Damascus, "Should you touch it with a barge pole".

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I am not buying your logic.

That's OK, it's not for sale anyway

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

And what evidence do you have that they will choose this strategy? The same could have been said for Baghdad, but it didn't happen. Just because it makes sense to you doesn't mean anything. And as I have outlined, I don't think it really makes all that much sense.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

It's a bad plan since the US has never abandoned a full fledged conventional war. The only war it gave up was Vietnam, and think of how many years that took. Better plan is to assume the country will be conquered (because it WILL happen) and plan for long term resistance. That is how you'd melt away support, just like in Iraq.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Er... how did civilians come into this? What do they have to do with anything? They would largely stay in place and suffer the consequences of whatever military action was waged there. Just like every other war.

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

That's not true at all. They might score PR points and cause ripple effects, but it doesn't mean they win a war. Especially if they are defeated militarily rather quickly. Also, if Syria did something to deliberately turn it into a humanitarian nightmare, the world's opinion would likely be calling for the defeat of the regime even quicker. But again, what indications do you have that the Syrians are planning mass martyrdom?

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

And what about the second war? The one they had 12 years to plan for? What they did not do was make a big last stand in Baghdad. Your logic, which is not based on any facts, would indicate that Baghdad would have been turned into a giant island of resistance. But it didn't happen that way, and I think I've clearly outlined the main reasons why. You haven't even bothered to challenge any of those reasons, BTW.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

And I agree that is what they will do. It's what the Iraqis did (for the most part) in OIF. And they still lost.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

This is not entirely correct. Look at Afghanistan. The Coalition holds a few key cities, and that's it. The rest of the country is outside of their control and the Taliban is regaining a lot of its strength. Therefore, like everything, there is a balance.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

Then what? Have the half in Damascus and Aleppo throw down their weapons, demoralized, when the rest of the country is conquered, food is scarce, and their families are either under occupation or suffering within the city? Great plan.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

And you are compare Damascus to Lenningrad? How's that work?

No, my comparison with Baghdad assumes only that since they are so similar there is a better chance of a similar outcome than a fantasy one drawn up from imagination. And even if your scenario happened, you still haven't proved it would work. I am sure it wouldn't. Doesn't mean it would be a cake walk, but I don't think it would achieve the goal of remaining undefeated in the conventional sense.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Recognizing a problem and solving it are two different things. Stalin was greatly alarmed at Germany's quick victories in the west. But one of the two strategies that was developed to counter the German threat would almost certainly have failed and caused the USSR to collapse as we knew it back then. So don't assume that the right plan for the right situation will be selected. It was only because Stalin became convinced that a preemptive strike was a bad idea, and instead an indepth defense was best, that the Germans lost the war. And that plan, BTW, came damned close to failing.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

Correct. And it won't work for the Syrians either. They might score more hits on the western forces, but they won't win the conventional war. That is the likely scenario.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

But where are you located? What is your schooling and training? Are you Syrian, in Syria, with rivals and potential adversaries waiting for you to make a wrong move in order to take you out? Do you have to deal with the realities of a "last stand" type defense in terms of planning, stockpiling, billeting of troops, etc, etc.? No. You are likely sitting at home in Scotland with a nice frothy mug of beer or a glass of whiskey dreaming this stuff up.

There is a HUGE difference between putting yourself into someone else's shoes and being in them. On that score you and I are even. However, I am trying very hard to incorporate as many other factors into this equation as possible. You are not. You are looking at this through a very narrow, technical standpoint divorced of internal regime politics, potential civil unrest, and the problems associated with admitting defeat before the first shot is fired.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

No. It is a bad option that is likely to backfire and unlikely to succeed. Best strategy is to break units up into semi-autonomous formations and scatter them all over the place. But this can't be done ahead of time because regimes of terror need the strict control over their forces. This was the primary reason Saddam's strategy was ultimately unsuccessful. To plan for the kind of war that would actually defeat a conventional first world invasion, the Syrians would have had to start 20 years ago IMHO. And I doubt very much they would have been able to do most of the necessary things because of culture, corruption, power struggles, poverty, and other issues.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

In 1941, no it wasn't a factor. The factors were the distance, the terrain, Soviet manpower reserves, in some cases superior Soviet equipment, the ability of Soviet forces to defeat a conventional attack at the tactical level, the sorry state of the German war economy, the horrible planning at the highest German levels, fantastic planning at the higher Soviet levels, the lack of German planning for the logistics problems, and eventually the weather (first mud then cold). And yet with all these massive things working against the Germans, they almost did it. Comparing Syria to the Soviet Union is just a ridiculous exercise. They couldn't be more different.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

See last comment above Leningrad had a couple hundred million people helping it out. Damascus, left on its own and without any hope of resupply (Leningrad was constantly resupplied, though inadequately for most of the time), is more like Berlin. But even then, going back 60 years to European history at the avoidance of experiences that have happened within the last 15 in the Middle East is rather silly to start with.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I am not buying your logic.

That's OK, it's not for sale anyway

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

And what evidence do you have that they will choose this strategy? The same could have been said for Baghdad, but it didn't happen. Just because it makes sense to you doesn't mean anything. And as I have outlined, I don't think it really makes all that much sense.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

It's a bad plan since the US has never abandoned a full fledged conventional war. The only war it gave up was Vietnam, and think of how many years that took. Better plan is to assume the country will be conquered (because it WILL happen) and plan for long term resistance. That is how you'd melt away support, just like in Iraq.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Er... how did civilians come into this? What do they have to do with anything? They would largely stay in place and suffer the consequences of whatever military action was waged there. Just like every other war.

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

That's not true at all. They might score PR points and cause ripple effects, but it doesn't mean they win a war. Especially if they are defeated militarily rather quickly. Also, if Syria did something to deliberately turn it into a humanitarian nightmare, the world's opinion would likely be calling for the defeat of the regime even quicker. But again, what indications do you have that the Syrians are planning mass martyrdom?

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

And what about the second war? The one they had 12 years to plan for? What they did not do was make a big last stand in Baghdad. Your logic, which is not based on any facts, would indicate that Baghdad would have been turned into a giant island of resistance. But it didn't happen that way, and I think I've clearly outlined the main reasons why. You haven't even bothered to challenge any of those reasons, BTW.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

And I agree that is what they will do. It's what the Iraqis did (for the most part) in OIF. And they still lost.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

This is not entirely correct. Look at Afghanistan. The Coalition holds a few key cities, and that's it. The rest of the country is outside of their control and the Taliban is regaining a lot of its strength. Therefore, like everything, there is a balance.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

Then what? Have the half in Damascus and Aleppo throw down their weapons, demoralized, when the rest of the country is conquered, food is scarce, and their families are either under occupation or suffering within the city? Great plan.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

And you are compare Damascus to Lenningrad? How's that work?

No, my comparison with Baghdad assumes only that since they are so similar there is a better chance of a similar outcome than a fantasy one drawn up from imagination. And even if your scenario happened, you still haven't proved it would work. I am sure it wouldn't. Doesn't mean it would be a cake walk, but I don't think it would achieve the goal of remaining undefeated in the conventional sense.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Recognizing a problem and solving it are two different things. Stalin was greatly alarmed at Germany's quick victories in the west. But one of the two strategies that was developed to counter the German threat would almost certainly have failed and caused the USSR to collapse as we knew it back then. So don't assume that the right plan for the right situation will be selected. It was only because Stalin became convinced that a preemptive strike was a bad idea, and instead an indepth defense was best, that the Germans lost the war. And that plan, BTW, came damned close to failing.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

Correct. And it won't work for the Syrians either. They might score more hits on the western forces, but they won't win the conventional war. That is the likely scenario.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

But where are you located? What is your schooling and training? Are you Syrian, in Syria, with rivals and potential adversaries waiting for you to make a wrong move in order to take you out? Do you have to deal with the realities of a "last stand" type defense in terms of planning, stockpiling, billeting of troops, etc, etc.? No. You are likely sitting at home in Scotland with a nice frothy mug of beer or a glass of whiskey dreaming this stuff up.

There is a HUGE difference between putting yourself into someone else's shoes and being in them. On that score you and I are even. However, I am trying very hard to incorporate as many other factors into this equation as possible. You are not. You are looking at this through a very narrow, technical standpoint divorced of internal regime politics, potential civil unrest, and the problems associated with admitting defeat before the first shot is fired.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

No. It is a bad option that is likely to backfire and unlikely to succeed. Best strategy is to break units up into semi-autonomous formations and scatter them all over the place. But this can't be done ahead of time because regimes of terror need the strict control over their forces. This was the primary reason Saddam's strategy was ultimately unsuccessful. To plan for the kind of war that would actually defeat a conventional first world invasion, the Syrians would have had to start 20 years ago IMHO. And I doubt very much they would have been able to do most of the necessary things because of culture, corruption, power struggles, poverty, and other issues.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

In 1941, no it wasn't a factor. The factors were the distance, the terrain, Soviet manpower reserves, in some cases superior Soviet equipment, the ability of Soviet forces to defeat a conventional attack at the tactical level, the sorry state of the German war economy, the horrible planning at the highest German levels, fantastic planning at the higher Soviet levels, the lack of German planning for the logistics problems, and eventually the weather (first mud then cold). And yet with all these massive things working against the Germans, they almost did it. Comparing Syria to the Soviet Union is just a ridiculous exercise. They couldn't be more different.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

See last comment above Leningrad had a couple hundred million people helping it out. Damascus, left on its own and without any hope of resupply (Leningrad was constantly resupplied, though inadequately for most of the time), is more like Berlin. But even then, going back 60 years to European history at the avoidance of experiences that have happened within the last 15 in the Middle East is rather silly to start with.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Mikey,

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict

True, but there are a LOT more variables outside of Syria's control. And seeing as they are behind the 8 ball to begin with, simple laws of probability lean in favor of the US side winning.

Example, again, is Nasiriyah. The Marines went in expecting no resistance. Instead they found some of the most organized and determined resistance the US has gone up against in 12 years. The Marines suffered about 2 platoons worth of casualties out of a battalion sized force, took and held their objectives, and did not stay out of the fight for an appreciable length of time. In short, even though everything went wrong operationally, and in cases tactically, strategically there was no ill effect worth mentioning. So I am confident that the US forces can handle things not going as expected and stay on top of it. It's just a matter of historical record, not wishful thinking.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Mikey,

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict

True, but there are a LOT more variables outside of Syria's control. And seeing as they are behind the 8 ball to begin with, simple laws of probability lean in favor of the US side winning.

Example, again, is Nasiriyah. The Marines went in expecting no resistance. Instead they found some of the most organized and determined resistance the US has gone up against in 12 years. The Marines suffered about 2 platoons worth of casualties out of a battalion sized force, took and held their objectives, and did not stay out of the fight for an appreciable length of time. In short, even though everything went wrong operationally, and in cases tactically, strategically there was no ill effect worth mentioning. So I am confident that the US forces can handle things not going as expected and stay on top of it. It's just a matter of historical record, not wishful thinking.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Mikey,

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict

True, but there are a LOT more variables outside of Syria's control. And seeing as they are behind the 8 ball to begin with, simple laws of probability lean in favor of the US side winning.

Example, again, is Nasiriyah. The Marines went in expecting no resistance. Instead they found some of the most organized and determined resistance the US has gone up against in 12 years. The Marines suffered about 2 platoons worth of casualties out of a battalion sized force, took and held their objectives, and did not stay out of the fight for an appreciable length of time. In short, even though everything went wrong operationally, and in cases tactically, strategically there was no ill effect worth mentioning. So I am confident that the US forces can handle things not going as expected and stay on top of it. It's just a matter of historical record, not wishful thinking.

Steve

[Saviola]

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

In general, and as prudence would dictate, the above statment is true, but not of the Syrians. In fact, you cannot only assume they’ll be stupid, you can count on it. Look at the comedy of errors they engrossed themselves in prior to incurring dangerous and binding UN resolutions:

Firstly, they overtly backed Saddam, the losing horse against all odds, not only that, they opened their border in 2003 for all kind of combatants to enter Iraq, as if such action would influence the inevitable outcome. They were so stupid as to not even calculate that such meddling with a giant is bound to be calamitous or payback would be forthcoming. I guess they couldn’t fathom, nor did they wanna envisage massive American presence at their doorstep, a denial case of utmost stupidity.

Enter the Lebanese debacle. They managed to lose France, their lukewarm ally of the last decade or so in a few days by insisting blatantly on forcing a second term for a puppet Lebanese president no one wanted but Syrian cronies. As if the latter weren’t enough, they began assassination attempts on every parliamentary and cabinet Lebanese figure who overtly or even covertly opposed the forced extension term of the puppet president.

Their galactically stupid calculation was that the elimination of the most vocal and influential voices of Lebanese dissent, even perceived dissent (Harriri) would buy them time in Lebanon and prolong their presence there. In their infinite wisdom, they thought the assassination of Harriri, a statesman billionaire and a well regarded friend of the west, particularly France, would create a wave of short lived condemnation, but it would be back to business as usual before long.

The result was the exact opposite of their disastrous plan, they were forced into the most humiliating, precipitous and unanticipated withdrawal under debilitating international pressure. Not only did they lose a flanking, supposedly advantageous military position on Israel, but they lost their cash cow called Lebanon in a few weeks after milking it for 30 years.

Their Bekaa Valley 1982 performance vs. Israel in an armor duel was abysmal, sure the Merkeva is a superior tank, but they had the advantage of defensive terrain and couldn’t defend and maneuver worth **** . They were routed within days, lost 30% of their tank force, while the PLO held Beirut for almost a month and only withdrew to Tunis as part of a settlement brokered by the Americans. So the astute observer would ask, is this anti Shock Force this stupid, his more handsome, more intelligent, more astute brother observer would reply, yes it is.

Syria hasn’t performed well in any war since its anti crusades commander Saladin sacked Jerusalem centuries ago.

[Saviola]

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

In general, and as prudence would dictate, the above statment is true, but not of the Syrians. In fact, you cannot only assume they’ll be stupid, you can count on it. Look at the comedy of errors they engrossed themselves in prior to incurring dangerous and binding UN resolutions:

Firstly, they overtly backed Saddam, the losing horse against all odds, not only that, they opened their border in 2003 for all kind of combatants to enter Iraq, as if such action would influence the inevitable outcome. They were so stupid as to not even calculate that such meddling with a giant is bound to be calamitous or payback would be forthcoming. I guess they couldn’t fathom, nor did they wanna envisage massive American presence at their doorstep, a denial case of utmost stupidity.

Enter the Lebanese debacle. They managed to lose France, their lukewarm ally of the last decade or so in a few days by insisting blatantly on forcing a second term for a puppet Lebanese president no one wanted but Syrian cronies. As if the latter weren’t enough, they began assassination attempts on every parliamentary and cabinet Lebanese figure who overtly or even covertly opposed the forced extension term of the puppet president.

Their galactically stupid calculation was that the elimination of the most vocal and influential voices of Lebanese dissent, even perceived dissent (Harriri) would buy them time in Lebanon and prolong their presence there. In their infinite wisdom, they thought the assassination of Harriri, a statesman billionaire and a well regarded friend of the west, particularly France, would create a wave of short lived condemnation, but it would be back to business as usual before long.

The result was the exact opposite of their disastrous plan, they were forced into the most humiliating, precipitous and unanticipated withdrawal under debilitating international pressure. Not only did they lose a flanking, supposedly advantageous military position on Israel, but they lost their cash cow called Lebanon in a few weeks after milking it for 30 years.

Their Bekaa Valley 1982 performance vs. Israel in an armor duel was abysmal, sure the Merkeva is a superior tank, but they had the advantage of defensive terrain and couldn’t defend and maneuver worth **** . They were routed within days, lost 30% of their tank force, while the PLO held Beirut for almost a month and only withdrew to Tunis as part of a settlement brokered by the Americans. So the astute observer would ask, is this anti Shock Force this stupid, his more handsome, more intelligent, more astute brother observer would reply, yes it is.

Syria hasn’t performed well in any war since its anti crusades commander Saladin sacked Jerusalem centuries ago.

[Saviola]

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

In general, and as prudence would dictate, the above statment is true, but not of the Syrians. In fact, you cannot only assume they’ll be stupid, you can count on it. Look at the comedy of errors they engrossed themselves in prior to incurring dangerous and binding UN resolutions:

Firstly, they overtly backed Saddam, the losing horse against all odds, not only that, they opened their border in 2003 for all kind of combatants to enter Iraq, as if such action would influence the inevitable outcome. They were so stupid as to not even calculate that such meddling with a giant is bound to be calamitous or payback would be forthcoming. I guess they couldn’t fathom, nor did they wanna envisage massive American presence at their doorstep, a denial case of utmost stupidity.

Enter the Lebanese debacle. They managed to lose France, their lukewarm ally of the last decade or so in a few days by insisting blatantly on forcing a second term for a puppet Lebanese president no one wanted but Syrian cronies. As if the latter weren’t enough, they began assassination attempts on every parliamentary and cabinet Lebanese figure who overtly or even covertly opposed the forced extension term of the puppet president.

Their galactically stupid calculation was that the elimination of the most vocal and influential voices of Lebanese dissent, even perceived dissent (Harriri) would buy them time in Lebanon and prolong their presence there. In their infinite wisdom, they thought the assassination of Harriri, a statesman billionaire and a well regarded friend of the west, particularly France, would create a wave of short lived condemnation, but it would be back to business as usual before long.

The result was the exact opposite of their disastrous plan, they were forced into the most humiliating, precipitous and unanticipated withdrawal under debilitating international pressure. Not only did they lose a flanking, supposedly advantageous military position on Israel, but they lost their cash cow called Lebanon in a few weeks after milking it for 30 years.

Their Bekaa Valley 1982 performance vs. Israel in an armor duel was abysmal, sure the Merkeva is a superior tank, but they had the advantage of defensive terrain and couldn’t defend and maneuver worth **** . They were routed within days, lost 30% of their tank force, while the PLO held Beirut for almost a month and only withdrew to Tunis as part of a settlement brokered by the Americans. So the astute observer would ask, is this anti Shock Force this stupid, his more handsome, more intelligent, more astute brother observer would reply, yes it is.

Syria hasn’t performed well in any war since its anti crusades commander Saladin sacked Jerusalem centuries ago.

[Bigduke6]

Yes, but what if the Syrian secret police, the Syrian special forces, and especially the Syrian population decide to actively resist a U.S. invasion?

Most Iraqis hated Saddam. Most Syrians, I think, would much prefer Assad to "liberation" by foreign invaders. It is not a great idea to get so excited about the power of your conventional forces, and use them without reclection, while forgetting about the limits those forces face when the population is actively against them.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq is already incredibly unpopular among pretty much the entirity of the Syrian society. I doubt a U.S. invasion of Syria itself would find any support, anywhere.

Now maybe Steve and the boys can come up with a backstory whereby the average Syrian citizen is at least neutral to an American invasion, while the Syrian army somehow actively resists it. Me, my imagination is limited. The way I see it, if the Syrian army were to fight the Americans, the Syrian population would be behind that fight about 99 per cent. Well, 90 per cent at minimum. Fighting to keep the infidels out of the Bekka valley, or Damascus and Aleppo, are pretty different things to the average Syrian, I would think.

[Bigduke6]

Yes, but what if the Syrian secret police, the Syrian special forces, and especially the Syrian population decide to actively resist a U.S. invasion?

Most Iraqis hated Saddam. Most Syrians, I think, would much prefer Assad to "liberation" by foreign invaders. It is not a great idea to get so excited about the power of your conventional forces, and use them without reclection, while forgetting about the limits those forces face when the population is actively against them.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq is already incredibly unpopular among pretty much the entirity of the Syrian society. I doubt a U.S. invasion of Syria itself would find any support, anywhere.

Now maybe Steve and the boys can come up with a backstory whereby the average Syrian citizen is at least neutral to an American invasion, while the Syrian army somehow actively resists it. Me, my imagination is limited. The way I see it, if the Syrian army were to fight the Americans, the Syrian population would be behind that fight about 99 per cent. Well, 90 per cent at minimum. Fighting to keep the infidels out of the Bekka valley, or Damascus and Aleppo, are pretty different things to the average Syrian, I would think.

[Bigduke6]

Yes, but what if the Syrian secret police, the Syrian special forces, and especially the Syrian population decide to actively resist a U.S. invasion?

Most Iraqis hated Saddam. Most Syrians, I think, would much prefer Assad to "liberation" by foreign invaders. It is not a great idea to get so excited about the power of your conventional forces, and use them without reclection, while forgetting about the limits those forces face when the population is actively against them.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq is already incredibly unpopular among pretty much the entirity of the Syrian society. I doubt a U.S. invasion of Syria itself would find any support, anywhere.

Now maybe Steve and the boys can come up with a backstory whereby the average Syrian citizen is at least neutral to an American invasion, while the Syrian army somehow actively resists it. Me, my imagination is limited. The way I see it, if the Syrian army were to fight the Americans, the Syrian population would be behind that fight about 99 per cent. Well, 90 per cent at minimum. Fighting to keep the infidels out of the Bekka valley, or Damascus and Aleppo, are pretty different things to the average Syrian, I would think.

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

Khaddam calls for Syrian revolt

Former Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam wants to oust President Bashar al-Assad through a popular uprising, he told an Arabic newspaper...

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

Khaddam calls for Syrian revolt

Former Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam wants to oust President Bashar al-Assad through a popular uprising, he told an Arabic newspaper...

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

Khaddam calls for Syrian revolt

Former Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam wants to oust President Bashar al-Assad through a popular uprising, he told an Arabic newspaper...

[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, I don't think things are nearly as happy in Syria as some think. I do agree with Bigduke, though, that as unhappy as they might be they would not like an invasion by the West. At least not presently. I doubt much would change between now and 2007 to radically alter that.

However, one must look at what the rank and file civilian would do initially. Probably not much. The danger from the rank and file is the occupation, not the frontline combat. This is one reason we are not positioning CM:SF to simulate occupation. It is too complex for us to get into and still make a reasonable release schedule (i.e. it is almost a second game).

I do not foresee the bulk of the Syrian Army putting up a fight. More units, I think, would fight than did Iraqi units. Of that I am convinced. But I think a large portion of the Syrian forces would melt away. There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, I don't think things are nearly as happy in Syria as some think. I do agree with Bigduke, though, that as unhappy as they might be they would not like an invasion by the West. At least not presently. I doubt much would change between now and 2007 to radically alter that.

However, one must look at what the rank and file civilian would do initially. Probably not much. The danger from the rank and file is the occupation, not the frontline combat. This is one reason we are not positioning CM:SF to simulate occupation. It is too complex for us to get into and still make a reasonable release schedule (i.e. it is almost a second game).

I do not foresee the bulk of the Syrian Army putting up a fight. More units, I think, would fight than did Iraqi units. Of that I am convinced. But I think a large portion of the Syrian forces would melt away. There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, I don't think things are nearly as happy in Syria as some think. I do agree with Bigduke, though, that as unhappy as they might be they would not like an invasion by the West. At least not presently. I doubt much would change between now and 2007 to radically alter that.

However, one must look at what the rank and file civilian would do initially. Probably not much. The danger from the rank and file is the occupation, not the frontline combat. This is one reason we are not positioning CM:SF to simulate occupation. It is too complex for us to get into and still make a reasonable release schedule (i.e. it is almost a second game).

I do not foresee the bulk of the Syrian Army putting up a fight. More units, I think, would fight than did Iraqi units. Of that I am convinced. But I think a large portion of the Syrian forces would melt away. There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

Probably so, I mean IIRC, the House of Saud came to power by what is in essence a couple of wise guys climbing over a wall and doing a little knife work.

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

Probably so, I mean IIRC, the House of Saud came to power by what is in essence a couple of wise guys climbing over a wall and doing a little knife work.

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There is something about the Arab makeup that tends to shy away from what the West would consider a stand up fight. The motivation to die for the State just isn't there. Not historically anyway, and I am not sure it would be any different (or at least wildly different) in the event of a home defense scenario. At least not initially.

Steve

Probably so, I mean IIRC, the House of Saud came to power by what is in essence a couple of wise guys climbing over a wall and doing a little knife work.

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

Aren't you making the same judgements about Syria as Bush made about Iraq.

Sure it wasn't much of a fight, but the Iraqi's put up more of a fight that many expected and there army wasn't exactly motivated or state of the art.

Oh and over a decade the best part of 1 million Iranians gave there lives when they were invaded, and if that wasn't a stand up fight I'd like to know what is.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

Aren't you making the same judgements about Syria as Bush made about Iraq.

Sure it wasn't much of a fight, but the Iraqi's put up more of a fight that many expected and there army wasn't exactly motivated or state of the art.

Oh and over a decade the best part of 1 million Iranians gave there lives when they were invaded, and if that wasn't a stand up fight I'd like to know what is.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

Aren't you making the same judgements about Syria as Bush made about Iraq.

Sure it wasn't much of a fight, but the Iraqi's put up more of a fight that many expected and there army wasn't exactly motivated or state of the art.

Oh and over a decade the best part of 1 million Iranians gave there lives when they were invaded, and if that wasn't a stand up fight I'd like to know what is.

Peter.

[Dirtweasle]

I'm not sure where to post these news stories and conjecture on backstory as related to CMSF, and Austin Bay has a good post at Strategy Page worth a look;

From "The Beirut Spring" to Toppling Assad

by Austin Bay

January 17, 2006

Two events sparked Lebanon's 2005 "Beirut spring," that "street revolution" of protests and pro-democracy demonstrations which ultimately forced Syria to end its two-decade-long military occupation of Lebanon.

The first revolutionary fire-starter was Iraq's historic January 2005 election. The Iraqis trek to the polls, despite the threats of terrorists, encouraging democrats throughout the Middle East, but particularly in Lebanon.

Murder, however, provided the ultimate spur. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a Lebanese nationalist with the guts to challenge Syria's vicious and corrupt Assad regime. The Valentine's Day 2005 assassination of Hariri pushed hundreds of thousands of Lebanese into the streets.

Lebanese of all political and religious stripes suspected the orders to kill Hariri came from Syria. The assassination was clearly an act of terror designed to thwart Lebanese nationalist goals and democratic aspirations -- and continue Syrian control...

[...]

...Unlike rogue Iran, Syria lacks oil cash. It's an economic basket case and vulnerable to economic pressure. Unlike North Korea, it cannot seal itself in a Stalinist shell. TV satellite dishes dot too many Syrian roofs. Assad can kick journalists out of Damascus, but Syria's borders are permeable.

On its own, an international judicial inquiry won't topple Assad. However, the Syrian military, pressured by U.N. investigators, squeezed by economic sanctions and goaded by a government in exile, just might.

[Dirtweasle]

I'm not sure where to post these news stories and conjecture on backstory as related to CMSF, and Austin Bay has a good post at Strategy Page worth a look;

From "The Beirut Spring" to Toppling Assad

by Austin Bay

January 17, 2006

Two events sparked Lebanon's 2005 "Beirut spring," that "street revolution" of protests and pro-democracy demonstrations which ultimately forced Syria to end its two-decade-long military occupation of Lebanon.

The first revolutionary fire-starter was Iraq's historic January 2005 election. The Iraqis trek to the polls, despite the threats of terrorists, encouraging democrats throughout the Middle East, but particularly in Lebanon.

Murder, however, provided the ultimate spur. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was a Lebanese nationalist with the guts to challenge Syria's vicious and corrupt Assad regime. The Valentine's Day 2005 assassination of Hariri pushed hundreds of thousands of Lebanese into the streets.

Lebanese of all political and religious stripes suspected the orders to kill Hariri came from Syria. The assassination was clearly an act of terror designed to thwart Lebanese nationalist goals and democratic aspirations -- and continue Syrian control...

[...]

...Unlike rogue Iran, Syria lacks oil cash. It's an economic basket case and vulnerable to economic pressure. Unlike North Korea, it cannot seal itself in a Stalinist shell. TV satellite dishes dot too many Syrian roofs. Assad can kick journalists out of Damascus, but Syria's borders are permeable.

On its own, an international judicial inquiry won't topple Assad. However, the Syrian military, pressured by U.N. investigators, squeezed by economic sanctions and goaded by a government in exile, just might.