US shortcommings and how did they win.

[JonS]

The sheer attrition across multiple front forced them to relinquish it.

Well, if you believe that, then you must simultaneously belive that the Allies had the bestest, most awesomest militaries evar. Being able to inflict attrition on the Germans, while not suffering attrition themselves is a pretty neat trick.

(hint: the Allies suffered attrition too. Lots of it. But they organised and equipped themselves explictily to be able to cope with it. There is NO reason the GAF couldn't have done likewise.)

[Squatdog]

Well, if you believe that, then you must simultaneously belive that the Allies had the bestest, most awesomest militaries evar. Being able to inflict attrition on the Germans, while not suffering attrition themselves is a pretty neat trick.

(hint: the Allies suffered attirition too. Lots of it. But they organised and equipped themselves explictily to be able to cope with it. There is NO reason the GAF couldn't have done likewise.)

Did you even read my post?

Once again, the Allies had vastly superior resources at their disposal (especially with America's untouched industrial plant), so were able to replenish their casualties, while Germany struggled to maintain operational footing across multiple, widely dispersed fronts.

Squatdog are you Steiner Mk II by any chance? You seem to have bought into the Germanic Wagnerian, mighty warriors submerged by the hordes, thesis (excuse) for defeat, hook line and sinker.

No, I am pointing our facts.

[ChrisND]

Did you even read my post?

Once again, the Allies had vastly superior resources at their disposal (especially with America's untouched industrial plant), so were able to replenish their casualties, while Germany struggled to maintain operational footing across multiple, widely dispersed fronts.

That's their own friggin fault for being arrogant enough to take on the rest of the civilized world without being prepared for it. You can't just concentrate on their strengths and ignore their weaknesses.

[JonS]

Did you even read my post?

Yeah, I read it. It's rubbish.

the Allies had vastly superior resources at their disposal (especially with America's untouched industrial plant),

The US only became a major factor in Euurope from 1944.

while Germany struggled to maintain operational footing across multiple, widely dispersed fronts. ....

... because of the choices they made.

By the by ... 'widely dispersed fronts?' *pfft* The UK maintained operational fronts in the Med, East Africa, the Levant, Persia, Burma, the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and in NWE. The US maintained operational fronts in the Aleutians, North West Europe, China, Burma, the South Pacific, Central Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Med. That's widely dispersed.

No, I am pointing our facts.

Ah, no.

[Vark]

Like the statement the Germans were out numbered in the whole Kursk salient but neglecting to point out on the main avenues of advance they out numbered their opponents (it's what armies do, mass force at select areas). Of course when the mighty German military did it, it is evidence of superior tactical gee whizness, but when the Allies, especially those Slavic peasants do the same, it's just so unfair. Talking of which dedicating most of your air assets to CAS instead of the less sexy interdiction is pretty dumb, but par for the course for the glory seeking Teutons. They had tank aces and air aces and infantry aces and sub aces and AT gun aces, pity they left out the winning ace!

Go away and research the Battle of Britain, compare the force ratios and then savour the operational and strategic ineptness that followed before parroting the out-numbered gambit.

[Squatdog]

"the Allies had vastly superior resources at their disposal (especially with America's untouched industrial plant)"

The US only became a major factor in Euurope from 1944.

Oh boy.

RESOURCES??? Did you even read what I wrote?

Also, I guess the hundreds of thousands of US personnel deployed in North Africa and the Italian campaign don't count either? Or the USAF strategic bombing?

... because of the choices they made.

By the by ... 'widely dispersed fronts?' *pfft* The UK maintained operational fronts in the Med, East Africa, the Levant, Persia, Burma, the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and in NWE. The US maintained operational fronts in the Aleutians, North West Europe, China, Burma, the South Pacific, Central Pacific, the Atlantic, and the Med. That's widely dispersed.

Oh boy.

The Germans ALSO maintained operational fronts in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Atlantic, while the Levant and Persia would barely even qualify as 'fronts' and the Italian forces in east Africa were quickly rolled up.

That's their own friggin fault for being arrogant enough to take on the rest of the civilized world without being prepared for it. You can't just concentrate on their strengths and ignore their weaknesses.

LOL@the 'logic' of assessing the operational efficiency of a nation's military solely by the fact that they eventually lost because the one-sided odds were 'their own fault'....

I guess semi-clothed Somali bandits are vastly superior to the much-vaunted US military because they forced them out of Somalia, right? Who cares about little things like political expediency or mitigating circumstances...they won so that means they're better!

[JonS]

Also, I guess the hundreds of thousands of US personnel deployed in North Africa and the Italian campaign don't count either? Or the USAF strategic bombing?

In '43? No, not really.

Which, ironically enough, is exactly what I wrote.

[sburke]

In '43? No, not really.

Which, ironically enough, is exactly what I wrote.

And he isn't going to read. He's already decided Hitler's legions were the best combat soldiers the world has ever seen. Save your breath, reality isn't going to intrude. There will always be some excuse why Germany wasn't able to win, next he will blame the traitors amongst the German people and say they deserved their fate...wait that sounds familiar.

The fact that Stalingrad and Tunisia had put the stake in the ground that Germany was doomed in 1943 when the Wehrmacht still believed they maintained the strategic initiative in the East apparently isn't gonna get through to squatdog. Again it will probably be Hitler's fault as if the German army wasn't simply out generaled by the Red Army and outfought.

This thread has gone the way of most of these unfortunately. The OP genuinely wanted to discuss how the Allies and particularly the US army overcame it's deficiencies and was able to successfully prosecute the war. Instead we get bogged down in another reprisal of how sad for the ubermensch that we didn't play fair. It's boring, bogus and bulls**t.

[Michael Emrys]

...Germany struggled to maintain operational footing across multiple, widely dispersed fronts.

So? Both the Commonwealth and the US were fighting on even more dispersed fronts. And were victorious on those fronts. I'm not impressed.

Michael

[Squatdog]

In '43? No, not really.

Which, ironically enough, is exactly what I wrote.

No you didn't. What you actually wrote was "The US only became a major factor in Euurope from 1944."

So the Italian campaign still doesn't count, along with the immense material aid provided by America, the contribution to strategic bombing, the North Africa campaign etc. etc.

So? Both the Commonwealth and the US were fighting on even more dispersed fronts. And were victorious on those fronts. I'm not impressed.

The British Commonwealth covered a huge swath of the world's land surface and had resources that dwarfed the German state. The vast majority of troops in the Burma campaign (for example) were from British India.

The untouched American industrial base dwarfed anything Germany could produce, even with the Pacific commitment against Japan. Meanwhile the Soviets had mobilised a massive army that was engaged with German forces across over a thousand kilometres of front

And he isn't going to read. He's already decided Hitler's legions were the best combat soldiers the world has ever seen. Save your breath, reality isn't going to intrude. There will always be some excuse why Germany wasn't able to win, next he will blame the traitors amongst the German people and say they deserved their fate...wait that sounds familiar.

The level of groupthink and denial on this forum is always hilarious...

State that the Wehrmacht was effective at an operational level? THAT MEANS YOU LOVE HITLER!!!!11

Point out that the regular US infantry could be regarded as poor quality troops? HOW DID AMERICA SINGLE-HANDEDLY WIN WW2 THEN???

[sburke]

The level of groupthink and denial on this forum is always hilarious...

State that the Wehrmacht was effective at an operational level? THAT MEANS YOU LOVE HITLER!!!!11

Point out that the regular US infantry could be regarded as poor quality troops? HOW DID AMERICA SINGLE-HANDEDLY WIN WW2 THEN???

Okay I admit that wasn't fair. My apologies, I was out of line.

You didn't state however that they were effective. I believe it was a bit more prolific than that. It gets old hearing how great the German army was and how they only lost because of the "Materialschlacht". Modern war is what it is and Germany was incapable of keeping up. The German Army started losing the war as soon as they invaded Russia. Smolensk was only a few months into Barbarossa and already the grandiose plans and Blitzkrieg tactics were starting to unravel in the face of a total commitment by the Soviet Union. This isn't 1944, or even 1943. By the following winter the Russians had crushed 6th army and savaged 4th Pz Army. US troops were not yet in N Africa and Rommel was still loose in the Desert. So what now is the excuse?

As to US infantry being poor quality troops, that was certainly true in 1943 and of units new to combat in June 1944. The British noted it, the Germans noted it and took advantage of it. The Germans had the same issues when units were first in combat. The US Army barely existed prior to 1940. In 1939 it consisted of approximately 160,000 men. It takes time to build a competent military. However the US learned and was able to go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht even without air power. There are plenty of battles to back that up if you'd like. 7th Armored at St Vith, the 2nd Infantry Division at the Twin villages etc. These can't be battles you've never heard of so I can only assume you chose to ignore them.

[Squatdog]

Okay I admit that wasn't fair. My apologies, I was out of line.

You didn't state however that they were effective. I believe it was a bit more prolific than that. It gets old hearing how great the German army was and how they only lost because of the "Materialschlacht". Modern war is what it is and Germany was incapable of keeping up. The German Army started losing the war as soon as they invaded Russia. Smolensk was only a few months into Barbarossa and already the grandiose plans and Blitzkrieg tactics were starting to unravel in the face of a total commitment by the Soviet Union. This isn't 1944, or even 1943. By the following winter the Russians had crushed 6th army and savaged 4th Pz Army. US troops were not yet in N Africa and Rommel was still loose in the Desert. So what now is the excuse?

As to US infantry being poor quality troops, that was certainly true in 1943 and of units new to combat in June 1944. The British noted it, the Germans noted it and took advantage of it. The Germans had the same issues when units were first in combat. The US Army barely existed prior to 1940. In 1939 it consisted of approximately 160,000 men. It takes time to build a competent military. However the US learned and was able to go toe to toe with the Wehrmacht even without air power. There are plenty of battles to back that up if you'd like. 7th Armored at St Vith, the 2nd Infantry Division at the Twin villages etc. These can't be battles you've never heard of so I can only assume you chose to ignore them.

I agree with this, although St. Vith was a clear exception to the general chaos in the Ardennes.

[JonS]

No you didn't. What you actually wrote was "The US only became a major factor in Europe from 1944."

So the Italian campaign still doesn't count, along with the immense material aid provided by America, the contribution to strategic bombing, the North Africa campaign etc.

Sigh. I know what I wrote, but I didn't know you were this hard-of-reading.

1943 came before 1944. In 1943 the US and it's resources wasn't yet a major factor in Europe. The US direct military contribution to North Africa was ... what? Two divisions, maybe three? Big whoop. A single corps, out of two field armies. Same goes for Sicily, and it was still about the same in Italy. The US bomber offensive in 1943 was defeated. The US only became a major factor in Europe from 1944 is what I wrote. In 1944 they were a major factor. Big styles. But not 1943.

Incidentally, are you aware that for a whole year the Germans had control of all Europe from the Bug to Pyrenees, and from North Cape to Sofia, opposed only by the UK? A whole year! Talk about your massive material advantage. You'd think they'd be able to, you know, achieve something, with an overwhelming advantage like that. Especially with them being the masters of warfare and all.

[Taraphir]

Lend-Lease should also be taken into account.

The USSR´s rail network for example would have been practically shut down

without the delivery of american locomotives and railcars in 1941.

In a certain way the United States were present very early on.

[wokelly]

Lend-Lease should also be taken into account.

The USSR´s rail network for example would have been practically shut down

without the delivery of american locomotives and railcars in 1941.

In a certain way the United States were present very early on.

It would not have been shut down, more so factories which had built rails cars and engines but now built T-34s would never have been converted. Lend lease allowed the Russians to concentrate on producing certain weapons. They probably could have managed to build enough trucks and rail engines for themselves, they would have had a lot less tanks though.

[JonS]

Lend-Lease should also be taken into account.

The USSR´s rail network for example would have been practically shut down

without the delivery of american locomotives and railcars in 1941.

In a certain way the United States were present very early on.

The US didn't start delivering RR equipment (engines, rolling stock, rails, etc) until after July 1943.

Albert L. Weeks, Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II, Table I, p.141-144

[Taraphir]

The US didn't start delivering RR equipment (engines, rolling stock, rails, etc) until after July 1943.

Albert L. Weeks, Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II, Table I, p.141-144

Thank you wokelly and JonS for correcting me on that subject your´re both welcome.

Allow me to turn the railway switch back to the key subject of alleged american shortcomings.

In my opinion the Americans were good in acknowledging their shortcomings and to compensate for them.

Perhaps some of you know good examples?

[JonS]

Allow me to turn the railway switch back to the key subject of alleged american shortcomings.

In my opinion the Americans were good in acknowledging their shortcomings and to compensate for them.

Perhaps some of you know good examples?

That's a good point, and the core thesis of Doubler's "Closing With The Enemy". The weakness of his book, I think, is that it isn't comparative. He describes many examples of adaption to solve difficult tactical problems, and then sums it up with 'aww shucks, aren't we great!' But he doesn't compare that to what the Germans were up to, or how the British and Canadians were adapting to similar problems. The US Army was clearly good at solving problems, but were other armies better? CwtE doesn't try to answer that question.

[Squatdog]

1943 came before 1944. In 1943 the US and it's resources wasn't yet a major factor in Europe.

Oh boy.

So the immense quantity of war materiel supplied by America had no bearing on Britain's ability to continue the war after the fall of France? It must be wonderful to live in your fantasy world.

[Squatdog]

That's a good point, and the core thesis of Doubler's "Closing With The Enemy". The weakness of his book, I think, is that it isn't comparative. He describes many examples of adaption to solve difficult tactical problems, and then sums it up with 'aww shucks, aren't we great!' But he doesn't compare that to what the Germans were up to, or how the British and Canadians were adapting to similar problems. The US Army was clearly good at solving problems, but were other armies better? CwtE doesn't try to answer that question.

A common problem with the US military (which persists to this day) was the resolute refusal to face up to problems other than throwing more money at them.

They refused to accept that the M4 was woefully inadequate against the latest generation of German tanks and refused to follow the British example of up-gunning to calibre that could actually compete on relatively equal terms. They persisted with the obsolete 57mm infantry gun until the Ardennes fiasco jarringly confirmed that it was basically worthless as an anti-tank platform. Then there was the fundamentally flawed tank destroyer doctrine, the continued use of the BAR as a section LMG (well into the Korean War!) and the BCR system that negatively impacted unit morale and cohesion.

[JonS]

Oh boy.

So the immense quantity of war materiel supplied by America had no bearing on Britain's ability to continue the war after the fall of France? It must be wonderful to live in your fantasy world.

Yes, that's right, because 'wasn't yet a major factor' means exactly the same as 'had no bearing'

I henceforth dub thee "Strawdog". Let it be known. Let it be so.

[JonS]

They refused to accept that the M4 was woefully inadequate against the latest generation of German tanks and refused to follow the British example of up-gunning to calibre that could actually compete on relatively equal terms.

Yes. That explains why they never upgunned the Sherman to a 76mm, and never produced a version with robust armour.

They persisted with the obsolete 57mm infantry gun until the Ardennes fiasco jarringly confirmed that it was basically worthless as an anti-tank platform.

The 57mm was ok as part of an integrated defence in depth. Which it usually was.

Then there was the fundamentally flawed tank destroyer doctrine

The TD doctrine worked fine, when it needed to. The 'problem' was they didn't realise what a paper tiger the German armoured force was.

the continued use of the BAR as a section LMG (well into the Korean War!)

Did it really matter though? Wars certainly aren't won by LMGs. Neither are operations. Heck, battles aren't often decided by LMGs.

the BCR system that negatively impacted unit morale and cohesion.

It's a trade off. I, personally, would have hated to be caught up in the WWII US BCR system. But putting a 'commander hat' on I can see the attractions of it, and how it allowed the US to apply maximum combat power more often and for longer.

[Squatdog]

Yes, that's right, because 'wasn't yet a major factor' means exactly the same as 'had no bearing'

I henceforth dub thee "Strawdog". Let it be known. Let it be so.

So the immense amount of war materiel supplied by America 'wasn't yet a major factor' in the ability of Britain to continue the war after the fall of France?

Seriously???

Yes. That explains why they never upgunned the Sherman to a 76mm, and never produiced a version with robust armour.

Which STILL couldn't penetrate the Panther frontally under most conditions, unlike the 17-pounder?

Nice going!

The 57mm was ok as part of an integrated defence in depth. Which it usually was.

Oh boy.

It was an infantry battalion's primary line of anti-tank defence and was woefully inadequate, to the point where the gun was so "effective" as part of an 'integrated defence in depth'that it was identified as a major liability by the US command following the Ardennes offensive...

The TD doctrine worked fine, when it needed to. The 'problem' was they didn't realise what a paper tiger the German armoured force was.

Oh boy.

Once again, the M4 was hugely outclassed by the Panther in particular and the tank destroyer doctrine meant that the open-topped M10s (which STILL had trouble dealing with German armor) were often miles away.

Did it really matter though? Wars certainly aren't won by LMGs. Neither are operations. Heck, battles aren't often decided by LMGs.

It meant that what was supposed to be the cornerstone of a US rifle platoon's firepower had a flimsy 20-round magazine and a thin barrel that couldn't easily be changed when it (frequently) over-heated.

Meanwhile each German rifle section had an MG42 that could put out more sustained fire than an entire US rifle section by itself.

It's a trade off. I, personally, would have hated to be caught up in the WWII US BCR system. But putting a commander hat on I can see the attractions of it, and how it allowed the US to apply maxmimum combat power more often and for longer.

...that needlessly reduced morale and combat cohesion, instead of adopting a superior existing system?

[JonS]

it was identified as a major liability by the US command following the Ardennes offensive.

A "major liability." It was so bad that infantry battalions would have been better off without it.

Uh huh.

[JonS]

Meanwhile each German rifle section had an MG42 that could put out more sustained fire than an entire US rifle section by itself.

Uh huh. And could this wonderous MG put out more sustained fire than a Sherman, or a battery of 105mm, or both at the same time?

Combined arms. It's what wins wars.