Usefulness of games for training

[Erwin]

We've had interesting discussion here re the sim vs game issue and the possible uses of CMSF as a training tool and how valid that is etc. Here is an interesting discussion between a couple guys I had the pleasure of working with some time ago:

http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=4995893

The gaming debate

November 24, 2010

Michael Peck’s article “Less is more” in August/September TSJ prompted a spirited debate among experts on the usefulness of games as an education tool in military academies and the standards applied to them versus those applied to traditional, large-scale simulations such as OneSAF.

Col. John R. “Buck” Surdu, military deputy director at the U.S. Army Communications & Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center in Maryland, argues that games-based systems should meet the same verification standards as conventional simulations.

James Sterrett, deputy lead, simulations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Digital Leader Development Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., counters that comparing big sims with small games is an apples-to-oranges exercise: Each has a different role and set of requirements.

And Jim Lunsford, president of Kansas City-based games maker Decisive-Point, makes the point that any debate on games should focus on the end goal and the quality of training, not the tool.

Col. John R. “Buck” Surdu

The article “Less is more,” like most articles I have read about “serious games,” misses a number of important points.

First, the article misses the difference between the user interface and what is under the hood. Decisive-Point President Jim Lunsford is quoted as saying that his games must be learnable in 10 minutes and then compares his games to simulations like Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) and One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF). I agree that our simulations (and in fact our battle command systems) could use simpler, more intuitive interfaces. But let’s not confuse the fact that the user interface is independent of the quality of the simulation “under the hood.” Could intuitive, gamelike interfaces be applied to OneSAF or its ilk? Absolutely! Will the requirements developers for these simulations allow the product managers to spend money on better interfaces? Usually not! The requirements developers often insist on packing more functionality into Army simulations and refuse to let the program managers spend time and money improving the interfaces (e.g., user interface, editing tools, scenario creation tools). Does it make sense to spend $100,000 on a new game or to spend $30,000 to add a gamelike interface to OneSAF, which has already had what is under its hood verified and validated (V&V)? The irony is that, in most cases, the same people who are demanding more functionality (rather than usability) and high levels of verification and validation (rather than an engaging experience) from a WarSim or a OneSAF are the same ones who are willing to sacrifice that functionality and V&V if you call the software a “game.”

Second, I’m unaware that anyone has taken the time to conduct V&V on these “games.” Do we understand where there might be negative learning because the combat effects are incorrect? In the article, Lunsford admits that 70 percent of the solution is the instructor. I concur, but do we understand how much of that 70 percent is related to the underlying models within the game and how much is related to pedagogy? If V&V in our games is unnecessary -— although I believe it is necessary — then let’s relax the requirement for all our simulations. Otherwise, we should enforce the requirement for all of them.

These comparisons of Army simulations built as programs of record, versus quickly developed games, are apples-to-oranges comparisons. They are not held to the same standards of V&V, functionality, entity counts, detailed interaction with battle command systems, per-seat cost (The Army only pays for OneSAF once; how many licenses of several games have we bought instead of building customized interfaces to OneSAF for specific uses?), or accountability. I have yet to see a true apples-to-apples comparison or scholarly analysis that looks at all these factors. The community is rushing to develop many one-off games. Have we forgotten the landscape in the ’70s and ’80s when none of our simulations could talk to each other or real battle command systems. Are we rushing to re-create that same environment?

James Sterrett

Regarding Col. John Surdu’s concerns about serious games, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) use simulations to create low-overhead, execution-centric learning environments, often running tens or hundreds of simultaneous, completely independent exercises. Warsim and OneSAF can provide great execution-centric learning environments, but the overhead they require doesn’t support the majority of the education executed by CGSC. This is simply recognition of what the tools can and cannot do. There are limitations to large simulations, just as our low-overhead classroom simulations cannot support large live-virtual-constructive exercises.

Addressing Surdu’s points more directly, would CBS/OneSAF/ Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) serve CGSC better? The answer is no; where their capabilities overlap with our objectives, the big Army simulations cost too much to run and they often don’t support the educational objectives. We need to run many concurrent independent exercises (every February we have 17 division exercises running) to create a similar educational experiences for all our students. From experience, we know that the overhead of conducting even one of these exercises with a more detailed simulation than Jim Lunsford’s Decisive Action is prohibitive, and that merely adding a “game interface” to a major Army simulation does not make it simpler to manage, due to the level of detail that still must be managed.

Big simulations also do not address all the required scenarios. There is no other capability to address years of force management and budgeting, as Future Force does. Likewise for long-term stability operations, where we use Elusive Victory and UrbanSim — two different simulations in order to deliver economical support to both staff group exercises and individual/small group exercises. Forward into Battle and Fueling the Force provide highly accessible introductions to the logistical problems they present. Again, there is no economical replacement. Elusive Victory is being built to serve in up to 88 simultaneous, completely independent, 16-student exercises; the other games I mentioned are intended to provide simultaneous, completely independent exercises to groups of two to four students totaling more than 350 exercises at once.

Big simulations are useful under the right circumstances. We use OneSAF at CGSC to train Functional Area 57 Simulation Operations students, who use it in an eight-hour simulation-stimlation-C4I practical exercise during an elective course. For that purpose, OneSAF suits our educational objectives admirably.

As for Surdu’s concerns about the validation process for games, ours is driven by instructors, who validate the tools we offer against their educational objectives. The instructors we support are happy that the tools we provide are suitable for their purpose: We meet their educational objectives while using the minimum possible time on teaching students to learn the tools.

I agree that because they have different objectives, the comparison between the big program of record simulations, and our simulations, is often an apples-to-oranges comparison. The big simulations are intended to support large collective training events, while ours are supposed to support individual leader development and education. The apples-to-apples comparison should run on the basis of intended learning outcomes and constraints on overhead. Different tools serve different tasks.

Jim Lunsford

Serious games are here to stay. When properly developed, fielded, and used, they are a very effective and relatively low-cost way to educate and train. It is as ludicrous to think that serious games will replace larger military simulations as it is to think that simulations, of any kind, will ever replace the need for most live training. Serious games should be viewed as a set of simple, effective, individual cognitive skills or team training devices used routinely at home, in the classroom or the unit area. When employed properly, serious games can better prepare individuals and units for live training or larger military simulation-supported training exercises. Rather than wasting time and energy comparing apple and oranges, what we, as a military and a society, really need is a strong vision for the future use of serious games and a viable strategy for their acquisition and integration into our education and training programs.

Why even use serious games? The simple answer is that most of what we learn as leaders is actually more complex than is readily apparent. To truly understand 90 percent of what we teach and train such as doctrine, tactics, weapons employment, leadership, etc., requires more than just reading and discussion. Until we have observed someone performing the task, or better yet done it ourselves, and then had a chance to reflect on what happened and why, we only have a rudimentary understanding of the subject. We might be able to score an A+ on the written test, but at the practical level, we are still essentially ignorant. However, once we experience the “ah-hah” moment in the field or within a suitable and acceptable simulated experience, particularly if the learning is shaped by an excellent facilitator, we start the process of learning not just the science, but the art of our profession. Well-designed games, integrated within sound instructional strategies, provide a strong foundation to not only experience the revelations associated with intellectual discovery, but a means to repeatedly practice the newly learned knowledge almost anytime and anywhere.

Serious games can also address a vast set of requirements for which no traditional military simulation exists. During the last year, one of the games we developed for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College supports instruction on Army force management. Using “Future Force,” students practice managing the Army budget during a 20-year period while creating and maintaining the proper force structure to effectively respond to any contingency. This requirement, and many like them, cannot be met with existing military simulations.

Serious games should and often do undergo a form of VV&A (verification, validation and accreditation); VV&A is not rocket science. It is merely a structured methodology to ensure the models within the game perform as claimed by the developer (verification), correctly model the intended behavior (validation) and are acceptable to the instructors for their intended use in the training program (accreditation). For serious games, a continuous, informal VV&A can be conducted during the spiral development process by the organization or institution responsible for the courseware the game is being developed to support.

Serious games do not constitute a revolution in training and education. They are just a new form of simulation-supported training. Knowing when and how to use them is as important as knowing when and how to use any other existing training tool. In order to effectively take full advantage of their capabilities while recognizing their limitations, we should train our leaders and instructors in their use as part of their professional development. For no matter how good the game may appear to be, the quality of training will always depend on the instructor’s ability to shape learning.

In the very near future, serious games will be as prolific as textbooks. Students everywhere will actively use simple, focused, games to enhance their educational experience in just about every course of instruction. They will use these games to practice the art of their craft as well as better understand the science prior to conducting the task for the first time as a live event. Will we be ready as a nation to take full advantage of this capability?

[HintJ]

What an interesting topic, with implications beyond military training. . .

I work in the transportation industry, and I wish all dispatchers would play Close Combat for awhile, because their job is kind of like a real-time strategy: They have to direct trucks in real-time, and drivers have varying levels of experience and ability, and just because a dispatcher "orders" a driver to go somewhere, doesn't mean he will do it! Too many stressful, low-paying runs into Brooklyn or Detroit and he'll defect to a competing company!

A bad dispatcher runs his load board like a Korean kid playing Starcraft, or something like that.

[LongLeftFlank]

Interesting piece, thanks for posting.

Viewpoint A (Surdu): I’m unaware that anyone has taken the time to conduct V&V on these “games.” Do we understand where there might be negative learning because the combat effects are incorrect?

I doubt CMSF would EVER pass this guy's V&V tests, which is why Steve wisely shied away from trying to meet the MilSpecs.

Viewpoint B (Sterrett): The big simulations are intended to support large collective training events, while ours are supposed to support individual leader development and education. The apples-to-apples comparison should run on the basis of intended learning outcomes and constraints on overhead.

(Lunsford) Serious games should be viewed as a set of simple, effective, individual cognitive skills or team training devices used routinely at home, in the classroom or the unit area. When employed properly, serious games can better prepare individuals and units for live training or larger military simulation-supported training exercises.

IIUC, these two points are interrelated.

1. What "intended learning outcomes" would CMSF, in its current incarnation (i.e. as off the shelf software, not containing some kind of features we might wish it had), deliver in a military training environment, as a supplement to formal instruction?

a. Would CMSF be best used as a classroom discussion aid? e.g. a student plots orders then replays 1-3 WEGO minutes of the resulting action on a big screen, with instructor-led class discussion of the results as they unfold?

b. Or is it more like "homework" or a textbook problem set or case; take home a Savegame and conduct the next 10 minutes in RT, then submit a set of screenshots of your orders and their results? (A certain amount of "honour system" would be required)

2. What "cognitive skills" would a junior officer or NCO take away from CMSF?

[gibsonm]

a. Would CMSF be best used as a classroom discussion aid? e.g. a student plots orders then replays 1-3 WEGO minutes of the resulting action on a big screen, with instructor-led class discussion of the results as they unfold?

No, because:

a. It doesn’t support “co-op” play (i.e. the Blue commander can micro manage his units, and he doesn’t have supporting arms commanders).

Even at say CT level, the CT comd does plot exactly where 2 section , 1PL goes. So he needs say 3 x Inf comds working to him and perhaps a tank guy too.

And a flow on effect is that that implies networked machines and TCP/IP WEGO (required for the replay / critique) isn’t implemented.

Lastly, it doesn’t have any Aust kit.

So there’s three reasons why its failed (at least in our trials of it) as an “off the shelf” product.

[HintJ]

2. What "cognitive skills" would a junior officer or NCO take away from CMSF?

Perhaps confidence in the concept of sectors of fire and proper placement of heavy weapons, but other than that, it is probably a bad idea to train NCOs with anything that has a pause mode or wego.

[LongLeftFlank]

No, because:

a. It doesn’t support “co-op” play (i.e. the Blue commander can micro manage his units, and he doesn’t have supporting arms commanders).

Even at say CT level, the CT comd does plot exactly where 2 section , 1PL goes. So he needs say 3 x Inf comds working to him and perhaps a tank guy too.

And a flow on effect is that that implies networked machines and TCP/IP WEGO (required for the replay / critique) isn’t implemented.

Lastly, it doesn’t have any Aust kit.

So there’s three reasons why its failed (at least in our trials of it) as an “off the shelf” product.

Interesting, thanks. So if I understand you right, CMSF is of little value as a classroom tool if it doesn't allow a trainee to "stand in the shoes" of a specific commander (Bat, Coy), which would involve, at a minimum:

(a) seeing and hearing only what he and his command would see and hear in RL,

( having no direct influence over the conduct of the subunits (or first person knowledge of their situation), but some ability to issue instructions to them (and have them reacted to)

© keeping the clock running in RT with no "pauses"

[gibsonm]

2. What "cognitive skills" would a junior officer or NCO take away from CMSF?

Perhaps confidence in the concept of sectors of fire and proper placement of heavy weapons, but other than that, it is probably a bad idea to train NCOs with anything that has a pause mode or wego.

It certainly has potential for small unit post Hr planning / COA analysis.

But as its limited to easy to facilitate (yes you can get your section commanders to cycle through the machine to plot their moves, but that just gobbles up the available time and space) single player per side its value stops at pretty much Platoon level.

The problem is that its above Platoon that you really need to do the Post Hr planning / COA analysis. At Platoon level once you cross the LD its pretty much drills or instinctive response to short notice, unplanned incidents.

[gibsonm]

Interesting, thanks. So if I understand you right, CMSF is of little value as a classroom tool if it doesn't allow a trainee to "stand in the shoes" of a specific commander (Bat, Coy), which would involve, at a minimum:

(a) seeing and hearing only what he and his command would see and hear in RL,

( having no direct influence over the conduct of the subunits (or first person knowledge of their situation), but some ability to issue instructions to them (and have them reacted to)

© keeping the clock running in RT with no "pauses"

Well usually for a given tactical problem (we call them TEWTs - Tactical Exercise Without Troops) the trainee is in a command position.

The opening paragraph normally reads “You are Officer Commanding A Coy ...” and then goes on to describe the problem facing A Coy and the trainees has to come up with a plan.

No happy for him to see / hear everything (esp. if the plan has “teaching points” i.e. very good or very bad). However his influence is too great in CM:SF.

A given Platoon is a PL Comd‘s unit. The Coy Comd usually shouldn’t drill down and bypass the PL Comd and start micro managing that PL (breaking this section into teams, tell another where to site its MG, etc.).

In the absence of multi player, the Coy Comd can do that here.

Ideally he should be limited to say map view 4 or something and have his Platoon Comds “do the business” with their PLs at level 1 or 2.

The Company Comd should describe the effects he wants to achieve (i.e. the “what“) “2 PL is left forward in the assault, secure OBJ 2, 8-12 on Re-org” or some such. The PL Comd comes up with the “how” (otherwise he doesn’t need to be there).

Happy with WEGO.

This provides an opportunity to review the battle and indeed replicates pretty standard COA wargaming techniques used to develop a sync matrix.

So H - H+1, H+1 - H+2, etc.

Yes you can use CM:SF as a CPX tool providing feeds (in which case you could isolate the Comd from the screen totally). His subordinates (again if there was co-op) could fight the battle and submit reports to the CP, where the OC could react and then issue FRAGO’s etc.

But that’s trg in a different skill to a TEWT.

[HintJ]

Well, I think I understand what you're saying, and I also think that voice recognition software is absolutely essential for realistic training programs, or at least a co-op game w/radio simulation that tells people where to go is better than mouse-clicking.

My military experience is rather modest, but I do know that a reasonably articulate radio operator is worth his weight in gold.

Perhaps the best simulator I've played is Steel Beasts, when the players print out paper maps beforehand, and communicate over microphones.

[abneo3sierra]

I have used this game to teach, but mostly to JROTC and ROTC level "officer candidates" Every sim or wargame has enough of realistic tactics in it, to teach at least some tactical lessons. In three combat tours ,the platoon leaders under me,and myself, would often play the game,and usually comment about how well things worked in it,but at that level, it was not really "training" for us. Nevertheless, the military in general uses massive amounts of wargames to teach lessons,some of them are far worse and far less realistic than civilian games,but they are quite good at teaching that ONE lesson, for which they are there. Jim Lunsford, who the OP quoted, actually designed "Decisive Action" a corps level operational wargame we used at the Army CGSC,and again...quite realistic at what it taught,but definite holes in other areas.

The point is..it really,really,depends on the lesson you are trying to teach, as to whether this game, or any game, can teach it. I would definitely say that this game is enough "sim" for realistic tactics to work a realistic amount of time, but they kept enough "fun" in it, to still be an enjoyable game.

[Battlefront.com]

It is an interesting debate. I agree with abneo3sierra that something like CM:SF could never be used as a true training tool "as is". Gibsonm pointed to a lot of the reasons why. I've seen how difficult it is to use CM:SF in a Battalion CPX, in person, and was actually surprised how well CM:SF held up compared to what it was designed to do.

Which brings me back to the point I've come to many times with potential military and civilian partners... the features that are required to make CM:SF a viable training tool can be added, but we have to have a financial incentive to add them. That incentive is unlikely to come from the public sector directly, which means either a larger contractor or the military directly has to hand over some cash to make it happen. But getting those resources allocated tends to be near impossible, which means the features aren't added, which means there's nothing for them to purchase as a "stock" product. It's a typical chicken and egg problem.

I think CM:SF's primary strength is that it doesn't have a particular training focus. Years ago I had a Brigade S3 (or was he S4? I forget now!) ask me what good CM could since it only went up to Battalion level. I said if you're looking for logistics training, absolutely nothing. If you want to simulate enveloping an entire city, not much there either. However, if you want an Infantry Company Commander to get a better appreciation for how combined arms with tanks, artillery, air, and other weapons work together to achieve a satisfactory outcome, then CM is a pretty good tool. It's a very good way for an inexpensive and entertaining way for junior officers and NCOs to get a practical and safe reminder that the more robust your plan, the more understanding you have of the elements, the more likely you're going to succeed. And the opposite, of course!

Steve

[Erwin]

And you really don't want to waste gazillions of dollars getting the V&V sorted out with the huge contractors looking over your shoulder.

Possibly the DoD solution would be to have two families of sims, one (expensive) that has passed V&V, and the other COTS used for highly specific training where the instructor is the primary teaching tool who is using the COTS game only for visual illustration purposes.

[abneo3sierra]

Your description Erwin, is probably the best description for how I use this game,as visual illustration, as well, as like Steve above said, to show the effects of things such as combined arms,artillery preparation before an assault,various things like that. And it also is a fun game to make THEM think of "I wonder if this will work" which is the best type of teaching, when you get your students to experiment because they want to,rather than you told them to.

[Praetori]

My take on wargames used as educational tools is that they're good for pure C&C radio exercises (ie the training officers never gets to see any of the computers involved).

Instead of scripting a scenario you can have a couple of Coy commanders in front of a computer each (and each running an instance of say CM:SF, missions not interacting). These then communicate to the Battalion as per normal procedure and the Battalion staff and chief react to these game generated events instead of scripted ones.

[Erwin]

FYI: Here is an example of using the "Follow Me" game.sim whatever you wanna call it:

www.followme.tacticaldecisiongames.com

[dan/california]

Eighty percent of Gibsonm's issues seem to come down to the lack of co-play. You have mentioned you intend to do that sooner or later, although it keeps sliding towards even later than that. He brings up some specifics about how he would like co-play to work,, still if you committed to coplay the details seem manageable. Most of the rest seem to involve specifics that are known quantities, equipment TO&E ect..

So please do co-play!

[gibsonm]

The point is, the guys are happy to implement it if a specific customer says “Yes, we’ll pay for that” and then they can pass it on to the public.

The issue I’ve run into is that the decision makers want that capability already built in.

They seem reasonably happy to pay for Australian gear / units to be modelled as that is seen as something they would need to pay for to get.

They don’t want to pay for some generic capability to be added to the game engine and then pay for the “country specific” stuff.

So I suspect we might go round and round in circles on that for a while yet.

Meanwhile other products are out there that can meet some / most of the requirement.

But again its a question of matching the training needs of the audience with the product that best suits.

For example:

VBS2 = lower level “Infantry centric” manoeuvre. Where individual people can participate.

Steel Beasts Pro = AFV crew training and Troop - BG (and in map mode only) BDE level manoeuvre.

TacOps = CT - BG manoeuvre where map based product is all that is required.

Decisive Action = BDE + manoeuvre (used at our Command and Staff College).

[shauny1987]

What an interesting topic, with implications beyond military training. . .

I work in the transportation industry, and I wish all dispatchers would play Close Combat for awhile, because their job is kind of like a real-time strategy: They have to direct trucks in real-time, and drivers have varying levels of experience and ability, and just because a dispatcher "orders" a driver to go somewhere, doesn't mean he will do it! Too many stressful, low-paying runs into Brooklyn or Detroit and he'll defect to a competing company!

A bad dispatcher runs his load board like a Korean kid playing Starcraft, or something like that.

just funny.

[Battlefront.com]

Eighty percent of Gibsonm's issues seem to come down to the lack of co-play. You have mentioned you intend to do that sooner or later, although it keeps sliding towards even later than that. He brings up some specifics about how he would like co-play to work,, still if you committed to coplay the details seem manageable. Most of the rest seem to involve specifics that are known quantities, equipment TO&E ect..

So please do co-play!

This is the maddening thing, from our perspective. CoPlay could be added very easily, from a technical standpoint, if we set aside about 1 year to implement it. That's how long we think it would take without additional resources. To make this a viable venture we would need one of two things:

1. A cash commitment in the form of a contract

2. The hope of improving sales that would be in excess of what we could have achieved if we had spent this time doing something else + risk reward

We don't really see #2 as viable for the time being, so it's really either #1 or nothing. And as I've said a million times before, we're not stupid enough to do anything for any military "on spec". While we do think that there is a pretty good chance that if we build it they will buy it, given the risks and opportunity costs it's really not a smart thing to do.

Steve

[gibsonm]

Sure but to use you ever popular car analogy (promise, no reference to cup holders).

Lets say BTS / BFC is a car dealer selling sedans.

“My people” come in and say we want a station wagon (co-op play) in red (Australian stuff).

If you respond with “we can custom build you a station wagon for X more and then Y on top for a red one”, my people are probably just going to go down the street to where there can see a station wagon in the show room, test drive a blue one and then just pay to have the red bit done.

And if they do give you the cash to build a station wagon, who owns the rights to it?

I suspect they’ll will want something more than a sticker on every car saying “station wagon bought to you by the Australian Government”.

Like I said its a circular argument.

Your saying, give me the money and I’ll build it.

“We” are saying show me a working version and we’ll think about buying it.

Certainly in an environment where we have to cut our budget by $20Bn and where there are already enough “open ended” contracts (JSF, etc.) people are very keen to buy off the shelf.

[abneo3sierra]

Couldn't have said it better myself, Major. Still though, I know that the current game alone has gotten some money from the military, albeit indirectly. There are very few people I meet who I do not recommend it to, so much that in many cases they have broken down and purchased a copy just to shut me up.

[Battlefront.com]

Oh, we definitely know that the chicken and egg problem is true from both us and a potential military customer's standpoint. But let's be real about how governments procure stuff that they don't already have or don't find in the market place.

Someone inside the military thinks of a need. The need is explored and goes through 20,000 PowerPoint presentations made by several teams over many years. The Project Managers come and go as they finish out their time in uniform or until they get another posting. In the process they work with "industry partners" to devise specifications, which sometimes are accused of being more in the interests of the "industry partners" than the military. For big projects MILLIONS can be spent on this phase.

Eventually specifications are put out for bidding. For big stuff only certain companies are invited to bid on being the prime contractor, the rest line up to compete for sub contractor status. Cue investigative journalists to start finding out how the bid specifications seem eerily similar to what one of the "industry partners" has an edge in. Then a prime is selected after. Cue luxury yacht makers to get ready for some new orders from the lawyers of whomever loses the bidding. Cue Milan and Paris tailors to start filling orders for new $5000 suits for the lobbyists who start pressing Congress to do an investigation or otherwise throw a monkey wrench into things.

Once a prime contractor is selected the prime has to go out and find various partners to produce the things which don't exist yet or modify things which do exist so they will work within the specified parameters. This creates all kinds of alliances and eventually fewer, larger prime contractors big enough to compete on the next contract. And with all that overhead they now carry from their acquisitions, there's a certain bottom line price that is associated with every project they produce. Whether they are a prime on a new tank or prime on redesigning a sceptic pump for a submarine. Gotta keep the giant fed and the lobbyists' wardrobes full of $5000 suits.

At this point gobs and gobs of money have been spent. And yet not a single thing has been produced. To get something produced the BIG money has to be spent.

The contract specifies that the system will have X number of features and will be available on Y date and will cost Z money. When in fact everybody knows it will have X- features, will be available on Y+ date, and will cost Zx money. Not to mention the costs of Congressional investigations and hearings about either the feature compromises, the time slippage, the cost overruns, or (as it usually goes for big projects) all three.

Years later the project is deemed so off track that it gets "killed". Which in defense speak means it is given a new name, some staff is changed, new PowerPoint presentations are made, and a new pitch to do the same thing as the old project. And it goes on from there.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

The point of my not-so-tongue-in-cheek rant above is that military contracting is very, very often about spending money for something that doesn't yet exist. And that the reality is many of the things they contract for disappoint. This is something they are used to, as a community. So why would anybody blink an eye about signing a contract with a small software company to produce something which is technically straight forward and relatively cost effective?

The simple answer is because we don't have $5000 suits.

One Colonel, who was in charge of a fairly large area of hardware development, procurement, and training told me that if we asked for anything more than pocket change the contract would have to go before a centralized review. At that point the big guys would say "oh, you want that? Well, we can transform our cardboard box manufacturing simulation to do what you want it to do. Of course we'll do it better and it will take a bit more time, but who would you rather trust making your software? Some puny company with no military contracting experience, or us? BTW, they are low balling their cost estimate. It's going to cost 10 times that amount."

They sign the contract and they get their money. But the military never gets a useable product.

This might sound very cynical, but I assure you I'm an optimist

Anyway, the point of this semi-rant is that we are fairly sure that a military would license a product from us if we built it first. But we aren't willing to put our jobs and your entertainment on the line for a "maybe" event. We're quite happy to make our living from the private sector. If a military customer approaches us with a sensible deal, we would definitely do it. But after perhaps a dozen pretty promising leads over the years, including flying around and even a draft contract at one point, we're not kidding ourselves about the reality of how this game is played.

Steve

[gibsonm]

Maybe I should have mentioned a cup holder ....

[HintJ]

The point of my not-so-tongue-in-cheek rant above is that military contracting is very, very often about spending money for something that doesn't yet exist. And that the reality is many of the things they contract for disappoint. This is something they are used to, as a community. So why would anybody blink an eye about signing a contract with a small software company to produce something which is technically straight forward and relatively cost effective?

The simple answer is because we don't have $5000 suits.

One Colonel, who was in charge of a fairly large area of hardware development, procurement, and training told me that if we asked for anything more than pocket change the contract would have to go before a centralized review. At that point the big guys would say "oh, you want that? Well, we can transform our cardboard box manufacturing simulation to do what you want it to do. Of course we'll do it better and it will take a bit more time, but who would you rather trust making your software? Some puny company with no military contracting experience, or us? BTW, they are low balling their cost estimate. It's going to cost 10 times that amount."

They sign the contract and they get their money. But the military never gets a useable product.

This might sound very cynical, but I assure you I'm an optimist

Anyway, the point of this semi-rant is that we are fairly sure that a military would license a product from us if we built it first. But we aren't willing to put our jobs and your entertainment on the line for a "maybe" event. We're quite happy to make our living from the private sector. If a military customer approaches us with a sensible deal, we would definitely do it. But after perhaps a dozen pretty promising leads over the years, including flying around and even a draft contract at one point, we're not kidding ourselves about the reality of how this game is played.

Steve

It makes total sense the people awarding the contract aren't going to give you the investment money!

Maybe I've got the dollar amounts guessed wrong here but,

You just need more money. If you had $400K and a year (for example) then perhaps you could make a product a government would give you a $900K contract for. Am I getting that right? You could then pay off your investor $500K (20% return in one year) keeping the rest for paying costs and further development--and further contracts?

Isn't that what you're trying to do and what others contractor hire lobbyists in $5K suits to protect? So what then hire someone w/$6K suits--they don't have souls anyway.

Yes, I'm sure that I'm oversimplifying it, but don't expect a customer that has purchased every one of your CM games to feel sympathy for you when a more important customer didn't buy your product.