Damascus, "Should you touch it with a barge pole".

[MikeyD]

"Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country."

Yup, Damascus would fall just like Moscow fell to Napoleon, or Beirut to Israel. That's the importance of the 'restoration of legitimate authority' backstory to this game. If it was a straight 'crusader' invasion/occupation backstory we might as well start concocting combat scenarios for U.S. troops fifteen years down the road! The 'restoration' backstory has the benefit of being a "shoot & scoot" timetable. Go in, do the job, get out.

[MikeyD]

"Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country."

Yup, Damascus would fall just like Moscow fell to Napoleon, or Beirut to Israel. That's the importance of the 'restoration of legitimate authority' backstory to this game. If it was a straight 'crusader' invasion/occupation backstory we might as well start concocting combat scenarios for U.S. troops fifteen years down the road! The 'restoration' backstory has the benefit of being a "shoot & scoot" timetable. Go in, do the job, get out.

[MikeyD]

"Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country."

Yup, Damascus would fall just like Moscow fell to Napoleon, or Beirut to Israel. That's the importance of the 'restoration of legitimate authority' backstory to this game. If it was a straight 'crusader' invasion/occupation backstory we might as well start concocting combat scenarios for U.S. troops fifteen years down the road! The 'restoration' backstory has the benefit of being a "shoot & scoot" timetable. Go in, do the job, get out.

[Sgt Joch]

I agree with Peter on this one. In terms of the CMSF backstory, I can't see the UN intervening to put the Assad government back in power.

To me, a more logical backstory would be tied in to Lebanon. Syria wants to keep Lebanon as a protectorate. The US and France have been pressuring Syria to leave. The Syrian army left in april 2005, but Syria is trying to maintain control, as we can see from the Hariri assassination and that of Tueni on Monday.

For example, what about this sory:

1.In 2006, an anti-Syrian government is elected in Lebanon which starts to take concrete measures to remove Syrian influence from the lebanese government and economy;

2.The Assad government, in a bid to retain power, organises a coup by pro-syrian forces in Lebanon which topples the newly elected Lebanese government;

3.The new pro-Syrian government asks Syria for help to maintain order. Syria sends in a couple of divisions as "peacekeepers";

4. The UN security council, which sees through the Syrian game, demands that Syria leave Lebanon.

5. Assad who knows that another pullout from Lebanon could lead to an internal coup against him, stalls for time and tries to bluff his way out;

6. US and coalition forces launch a limited attack against Syria to liberate Lebanon and blunt Syrian military capability.

This scenario is a mix of Afghanistan, 1979, and Kuwait, 1990.

[Sgt Joch]

I agree with Peter on this one. In terms of the CMSF backstory, I can't see the UN intervening to put the Assad government back in power.

To me, a more logical backstory would be tied in to Lebanon. Syria wants to keep Lebanon as a protectorate. The US and France have been pressuring Syria to leave. The Syrian army left in april 2005, but Syria is trying to maintain control, as we can see from the Hariri assassination and that of Tueni on Monday.

For example, what about this sory:

1.In 2006, an anti-Syrian government is elected in Lebanon which starts to take concrete measures to remove Syrian influence from the lebanese government and economy;

2.The Assad government, in a bid to retain power, organises a coup by pro-syrian forces in Lebanon which topples the newly elected Lebanese government;

3.The new pro-Syrian government asks Syria for help to maintain order. Syria sends in a couple of divisions as "peacekeepers";

4. The UN security council, which sees through the Syrian game, demands that Syria leave Lebanon.

5. Assad who knows that another pullout from Lebanon could lead to an internal coup against him, stalls for time and tries to bluff his way out;

6. US and coalition forces launch a limited attack against Syria to liberate Lebanon and blunt Syrian military capability.

This scenario is a mix of Afghanistan, 1979, and Kuwait, 1990.

[Sgt Joch]

I agree with Peter on this one. In terms of the CMSF backstory, I can't see the UN intervening to put the Assad government back in power.

To me, a more logical backstory would be tied in to Lebanon. Syria wants to keep Lebanon as a protectorate. The US and France have been pressuring Syria to leave. The Syrian army left in april 2005, but Syria is trying to maintain control, as we can see from the Hariri assassination and that of Tueni on Monday.

For example, what about this sory:

1.In 2006, an anti-Syrian government is elected in Lebanon which starts to take concrete measures to remove Syrian influence from the lebanese government and economy;

2.The Assad government, in a bid to retain power, organises a coup by pro-syrian forces in Lebanon which topples the newly elected Lebanese government;

3.The new pro-Syrian government asks Syria for help to maintain order. Syria sends in a couple of divisions as "peacekeepers";

4. The UN security council, which sees through the Syrian game, demands that Syria leave Lebanon.

5. Assad who knows that another pullout from Lebanon could lead to an internal coup against him, stalls for time and tries to bluff his way out;

6. US and coalition forces launch a limited attack against Syria to liberate Lebanon and blunt Syrian military capability.

This scenario is a mix of Afghanistan, 1979, and Kuwait, 1990.

[MikeyD]

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

[MikeyD]

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

[MikeyD]

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

very cynical, I like it!

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

very cynical, I like it!

[Sgt Joch]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

Maybe a non-Assad 'legitimate government' backstory might work.

Free internationally-observed elections are held, Assad loses by a narrow margin. But he retains his grip on power by sending Bathist thugs into a key polling station to beat the vote counters and stop the vote, as the world looks on in horror. The decision is then thrown to the Syrian supreme court, which is coincidentally packed with Assad loyalists. The world's democracies rise up in indignation...

...nah, on second thought that scenario's just too absurd to work.

very cynical, I like it!

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

Yes, as it is right now I agree. But a lot can change. Look at Pakistan. Before 9/11 there was a lot of pressure mounting to do something about the military dicatorship that exists there. But whaddaya know... 9/11 happens and now things have changed quite a bit.

All I am saying is that I can see how this might happen. I've seen far stranger things happen in my short time on this planet, so I'm not about to say "it could never happen".

It must also be remembered that Assad is not universally condemned like other dictators. There are many who feel he is trying real hard to change things, but that change can't come as quickly as the West would like. One theory is that it is better for Syria to change slowly over time than to try a radical change in a short period of time. Recent events in Labanon are, of course, being watched with great interest by everybody.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

I think the point you've missed is that the back story isn't about one or the other, it's about both. Assad being tossed out *is* the security concern that is almost enough for a pretext for invasion. But if one is going in to get rid of the new government, then one is faced with the problem of what to replace it with. So it is not a war to reinstall Assad, it is a war to get rid of the coup government. Assad, for the reasons I stated, is an obvious choice for reinstatement. I'm not saying it is the best choice, or the most favorable one, but it is a choice and there is no denying that.

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

But in Realpolitik there more often is no difference or only a very small amount. Usually compromise involves hypocrisy, especially in that part of the world.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

No, it is the best kind of rational thinking. Look at it this way... urban warfare would be even deadlier for the US forces if the Syrians had sharks with laser beams attached to their frick'n heads, but I don't see them having them any time soon. So why create a scenario where US soldiers are getting zapped by them when the facts indicate that they won't be an issue?

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

That's just my point. The "everybody back behind the city walls" scenario you painted is stupid, IMHO, and therefore I assume the Syrians wouldn't adopt it. It is impractical, for starters, and all it won't change the ultimate outcome.

Think about it this way... Iraq had all the warning in the world that an attack was on its way. They were armed with all the same mountains of theories that you have in front of you. They could have chose to do EXACTLY what you suggested in Baghdad. In fact, US military planners were very concerned that they would do just that. But they didn't. Why? Because they were stupid? I don't believe that. Because they hadn't thought of it? No, I really doubt that. Because they thought it wouldn't work or something else would work better? Yeah, that's what I would suggest.

There is a difference between predicting and just wishful thinking. Predictions are made by taking into account all relevant factors to the best of one's ability. Wishful thinking is cherry picking things out of context and creating a position from that. I've outlined the practical reasons why the Damascus scenario you created isn't likely, nor is it likely to work even if it happened. This is based on factors that go well outside of small unit tactics. It is wishful thinking to think these other factors aren't important.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

Yes, as it is right now I agree. But a lot can change. Look at Pakistan. Before 9/11 there was a lot of pressure mounting to do something about the military dicatorship that exists there. But whaddaya know... 9/11 happens and now things have changed quite a bit.

All I am saying is that I can see how this might happen. I've seen far stranger things happen in my short time on this planet, so I'm not about to say "it could never happen".

It must also be remembered that Assad is not universally condemned like other dictators. There are many who feel he is trying real hard to change things, but that change can't come as quickly as the West would like. One theory is that it is better for Syria to change slowly over time than to try a radical change in a short period of time. Recent events in Labanon are, of course, being watched with great interest by everybody.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

I think the point you've missed is that the back story isn't about one or the other, it's about both. Assad being tossed out *is* the security concern that is almost enough for a pretext for invasion. But if one is going in to get rid of the new government, then one is faced with the problem of what to replace it with. So it is not a war to reinstall Assad, it is a war to get rid of the coup government. Assad, for the reasons I stated, is an obvious choice for reinstatement. I'm not saying it is the best choice, or the most favorable one, but it is a choice and there is no denying that.

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

But in Realpolitik there more often is no difference or only a very small amount. Usually compromise involves hypocrisy, especially in that part of the world.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

No, it is the best kind of rational thinking. Look at it this way... urban warfare would be even deadlier for the US forces if the Syrians had sharks with laser beams attached to their frick'n heads, but I don't see them having them any time soon. So why create a scenario where US soldiers are getting zapped by them when the facts indicate that they won't be an issue?

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

That's just my point. The "everybody back behind the city walls" scenario you painted is stupid, IMHO, and therefore I assume the Syrians wouldn't adopt it. It is impractical, for starters, and all it won't change the ultimate outcome.

Think about it this way... Iraq had all the warning in the world that an attack was on its way. They were armed with all the same mountains of theories that you have in front of you. They could have chose to do EXACTLY what you suggested in Baghdad. In fact, US military planners were very concerned that they would do just that. But they didn't. Why? Because they were stupid? I don't believe that. Because they hadn't thought of it? No, I really doubt that. Because they thought it wouldn't work or something else would work better? Yeah, that's what I would suggest.

There is a difference between predicting and just wishful thinking. Predictions are made by taking into account all relevant factors to the best of one's ability. Wishful thinking is cherry picking things out of context and creating a position from that. I've outlined the practical reasons why the Damascus scenario you created isn't likely, nor is it likely to work even if it happened. This is based on factors that go well outside of small unit tactics. It is wishful thinking to think these other factors aren't important.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

Yes, as it is right now I agree. But a lot can change. Look at Pakistan. Before 9/11 there was a lot of pressure mounting to do something about the military dicatorship that exists there. But whaddaya know... 9/11 happens and now things have changed quite a bit.

All I am saying is that I can see how this might happen. I've seen far stranger things happen in my short time on this planet, so I'm not about to say "it could never happen".

It must also be remembered that Assad is not universally condemned like other dictators. There are many who feel he is trying real hard to change things, but that change can't come as quickly as the West would like. One theory is that it is better for Syria to change slowly over time than to try a radical change in a short period of time. Recent events in Labanon are, of course, being watched with great interest by everybody.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

I think the point you've missed is that the back story isn't about one or the other, it's about both. Assad being tossed out *is* the security concern that is almost enough for a pretext for invasion. But if one is going in to get rid of the new government, then one is faced with the problem of what to replace it with. So it is not a war to reinstall Assad, it is a war to get rid of the coup government. Assad, for the reasons I stated, is an obvious choice for reinstatement. I'm not saying it is the best choice, or the most favorable one, but it is a choice and there is no denying that.

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

But in Realpolitik there more often is no difference or only a very small amount. Usually compromise involves hypocrisy, especially in that part of the world.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

No, it is the best kind of rational thinking. Look at it this way... urban warfare would be even deadlier for the US forces if the Syrians had sharks with laser beams attached to their frick'n heads, but I don't see them having them any time soon. So why create a scenario where US soldiers are getting zapped by them when the facts indicate that they won't be an issue?

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

That's just my point. The "everybody back behind the city walls" scenario you painted is stupid, IMHO, and therefore I assume the Syrians wouldn't adopt it. It is impractical, for starters, and all it won't change the ultimate outcome.

Think about it this way... Iraq had all the warning in the world that an attack was on its way. They were armed with all the same mountains of theories that you have in front of you. They could have chose to do EXACTLY what you suggested in Baghdad. In fact, US military planners were very concerned that they would do just that. But they didn't. Why? Because they were stupid? I don't believe that. Because they hadn't thought of it? No, I really doubt that. Because they thought it wouldn't work or something else would work better? Yeah, that's what I would suggest.

There is a difference between predicting and just wishful thinking. Predictions are made by taking into account all relevant factors to the best of one's ability. Wishful thinking is cherry picking things out of context and creating a position from that. I've outlined the practical reasons why the Damascus scenario you created isn't likely, nor is it likely to work even if it happened. This is based on factors that go well outside of small unit tactics. It is wishful thinking to think these other factors aren't important.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, I've never liked this axiom:

" You Never Fight the Same War Twice"

Of course not. But that doesn't mean the next war you fight will be WORSE than the one you've already fought. Remember, most militaries are set up to fight the last war, not the next one. Syria is set up to fight something that hasn't been relevant for decades. The US is fresh and still embroiled in two wars of today's battlefield. The US also has massive resources to call upon for any furture conflict, while Syria is still struggling to get out of the 1970s.

So which force do you think is better positioned to fight the next war? The stagnent, backwards military that has proven time and again that it is incapable of fundamental reform, or the one that continues to show an amazing ability to adapt itself extremely quickly to a rapidly changing combat environment? If you're putting your money on the Syrians magically coming out of the "dark ages" and surpassing the West's abilities within the next year or two... well... I've got a bridge in New York to sell you

Again, I'm talking about the stratgic level. While I would expect very little change from the regular Syrian Army, I do not hold the same opinion of the Syrian Special Forces or the terrorist groups already located in Syria. The latter two are indeed capable of adapting, but they are limited in how the can adapt. Mass employment of artillery, armor, formations of soldiers, etc. are simply not possible for them. So when one things "challenge" in CM:SF, one must think in terms of smaller units using older and lighter equipment for modern tactics.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, I've never liked this axiom:

" You Never Fight the Same War Twice"

Of course not. But that doesn't mean the next war you fight will be WORSE than the one you've already fought. Remember, most militaries are set up to fight the last war, not the next one. Syria is set up to fight something that hasn't been relevant for decades. The US is fresh and still embroiled in two wars of today's battlefield. The US also has massive resources to call upon for any furture conflict, while Syria is still struggling to get out of the 1970s.

So which force do you think is better positioned to fight the next war? The stagnent, backwards military that has proven time and again that it is incapable of fundamental reform, or the one that continues to show an amazing ability to adapt itself extremely quickly to a rapidly changing combat environment? If you're putting your money on the Syrians magically coming out of the "dark ages" and surpassing the West's abilities within the next year or two... well... I've got a bridge in New York to sell you

Again, I'm talking about the stratgic level. While I would expect very little change from the regular Syrian Army, I do not hold the same opinion of the Syrian Special Forces or the terrorist groups already located in Syria. The latter two are indeed capable of adapting, but they are limited in how the can adapt. Mass employment of artillery, armor, formations of soldiers, etc. are simply not possible for them. So when one things "challenge" in CM:SF, one must think in terms of smaller units using older and lighter equipment for modern tactics.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, I've never liked this axiom:

" You Never Fight the Same War Twice"

Of course not. But that doesn't mean the next war you fight will be WORSE than the one you've already fought. Remember, most militaries are set up to fight the last war, not the next one. Syria is set up to fight something that hasn't been relevant for decades. The US is fresh and still embroiled in two wars of today's battlefield. The US also has massive resources to call upon for any furture conflict, while Syria is still struggling to get out of the 1970s.

So which force do you think is better positioned to fight the next war? The stagnent, backwards military that has proven time and again that it is incapable of fundamental reform, or the one that continues to show an amazing ability to adapt itself extremely quickly to a rapidly changing combat environment? If you're putting your money on the Syrians magically coming out of the "dark ages" and surpassing the West's abilities within the next year or two... well... I've got a bridge in New York to sell you

Again, I'm talking about the stratgic level. While I would expect very little change from the regular Syrian Army, I do not hold the same opinion of the Syrian Special Forces or the terrorist groups already located in Syria. The latter two are indeed capable of adapting, but they are limited in how the can adapt. Mass employment of artillery, armor, formations of soldiers, etc. are simply not possible for them. So when one things "challenge" in CM:SF, one must think in terms of smaller units using older and lighter equipment for modern tactics.

Steve

[Peter Cairns]

Steve

I am not buying your logic.

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

Okay so lets say I can't get everyone to stay in the capital, where are they going to go, North across the mountains to the Lebanon, yeh they'll get a warm welcome there.

In Cars towards the US in a shooting war, doubtful as you said yourself SOP says shoot any vehicle that could be construde a threat, and besides civilians don't run towards the war. I didn't come across many news reports of people abandoning Baghdad for the desert.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Who's commanding Strker force... Moses...

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

What do you do with all the males of fighting age in that 1 million, ask Fidel for a bigger bit of Cuba.

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

Thats what Vann advised the Vietnamese ( and Westmoreland) to do. The jungles useless let them have it.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

Oh one other thing, I am not big on the Russian front but I do know that the US formally offered aid to Russia in July 41 and set out the practicals at a conference at the end of Oct 41.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Steve

I am not buying your logic.

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

Okay so lets say I can't get everyone to stay in the capital, where are they going to go, North across the mountains to the Lebanon, yeh they'll get a warm welcome there.

In Cars towards the US in a shooting war, doubtful as you said yourself SOP says shoot any vehicle that could be construde a threat, and besides civilians don't run towards the war. I didn't come across many news reports of people abandoning Baghdad for the desert.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Who's commanding Strker force... Moses...

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

What do you do with all the males of fighting age in that 1 million, ask Fidel for a bigger bit of Cuba.

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

Thats what Vann advised the Vietnamese ( and Westmoreland) to do. The jungles useless let them have it.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

Oh one other thing, I am not big on the Russian front but I do know that the US formally offered aid to Russia in July 41 and set out the practicals at a conference at the end of Oct 41.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Steve

I am not buying your logic.

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

Okay so lets say I can't get everyone to stay in the capital, where are they going to go, North across the mountains to the Lebanon, yeh they'll get a warm welcome there.

In Cars towards the US in a shooting war, doubtful as you said yourself SOP says shoot any vehicle that could be construde a threat, and besides civilians don't run towards the war. I didn't come across many news reports of people abandoning Baghdad for the desert.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Who's commanding Strker force... Moses...

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

What do you do with all the males of fighting age in that 1 million, ask Fidel for a bigger bit of Cuba.

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

Thats what Vann advised the Vietnamese ( and Westmoreland) to do. The jungles useless let them have it.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

Oh one other thing, I am not big on the Russian front but I do know that the US formally offered aid to Russia in July 41 and set out the practicals at a conference at the end of Oct 41.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

Peter.

[MikeyD]

Let's not assume flawless U.S. strategy (especially if us board members are the ones directing this war!)

I recall as the Kuwait war was being planned Schwartzkof submitted an attack strategy based on the force size he had then been promised. Horrified onlookers dubbed the plan "Hey diddle-diddle, straight up the middle" after a line in a Marx brothers football farce! They quickly increased Schwartzkof's allocated forces by a third and the famous 'left hook' encirclement strategy resulted.

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict. After all, 2007 is dangerously close to the next presidential election cycle.

[ December 14, 2005, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[MikeyD]

Let's not assume flawless U.S. strategy (especially if us board members are the ones directing this war!)

I recall as the Kuwait war was being planned Schwartzkof submitted an attack strategy based on the force size he had then been promised. Horrified onlookers dubbed the plan "Hey diddle-diddle, straight up the middle" after a line in a Marx brothers football farce! They quickly increased Schwartzkof's allocated forces by a third and the famous 'left hook' encirclement strategy resulted.

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict. After all, 2007 is dangerously close to the next presidential election cycle.

[ December 14, 2005, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[MikeyD]

Let's not assume flawless U.S. strategy (especially if us board members are the ones directing this war!)

I recall as the Kuwait war was being planned Schwartzkof submitted an attack strategy based on the force size he had then been promised. Horrified onlookers dubbed the plan "Hey diddle-diddle, straight up the middle" after a line in a Marx brothers football farce! They quickly increased Schwartzkof's allocated forces by a third and the famous 'left hook' encirclement strategy resulted.

So in our hypothetical little war there are a lot of variables outside of our (the armchair generals') control that could shape the conflict. After all, 2007 is dangerously close to the next presidential election cycle.

[ December 14, 2005, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: MikeyD ]

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

I am not buying your logic.

That's OK, it's not for sale anyway

The Syrians can't win a war, so there best tactic is to prevent it, therefore the best strategic defence is to do the one thing the US doesn't want them too, which is turn Damacus in to a fortress.

And what evidence do you have that they will choose this strategy? The same could have been said for Baghdad, but it didn't happen. Just because it makes sense to you doesn't mean anything. And as I have outlined, I don't think it really makes all that much sense.

If that doesn't stop the war then it is certainly the best way to prelong it, and that at least offers the hope that Support in and for the US will melt away.

It's a bad plan since the US has never abandoned a full fledged conventional war. The only war it gave up was Vietnam, and think of how many years that took. Better plan is to assume the country will be conquered (because it WILL happen) and plan for long term resistance. That is how you'd melt away support, just like in Iraq.

Lets say a million leave and that leaves me half a million, where is the US going to put it's million, in tents in the desert over winter?

Er... how did civilians come into this? What do they have to do with anything? They would largely stay in place and suffer the consequences of whatever military action was waged there. Just like every other war.

If the Syrians can turn the war in to a humanitarian disaster they can win.

That's not true at all. They might score PR points and cause ripple effects, but it doesn't mean they win a war. Especially if they are defeated militarily rather quickly. Also, if Syria did something to deliberately turn it into a humanitarian nightmare, the world's opinion would likely be calling for the defeat of the regime even quicker. But again, what indications do you have that the Syrians are planning mass martyrdom?

As to the iraqi's fading away, well what do you expect, they'd been hammered in Kuwait and by the time the US reached Bagdad ever unit in their path had been rolled up.

And what about the second war? The one they had 12 years to plan for? What they did not do was make a big last stand in Baghdad. Your logic, which is not based on any facts, would indicate that Baghdad would have been turned into a giant island of resistance. But it didn't happen that way, and I think I've clearly outlined the main reasons why. You haven't even bothered to challenge any of those reasons, BTW.

So you avoid that mistake, you don't try to fight all along the road to Damascus. You fortify key towns over your six month preparation period, not forgetting food and water, and let the US have the desert for free, they can keep it.

And I agree that is what they will do. It's what the Iraqis did (for the most part) in OIF. And they still lost.

The land doesn't matter it's the people that count.

This is not entirely correct. Look at Afghanistan. The Coalition holds a few key cities, and that's it. The rest of the country is outside of their control and the Taliban is regaining a lot of its strength. Therefore, like everything, there is a balance.

Put about half of the regular army split between Damascus and Aleppo, and disperse the rest with orders to avoid contact till after the siege begins.

Then what? Have the half in Damascus and Aleppo throw down their weapons, demoralized, when the rest of the country is conquered, food is scarce, and their families are either under occupation or suffering within the city? Great plan.

"You Never fight the Same War Twice", doesn't mean it will be worse, but that it will be different, your comparison with Bagdad assumes it will be the same.

And you are compare Damascus to Lenningrad? How's that work?

No, my comparison with Baghdad assumes only that since they are so similar there is a better chance of a similar outcome than a fantasy one drawn up from imagination. And even if your scenario happened, you still haven't proved it would work. I am sure it wouldn't. Doesn't mean it would be a cake walk, but I don't think it would achieve the goal of remaining undefeated in the conventional sense.

The Syrians know and have seen on TV that no one can match the US in the open, they may be unreformed, but they aren't morons. It also assumes that the errors Saddam made aren't pretty obvious.

Recognizing a problem and solving it are two different things. Stalin was greatly alarmed at Germany's quick victories in the west. But one of the two strategies that was developed to counter the German threat would almost certainly have failed and caused the USSR to collapse as we knew it back then. So don't assume that the right plan for the right situation will be selected. It was only because Stalin became convinced that a preemptive strike was a bad idea, and instead an indepth defense was best, that the Germans lost the war. And that plan, BTW, came damned close to failing.

Trying to fight the US failed it Kuwait so Saddam changed tactics and placed his army in large units along the Allied advance route, in an attempt to delay them, he had some success in the close urban fighting but in the end that didn't work either.

Correct. And it won't work for the Syrians either. They might score more hits on the western forces, but they won't win the conventional war. That is the likely scenario.

So the only real successes if you can call them that were when the US was draw in to urban or close terrain and close combat. It's not much but it's all the Syrians have to build on.

You don't have to be a genius to work out that that points to only one realistic chance for the Syrians from a strategic point of view.

But where are you located? What is your schooling and training? Are you Syrian, in Syria, with rivals and potential adversaries waiting for you to make a wrong move in order to take you out? Do you have to deal with the realities of a "last stand" type defense in terms of planning, stockpiling, billeting of troops, etc, etc.? No. You are likely sitting at home in Scotland with a nice frothy mug of beer or a glass of whiskey dreaming this stuff up.

There is a HUGE difference between putting yourself into someone else's shoes and being in them. On that score you and I are even. However, I am trying very hard to incorporate as many other factors into this equation as possible. You are not. You are looking at this through a very narrow, technical standpoint divorced of internal regime politics, potential civil unrest, and the problems associated with admitting defeat before the first shot is fired.

FORTRESS DAMASCUS.

It's not great but it's the best option they have.

No. It is a bad option that is likely to backfire and unlikely to succeed. Best strategy is to break units up into semi-autonomous formations and scatter them all over the place. But this can't be done ahead of time because regimes of terror need the strict control over their forces. This was the primary reason Saddam's strategy was ultimately unsuccessful. To plan for the kind of war that would actually defeat a conventional first world invasion, the Syrians would have had to start 20 years ago IMHO. And I doubt very much they would have been able to do most of the necessary things because of culture, corruption, power struggles, poverty, and other issues.

As the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow within a month of that I hardly think that american aid was a factor.

In 1941, no it wasn't a factor. The factors were the distance, the terrain, Soviet manpower reserves, in some cases superior Soviet equipment, the ability of Soviet forces to defeat a conventional attack at the tactical level, the sorry state of the German war economy, the horrible planning at the highest German levels, fantastic planning at the higher Soviet levels, the lack of German planning for the logistics problems, and eventually the weather (first mud then cold). And yet with all these massive things working against the Germans, they almost did it. Comparing Syria to the Soviet Union is just a ridiculous exercise. They couldn't be more different.

Leningrad had been under siege for three months by then, and it lasted 900 days.

See last comment above Leningrad had a couple hundred million people helping it out. Damascus, left on its own and without any hope of resupply (Leningrad was constantly resupplied, though inadequately for most of the time), is more like Berlin. But even then, going back 60 years to European history at the avoidance of experiences that have happened within the last 15 in the Middle East is rather silly to start with.

Steve