Interesting article by UK officer on US Army

[Wisbech_lad]

Military Review Article

Got to love the cliched double barrel name - though as a Nigel he should of course be in the RAF. Army are Ruperts...

Interesting point that the US army is maybe just too good and focused at what it is good at (destruction of the enemy) for the pacification phase. I guess the USMC is even more so?

Two other points that interested me:

- lack of experienced company commanders

- large cultural gap between US civilians and armed forces.

This second point, I can see now I think about it. Especially USMC and "teeth" troops seem to be changed for life. Whereas I work with a number of ex British Army officers, and it never occureed to me they had been in the army - they are no different from our other managers. Well, apart from shinier shoes! And friends who went into the armed services - their characters and opinions were not changed by the experience, and came out with same culture that they went in with. Maybe a product of UK class system being fairly strong in comparison?

[Imperial Grunt]

Very interesting article. I once read a book about Grenada that was written by a Brit Army officer and I thought his perspective was very accurate and refreshing. Forgot what it was titled.

There are some points I would like to comment on:

"Yet it would be simplistic and misleading to suggest that U.S. senior commanders

simply did not understand the importance of popular support. At least 2 evidently did. Major General (MG) David Petraeus, as Commanding

General (CG) of the 101st Division and responsible for Northern Iraq in the period after the fall of Saddam, swung his troops routinely between offensive operations and an equally vigorous domestic construction and restoration programme.14 He is widely accredited with maintaining

relative peace and normal functionality in Mosul, a city with an ethnic mix easily liable to ignite into civil conflict. Likewise, MG Pete Chiarelli, CG of 1st Cav Div, responsible for the demanding and volatile Baghdad area of operations

in 2004, referred in briefings to his Division’s

SWETI ops: Sewage, Water, Electricity, Trash, Information. He considered his role to be as much city chief executive as soldier."

[]Marine Generals Conway (I MEF CG) and Mattis (1st MarDiv CG) were very focused on "winning hearts and minds". Also, back during Vietnam War, there was alot of senior level conflict between the Army and Marines. Gen Westmorland wanted set piece battles against the NVA and VC and to engage them in a war of attrition with US firepower. The Marines only wanted to fight when challenged and focus on an "ink-blot" strategy that pacified towns and villages, one at a time. The combined action program (CAP) was created early to do this, but without strategic support, the Marines could only make some operational level success.

"‘they live in fortified camps away from the population and most face-to-face contact . . . is during cordon and search or vehicle checkpoint operations’.18 Routine foot patrolling, a key means of interacting and thus gathering HUMINT, was the exception."

[] The Marines and Army have differed alot about this "fortress" mentality. When the Marines pulled out of Somalia, there was an immediate feeling among the populace that the street cop just left. While of course the Marines use FOB's, many company level firm bases and smaller patrol bases are also in use in order to have better influence and presence. Of course, this exposes the Marines to more IED attacks and other threats.

"when insurgents captured and mutilated 4 U.S. contractors in Fallujah. In classic insurgency doctrine, this act was almost certainly a come-on, designed to invoke a disproportionate response, thereby further polarising the situation and driving

a wedge between the domestic population and the Coalition forces. It succeeded."

[] This event occurred right after 1st MarDiv completed its reflief in place (RIP) of the 82nd Airborne, which had responsiblity for Fallujah. The 82nd did maintain a continual presence, following pretty much the FOB example. They did conduct mounted patrols and other operations, especially raids against insurgent/jihadist leadership. And they had to deal with a very unfortunate shooting incident when some paratroopers fired into a crowd when defending themselves. Marine Generals Conway and Mattis did not want to attack the city until it had been properly prepared...ie the event "set up" so that the Arab world saw Fallujans as the bad seeds they were. But the Marines were ordered to attack. General Conway also said that if the attack is started, the worst thing that could happen would be to stop the attack. But this is what exactly happened due to political pressure from Bahgdad and the international community. So the offensive stopped. This created a huge pyschological victory for the insurgents and jihadists and made Fallujah a safe haven. Thus by November, it had to be cleared. The Phase IV part of the operation was completely planned out. But it was a tactical and operational success and did not have the overall impact at the strategic level in Iraq in the long term.

"Each commander had his own style, but if there was a common trend it was for micro-management, with many hours devoted to daily briefings and updates. Planning tended to be staff driven and focused on process rather than end effect. The net effect was highly centralised decision-making, which worked when serving a commander with a gift for retaining detail and concurrently managing a plethora of issues, but all too readily developed undue inertia."

[] This is one of the major differences that I have experienced as a Marine officer who has worked with the US Army. Very different command and staff styles. US Army Col Daniel Bolger wrote about that in his book "Death Ground, American Infantry in Battle" (another excellent book that I highly recommend). When describing the Marines he describes plans as being brief, sometimes overly so. While Marines are guilty of micro-management just like the Army and other services, US Army staffs are especially prone to alot of briefs by powerpoint. US Army battalions attached to 1st MarDiv for OIF2 would often create briefs of 20-50 slides for Gen Mattis. He wanted 5 and an overall assessment from the commander, face to face.

This is one of the problems that I see with a completly digitized force. It allows, even invites, a commander to micromanage each squad and vehicle (just like in CM) which squelches inititive and judgement. And things are always different on the ground than they are on map symbology, no matter how digital.

"• Improve skills and tactical repertoire for IW across the wider force—broaden the knowledge base outside Special Operations Forces and Marines."

[] The Marines have been a "small wars" force since its inception and US SOF were originally designed as counter guerrilla forces. The book by Col Bolger mentioned above as well as "Making the Corps" by Thomas Ricks document this well. But while the Marine Corps thrives in expeditionary operations, most of the Army does not (and, overall, should not in my opinion). The Army is the Nation's slegehammer to win a war at the strategic level. Many Army units are trained and equipped for "small wars", like the 10th Mountian for example, but as an institution the US Army does not have the institutionalized experience and mentality that the Marines and SOF have acquired. At the same time, Marines struggle with planning and corps and above sized operations, something that the Army has mastered better than anyone else in the world.

The article is correct in many ways and I am glad it was written by a Brit and not a Marine. But in the US Army's defense, being the most potent land force in the world in sustained land combat is its primary mission. The Marines can contribute to this effort, especially for amphibious assaults and other limited operations in support of the land campaign. But to retrain the entire Army to think like Marines and SOF would lessen its ability to wage a sustained land war. And while many may say that such a war will never happen again, all I can say is that all those who predicted that before were wrong.

[Imperial Grunt]

Especially USMC and "teeth" troops seem to be changed for life.

Never heard of "teeth" troops, but the experience of bootcamp and OCS does "change" most Marines for life. When I left active-duty in 1995 after 5 years and several months of service, I was looking forward to civilian life. Less than 6 months later, I volunteered for the Marine reserves. And I have few civilian close friends that are not ex-military and/or law enforcement. Thomas Ricks talks alot about this in his book. Marine bootcamp is one of the few public institutions in the US that still hammers home standards as simple as "honor, courage, committment". Of course not all Marines keep that standard or meet it very well, but they are taught it and the standard is very much there.

Now that I have experienced the war-time Marine Corps, I would say that I am even more addicted to it.

[Michael Dorosh]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4603136.stm

UK officer slams US Iraq tactics

By Matthew Davis

BBC News, Washington

The brigadier said he wanted to help an institution he respects

A senior British Army officer has sparked indignation in the US with a scathing article criticising the US Army's performance in Iraq.

Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster said US tactics early in the occupation had alienated Iraqis and exacerbated problems for the coalition.

Officers displayed cultural ignorance, self-righteousness, over-optimism and unproductive management, he said.

The article, in Military Review, has drawn US criticism but also approval.

'Stiflingly hierarchical'

In it Brig Aylwin-Foster says American officers displayed such cultural insensitivities that it "arguably amounted to institutional racism" and may have helped spur the insurgency.

Sometimes good articles do make you angry

Col Kevin Benson

School of Advanced Military Studies

While the army is "indisputably the master of conventional war fighting, it is notably less proficient in... what the US defence community often calls Operations Other Than War," the officer wrote.

Operations to win the peace in Iraq were "weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, predisposition to offensive operations and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head on", he added.

The British officer - who was commander of a programme to train the Iraqi military - says he wrote the article with the intent to "be helpful to an institution I greatly respect".

Yet the initial response from many US military officers was hostile.

'It made me upset'

Col Kevin Benson, commander of the US Army's elite School of Advanced Military Studies, said his first reaction was that Brig Aylwin-Foster was "an insufferable British snob".

"Some of this is pretty powerful stuff and it made me a little upset," the colonel told the BBC.

Col Benson, one of the lead planners for the 3rd US Army's early post-invasion operations, is writing a rebuttal to the Military Review piece.

"We paid a great deal of attention to the tribal interactions within Iraq and on making commanders in the field aware of the sensitivities," he said.

"And I certainly don't recognise what he says about the de-professionalisation of the US Army.

"But sometimes good articles do make you angry. We should publish articles like this. We are in a war and we must always be thinking of how we can improve the way we operate."

Earlier this month President George W Bush said US troop levels in Iraq would be reduced to several thousand below the pre-election baseline of 138,000 by Spring 2006.

Those cuts would come in addition to the decrease of 20,000 troops who were in the country largely to provide security during the December elections.

[Imperial Grunt]

Near the end of my second tour in Iraq, I was serving with BLT 1/2 and they were reinforced with a British company from Basra (I think they were some kind of Highlander or Scottish unit but the names of the British regiments are beyond me. US Marines keep it simple- the 1st Marine regiment, the 2nd Marine regiment, etc..) The Brits initally thought that the Marine patrols were being too offensively minded and disregarded some of the advice that the BLT staff and company commanders offered. Their very first week on deck a Brit patrol was ambushed and they took 4-5 WIA and they subsequently adjusted their tactics to mirror the BLT's. Things were different in the I MEF AO as compared to Basra.

There are lessons to be learned by all. The Brits were outstanding soldiers.

[Wisbech_lad]

LtCol West, well of course USMC have to keep it simple - trouble is, what happens when they have more regiments than a marine has fingers...

It was the Black Watch ISTR.

"teeth" troops - ones that are dedicated to do the actual fighting, not in the logistical back up units, who should only be fighting if things have gone wrong...

What you say of your personal experience is very interesting. I guess that is what the Brigadier meant when he said there was a bigger cultural division between the US army, and the US population, than in other countries. But, then again, very few (if any) other first world countries have been in conflict as much over the last 15-20 years.

Then again, almost all of the ex-army officers I know were in either the LI, the Ghurkas, or the Guards. All three have a reputation of where well-connected young men go to be officers for a six year SSC, to discharge their debt to society or to honour family tradition - so it wasn't a career for them. Other than NI, only one saw combat (on secondment to the Omanis, fighting tribal rebels)

[Peter Cairns]

THe point that sticks out for me is the one about micromanagement and the digital battlefield. This isn't just a problem for the US but all advanced forces.

There are real dangers of information overload, where peopel are given more than they can handle, or where because they have all that information they start taking decisions that should be made at a higher level.

there have been a few examples of air accidents involving aircraft with advanced MF screen navigation systems whrer when the screen information has been wrong, but the pilots have no realisied because they have come to be to dependant on them.

In the worst case which i think was in greek airspace, the system mixed up to beacons and the jet ( I seem to recall was an Airbus) flew in to a mountain that the computer said wasn't there.

All the technology is great, but if you become dependant it can be dangerous.

One of the things I've noticed about powerpoint is that you tend to be given printed notes as well. this can mean ( partciularly in a long and or boring technical briefing), that people lose interest and think "well it's ok , I've got my notes, and then put their notes in abag and never look at them again, or at least until it's to late and they've forgotten the context.

again I am ending with the same comment

KISS. (Keep it simple stupid).

Peter.

[Nidan1]

How many more times are we going to hash out this argument, when there are obvious agendas in play, we can discuss this stuff to death, which is what often happens on this forum.

"My army is smarter than your army, nah! nah! nah!" Woe to those who are tied up in the logic that the process is more important than the final product.

[Lars]

Thanks for the link, Wisbech. Cuz this is how it was reported in (admittedly) the Guardian.

US army in Iraq institutionally racist, claims British officer

A senior British officer has criticised the US army for its conduct in Iraq, accusing it of institutional racism, moral righteousness, misplaced optimism, and of being ill-suited to engage in counter-insurgency operations.

My first reaction was, "Well, he should know, now shouldn't he?".

[Splinty]

I have to agree that the Army is too process driven at a higher level. (Div and higher)But at the Company and Platoon level our Op-orders tended to be very simple, because we did the same kinds of missions all the time. Not to say we glossed over details or that missions became too routine, but because we got good at what we were doing. As for cultural awareness, my unit was always emphasising the difference between the insurgency and the average Iraqi. We constantly got classes on Arabic culture and what not to do.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by LtCol West:

Near the end of my second tour in Iraq, I was serving with BLT 1/2 and they were reinforced with a British company from Basra (I think they were some kind of Highlander or Scottish unit but the names of the British regiments are beyond me. US Marines keep it simple- the 1st Marine regiment, the 2nd Marine regiment, etc..)

It won't be an issue in future; the Scottish Division has been amalgamated into a single Regiment, with wonderfully colourful battalion titles

1 SCOTS

2 SCOTS

3 SCOTS

4 SCOTS

5 SCOTS

(Actually, former regimental names will be parenthesized sub-titles and if you want to impress people you'll need to memorize what colour the hackles on the hats correspond with which battalions).

[Imperial Grunt]

Originally posted by Wisbech_lad:

LtCol West, well of course USMC have to keep it simple - trouble is, what happens when they have more regiments than a marine has fingers...

It was the Black Watch ISTR.

"teeth" troops - ones that are dedicated to do the actual fighting, not in the logistical back up units, who should only be fighting if things have gone wrong...

What you say of your personal experience is very interesting. I guess that is what the Brigadier meant when he said there was a bigger cultural division between the US army, and the US population, than in other countries. But, then again, very few (if any) other first world countries have been in conflict as much over the last 15-20 years.

Then again, almost all of the ex-army officers I know were in either the LI, the Ghurkas, or the Guards. All three have a reputation of where well-connected young men go to be officers for a six year SSC, to discharge their debt to society or to honour family tradition - so it wasn't a career for them. Other than NI, only one saw combat (on secondment to the Omanis, fighting tribal rebels)

The Black Watch,that is right. I remember now. Thanks.

[Imperial Grunt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by LtCol West:

Near the end of my second tour in Iraq, I was serving with BLT 1/2 and they were reinforced with a British company from Basra (I think they were some kind of Highlander or Scottish unit but the names of the British regiments are beyond me. US Marines keep it simple- the 1st Marine regiment, the 2nd Marine regiment, etc..)

It won't be an issue in future; the Scottish Division has been amalgamated into a single Regiment, with wonderfully colourful battalion titles

1 SCOTS

2 SCOTS

3 SCOTS

4 SCOTS

5 SCOTS

(Actually, former regimental names will be parenthesized sub-titles and if you want to impress people you'll need to memorize what colour the hackles on the hats correspond with which battalions). </font>

[Peter Cairns]

According to Wikipedia it will be the third battalion

Royal Regiment of Scotland 3rd battalion (Blackwatch)

Peter.

[Michael Dorosh]

Ahem

Black Watch.

Also, there is still The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, a militia battalion in Montreal, proudly wearing the red hackle and carrying on the traditions. Nemo me Impune Lacessit.