the combination of the US and USSR. Churchill's role in things had become much more muted and he had been all but pushed aside. Churchill and the forces he commanded were still quite important, but he no longer occupied the center of gravity of strategic thinking. He had been largely reduced to going along with whatever Roosevelt and Stalin worked out between them.

Michael

[winkelried]

Up until the middle of 1943 I would tend to agree with you.

You're right when looking at the whole war. On the other hand, if England would have given in the whole war could have turned differently - but this is pure speculation.

I just like the idea that a cigar smoking, overweight workaholic and a homosexual intellectual were instrumental to beat the vegetarian Gefreite and his uebermenschen in this epic struggle.

[Michael Emrys]

You're right when looking at the whole war. On the other hand, if England would have given in the whole war could have turned differently - but this is pure speculation.

Agreed on both points.

I just like the idea that a cigar smoking, overweight workaholic and a homosexual intellectual were instrumental to beat the vegetarian Gefreite and his uebermenschen in this epic struggle.

Life is full of such amusing incongruities. The gods laugh at us and our feeble attempts to put things in order. Especially when it is we ourselves who stumble over our castles of sand.

Michael

[undead reindeer cavalry]

The whole German strategy depended on being able to take on one opponent at a time and defeating him in a quick war.

what's the reasoning behind this idea?

Germans are still preparing for a long WW1 style war when they go for Western Europe in 1940. that they are able to finish the war so quickly is not the result of their strategy.

when they go for USSR in 1941 their strategic aim is to get the large material resources located in USSR in order to be able to fight the coming long war against US and UK.

the only short war aspect i see is the planning for the summer campaign against USSR. here they expect that they can defeat the Red Army in the European Russia - they are not aware of the Soviet capacity to mobilize reserves. nobody but Soviets were aware of that capacity. US military intelligence estimated that Germans would finish Soviets in 6 weeks (IIRC).

[Boche]

True, as far as I am aware, Hitler was basically close to a nervous breakdown throughout the campaign in France, half expecting the war to bog down into a near WW1 setting.

[JasonC]

"the first person who wouldn't yield"

Duff Cooper (then lord of the admiralty) - the only member of Chamberlain's cabinet to resign over Munich.

Honor trivia...

[Michael Emrys]

what's the reasoning behind this idea?

Germans are still preparing for a long WW1 style war when they go for Western Europe in 1940. that they are able to finish the war so quickly is not the result of their strategy.

You are forgetting something. When Hitler went into Poland, he was expecting Britain and France to stay out of the war until he was ready to take them on. In fact, he was hoping to persuade Britain to stay out altogether. When they declared on Sept. 3, he must have felt as if he had landed in the soup. When France fell so quickly, he must have felt reprieved, that his strategy was back on track once again.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

"the first person who wouldn't yield"

Duff Cooper (then lord of the admiralty) - the only member of Chamberlain's cabinet to resign over Munich.

Didn't Eden also quit around that time?

Michael

[Bigduke6]

This is a very good point. The Soviets, er, the Russians like to argue they defeated Germany with little help and overall they are probably right.

However, we should not forget that during the Czechoslovakian crisis the Soviets talked about mobilizing major air force elements and sending arms to Prague...and then then did nothing.

And when it came Poland's turn, the Soviets waited a while and then invaded Poland from the East.

And then when the Germans were mopping up France, the Soviets displayed their iron-hard opposition to territorial agression in Europe by...overrunning the Baltic states and a nice chunk of Romania.

It is quite right to point fingers at Hitler and say, "bad strategist". But even though the Soviets at the very least did the lion's share of destroying the Wehrmacht, one certainly can question Soviet strategy in the run-up to the German invasion. How smart is it not only to cut a deal with Facist Germany, help them perform military training on your own territory, and stand by as Facist Germany takes over Europe, all on a bet Hitler won't try conclusions with the Soviet Union next?

If we can wonder "What in the world was he thinking?" when Hitler decided to invade the SU, we certainly can wonder "How could they not have seen it coming?" when it comes to the Kremlin.

Which brings us back to Churchill. He and of course his advisors were the first ones who decided that no, the Germans were going to get a long war whether they liked it or not.

I personally wouldn't call Churchill the Allies' strongest asset, that puts him ahead of things like the Soviet Stavka and how committed they were to making Frunze's theories work, or FDR's inclination to let US big business have a free rein and good profits in producing war materials.

But if you want to look for forks in the historical road where you can say "it definately would have gone differently if this decision maker had taken that other route", then Winston's deciding he for one wasn't going to yield to the Hun has to be one of those key points.

The whole strategy was biased by the Nazi view of the world. On one side the superior German race and on the other side the weak democracies and the slavic Untermenschen. Unluckily enough this view was strengthened during the years leading to war (e.g. at Munich).

But then there was Churchill - the first person who wouldn't yield. I believe that he was the strongest allied asset.

[Michael Emrys]

It is quite right to point fingers at Hitler and say, "bad strategist". But even though the Soviets at the very least did the lion's share of destroying the Wehrmacht, one certainly can question Soviet strategy in the run-up to the German invasion....

If we can wonder "What in the world was he thinking?" when Hitler decided to invade the SU, we certainly can wonder "How could they not have seen it coming?" when it comes to the Kremlin.

For sure. Anyone with doubts on that issue might find Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia by Gabriel Gorodetsky interesting reading.

Michael

[Vark]

I think early German successes and Allied humiliations also played a role. After Dunkirk the British literally had their backs to the wall, and lets not forget the British rearmament programme was predicated on a war starting in 42-43. The Germans with their pseudo-scientific racial superiority schtick were emboldened by early victories, that could have so easily turned into more bloody and protracted victories. The Allies delusions of military superiority, pre-war, were quickly shattered and nothing enhances the effectiveness of a conservative and hidebound institution, like the army, than a defeat survived. Of course Nazi Germany was to face military defeats, but it either ignored them (Retreat from Moscow, Stalingrad) or got caught in a spiral of defeats it could never escape from, victims of the speed and violence of mechanised war.

On that note has anyone else read Wolfgang Schivelbusch's "The Culture of Defeat"?

[Noltyboy]

You're right when looking at the whole war. On the other hand, if England would have given in the whole war could have turned differently - but this is pure speculation.

I just like the idea that a cigar smoking, overweight workaholic and a homosexual intellectual were instrumental to beat the vegetarian Gefreite and his uebermenschen in this epic struggle.

I hate to nit pick but it is the United Kindom of Great Britain (and her Empire at that time). In the same way that it was the USA not "Texas" that reacted to the Attack on Pearl Harbour...

[sburke]

I hate to nit pick but it is the United Kindom of Great Britain (and her Empire at that time). In the same way that it was the USA not "Texas" that reacted to the Attack on Pearl Harbour...

huh, it was more than Texas? That's not what Gov Parry said.

[Noltyboy]

huh, it was more than Texas? That's not what Gov Parry said.

Touche!

[JasonC]

Michael - in re Eden, he resigned well before Munich, in February 1938, because he believed Chamberlain undercut his line on Italy-Spain.

He was objecting to Italian support for Franco in the Spanish civil war, and thought Mussolini was violating an existing agreement with the UK on military non-intervention around the Med (which arguably was true, though the Italians construed that agreement to cover further direct military actions toward Greece or the eastern Med islands, not arms shipments to Franco). Chamberlain wanted to negotiate a new agreement with Mussolini over Spain; Eden believed this undercut his (Eden's) previous negotiating stance that Italy was already in violation of its existing commitments.

Eden did not object to Chamberlain's line on Germany during his time as foreign minister. He abstained from the vote on Munich in the House (he was no longer in the cabinet, but still supporting the conservative government in the House, etc). Later, some opponents of appeasement toward Germany gathered around him as a conservative out of the government with foreign policy credentials etc. But he did not directly oppose Chamberlain over Munich, or resign over it, and he only came round to Churchill's own position on such things after Norway and the fall of Chamberlain's government.

It is fair to say he was less of an appeaser than Chamberlain, or than say Halifax. He was not as forthright as Churchill or Cooper in warning of German aggression, the likelihood of war, or the need to prepare for it. Cooper had been pushing that position from inside the cabinet for some time before resigning over Munich; immediately prior, in fact, he thought he had secured a commitment from Chamberlain to stand with the French and the Czechs - which Chamberlain reversed (second 180 on it) after his last shuttle diplomacy trip (the infamous "peace in our time" one).

[ArgusEye]

But let us not forget that it was indeed Chamberlain who declared war on Germany, and that it was he who promised "war to our utmost" after being offered favorable peace terms by Germany during the phoney war.