Joint Forces Quarterly Article "Everybody Wanted Tanks"

[MikeyD]

Remember Stryker Brigade is part of Rumsfeld's rethinking how the Army gets the job done (I can't recall his nifty catch-phrase for it). In the 'good old days' they might be used as a delaying force until the heavies get there, but the Pentagon's pinned a lot of hopes on the 'force multiplication' value of speed, 360 degree battlefield awareness, and combined arms. Instead of heavy tanks fighting toe-to-toe its supposed to be precision airpower and rapid reaction. Basically, if you've got yourself into a position where an Abrams is facing a still kicking T72 at 2000m then you haven't conducted the operation properly.

But that was their thinking around 2002. Force multiplication through battlefield awareness is proving more elusive than expected, and 'boots on the ground' is looking more necessary..

[Tarquelne]

...in real life, I would see the Stryker Brigade as being more of a rapid reaction force to be airlifted to,...I don't think it is suited to spearheading an Invasion of Syria.

Picture an OIF type Thunder Run not just through a single city but through an entire country.

What's the quote? "As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you think you have, not the Army you want."

Maybe I misremembered something...

If the Stryker isn't well suited to it's projected role in CM:SF that in no way means it wouldn't be used in such a role. All the better the game for us, if that the Stryker-based nation-wide "thunder run" concept doesn't work well. Good thing it's fictional, eh?

[Sgt Joch]

Here is some additional information I had found on Stryker Brigades:

The interim force will not be an early-entry force. Instead, the IBCT's will fill the gap between early-entry forces and heavier follow-on forces; the brigades will be lethal, agile, and mobile enough to dominate combat during that interval...

The Army's IBCT is a full-spectrum, wheeled combat force. It is employed in all operational environments against all projected future threats. However, it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and midrange threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The IBCT deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The IBCT participates in war (with augmentation) as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or a corps and in a variety of possible roles. The IBCT also participates (with appropriate augmentation) in stability and support operations as an initial-entry force or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive capabilities...

The IBCT is a divisional brigade. It is designed to optimize its organizational effectiveness and to balance the traditional domains of lethality, mobility, and survivability with the domains required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a reduced in-theater footprint. Its two core qualities are its high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through a dismounted infantry assault. The major fighting components are its motorized infantry battalions. The IBCT has a unique reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron to enhance situational understanding...

To achieve a rapid deployment threshold, the brigade's design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular platforms-particularly a highly mobile, medium-weight, combat/CS platform coupled with the minimization of the personnel and logistical footprint on theater. Encompassing a personnel strength of about 3,500 and preconfigured in ready-to-fight combined-arms packages, the entire IBCT can deploy within 96 hours of "first aircraft wheels up" and begin operations immediately upon arrival.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm

The comments on the off-road capability are from the U.S. army's dec.2004 evaluation report, although it's true it will probably have limited application to CM style battles.

As I said, I am looking forward to the tactical challenge of commanding a Stryker combat team in CMSF...but I would feel more comfortable if I had a M1A1 platoon backing me up

[Tarquelne]

But that was their thinking around 2002. Force multiplication through battlefield awareness is proving more elusive than expected, and 'boots on the ground' is looking more necessary.. [/QB]

I do think a lot of the Stryker criticisms are trying to shoe horn the Strykers into the same role as Armored units. Of course it's a poor fit. But then, if the Strykers are going to be the "tip of the spear", isn't that a more "apples to apples" sort of comparison?

Just what is a Stryker group supposed to do at the tip of the spear? Assuming an enemy with the anti-tank assets to neutralize a MBT, the Strykers aren't going to fare any better in those all-too-common ambush points of contact. But no worse than an group with tanks.

Well, OK, somewhat worse. Less armor is less armor. Still, the gap doesn't seem that great... the worse-case scenario would be an enemy with plenty of weapons that could penetrate a Stryker but not a MBT. How common are these?

With their speed, extra infantry (right?) and better awareness the Strykers should find themselves surprised by significant ready-to-go anti-armor elements less often. Anything really needing lots of tanks will be handled from the air? Is that the idea?

The thing I wonder about most is those MGSs. Without them a Stryker co. lacks the direct-fire HE capability that the Armored unit would bring to the table. That could be somewhat replaced by massive CAS support and a slower advance, but I don't think that really gives us our nation-wide "thunder run."

[RMC]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

What's the quote? "As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you think you have, not the Army you want."

"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

[RMC]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

The thing I wonder about most is those MGSs. Without them a Stryker co. lacks the direct-fire HE capability that the Armored unit would bring to the table. That could be somewhat replaced by massive CAS support and a slower advance, but I don't think that really gives us our nation-wide "thunder run."

That was one of the points in the JFQ article. Tanks could bring fire to bear on targets immediately whereas for indirect there was 2-4 minutes of delay and air took considerably longer.

[Dirtweasle]

As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.

[gunnergoz]

I think that the demand that the MGS be equipped with a 105mm weapon is part of what is leading to its poor showing and possible demise. If the Army had been a bit more flexible and permitted smaller caliber weapons to be tested and considered, a significant weight saving could probably be assured, along with nice-to-have things like more ammo stowage, etc. If the Stryker ATGM units are the primary anti-armor shield anyway, why not use a low-pressure gun in the MGS...or even a breech mounted mortar? I could see a 90-120 mm mortar doing a good job, especially if it was configured with an autoloader and ability to fire over open sights in the direct fire role. The claimed use of the MGS was infantry support, taking out bunkers and buildings, etc so I don't see why they have to cling to that high-velocity 105 tank gun, except that someone really wants a wheeled tank.

[RMC]

It's called risk management. The just-in-case mentality that has plagued us for generations. Gotta have the 105, just in case a hard target pops up and the ATGM vehicle is otherwise occupied.

[Kurtz]

Having ATGMs and 105 mm MGS doubles the anti-tank capability. A low-pressure gun might not be the best choice when it comes to tank-killing.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by RMC:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Tarquelne:

What's the quote? "As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you think you have, not the Army you want."

"As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time." </font>

[Dirtweasle]

Tarqi, I was confirming the quote not trying to unsnarl some fourth level of meaining you've got wrapped in bacon, broiled for 15 minutes, and then served with duck sauce.

[Tarquelne]

]

That was one of the points in the JFQ article. Tanks could bring fire to bear on targets immediately whereas for indirect there was 2-4 minutes of delay and air took considerably longer. [/QB]

Yeah, that's a pretty stark difference between practice and theory. Theoretically the more lightly-armored MGSs will provide that support, from whatever protected postion they're in... Something that could be tested if they'd actually been deployed. I really hope they make it into the game. A SBCT just isn't a SBCT without the MGS.

[hellfish]

I'd still rally for an M-8 AGS.

[Tarquelne]

The claimed use of the MGS was infantry support, taking out bunkers and buildings, etc so I don't see why they have to cling to that high-velocity 105 tank gun, except that someone really wants a wheeled tank. [/QB]

I think the real problem was - and hopefully it'll truly be a past-tense sort of thing soon - that the Army thought/believed they could have their cake and eat it too. In that they could put the 105 on a Stryker and actually see it in combat. The 105 won't looks nearly so dubious if it works. (Like most things, I guess.)

Did I see that a MGS can only carry 18 shells? How many more shells could they get with a 90mm mortar or a 75mm gun?

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

I'd still rally for an M-8 AGS.

What's the problem with the M-8 from the army's point of view? Not tracked? Insufficently digital?

[hellfish]

Not, the problem is that it is tracked. Kinda makes the whole Stryker concept redundant if there isn't commonality between everything in the brigade.

The M-8 was all set for production in '96, but the Bosnia mission killed the budget for it. In fact it was so close to production that the Army already had a field manual for how to use it.

There was talk about making one tracked IBCT, but I don't think that'll go anywhere.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by kipanderson:

[snips]

This was also the experience of the British as recorded in their “after action” report on the Second Gulf War. The report of the death of heavy armour is premature .

... again

I think it was at the end of Shelford Bidwell's "Firepower" he mentioned the old gunner saying, "In peace, the cry is always for greater speed into action; in war, for weight of shell".

Originally posted by kipanderson:

In any “real” war, by which I mean a high-intensity war between developed or semi-developed nations, you would immediately witness heavy tanks fielded with 140mm high pressure guns and hard and soft kill defensive aids for protection against diving/over flight attack ATGMs.

...for modern values of "immediately", which would imply, for the British Army, a rapid COEIA analysis, followed by the issue of a UOR, followed by some panicked too-quick-to-work designs, followed by the sickening realisation that now we've closed Chertsey there are probably three people left in the UK defence procurement organisation who know the first thing about designing an MBT, followed by the realisation that VSEL won't be able to produce stuff in the timescale needed, followed by an urgent request to the Americans/Germans/French/Italians to let us have some of their latest-model tanks, all followed by the GAO report saying what a disgrace it was and how we really must do better next time. Say five years, if things go smoothly.

Originally posted by kipanderson:

PS. When I describe high-intensity warfare as “real” wars this is not meant as an insult to those fighting low-intensity wars. If people are try to kill you or your chums it is all only too real.

I'm sure it's a definition we all know, but I still like it:

Low-intensity warfare = people shooting at you.

High-intensity warfare = people shooting at me.

All the best,

John.

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

[QB] Not, the problem is that it is tracked.

Whoops, right. "Not wheeled" is what I meant to write, but apparently the feat of looking at a picture of a tracked vehicle and then writing "wheeled" was just too much for me.

As a reason not to accept it that makes sense. How surprising.

[MikeyD]

The long recoil 105 (MGS) concept came about in the mid eighties. Until then Mecar and Cockriill were going strong fielding low and medium pressure 90mm guns for use as infantry support. As a matter of fact 90mm was halfway through being tested by the Pentagon when long recoil 105 showed up. It so dazzled the top brass that they couldn't even see the medium pressure guns anymore! Now its 20+ years later and they're STILL struggling to get the long recoil 105 to work. Funny thing is, 105 was preferred because of the wide range of available ammo types. But if you're using a carousel autoloader aren't you restricted to the types that are programmed into the system? I don't know what kind of a problem it would be to load 105 behive, smoke, and whatever odd 105 ammo types there are hanging around. It'd be nice if - in a pinch - a bartered batch of Pakistani 105 APFSDS rounds could be handled by the autoloader.

[aka_tom_w]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

[QB] Not, the problem is that it is tracked.

Whoops, right. "Not wheeled" is what I meant to write, but apparently the feat of looking at a picture of a tracked vehicle and then writing "wheeled" was just too much for me.

As a reason not to accept it that makes sense. How surprising. </font>

[Tarquelne]

there is more on the M8 AGS and the controversy here if you are interested.

Thanks! I'm interested, and it might come in handy should we need to lobby BFC for the inclusion of the M8 or something to round out the Stryker group.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by aka_tom_w:

there is more on the M8 AGS and the controversy here if you are interested.

Wow, hopefully designers of websites like that will be shot during the first day of the Revolution...

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

As for FCS... it is supposed to replace all current inventory equipment. Not all vehicles are wheeled either. The concept is for smaller, more robust vehicles that don't have to rely upon brute strength to defend themselves. Therefore you get a lighter, more mobile force with about the same level of protection and offensive capability. Yet to be seen how this will work out, but they have another 15 years or so before it is supposed to be fielded (IIRC).

It changes almost constantly - there was another program redo announced just this last week. But I don't even remember when they were claiming it was going to replace the entire force. FCS is hugely problematic, which I think would be a big deal if I thought it wasn't going to experience catastrophic financial failure before the first full unit of action gets stood up.

Scott

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by Tarquelne:

Still, the gap doesn't seem that great... the worse-case scenario would be an enemy with plenty of weapons that could penetrate a Stryker but not a MBT. How common are these?

unfortunately too common, methinks.

there are quite a couple of things which the M1 Tank Platoon Commander will laugh at, while it poses a serious concern to the poor slob commanding a Strykeout wheeled adventure brigade:

for example mortar fire/light arty, or the ubiquitous 23mm guns found in all those ZPU-4/ZU-23 AA guns, mounts and in all the russian BTR/BRDM etc. equipment, not to mention some old BMP-1 or PT-76 stumbling on scene...and I am not even starting about first-generation ATGMs like SS-12, HOT, Milan, AT-3 Sagger...man, even a Rotkäppchen would take out a Stryker.

for some folks it will be news that the US is not the first army to discover the wonders of wheeled AFVs - rather, they are the last to do so. russians (BTR-50 to BTR-80; BRDM), germans (Luchs, Fuchs), the french and the british, the dutch (YP-408), the chinese, the czech (OT-64), the south americans, pretty much everybody used or continues to use wheeled AFVs, ACs, all along. Marines then had their LAVs.

and now the US Army does, too.

I have always wondered why the bad guys don't to pull out the old PTRD from Museums or start to manufacture them anew now with all those merely bulletproof things (LAVs, Fuchs, Luchs, VAB, Strykers) being used by the UN heroes to police all the world's backyard conflicts; PTRDoid weapons would be cheap and easy to manufacture even in a war-torn third world country.

The only explanation is that they probably don't bother because they *would* have even more potent weapons already at their disposal; and the only explanation why we dont read about bloody massacres with burning ACs is that indeed these stabilization force / peace and police UN actions are low-intensity.

(oh, and to clarify, don't misunderstand me: of course I do not imply that CMSF will be such a scenario, those were just general ramblings)