Damascus, "Should you touch it with a barge pole".

[Moronic Max]

You mean, the way Baghdad was a death trap?

Consider the number of RPG hits the units taking part in the "thunder run" suffered. Now consider the fate of a Stryker after being hit by seven RPGs. See my point?

I said "comparative" deathtraps. Meaning it's much more dangerous than, as mentioned, 4km engagement ranges in the open desert. It doesn't mean I expect US troops to be butchered by the hundred.

[zmoney]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

And why would the US just decide to part with doctrine and just send the stykers in. See my point.

[ December 13, 2005, 02:17 PM: Message edited by: zmoney ]

[zmoney]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

And why would the US just decide to part with doctrine and just send the stykers in. See my point.

[ December 13, 2005, 02:17 PM: Message edited by: zmoney ]

[zmoney]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

And why would the US just decide to part with doctrine and just send the stykers in. See my point.

[ December 13, 2005, 02:17 PM: Message edited by: zmoney ]

[Peter Cairns]

ozi_digger,

Thanks that was a great help it gives really detailed maps of the whole of Syria.

Unfortunately they are in Russian.

However it does look like that feature is some kind of hill side quarry right enough.

From the spot heights on the map I'd say most of the city is about 700m Above sea level , but the slopes to the North about 1100m, some 1,000ft higher. The ridge itself is about 2km wide.

http://sunsite.berkeley.edu:8085/syria/100k/09-37-085.jpg

There are some wierd round layouts to the south west of the city, just above a town called "KNCYA", no idea what they are.

There are two other airfields to the Noth West that are new plus one close in on the west. The main international airport to the East doesn't show on this map.

I am surprised how much grren there is though I don't have a key so it could be just cultivated ground rather the tree cover.

Thanks again mate.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

ozi_digger,

Thanks that was a great help it gives really detailed maps of the whole of Syria.

Unfortunately they are in Russian.

However it does look like that feature is some kind of hill side quarry right enough.

From the spot heights on the map I'd say most of the city is about 700m Above sea level , but the slopes to the North about 1100m, some 1,000ft higher. The ridge itself is about 2km wide.

http://sunsite.berkeley.edu:8085/syria/100k/09-37-085.jpg

There are some wierd round layouts to the south west of the city, just above a town called "KNCYA", no idea what they are.

There are two other airfields to the Noth West that are new plus one close in on the west. The main international airport to the East doesn't show on this map.

I am surprised how much grren there is though I don't have a key so it could be just cultivated ground rather the tree cover.

Thanks again mate.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

ozi_digger,

Thanks that was a great help it gives really detailed maps of the whole of Syria.

Unfortunately they are in Russian.

However it does look like that feature is some kind of hill side quarry right enough.

From the spot heights on the map I'd say most of the city is about 700m Above sea level , but the slopes to the North about 1100m, some 1,000ft higher. The ridge itself is about 2km wide.

http://sunsite.berkeley.edu:8085/syria/100k/09-37-085.jpg

There are some wierd round layouts to the south west of the city, just above a town called "KNCYA", no idea what they are.

There are two other airfields to the Noth West that are new plus one close in on the west. The main international airport to the East doesn't show on this map.

I am surprised how much grren there is though I don't have a key so it could be just cultivated ground rather the tree cover.

Thanks again mate.

Peter.

[Moronic Max]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

While I may be mistaken, I believe Steve has, in various threads, been hammering home the point that Syria in CM:SF will be far more capable than Iraq was. Not capable enough to repel the invasion, obviously, but enough to--potentially--inflict significant(from an American casualty-phobic perspective) losses. I think the OPFOR thread covers this, actually.

As for abandoning doctrine, well, they wouldn't, but since, AFAIK, we're going to be "commanding" a unit of Strykers, that's the perspective I'm considering it from.

Incidentally, I know I came off as a bit of a jackass in the previous post. Sorry about that; conditioning from other message boards

[Moronic Max]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

While I may be mistaken, I believe Steve has, in various threads, been hammering home the point that Syria in CM:SF will be far more capable than Iraq was. Not capable enough to repel the invasion, obviously, but enough to--potentially--inflict significant(from an American casualty-phobic perspective) losses. I think the OPFOR thread covers this, actually.

As for abandoning doctrine, well, they wouldn't, but since, AFAIK, we're going to be "commanding" a unit of Strykers, that's the perspective I'm considering it from.

Incidentally, I know I came off as a bit of a jackass in the previous post. Sorry about that; conditioning from other message boards

[Moronic Max]

I don't think fighting in the Syrian cities will be any harder than the Iraqi cities.

Look at Falluja (sp), Bagdad, Basra, or any other speed bump.

While I may be mistaken, I believe Steve has, in various threads, been hammering home the point that Syria in CM:SF will be far more capable than Iraq was. Not capable enough to repel the invasion, obviously, but enough to--potentially--inflict significant(from an American casualty-phobic perspective) losses. I think the OPFOR thread covers this, actually.

As for abandoning doctrine, well, they wouldn't, but since, AFAIK, we're going to be "commanding" a unit of Strykers, that's the perspective I'm considering it from.

Incidentally, I know I came off as a bit of a jackass in the previous post. Sorry about that; conditioning from other message boards

[akd]

I will be interested to see how BFC handles highway interchanges (and I do dearly hope they won't dodge that one).

[akd]

I will be interested to see how BFC handles highway interchanges (and I do dearly hope they won't dodge that one).

[akd]

I will be interested to see how BFC handles highway interchanges (and I do dearly hope they won't dodge that one).

[Battlefront.com]

I've posted some thoughts about Damascus (and other large urban areas) in this thread:

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000611&p=5

The short of it is Baghdad was thought as being a deathtrap for US forces. Urban warfare, in general, has been long feared by US military planners. Check out MOUT doctrine from the 1980s, when it was still aimed at Europe, and you'll see terms like "bypass", "avoid", "skirt", "screen", and all sorts of things when discussing how to deal with large urban areas.

In the First Gulf War, one of the stated reasons for the war ending after 100 hours, before total victory was acheived, was the cost of taking Baghdad. Since then military planners have grudgingly, and timidly, started taking the reality of MOUT warfare seriously. Large urban areas simply can not be avoided any longer (not that they really ever could be IMHO). But as OIF loomed in front of planners and grunts, everybody was still quite unsure of how well the US forces would perform. Tanks were considered a liability for MOUT warfare by many, just as an example.

And yet it was recognized that urban areas of significance HAD to be taken. Regardless of their population size, religious significance (Najaf for example), anticipated level of hostility, and even public opinion. So OIF was launched with commanders and political leaders holding their breath to see how bad it would be. Especially Baghdad. It was a big ta-do over nothing, as it turned out. Baghdad fell with a whimper, not a roar as expected.

Tactically, of course, things were extremely tough at times. The battle for Nasiriyah was particularly bloody. But operationally there was hardly a hiccup, and strategically there was hardly a stutter.

I expect the operational and strategic sides of a fictional war on Syria to be about the same, but I do expect the tactical battle to be tougher. If Iraq offered an average resistance level of 2 strategically and 4 tactically I would expect the Syrians to be 3 strategically and 6 tactically. Tougher overall, but the same ultimate strategic conclusion.

Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country. That much I am certain of. I am also certain that after the fall things would get very "interesting" for the occupying force. But that isn't what CM:SF is set up to simulate so that isn't really relevant.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I've posted some thoughts about Damascus (and other large urban areas) in this thread:

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000611&p=5

The short of it is Baghdad was thought as being a deathtrap for US forces. Urban warfare, in general, has been long feared by US military planners. Check out MOUT doctrine from the 1980s, when it was still aimed at Europe, and you'll see terms like "bypass", "avoid", "skirt", "screen", and all sorts of things when discussing how to deal with large urban areas.

In the First Gulf War, one of the stated reasons for the war ending after 100 hours, before total victory was acheived, was the cost of taking Baghdad. Since then military planners have grudgingly, and timidly, started taking the reality of MOUT warfare seriously. Large urban areas simply can not be avoided any longer (not that they really ever could be IMHO). But as OIF loomed in front of planners and grunts, everybody was still quite unsure of how well the US forces would perform. Tanks were considered a liability for MOUT warfare by many, just as an example.

And yet it was recognized that urban areas of significance HAD to be taken. Regardless of their population size, religious significance (Najaf for example), anticipated level of hostility, and even public opinion. So OIF was launched with commanders and political leaders holding their breath to see how bad it would be. Especially Baghdad. It was a big ta-do over nothing, as it turned out. Baghdad fell with a whimper, not a roar as expected.

Tactically, of course, things were extremely tough at times. The battle for Nasiriyah was particularly bloody. But operationally there was hardly a hiccup, and strategically there was hardly a stutter.

I expect the operational and strategic sides of a fictional war on Syria to be about the same, but I do expect the tactical battle to be tougher. If Iraq offered an average resistance level of 2 strategically and 4 tactically I would expect the Syrians to be 3 strategically and 6 tactically. Tougher overall, but the same ultimate strategic conclusion.

Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country. That much I am certain of. I am also certain that after the fall things would get very "interesting" for the occupying force. But that isn't what CM:SF is set up to simulate so that isn't really relevant.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I've posted some thoughts about Damascus (and other large urban areas) in this thread:

http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=52&t=000611&p=5

The short of it is Baghdad was thought as being a deathtrap for US forces. Urban warfare, in general, has been long feared by US military planners. Check out MOUT doctrine from the 1980s, when it was still aimed at Europe, and you'll see terms like "bypass", "avoid", "skirt", "screen", and all sorts of things when discussing how to deal with large urban areas.

In the First Gulf War, one of the stated reasons for the war ending after 100 hours, before total victory was acheived, was the cost of taking Baghdad. Since then military planners have grudgingly, and timidly, started taking the reality of MOUT warfare seriously. Large urban areas simply can not be avoided any longer (not that they really ever could be IMHO). But as OIF loomed in front of planners and grunts, everybody was still quite unsure of how well the US forces would perform. Tanks were considered a liability for MOUT warfare by many, just as an example.

And yet it was recognized that urban areas of significance HAD to be taken. Regardless of their population size, religious significance (Najaf for example), anticipated level of hostility, and even public opinion. So OIF was launched with commanders and political leaders holding their breath to see how bad it would be. Especially Baghdad. It was a big ta-do over nothing, as it turned out. Baghdad fell with a whimper, not a roar as expected.

Tactically, of course, things were extremely tough at times. The battle for Nasiriyah was particularly bloody. But operationally there was hardly a hiccup, and strategically there was hardly a stutter.

I expect the operational and strategic sides of a fictional war on Syria to be about the same, but I do expect the tactical battle to be tougher. If Iraq offered an average resistance level of 2 strategically and 4 tactically I would expect the Syrians to be 3 strategically and 6 tactically. Tougher overall, but the same ultimate strategic conclusion.

Damascus would fall just like the rest of the country. That much I am certain of. I am also certain that after the fall things would get very "interesting" for the occupying force. But that isn't what CM:SF is set up to simulate so that isn't really relevant.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

Yeh but the legitimate Government is Assad and he's as big a thug as his dad. Thats like the US intervening to prop up Saddam if the Iranians had invaded in 2001.

Hardly likely.

As things are right now, I agree. However, the world is more complicated than the US would like it to be. Hence the problems with occupying Iraq. The US thought it would be treated as liberators and protectors, but it is largely seen as the opposite. Iran is said to field the third largest military force in Iraq after the US and British. This is mostly because the other nations field such tiny forces, but the point is that Iran is actively involved and there isn't a thing the US can do about it.

The situation I see is that there is a change of power in Syria. The recognized government, like it or not, is Assad's. A force going into Syria to oust the coup government would, by default, be obligated to reinstall the deposed one. That's how it works. And if you think the Arab/Muslim countries would sit around and watch a US lead effort overlook this you're nuts. The US has destroyed its credibility and political leverage for a long time to come. If it wants to extend its foreign policy into another Muslim state in the near future, it is going to have to compromise on its ideals in major ways. Of that I am sure, though the specifics would be highly situationally dependent.

Then there is the matter of the Syrians themselves. They really do see Assad as their leader. It is possible for him to be ousted without their approval, but that doesn't mean they would like it. One way to placate the population of Syria would be to say "we are bringing Assad back to you". It would likely make a huge difference in terms of how bad a time the occupation force would have in the short term.

I can easily see a compromise where the US goes along with a UN sanctioned action that reinstalls the Assad government with certain preconditions. For example, renouncing terrorism, torture, and repression. Just like the current government in Iraq, that doesn't mean Assad would actually do it once in power... but pieces of paper would say he would do it in exchange for being reinstalled.

The US might not like it, but they have shown a willingness to compromise on ideals when they feel it is in their best interest. For example, training death squads, mining international waters, funding coups, supporting murderous dictatorships all over the world, trading arms for hostages, etc. Some of these were covert, some overt. The point is, the US plays the game of Realpolitik. If getting rid of Syria as a base of terrorism and threat in the ME comes with some ugly riders, and those riders were critical for allowing it to happen, they'd go along with it.

Steve

P.S. I singled the US out in the last paragraph, but the Europeans are no different. Afterall, it was the Germans and the French that knowingly gave Saddam the ability to gas Iranians and Kurds (for example) and get going on making nukes. So hopefully nobody will take my comments out of context

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

Yeh but the legitimate Government is Assad and he's as big a thug as his dad. Thats like the US intervening to prop up Saddam if the Iranians had invaded in 2001.

Hardly likely.

As things are right now, I agree. However, the world is more complicated than the US would like it to be. Hence the problems with occupying Iraq. The US thought it would be treated as liberators and protectors, but it is largely seen as the opposite. Iran is said to field the third largest military force in Iraq after the US and British. This is mostly because the other nations field such tiny forces, but the point is that Iran is actively involved and there isn't a thing the US can do about it.

The situation I see is that there is a change of power in Syria. The recognized government, like it or not, is Assad's. A force going into Syria to oust the coup government would, by default, be obligated to reinstall the deposed one. That's how it works. And if you think the Arab/Muslim countries would sit around and watch a US lead effort overlook this you're nuts. The US has destroyed its credibility and political leverage for a long time to come. If it wants to extend its foreign policy into another Muslim state in the near future, it is going to have to compromise on its ideals in major ways. Of that I am sure, though the specifics would be highly situationally dependent.

Then there is the matter of the Syrians themselves. They really do see Assad as their leader. It is possible for him to be ousted without their approval, but that doesn't mean they would like it. One way to placate the population of Syria would be to say "we are bringing Assad back to you". It would likely make a huge difference in terms of how bad a time the occupation force would have in the short term.

I can easily see a compromise where the US goes along with a UN sanctioned action that reinstalls the Assad government with certain preconditions. For example, renouncing terrorism, torture, and repression. Just like the current government in Iraq, that doesn't mean Assad would actually do it once in power... but pieces of paper would say he would do it in exchange for being reinstalled.

The US might not like it, but they have shown a willingness to compromise on ideals when they feel it is in their best interest. For example, training death squads, mining international waters, funding coups, supporting murderous dictatorships all over the world, trading arms for hostages, etc. Some of these were covert, some overt. The point is, the US plays the game of Realpolitik. If getting rid of Syria as a base of terrorism and threat in the ME comes with some ugly riders, and those riders were critical for allowing it to happen, they'd go along with it.

Steve

P.S. I singled the US out in the last paragraph, but the Europeans are no different. Afterall, it was the Germans and the French that knowingly gave Saddam the ability to gas Iranians and Kurds (for example) and get going on making nukes. So hopefully nobody will take my comments out of context

[Battlefront.com]

Peter,

Yeh but the legitimate Government is Assad and he's as big a thug as his dad. Thats like the US intervening to prop up Saddam if the Iranians had invaded in 2001.

Hardly likely.

As things are right now, I agree. However, the world is more complicated than the US would like it to be. Hence the problems with occupying Iraq. The US thought it would be treated as liberators and protectors, but it is largely seen as the opposite. Iran is said to field the third largest military force in Iraq after the US and British. This is mostly because the other nations field such tiny forces, but the point is that Iran is actively involved and there isn't a thing the US can do about it.

The situation I see is that there is a change of power in Syria. The recognized government, like it or not, is Assad's. A force going into Syria to oust the coup government would, by default, be obligated to reinstall the deposed one. That's how it works. And if you think the Arab/Muslim countries would sit around and watch a US lead effort overlook this you're nuts. The US has destroyed its credibility and political leverage for a long time to come. If it wants to extend its foreign policy into another Muslim state in the near future, it is going to have to compromise on its ideals in major ways. Of that I am sure, though the specifics would be highly situationally dependent.

Then there is the matter of the Syrians themselves. They really do see Assad as their leader. It is possible for him to be ousted without their approval, but that doesn't mean they would like it. One way to placate the population of Syria would be to say "we are bringing Assad back to you". It would likely make a huge difference in terms of how bad a time the occupation force would have in the short term.

I can easily see a compromise where the US goes along with a UN sanctioned action that reinstalls the Assad government with certain preconditions. For example, renouncing terrorism, torture, and repression. Just like the current government in Iraq, that doesn't mean Assad would actually do it once in power... but pieces of paper would say he would do it in exchange for being reinstalled.

The US might not like it, but they have shown a willingness to compromise on ideals when they feel it is in their best interest. For example, training death squads, mining international waters, funding coups, supporting murderous dictatorships all over the world, trading arms for hostages, etc. Some of these were covert, some overt. The point is, the US plays the game of Realpolitik. If getting rid of Syria as a base of terrorism and threat in the ME comes with some ugly riders, and those riders were critical for allowing it to happen, they'd go along with it.

Steve

P.S. I singled the US out in the last paragraph, but the Europeans are no different. Afterall, it was the Germans and the French that knowingly gave Saddam the ability to gas Iranians and Kurds (for example) and get going on making nukes. So hopefully nobody will take my comments out of context

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, remember back to Kuwait. Many in the US, and other Coallition countries, were not at all happy about putting a rich, corrupt, repressive, bunch of men back into power in Kuwait. So a deal was struck where the promised significant reform in exchange for being reinstalled. Niether side had much choice in the matter, since Kuwait couldn't liberate itself and the Coallition couldn't go in there to liberate it without a government to reinstall. And the only one that had legitimacy was the recently deposed Kuwaiti royal family and hangers on.

In some ways it would be MUCH better if the reason for taking on Syria came about with Assad firmly in power. In other ways it doesn't. That's because the world is a very strange and complicated place

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, remember back to Kuwait. Many in the US, and other Coallition countries, were not at all happy about putting a rich, corrupt, repressive, bunch of men back into power in Kuwait. So a deal was struck where the promised significant reform in exchange for being reinstalled. Niether side had much choice in the matter, since Kuwait couldn't liberate itself and the Coallition couldn't go in there to liberate it without a government to reinstall. And the only one that had legitimacy was the recently deposed Kuwaiti royal family and hangers on.

In some ways it would be MUCH better if the reason for taking on Syria came about with Assad firmly in power. In other ways it doesn't. That's because the world is a very strange and complicated place

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, remember back to Kuwait. Many in the US, and other Coallition countries, were not at all happy about putting a rich, corrupt, repressive, bunch of men back into power in Kuwait. So a deal was struck where the promised significant reform in exchange for being reinstalled. Niether side had much choice in the matter, since Kuwait couldn't liberate itself and the Coallition couldn't go in there to liberate it without a government to reinstall. And the only one that had legitimacy was the recently deposed Kuwaiti royal family and hangers on.

In some ways it would be MUCH better if the reason for taking on Syria came about with Assad firmly in power. In other ways it doesn't. That's because the world is a very strange and complicated place

Steve

[Peter Cairns]

Sorry Steve,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Sorry Steve,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

Peter.

[Peter Cairns]

Sorry Steve,

I just can't see the US propping up Assad by force, even if Bin Laden was sworn in to office, Their international credibility is at an all time low, and their is no way this administrations supporters would back it let alone the democrats.

If the regeme was to implode and it looked like "verifiable" quantities of Syrians Chemical weapons were to fall in to the hands of iraqi sunni's then you have a pretext for action and a credible basis for CM:SF, but not bring back assad,

There is compromise and there is hypocracy, and they are different things. One is pragmatic the other deceitful, one is grudgingly accepted the other denounced.

As to Damascus, I thought you were the last person i should tell " You Never Fight the Same War Twice", to throw out or dismiss a generation of concern over urban warfare developed since Hue, because "Well Bagdah wasn't bad" is the worst kind of wishful thinking.

As I told c3k, one of the worst mistakes you can make is to assume your enemy is stupid.

Peter.