Details of Air and Artillery Support

[imported_Wildman]

Assuming that we are talking about a "Danger Close" situation, the JTAC will be giving a 9-line to the pilot. I'll see if I can dig one up.

Basically it tells.

1. Friendly location including orientation

2. Enemey location

3. Threats

4. Targets locations

Often the JTAC are using the designators to find a Lat/Long of the target which is passed to the pilot. The Targeting Pod can be slaved to those coords to provide the inital start point, or placed into the JDAM for immediate processing of the target.

I haven't seen the game so I'm not quite sure just how much of the process your modeling, but I would guess that some LOS at some time in the process is required/highly desireable. Heck for BDA if no other reason.

Here are some things I've found that might be useful.

http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/go_to_war_primer/Go-to-War%20Primer_files/TwoJCASArticles.pdf

http://www.ustacticalsupply.com/riteinrain.shtml

(click on the 9-line CAS...heck you can order it from here)

Some Marine training stuff

http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/g3/TACP/TACP_T%26R_Proposed_060301.doc

an actual 9-line

http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/g3/TACP/TACP_T%26R_Proposed_060301.doc

another

http://riteintherain.safeserver.com/pdf%20downloads/902LL.pdf

last and least is the Joint pub on CAS

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/doctrine/jp3_09_3.pdf

[c3k]

Gents,

As a former AF guy myself, I've got a few operational buddies left. One is currently flying Predators. If it'd help, I can ask him about procedures for attacking baddies. Of course, it'd only be non-classified stuff, and it'd be regarding the OIF theater. This would be the anti-insurgency style as opposed to a conventional attack.

Regards,

Ken

[Battlefront.com]

Wildman,

Thanks for the light reading links. I'll be sure to check them out this weekend.

Now, since you are a Powerpoint Jockey, you'll (probably) know how to view this file:

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/NDU_6001/SPOTTR_thompson.ppt

There are several relevant pieces of information in this presentation, as well as an interesting look at the procurement headaches within the military. Best I can tell, SPOTTR is still in the testing phase. It was used this summer during the Northern Edge 06 exercise in Alaska. So it's hard to say if this will be in the field by '07. At the moment I'm guessing it will, so our JTACs will be armed with this instead of the current large system they have no (I'd have to look up the designation).

MikeyD, yes, the FIST version of the Bradley and the Stryker FSV both have the ability to lase targets. The Scout version of the Bradley and the Stryker RV most likely have a lesser capacity to do so.

c3k, by all means ask them what the deal is these days. We are most interested in the steps the JTAC or run of the mill grunt needs to take to make various things happen.

As the Powerpoint document I linked to above shows, eyes on target is quite important. An aircraft 20,000 feet up really does need some help finding the right building to hit. Tanks out in the open... sure, no problem, but in an urban area basically all targets are "Danger Close" because of the risk of collateral damage.

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

Fascinating discussion. I do have some questions/observations:

1. I'm surprised that the basic USAF loadout consists of only MK-82 500 lbs. & MK-84 2000 lbs. bombs, although I can see the logistics advantage in using only 2 types of bombs. What about cluster bombs (i.e. CBU-87 or CBU-97), would'nt they be more effective against enemy infantry/soft targets?

2. The first article Wildman linked shows the JDAM's missing by, respectively, 150 and 200 feet, which is not only ineffective, but could put friendly forces at risk. Is that a typical occurrence in a combat situation?

web page

[offtaskagain]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

Fascinating discussion. I do have some questions/observations:

1. I'm surprised that the basic USAF loadout consists of only MK-82 500 lbs. & MK-84 2000 lbs. bombs, although I can see the logistics advantage in using only 2 types of bombs. What about cluster bombs (i.e. CBU-87 or CBU-97), would'nt they be more effective against enemy infantry/soft targets?

2. The first article Wildman linked shows the JDAM's missing by, respectively, 150 and 200 feet, which is not only ineffective, but could put friendly forces at risk. Is that a typical occurrence in a combat situation?

web page

Cluster munitions are frowned upon in urban areas, not only for their minimal effect on the masonry structures common to Iraq, but also the tremendous dud rate. There's also legal issues. Take a look at the heat Israel has been catching about them in Lebanon for a recent example. I've almost never heard of attacks in wide open areas. They almost always fire from built up areas.

That article you refer to sounds like it was quite the SNAFUd situation. From what I've heard and seen, JDAMs tend to be very accurate and very very lethal. When I was with 3/3 at Haditha Dam they put 4 MK-82s and 4 MK-84s into a hotel and all were direct hits. Obviously the building was completely flattened. One of the rifle squads was only about 150 yards from the builing. Obviously with the MK-84s thats well within danger close, but they were under cover for the strike.

[imported_Wildman]

The AEF battlecenter is here at Mountain Home, I'll have to see if that Lt Col still works here.

Interesting link, Steve. More of the complete stupidity of the aquisition process if nothing else. Sounds like that whole RPG defense problem that is going on between Rathyeon and the Israeli system.

[imported_Wildman]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

Fascinating discussion. I do have some questions/observations:

1. I'm surprised that the basic USAF loadout consists of only MK-82 500 lbs. & MK-84 2000 lbs. bombs, although I can see the logistics advantage in using only 2 types of bombs. What about cluster bombs (i.e. CBU-87 or CBU-97), would'nt they be more effective against enemy infantry/soft targets?

2. The first article Wildman linked shows the JDAM's missing by, respectively, 150 and 200 feet, which is not only ineffective, but could put friendly forces at risk. Is that a typical occurrence in a combat situation?

web page

Sgt, Joch.

Op Anaconda is actually an example that is used for the LACK of joint cooperation in my PME. Admittily, AF bias it revealed from an AF perceptive that there was little to no coordination between Army and AF/Navy for air support....otherwise a whole ass-ton of On-call CAS could have been scheduled and wasn't

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by offtaskagain:

That article you refer to sounds like it was quite the SNAFUd situation. From what I've heard and seen, JDAMs tend to be very accurate and very very lethal. When I was with 3/3 at Haditha Dam they put 4 MK-82s and 4 MK-84s into a hotel and all were direct hits. Obviously the building was completely flattened. One of the rifle squads was only about 150 yards from the builing. Obviously with the MK-84s thats well within danger close, but they were under cover for the strike.

That must have been quite a sight.

[offtaskagain]

Originally posted by Wildman:

Sgt, Joch.

Op Anaconda is actually an example that is used for the LACK of joint cooperation in my PME. Admittily, AF bias it revealed from an AF perceptive that there was little to no coordination between Army and AF/Navy for air support....otherwise a whole ass-ton of On-call CAS could have been scheduled and wasn't

Coordination is definitely a problem. I know every Marine battalion headquarters and higher has an Air Officer in their COC to manage all air traffic. From talking to a Marine who assisted the AirO I understand that we usually have very good coordination with Marine CAS, but we have had problems properly utilizing AF flights because of our two different ways of doing things. Sounds to me like there needs to be more cross training and standardization between all 4 branches.

[offtaskagain]

Originally posted by Sgt.Joch:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by offtaskagain:

That article you refer to sounds like it was quite the SNAFUd situation. From what I've heard and seen, JDAMs tend to be very accurate and very very lethal. When I was with 3/3 at Haditha Dam they put 4 MK-82s and 4 MK-84s into a hotel and all were direct hits. Obviously the building was completely flattened. One of the rifle squads was only about 150 yards from the builing. Obviously with the MK-84s thats well within danger close, but they were under cover for the strike.

That must have been quite a sight. </font>

[imported_Wildman]

Originally posted by offtaskagain:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Wildman:

Sgt, Joch.

Op Anaconda is actually an example that is used for the LACK of joint cooperation in my PME. Admittily, AF bias it revealed from an AF perceptive that there was little to no coordination between Army and AF/Navy for air support....otherwise a whole ass-ton of On-call CAS could have been scheduled and wasn't

Coordination is definitely a problem. I know every Marine battalion headquarters and higher has an Air Officer in their COC to manage all air traffic. From talking to a Marine who assisted the AirO I understand that we usually have very good coordination with Marine CAS, but we have had problems properly utilizing AF flights because of our two different ways of doing things. Sounds to me like there needs to be more cross training and standardization between all 4 branches. </font>

[Battlefront.com]

offtaskagain,

Cluster munitions are frowned upon in urban areas, not only for their minimal effect on the masonry structures common to Iraq, but also the tremendous dud rate.

To add to this, there was a particular strike during the opening phase of OIF that I recall being significant, perhaps even critical, in determining that cluster munitions were perhaps more trouble than they were worth. This doesn't just apply to CBUs but also to artillery FASCAM (scatterable mines).

A task force was moving into a wide open area and apparently they thought some Iraqi mech force was moving down on their way to meet them. So they called for some FASCAM in anticipatoin of enemy movement through the fields.

The Iraqi force never showed up, then the task force had to move into the same area and avoid the place they hit. Unfortunately, this was the best place for them to advance through. Worse, it was a farm and the farmer, IIRC, blew up when he went to go work on the fields. The Army then had to mark off the area and eventually probably had to EOD teams comb through and find the duds.

Since about that time, as far as I know, FASCAM and CBUs have not been used. Judging from some stuff I read it would appear that the intention is to not use them in the future either until they can fix the dud rate (at the very least).

Steve

[J_Toe]

Hi, not sure if this is relevant but a good vid of an incoming strike in an urban env. in Iraq

[MEYER_1944]

Any plans for white phosphorus "Whiskey Pete" in an arty barrage?

Harsh yes! but it was used in Fallujah

[Other Means]

Will the guys lower down the chain be able to call on the platoon and company support *quicker* than guys higher up the chain?

i.e. If the company mortar platoon is tasked to Easy company but a higher level FO has a target, wouldn't they have to go through more steps than the Easy company guys?

I guess what I'm trying to establish is if the response times are a decreasing speed hierarchy, with the FO's at the top and the grunts at the bottom, or whether various assets can be more closely tied to differing levels within that hierarchy, which would seem more realistic to me.

[Battlefront.com]

Yes, WP is included but you probably won't get it. It's not the sort of mission that a commander can just call in any old day.

Yes, where the unit is in the chain of command is very important. The lowly Rifle Squad can get access to 60mm Mortars a lot quicker, and a lot easier, than 155s. Also, some specialized units (FIST members) can get pretty much anything they want with the most minimal delays. As in civilian life, most things come down to "who you know"

Steve

[Chelt]

What happens when a 60mm mortar team is attached to a rifle platoon? Does the rifle platoon leader get immediate access to the mortar's fires?

[Other Means]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Yes, WP is included but you probably won't get it. It's not the sort of mission that a commander can just call in any old day.

Yes, where the unit is in the chain of command is very important. The lowly Rifle Squad can get access to 60mm Mortars a lot quicker, and a lot easier, than 155s. Also, some specialized units (FIST members) can get pretty much anything they want with the most minimal delays. As in civilian life, most things come down to "who you know"

Steve

Makes perfect sense to me, cheers.

[Battlefront.com]

Chelt,

What happens when a 60mm mortar team is attached to a rifle platoon? Does the rifle platoon leader get immediate access to the mortar's fires?

Yes, provided he has good communications with the mortars. If his radio is out, and he has to instead pass the message over to another platoon to be sent to the mortars then obviously the delay will be adjusted accordingly.

Steve

[Lee]

A cool practice range video showing the devastating strafing runs that an A-10 does.