Battle of the Atlantic is on!

[Snowstorm]

Ludi,

Thanks for the feedback on the USS Card and the Guadalcanal. I relayed that to my father, and he will check his facts and info as well as with his older brother who was on the Card. I appreciate the info on the USS England as well.

Your idea concerning multiple convoy routes seems sound, and a very good idea to me. Hopefully it wouldn't be too difficult for Hubert and Co. to add to the game if it appeals to them (What do you say, Hubert?). :cool:

Update: My father's reply:

The U.S.S. Card and its squadron, destroyers, and destroyer escorts held down the German U-boat U505 below the surface, and had tracked it and other German subs in the vicinity as it was running out of fuel and provisions. Soon after the U.S.S. Guadalcanal relieved the Card, the U505 rose to the surface and the German sub commander surrendered the sub to the Guadalcanal. Technically, the Guadalcanal did the capturing, but it was the Card that held the sub down (my uncle claimed that Gallery was a bit of a showboater), so both accounts may be right, more or less.

[Desert Dave]

Desert Dave I know I have brought this up before Ultra played a huge part in the latter sinking of Uboats and convoys avoiding them all together.I do realise the difficulty and maybe even the impossibility of somehow adding it but it was VERY important for the Allies.Many Uboat at sea re-supplyings were stopped because a destroyer just happened to be at the right spot at the right time.

arado234: Good point!

Your reminder of Ultra... and in fact, all - including the alternate convoy lanes - of these ideas have been bandied about and considered and re-re-considered, both in here and in the Beta forums, over these many years.

Not sure if Hubert is inclined to initiate any of the more complex changes to his magic-majestic schematics this late in the game, since so very many people have already been clamoring for this new game!

And well they should! It's... really... sweet!

Say, like a young lovelies' slow steady smile once you have undertaken - and done complete!

Some truly astonishing feat!

[Kuniworth]

Ok guys just a reminder. This board is about SC, keep it clean.

[Ludi1867]

Hi Snowstorm

Well, perhaps your father is right, but most sources do not seem to have the Card involved very much in the U-505 capture. There is what appears to be a very good web site on the whole incident. http://uboatarchive.net/U-505.htm If you scroll down there are a number of scanned documents that can be accessed. I am not an expert on CVE operations, but these documents seem authentic. Might be worth having a look, if you want to get a documentary perspective - sometimes the written record can be a little different (and a whole lot drier!) than memories!

[SeaMonkey]

Probably by now the progress of development has moved beyond incorporation of these suggestions for the naval mechanics of Global SC, although since we've discussed the multiple, variable convoy lanes before, I guess there could be a chance for them.

I try and work with an adaptation of existing features, one, like ludi loves, the teleportation feature, but you've got to lose that definition and think of the feature in more abstract terms, like dispersion......I like that better. What that does is just serve to simulate an action that was a characteristic of naval warfare, the contact and loss of, enemy vessels. The SC sea tile represents not only an area of global water but also a tactical battlefield, it is dual purpose. You locate enemy forces in the global grid (lat. & long.), but once found your units maneuver on a tactical orientation doing battle with the enemy where sightings are variable in affirmation. Think of the collection of tiles as the gameboard for something like a game of "Battleship".:cool:

Get it? Can you make the abstract transition...or is it too much? I detest tunnel vision, come on, you guys are better than that. Its a game within "the Game". What we want to do is use that dispersion feature for the variables in naval actions, smokescreens, evasive maneuver, subs diving and sneaking away, missed salvos, etc. etc.

Now another questionable action of SC naval operations is of course what Rambo states as "ramming" and that occurs in the strategic orientation of the SC seascape, when your units run into each other disclosing their positions. Potentially this is another use for the "dispersion " feature in conjuction with my often suggested "pass through" mechanic. Indeed with those two actions coordinating opposing task forces interaction, we have an environment that will support the greater movement rates for our SC naval icons.

Imagine it, you can base the final lockdown of an enemy's location to experience of the units, NW level, Intel, whatever, but you have at least a simulation of "the search" and maneuvering combat that naval warfare represents.

Ludi, remember, many Generals liken the maneuver of land mechanized units in the desert to those of ships on the ocean, so if the land unit interactions of SC units is fitting, then a somewhat similar concept can be applied to the SC naval units.

And yes......don't forget KISS, let's use what HC gives us, open up your minds and think!

[Snowstorm]

Ludi,

Thanks for the info. However, I would also counter with my (and my father's and uncle's) source:

Look in "Merchant Mariners at War, An Oral History of WWII" by George J.Billy and Christine M. Billy, Chapter 4 about Convoys. There is an accounting of this event with involving numerous idividuals quoted, including my uncle who as an engineering officer on board the Card was also interviewed on the encounter. It was one of his most vivid memories of the war. My father told me the info can also be found in the ship's and fleet's logs (he was in the navy as well). Sure, people's memories can get a bit fuzzy over time, but I doubt it is the case here. Nonetheless, I appreciate your research efforts.

Now let's get back to SC, before Kuni and/or the Gestapo arrive!

[jon_j_rambo]

World War II history is interesting. I'm sure that's why many Buntas play SC. More interesting is the direction the world is going now.

[Ludi1867]

Hi Snowstorm

Thanks for your info. My library does not have any oral history for the US merchant marine, just Canadian and RCN, so it will take some digging to get the source you note. Not that it matters a lot in the big scheme – capturing the U-505 was an important USN accomplishment, and success deserves a lot of participants! While an impressive feat, the most significant boarding action of a U-boat probably took place 30 October 1942. Three of the crew of HMS PETARD boarded U-559 and removed critically important enigma equipment. Two out of the three man boarding party drowned when the sub sank, but their capture arguably ended the most significant decryption drought the Allies suffered during the war. A good summary of Ultra is at http://www.uboat.net/technical/enigma_breaking.htm , apparently prepared by Ralph Erskine, an author who has published real books as well on the subject.

As for interest in WW II, I certainly agree with JJR as that being one of the main reasons I fiddle with SC. This discussion has got a bit off the game track at times, but it is still interesting to me! The achievements of the USN CVE groups were extremely impressive, starting in the summer of 1943. That makes their absence from the game interesting. It is defensible, I suppose, so Seamonkey doesn’t have to jump in and say and I am suggesting an impractical change here. However, it does reflect a choice on the designer’s part to significantly adjust play balance in the BOA. CVEs, or jeep carriers, were a deliberate operational choice made to put ‘cheap’ carrier based aircraft into the BOA (CVEs cost a small fraction of a fleet carrier, both in hull and air units). The RN pioneered this effort, although the RN was quite conservative in its approach, which significantly delayed the introduction of these mini-carriers into RN service. The USN took a more pragmatic and economical approach, deliberately eschewing many of the warship design aspects the RN insisted on, and put quite a few CVEs into the BOA pretty quickly. These CVEs had a major effect on the BOA from the summer of 1943 on. Some argue that the BOA was ‘lost’ by the Germans in May 1943, so anything after can perhaps be seen as irrelevant (Clay Blair essentially argues the Germans never had a chance, period, which is an even more extreme position). However, the campaign most certainly continued after May 1943, and the German efforts to extend the battle and cause losses did have an important impact in the war. In particular, Doenitz argued that keeping the battle going diverted hundreds of ships and an even greater number of strategic aircraft from more directly attacking Germany. Again, Allied production is so great by the summer of 1943 that Doenitz’s argument can perhaps be dismissed as irrelevant, but to those fighting the war in the fall of 1943 and even to the end, fighting the U-boats tied down significant Allied resources.

OK, long rant – what’s my point? In SC, the BOA tends to wrap up pretty quickly once the Allies put enough resources into it. And that is pretty much the end of things. Once the Germans lose several U-boats they really struggle to mount any kind of threat at all. So what’s wrong with this? Well, I think it abstracts the campaign a bit too much, and this abstraction makes the BOA too black and white. U-boats are usually (once the Allies have a few units with the right characteristics, such as CVs with some range) a little too easy to kill COMPLETELY. I don’t disagree that the Allies should be able to inflict losses on U-boats – of course they should. But competent players can usually kill off U-boats completely pretty quickly (if the German puts them out in the Atlantic, and if he doesn’t they are just a fleet in being sitting in port – accomplishing very little). So I remain dissatisfied with the current naval abstractions in SC. I am quite aware abstractions are necessary in a game of this scale, and well aware that the abstractions in land combat are susceptible to being criticized in detail. However, my personal assessment is that the abstractions in land combat more or less ‘work’ – but not so much in the naval game. So I keep watching – and hoping - for improvements.

[Snowstorm]

Ludi,

Thanks for the feedback. The U505 capture is probably something we both need to go look into more, but my personal opinion (not my dad's or uncle's) is there probably is a long running dispute between the Card and the Guadalcanal over credit for the whole incident, at least that is my impression, and may never be fully resolved. Oh well. Nonetheless, the exchange we've had about this was a good one.

Anyway, my head is still spinning from everything you said about the BOA , but generally I think your points are well taken. The naval battles in SC need alot of overhauling.

[arado234]

True about how the B.O.A.plays in SC but believe me,if the German player chooses to go allout with uboat tech.and the Allies dont discover it fast enough those tech.5 uboats with say a three star and above battle experience are VERY hard to kill.They are also devestating to any Allied war ship especially if the German player concentrates on sinking first the Brit destroyers as best as he can(this leaves the rest of the British fleet helpless and then the Uboats can go attacking and sinking the Brit ships in port).It then forces the Brits(who at first cant really afford it)to start spending on A.S.W. and Carrier L.R.(which is also quite expensive).I know the Brits.have three Carriers but those Carriers are prettywell useless in rough seas,so to just depend on them is risky.

[jon_j_rambo]

I use sub strategy for the Axis in some situations, but rarely. You need to immediately put some chits in sub technology, start building subs. THEN, you need to hope the British have no idea of your plan. Hopefuly you'll get some tech hits. THEN, hopefully the RN will expose themselves either in the MedFront or wherever......then for a nice ambush. Problem is, this strategy only works against average players. You'll pay the price in Russia.

[SeaMonkey]

Too much hoping and praying, I'm going for Sealion!

[Baron]

I like the idea of different convoy lanes - not sure how hard it would be to program but you certainly would get more of cat and mouse effect (for example is that DD spotted by Intel on the lane with the convoys on it or is it a decoy?).

I like the idea of Intel being linked with technology to determine if a unit "warps" or disperses as the case may be.

I also like the idea of different modes for the subs just like the fighters have now

I love the fact that surface ships can now raid the convoy lanes

On one of these threads I read somewhere that spotting ranges at sea should be reduced. I’m not so sure about that but I would suggest that LRB be giving the anti-sub tech upgrade. I’d also suggest that LRB only be given 1 attack vs. subs as there generally were not a lot on the same station representing multiple aircraft sorties at the same time. As an aside I suggest that the further an aircraft is from its base the less effective the attack should be – not sure if this could be programmed – but it would represent crew fatigue and aircraft attrition on the way to the target - if they were able to find the target over the ocean. Wasn’t it a dive bomber group that followed a lone DD to the Jap carriers at Midway? If that flight had missed the target at least 2 Jap carriers would have remained to fight the USN.

[SeaMonkey]

I'm with the crowd on reducing naval spotting of all aircraft, but especially land based. My reasoning is that since the sea areas are reduced in perspective to land regions the sea areas should eat up more spotting abilities as someone suggested earlier.

In fact, I'm getting to the point where I think all spotting needs to be reduced somewhat to enhance the FoW features, and especially for the global version.

Further it is my contention that to increase "the search" naval features, the CVs should be the SC units with the greatest recon abilities on the sea. If the ability to provide good reconnaissance at sea is left to the CV task forces, you'll see more use of single CV groups cruising the oceans.

If you take a CV unit and just provide it with LR then you could rationalize a CVE group, maybe add some ASW and DD escorts and you have a "convoy duty" task force. I believe it will add some dynamics and variable strategies to the game. Because of the reduced map proportions the disclosure aspects of Global SC should be greatly reduced, IMO.

[LGB]

Hi all, while I do not have enough experience with the game to make a specific comment I would note two texts on the subject: "Hitler's U-Boat War" vol I-III by Clay Blair and "Black May" by Michael Gannon.

Blair in volume II/III shows in plate 6 the results of Coastal Command's Bay offensive where from April 10th to Sept 21st 1943 where 30 U-Boats were sunk and another 21 are listed as damaged. However, it's worth pointing out this was during the time when U-boat command was ordering it's boats to transit on the surface and fight it out with enemy aircraft. Without these rather idiotic orders it's open to conjecture what losses would have been but in my view they would have been around a third.

There are of course other excellent sources especially if one speaks German. One can find out how every single U-boat was sunk or damaged. However, this can miss the forest for the trees. The simplest way to look at the BOA is that ships not in convoy are extremely vulnerable and cause almost no sub losses. Ships in lightly defended convoys are a bit less vulnerable to subs but again almost no subs will be lost. It is only when the escort group is well trained enough and of proper size that sub losses will exceed any reasonable attrition level the subs can inflict on the merchants.

The first "happy time" was entirely against non escorted merchants as was the 2nd "happy time" off the US East Coast in the first half of 1942. Once there are enough trained escorts with the proper weapons and doctrine the subs will be defeated attacking convoys.

So as someone here mentioned once the allies have enough invested in asw the BOA seems to end. That's not entirely against history the question is when it occurs; furthermore, the allies could not run convoys in all the far flung corners of the globe and non wolf pack long range subs remained effective after the days of the wolf pack were over.

As an aside the wolf pack never worked well for anyone. Radio transmissions give away your position and in the allied case bring down sub hunting aircraft and ships vectored in by direction finding. HF/DF was more important that radar in the BOA. In need not have been- German doctrine was extremely faulty on myriad levels.

[SeaMonkey]

Informative post LGB, welcome to "the forum", if your first post is any indication of future posts, then we will again add more dimension to an already very astute legion of historians.

[DarkLight]

A very good read about the BOA from the German perspective is "Iron Coffins: A Personal Account of the German U-Boat Battles of WWII." Herbert A. Werner

In it, he does describe transiting the Bay of Biscay on several occassions. It wasn't a fun place to be.

[Ludi1867]

LGB

A number of good points in your post, but your aside is, well, questionable, especially the suggestion that HF/DF was more important than radar in the BOA.

A better understanding of the classic German wolfpack operational doctrine is necessary to see why your assertion is questionable. Wolfpack operational doctrine had three (or four, if you count the disengagement order) phases.

The first, or search, phase was arguably the most innovative and important aspect of a Wolfpack. U-boats were ordered to positions athwart an expected convoy route. Distance between boats was usually about 17 NM. The number of boats varied, but 12 to 20 was most usual. More boats were occasionally available, but too many U-boats created a problem in the next phase – interception (ie distance for a boat to travel to intercept became too far in a larger wolfpack). An important aspect to note of the search phase is that U-boats were generally radio silent – that is, they were not to use a radio too often. There were exceptions, but U-boat HQ generally tried to conceal the initial search location of a wolfpack from shore based HF/DF, which the Germans were aware of.

Radio analysis proved important during the search phase because U-boat HQ sent search orders by radio to the wolfpack. There were quite a volume of these, and they provided opportunities for Allied traffic analysis and decryption efforts. Decryption, or Ultra, provided good windows into wolfpack positioning from time to time, although there were important periods when decryption was NOT available (most of 1942, in fact).

Once a U-boat found a convoy the second phase began. The initial contact U-boat was very important to the wolfpack tactic, and this U-boat was required to update the convoy’s position, course and speed relatively frequently. HF/DF could make a very important contribution here, if the contact keeper could be located and killed/neutralized. Shore based HF/DF could sometimes determine that a contact report had been sent and perhaps roughly identify the location (shore based HF/DF only localized to a circle of approximately 50 NM). However, this depended on a contact report being separated out from other U-boat radio traffic – generally a traffic analysis or decryption aspect – as well as response forces being close enough to react. If the Allies had no warning (ie decryption of planned wolfpack operations) there was a rather small chance that reaction forces could move to intercept the contact keeper. If decryption was available and reaction forces (VLR aircraft and support groups) had been pre-positioned in a threatened area, then the contact keeper might be quickly attacked. This began to happen in the spring of 1943, but it had been unusual before that, both because decryptions were less timely and because there were insufficient forces available to the ASW authorities.

During the interception phase, U-boats not in contact raced to intercept. They did not usually transmit during this phase, so HF/DF was of limited value. They did, of necessity, travel on the surface. Submerged Type VII and IX U-boats had low speeds and short underwater endurance. Surface travel was required, and made them vulnerable to radar equipped ASW forces. Radar equipped aircraft proved very effective at finding and attacking U-boats racing to intercept a convoy.

The third phase was usually centrally ordered by BdU, but was executed in a tactically decentralized manner. Wolfpack attacks were almost completely uncoordinated, aside from the direction by BdU to commence an attack at a certain point. The reason for the delay was to gather enough U-boats so that their independent attacks would hopefully distract and confuse the escort. But tactical coordination between U-boats was rare – it was more a matter of all U-boats doing their best to penetrate and attack independently.

When the wolfpack worked well – and wolfpacks actually did work well for a time – the repeated attacks, almost always from different directions, did cause confusion, chaos and losses. The phase when wolfpacks worked best was probably the fall of 1942 – there were enough U-boats for interception to happen reasonably frequently, there were not enough escorts, and – probably extremely important – too few of the escorts were equipped with centimetric radar.

Why centimetric radar? Because earlier (metric) radars were very poor at detecting U-boats on the surface at night. And during this phase of the battle (there are 7,8 or 11 phases of the BOA, depending on the source you consult) wolfpack orders to attack were usually to commence at nightfall, so that U-boats could race around on the surface more like torpedo boats than submarines. And until enough radar-equipped escorts were available, this tactic worked quite effectively.

Radar was also important for aircraft attempting to localize a U-boat detected by HF/DF, once sea based sets (which the Germans were convinced could not be developed) became available. HF/DF provides only a bearing (single interception) or a rough cross-fix (two or more correlated bearings), but NOT enough information to engage a U-boat with weapons (determination of distance is also problematic, although operators gradually began to be able to differentiate between ground and sky wave HF/DF intercepts). An aircraft or fast escort had to be sent searching, and radar proved critical in the localization phase. U-boats only became equipped with radar receivers that could detect centimetric radar in 1944, so centimetric equipped units could surprise U-boats in low vis conditions (night or fog) until late in the war. And they frequently did – the battle of ONS 5 is a classic example of this phenomenon.

The BOA was, as with all long campaigns, a measure, counter-measure, counter-counter-measure campaign. The Allies proved to have more resources, and proved highly efficient at harnessing science to their ASW campaign. But the Germans also made efforts to respond. The Type XXI is often brought up as a good example, and its combination of good submerged speed and smaller requirement for schnorkelling made Type XXI wolfpacks a theoretical possibility from a mobility perspective. Perhaps less well known is the burst transmission technology that may have made wolfpacks a possibility from a communications perspective. The Allies were poorly prepared to deal with high speed submerged submarines as the war ended, and completely unequipped to deal with burst transmissions. But countermeasures to both technologies were developed after the war, as the cold war continued….

[Desert Dave]

I'm with the crowd on reducing naval spotting of all aircraft, but especially land based. My reasoning is that since the sea areas are reduced in perspective to land regions the sea areas should eat up more spotting abilities as someone suggested earlier.

In fact, I'm getting to the point where I think all spotting needs to be reduced somewhat to enhance the FoW features, and especially for the global version.

Further it is my contention that to increase "the search" naval features, the CVs should be the SC units with the greatest recon abilities on the sea. If the ability to provide good reconnaissance at sea is left to the CV task forces, you'll see more use of single CV groups cruising the oceans.

If you take a CV unit and just provide it with LR then you could rationalize a CVE group, maybe add some ASW and DD escorts and you have a "convoy duty" task force. I believe it will add some dynamics and variable strategies to the game. Because of the reduced map proportions the disclosure aspects of Global SC should be greatly reduced, IMO.

Reducing the spotting so that SB's = Naval bombers is a good idea, as I mentioned in my first post.

I also agree that CV's should have to bear the brunt of locating sub & surface raiders.

One problem... as currently constituted, in game terms (... and here we need go back to "Storm of Steel" in PDE) the UK Carriers are over-rated. IE, too much fire-power relative to: a) the IJN & USN, and the very large # of A/C in the typical LB air unit, of any kind.

Let's see... 20-40 mixed plane groupings in UK Carrier (... recall it was a Swordfish BI-PLANE that put the Bismark's rudder out of commission) compared to what? ~500 planes in a LB air group? That's quite a HUGE difference, yes?

The "combat target data" should be adjusted DOWNWARD for ALL UK Carriers. Naval Attack, Carrier Attack, and most especially Sub Attack.

And I also agree with the one who said that SB "sub attack" should be reduced as well.

The Battle of the Atlantic is obviously of great interest and concern to MANY SC folks, as evidenced by the # of posts herein. Most of which (... ah, sure, excluding mine, LOL!) are VERY informative and helpful.

[arado234]

It is worth mentioning that when you compare the total Allied losses of merchant shipping for WW2(around 21 million tons)compared to what they produced(43 million tons)once the Allies(Brits.mainly)survived the German''happy times''it was over.The liberty ships the Amis.were producing could be made in about 10 days.However if Germany had gone allout from the start with a uboat campaign she may have been able to starve England into submission.I have read quite a few books on the subject and it was possible.Ignoring tech.and the possibilty the enemy had centemeter radar and thinking Enigma was un-breakable didnt help the German cause.

In the Game Third Reich it is possible to starve England out of the war by at the beginning of the Year Start Sequence(thats when you calculate the total number of B.R.P.S,sorta like mpps)if England is below a certian amountof B.R.P.S. the Germans have an option to accept a 1 time British surrender.Dont know if this would work for SC.

[jon_j_rambo]

Why you have a good memory. In 3R the U-Boats could do everlasting damage to the BRP level of the UK.

Somebody send arado234 a "I got racked by Camp Rambo T-Shirt"

Stay Thirsty My Friends,

-Legend

[SeaMonkey]

This brings up an interesting thoughts for Global, perhaps actuating a decision event.

Let's say that after the initiation of war between Germany and UK / France or perhaps at some % belligerency level, the Germans are presented with a question or two.

At some % reduction in MPP level, Germany can pursue the uboat plan and if successful in raiding for a certain number of UK MPPs per turn over a certain time period, UK would become, temporarily, a non-belligerent, a cease fire so to speak.

Further, let's say the Kriegsmarine declines the offer for the uboat plan, the next popup, worded simularly, asks the German player if they would like to follow the Z-plan. Of course the option can be to ignore both, answering "No", but wouldn't it open up some great possibilities for the BoA?

[SeaMonkey]

Oh and Dave, while you were away, myself, among others discussed the apparent inequality of Landbased vs carrier based aviation strikes and CTVs, although you've added a very interesting wrinkle of the defficiencies in UK naval air operations.

My contention is that LB air should have 2 strikes also, toning down their CTVs appropriately, giving them greater flexible, with their mobility in mind. What is important is to not make them too deadly vs land targets as well as naval units, and because now they have greater flexibity, two strikes, you could limit the number of them for each countries build Q.

Again thinking about the situation, if you retained the single strike fighters, then escorting wouldn't be such a big deal also, where TAC usually doesn't receive any losses due to enemy intercepts.

[arado234]

Hey Rambo I didnt know you had played Third Reich.Yes them freakin U-Boats were real nasty against England,although as soon as America went to war those poor subs were in big trouble.