British to adopt LRDG tactics on Iraq-Iran frontier

[cassh]

nijis said-

I was actually thinking of platoons as the minimum size for static FOBs that will necessarily make up the vast majority of the MNF's frontline military presence

Well if you're talking about static then a platoon is too small - just three squads/sections to cover patrolling (foot and vehicular), base security and camp/base admin (cleaning weapons, sleeping etc etc). That means there is no backup - you're foot patrol gets a contact or man down whose going to bail them out? You need one squad to hold the base? Company base is the smallest static FOB that would be preacticable unless local forces present to bolster the ranks.

The LRDG concept might work for border control or a few other specialized missions in unpopulated areas, but it seems pretty useless if you're trying to exert control over cities and towns

Don't know whether to say "Stating the bleeding obvious" or "No **** Sherlock".

[nijis]

"stating the bleeding obvious" etc

Whatever. I had been generalizing about FOBs throughout Iraq, and you'd suggested that I missed the point of mobile patrolling.

FOBs with a single platoon of Coalition troops have been used at certain times in Iraq in certain places. You might find an Iraqi platoon quartered there too, but they're usually woefully understrength and I wouldn't imagine that they're relied upon for anything important, and thus a single-platoon FOB would also be possible. I suspect the battalion provides the QRF.

[ August 25, 2006, 03:34 PM: Message edited by: nijis ]

[John Kettler]

Mace,

What are those vehicles the Aussie S.A.S. is operating? They look like cutdown 6x6s, or some such.

Regards,

John Kettler

[cassh]

Smaller FOBs are unsuitable in combat areas as they lack the ability to survive genuine hostile intent.

They are ideal in peaceable regions where you want to get a presence on the ground and meet and greet the people, support the civilian authorities and police in their work, shielding them as much as possible from terrorism.

and thus a single-platoon FOB would also be possible. I suspect the battalion provides the QRF

It possible to do this - but is it prudent in all regions and circumstances? They only really work well where the threat level is lower.

The problem with a small base/outpost in hostile areas is that they present the enemy or insurgents with a target they can actually attack and destroy.

This temptation often has inevitable consequences such as VBIEDs and suicide bombers conducting point attacks, improvised mortar attacks, sniping and sometimes deliberate assault/overrun. These smaller bases have little to offer in return other than getting in reinforcements - which kind of defeats their purpose.

The problems of platoon strength bases are -

limited perimeter

limited firepower

limited flexibility

limited foot patrols

limited vehicle patrols

limited operational endurance

These bases are fine for policing actions, but are vulnerable in belligerent regions. It's been seen time and again in colonial and decolonisation conflicts - some hapless base / outpost /police station gets isolated or overrun by the locals before the cavalry can arrive to rescue them. The QRF often have to be PDQ.

[nijis]

It was an experiment in a comparatively secure area, although there was some threat, and I'm not sure it was duplicated elsewhere. I think the main advantage was that more FOBs meant more constant observation over critical parts of the AO.

I take your point that there's lots of drawbacks to small FOBs. The point of talking FOB size is that there's an idea circulating out there that the US military needs to get in deeper and cozier with the Iraqi population, and that smaller-sized bases are the way to do it. Personally, I suspect that the military is about as spread out as it can get without, as you point out, suffering an exponential jump in its vulnerability, and the solution, if there is any, lies elsewhere.

[rudel.dietrich]

I know it is very poltical, but I do not think a military solution exists in Iraq.

As long as you have fresh bodies to replace what is lost than no matter what tactics you use they will never be entirely effective.

[Battlefront.com]

I heard a talk by a 101st Airborne Battalion CO that went into some detail of the problems he experienced trying to keep track of his far flung (i.e. overstretched) forces. Radios were out since the distances were too far. He had to rely on personal visits via helicopter and subordinates going around as well. Obviously things are a wee bit better with Digital units, like SBCT, but even then you don't want to get into a firefight knowing that help is 2 hours away at best.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

Hmm. I've learned a lot reading this thread. Thanks, all.

I was particularly compelled by the comparison between Iraq-Iran and Texas-Mexico frontiers.

Most reasonable parties involved privately admit the latter to be an utterly futile whack-a-mole game, just like the war on drugs (i.e. as long as demand is strong for the smuggled commodity -- cocaine, immigrant labour, arms -- supply will find a way through even if the loss rate is high owing to costly saturation policing by the authorities).

I suspect the same dynamics apply to the Syrian-Iraq frontier, even if the USMC refuses to admit that.

Just as it was for the "Market Time" and Laos-Cambodia interdiction ops back in the day. Are there any Vietnam vets still active within the DoD command structure? Or did they all take their pensions with Colin Powell before GWB, Rummy and the "government can be managed just like a corporation" gang moved in? (Coincidence? You decide)

The above line of reasoning suggests that even if you could magically seal the "hostile" borders, all you'd do is create pressure for substitute flow via corruptible "allies" in Kurdistan, Jordan and Saudi/Kuwait. Which would effectively destabilize the few stable areas remaining within the Artist Formerly Known As Iraq.

So, following the logic of the war on drugs/immigrants: supply-side interdiction of a highly fungible commodity (e.g. white powder / hard-working day labourer / Chinese or Slovak knock-off of Soviet-era wire guided missile) is futile. In which case, interested parties should focus on "demand side management". And what is that, exactly?

[Wubbits]

What are those vehicles the Aussie S.A.S. is operating? They look like cutdown 6x6s, or some such

They are LRPVs (Long Range Patrol Vehicle).

Clicky

IMO a LRDG type of force doesnt hold ground. Instead they provide eyes on the ground over an extremly large area. They can conduct a variety of tasks "hearts and minds", raids, road blocks.

They are a force multiplier, they allow a small number of men and equipment to influence a large area allowing the normal formations to be concentrated in other places.

I think it is a bit of a gamble by the Brits as normally this task is done by elite troops. Can a standard regiment perform as well?

[ August 26, 2006, 01:02 AM: Message edited by: Wubbits ]

[John Kettler]

Wubbits,

Thanks! Now I know why even though they looked like cutdown 6x6s, they still didn't look right. More LRPV info and pics here.

http://www.mheaust.com.au/Aust/Walkaround/LRPV/6x6lrsas.htm

http://www.4wdonline.com/Perentie/LRPV.html

http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/Australia/SASR/LRPV.htm

http://www.yaffa.com.au/defence/current/3-116.htm

BTW, the Mig-25 in the series is a Mig-25R.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ August 26, 2006, 02:20 AM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[cassh]

LongLeftFlank – although ostensibly analogous, the model of the Texan-Mexico border and Iran-Iraq is not quite apt. The difference in asset capabilities deployed is considerable; if we think about the U.S.’s southern border we know Federal and State funding and resources are low given the magnitude of the task. We also know that the U.S. government only really takes a special interest where serious cross-border criminality occurs. Where the activity is simple economic migration the INS, Texas Rangers and border patrols merely keep a lid on things and stop flagrant abuses of border controls.

Now in Iraq we have a counter-terrorism / counter-insurgency campaign where the full resources and assets of the military can be deployed to stop state-sponsored infiltration and proxy support of Shiite insurgents.

We know that UK special forces have been conducting a COIN operation against Iranian intelligence sponsored infiltration and weapon supply for some time now, and that incidents of IEDs and ambushes in the Shiite areas has dropped dramatically in the past 12 months – I think there is in all likelihood a cause and effect linkage here.

Military forces conducting this type of operation have technological resources to support them that US border police could only dream of such as permanent geostationary loiter sorties by UAVs assets, ground based radar and thermal detections systems, radio / telecoms intercept and ELINT with chatter pattern automation and filtering, covert Ops and special forces operators, trained reconnaissance personnel, intelligence info, covert tactical patrolling, mobile OPs, snap VCPs and traffic control, ability to hold suspects and conduct interrogation / debriefing without convoluted legal constraints face by ATF/FBI etc.

So in many ways the forces deployed on the Iran-Iraq border have much more capability and resources than one would find deployed on the U.S.-Mexican border. I think this will make a telling difference.

With regard to South-East Asia and cross border infiltration – the nature of the terrain in Iraq makes life that much more easy to operate counter infiltration missions and surveillance – and since 1970s many sensor and surveillance technologies make it much more difficult to avoid detection, especially in open desert, Hamada and scrubland. There is little in the way to prevent Predator and Global Hawk type UAVs spotting a knat's bollocks moving out there in the border region - and that just one type of surveillance asset/platform. The combined mix of technologies and assets deployed make infiltration much less straightforward for the Iranian sponsored insurgents.

Don’t know if many of you know about the “Claret” operations on the Borneo-Indonesian border back during the insurgency but it serves as a good example of how to conduct counter insurgency and infiltration campaigns – albeit at a very small scale compared to either Vietnam or Iraq today.

Wubbits said –

I think it is a bit of a gamble by the Brits as normally this task is done by elite troops.

Remember most British Army infantry battalions have done numerous tours in Ulster (Northern Ireland), and often spent their entire time conducting border surveillance and counter infiltration operations that would require covert OPs and patrolling so this type of operation in Iraq will pose no great change of mindset or thinking. The only major training required will be in camouflage and concealment and fieldcraft required for operating in a desert type environment for covert patrolling and operations. I don’t wish to belittle this requirement, but it is one of the least challenging if your soldiers’ minds are already cued up for counter infiltration and surveillance missions.

Hopefully they'll get their heads round desert camo and operating requirement quite quickly - I know most battalions have many officers and NCOs who have trained in places like Oman and the Gulf States before, and will also have got pretty clued up just being deplyed in Iraq, so it should be a "no dramas" implementation.

[nijis]

"Incidents of IEDs and ambushes in the Shiite areas has dropped dramatically in the past 12 months."

Quite the opposite, I think. Basra has become a much more violent province in the last year. Certainly by all accounts Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence has skyrocketed. In terms of attacks on the British military, I don't think they give out attack numbers per province, and the rate of military fatalities are pretty constant, but when I was down there last a month ago pretty much everyone I spoke said that the IED threat had drastically increased since the last time I was there (April '05). There may be fewer attacks, but that's probably because the military is moving around less. Also, the FCO compound on the Shatt al-Arab is now mortared quite regularly, which was not the case a year ago. Maybe British operations in the south have had some effect on Iranian infiltration, but I doubt that's a major factor affecting the frequency of attacks. The problem in Basra is an internal Iraqi political one -- the Fadila party, which holds the governorship, seems to have no interest in curtailing militia activity. This suggests that, at least in the south, it doesn't matter all that much what the MNF does militarily if the wrong Iraqi politicians get elected.

Also -- and this is just a guess -- I'd suspect that the vast majority of Iranian agents and weapons technology enters Iraq at legal border crossings. The Basra police force, ministerial Facility Protection Forces, and at least one major private security firm in the south employ mostly party/militia loyalists. I'd be very suprised if the militias don't have members in the border guards as well. Also, even non-militia affiliated border guards aren't incorruptible. Insurgents bribing their way through has certainly been a problem in the west, and I doubt the eastern borders are any different.

[ August 26, 2006, 09:36 AM: Message edited by: nijis ]

[cassh]

pretty much everyone I spoke said that the IED threat had drastically increased since the last time I was there

Correct - it is not the frequency - but the nature of the IEDs that is the cause for concern and there is indeed a greater threat. However, the frequency of incidents has diminished.

The Iranians have introduced sophisticated shaped-charge technology IEDs - and this is what the covert British Army surveillance teams are trying to curtail.

Once these devices were first detected it was clear the local insurgents were receiving some pretty sophisticated help and the military intelligence, surveillance and covert ops teams were called into action against this threat.

It is a direct result of this technology in bomb making that the threat level is higher.

I'd suspect that the vast majority of Iranian agents and weapons technology enters Iraq at legal border crossings. The Basra police force, ministerial Facility Protection Forces, and at least one major private security firm in the south employ mostly party/militia loyalists. I'd be very suprised if the militias don't have members in the border guards as well.

Quite so. If you recall a couple of British soldiers dressed as Arabs were compromised on an operation and detained by local police who made wild claims about them planting bombs or some such bollocks. They were held in prison as terrorists. I think the intervention of a British armoured battle group squadron to break them out of prison speaks volumes about the trust in local authorities and rule of law.

[nijis]

"Correct - it is not the frequency - but the nature of the IEDs that is the cause for concern and there is indeed a greater threat. However, the frequency of incidents has diminished."

Is there a quotable source on IED frequency diminishing? I don't doubt you -- it would make a certain amount of sense -- I'd just like to be able to cite it at some point.

Any quotable source confirming of successful interception of Iranian infiltrators would be even better. The usual line that you get from MNF officers is that while there is extensive indirect evidence of Iranian assistance (ie, shaped charge technology) there is no direct evidence. Coalition spox MGN Caldwell two weeks ago: there "is nothing that we definitively have found to say that there are any Iranians operating within the country of Iraq." I've heard similar stuff from British officers. That doesn't of course rule out Iraqis bringing stuff in from Iran, of course. Or they're telling flat-out porky pies, which technically they're not supposed to do, but one imagines might happen anyway from time to time.

[cassh]

If you want sources see the PMCs - it's a small world...

[Bigduke6]

"What can this big silly expensive Rat Patrol-type unit do, that a few Arab-speaking agents dressed as Bedouin, riding in a single Toyota pick-up, and equipped with a burst transmitter cannot do?"

Stop suspicious vehicles. Ask the drivers questions. Search their trunks. Detain them if need-be.

More importantly, not get captured themselves. You may remember the Basra jail incident in September, where a couple of undercover observers were spotted, captured, and handed over to the Mahdi Army. In many parts of Iraq, betraying the slightest hint of not being from the region/neighborhood will get you grabbed by militia or insurgent group, precisely because people are so preoccupied with spies, suicide bombers, and the like.

Nah, that's military thinking. A pretty good example of what happens if the only tool you are willing to consider is a hammer, then all your problems will look like nails.

But you make some good points. It's useful to think about what needs to happen in practical terms, rather than thinking than the problem will be solved if you send a bunch of soldiers to a place and have them drive around in the desert.

I think soldiers would suck at border control. The simplest analogy I can give is the idea of taking a bunch of well-trained Arab soldiers, say the Jordanian Legion or the Syrian Special Forces, and deploying them to the U.S.-Mexico border and then telling them to stop the drug trade.

British soldiers are pretty good at what they do, but:

1. They do not speak Arabic

2. Their knowledge of the local culture is close to nothing. If you want to police a border it needs to be on the level of a police detective knowing the criminal portions of his society.

3. They are soldiers in a foreign country performing a police function. If they arrest some one they will have little role in the prosecution, and since the Iraqi judiciary is corrupt, they will learn they are wasting their time = bad morale, and the locals will laugh at them.

If they do not arrest people they'll get laughed at for being unable to do their jobs.

4. There are not enough of them. The border sector is what, 100s of kilometers long? Factor in leave, fear of insurgents so the vehicle columns big, and what you get are these rat patrol convoys wandering around the vehicle-capable portions of the border once every 24 hours or so.

Are the smugglers smart enough to pay the bedouin to let them know where the column is at? They are. Is there any way for the British to prevent the bedouin from buying into the deal? Very doubtful; the bedouin are not stupid either. As long as the smugglers are in business the bedouin make money. If the British actually close the border, the bedouin lose money.

4. Even if the British manage to close a few roads and open areas, all that is going to do is force the smugglers to switch to areas where vehicles can't go, with stuff carried on camels. The only way to prevent this is intensive foot patrols and checks of all the camels; which the British are incapable of doing for any reasonable period of time, as dismounted British infantry moves though a desert a lot more slowly, and a lot more noisily, and with a lot less endurance, than a camel caravan.

5. Even if by some miracle the British were able to physically monitor their section of the border so that the chances of intercepting smugglers would go from "waste of time" to "might catch enough to deter some of the rest" - a task requiring probably a full division of light infantry - the operation can do nothing about corrupt Iraqi border officials, who have huge incentives to let stuff across the border and look the other way. See the paragraph about bedouin to see my prediction about how effective the British would be at preventing that.

Result? Well, none. If the goal is giving the soldiers some field training, and making the British public feel good about their military and just maybe the ruling government, ok, the mission might produce. But if the goal is significantly reducing smuggling across the Iran-Iraq border, it is a waste of time and a waste of money, and so is stupid policy.

Part of the solution here is to pay the bedouin so much that they leave your own spies alone most of the time, and then to have enough spies (and expendable ones) to have lots of eyes watching all of the border. When they see something, you call in the troops. If they get attacked, they call in the troops.

The other part of the solution here is to create a police structure in the region that is paid well enough not to be corrupt, and that polices itself brutally. Not easy, but Saddam did it for years and he used the same Iraqis that are giving the occupation fits right now.

Like Andreas says, Land Rovers with Union Jacks on them tooling through the desert will make for some great televsion. But it won't do squat for the problem at hand.

[Homo ferricus]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

If the goal is giving the soldiers some field training, and making the British public feel good about their military and just maybe the ruling government, ok, the mission might produce.

what didja think it was about?!?!

Land Rovers with Union Jacks on them tooling through the desert will make for some great televsion.

now your gettin' it.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

British soldiers are pretty good at what they do

Yup.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

1. They do not speak Arabic

Unless they've done the course at Beaconsfield.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

2. Their knowledge of the local culture is close to nothing.

Unless they've read their int folders during IPB like good little soldiers.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

3. They are soldiers in a foreign country performing a police function.

Something the British Army has had rather a lot of practice at these past three hundred years.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

4. There are not enough of them.

Yup.

As Bugeaud had it, "L'infanterie anglaise est la plus redoubtable de l"Europe; heureusement, il n'y en a pas beaucoup".

Of course, "Network Enabled Capability" means that people making decisions about defence policy -- usually people with no military knowledge, experience or culture, advised by other people who want to sell them expensive electronics and consultancy -- are currently engaged in cutting the number of infantry in the British Army, and seeking to obtain military capabilities "better, faster and cheaper" by means of the military equivalent of the .com boom of blessed memory. If you have a belief in technology as sympathetic magic, then every problem presents itself to you as a technological problem -- hammers and nails again. And this is the real reason for why someone needs pictures of special forces tooling around in satcom-equipped desert cruisers ready to call in expensive death from the sky before you can say "reconaissance-strike complex". It's so much more glamorous and exciting than training, equipping and supporting an adequate number of boot infantry.

All the best,

John.

[ August 27, 2006, 01:35 AM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

[Bewildered]

Hi,

I don't really feel able to offer an opinion on the relative merits of different types of deployments, or the use of paid informants, but there is an important aspect to this that has already been hinted at. I want to keep the party politics out of this, as best I can, but it's important to know that in the UK, the current government has seen an unprecedented fall in it's opinion poll ratings. The huge drop in popularity has, in most cases, been attributed to people's dissatisfaction with foreign policy. There is a sense that the public were duped about WMD, that "the war against terror" has made the world less safe, and, more recently, that there attitude to the conflict in Lebanon was wrong in emphasis. Whether any of this is right is not the purpose of the post, so please don't take it as that, as I'm only referring to the political climate, which is currently skeptical. I'm 52, which means that all I know about the LRDG is what I read in Comics, like Commando, as a kid. But, they sparked the imagination and became a picture of heroism. A LOT of people feel they own some knowledge of the LRDG. Whatever it actually achieved isn't the point. It has a unique place in the heart of the middle aged public regardless of what it achieved. Politically, creating anything at all, and calling it the LRDG, full of "chaps" with names like "bonzer", "poppy" and "spikey" racing through sand with the Union Jack flapping in the wind, with no regard for the enemy or their personal safety, is a GREAT move.

"C'mon chaps - lets find those damn terror wallas!"

It's a "Boy's Own" thing.

[Bewildered]

Forgot

The "Long Range Desert Chindit Group" would be even better and really set the blood running warm in the british veins. I'm not alone - biffa and sandy agree with me!

No disrespect meant to brave men.

[cassh]

Bigduke6 opined -

Nah, that's military thinking. A pretty good example of what happens if the only tool you are willing to consider is a hammer, then all your problems will look like nails.

You do like that metaphor don't you. However, in the real world when people are being bombed and murdered the controlling power/force in that region is responsible for trying and prevent or at least reduce murder, sectarian violence and unlawful behaviour. The army's job is to support the forces of law in this endeavour.

In order that political measures and institutions of a restorative nature can be developed and embedded one has to try and establish a level of security and peaceful normality that allows at least the edifice of civil society to take root. Without this politics, economic activity and normal civil social existence are impossible.

I think soldiers would suck at border control.

The British Army are not conducting border control in the sense you mean of physically controlling the border region and crossing point. It is more of a stand-off role where surveillance and reconnaissance are key and detecting who the insurgent operatives are and where they support network lies. The overt presence is there to change the pattern of enemy modus operandi - which make life easier for the counter-insurgents.

1. They do not speak Arabic

More than you think. Also they have access to local interpreters.

2. Their knowledge of the local culture is close to nothing. If you want to police a border it needs to be on the level of a police detective knowing the criminal portions of his society.

On what basis do you make that judgement? Have you interviewed soldiers, NCOs and officers on the ground in Iraq? I doubt you are any more qualified to judge the British Army's understanding of local cultures in southern Iraq than a fish is to take the Pepsi challenge.

It is something that the British Army takes very seriously in counter-insurgency operations.

3. They are soldiers in a foreign country performing a police function. If they arrest some one they will have little role in the prosecution, and since the Iraqi judiciary is corrupt, they will learn they are wasting their time = bad morale, and the locals will laugh at them.

As this type of operation is the British Army's modus vivendi for the past half-century - it's what they have done day-in day-out all around the world as part of our de-colonisation, Northern Ireland and peace keeping duties . I doubt morale will suffer at all. If the locals are laughing at them then it will be a small minority. Most Iraqi's want peace and security.

If they do not arrest people they'll get laughed at for being unable to do their jobs.

The army's job is not to arrest people - it is to ensure the police can carry out their duties. The Iraqi police are responsible for law and order.

fear of insurgents so the vehicle columns big

Fighting patrols yes, recce patrols and OPs no. As most of the work is reconnaissance the general rule would be for smaller patrols (2 - 4 vehicles ).

4. Even if the British manage to close a few roads and open areas, all that is going to do is force the smugglers to switch to areas where vehicles can't go, with stuff carried on camels. The only way to prevent this is intensive foot patrols and checks of all the camels; which the British are incapable of doing for any reasonable period of time, as dismounted British infantry moves though a desert a lot more slowly, and a lot more noisily, and with a lot less endurance, than a camel caravan.

If insurgents go "off road" then there are more efficient ways of tracking someone that bimbling around with hapless foot patrols. From 20,000 feet a loitering UAV can see almost everything below in open terrain. A fighting patrol or three or four sticks can be on top of a potential smuggler by helo in two shakes.

The Bedouin are indeed a crucial element in this conundrum - and I would expect commanders to quickly establish this and make getting the local Bedou clans on board with various enticements and / or coercion explaining the financial / legal / practical pitfalls for them of supporting the insurgents. This is not a flight of fancy - gaining support of local tribes and indigenous peoples has been done so many times by the British in these types of situations that it is almost second nature. It is one of the keys to successful counter-insurgency.

If the insurgents are then reliant on the Bedouin whose loyalties you have secured by whatever means - then you can start to get some actionable intel about who the players are and what is being moved about, and to where.

5. ...the operation can do nothing about corrupt Iraqi border officials, who have huge incentives to let stuff across the border and look the other way. See the paragraph about bedouin to see my prediction about how effective the British would be at preventing that.

Why can the operation do nothing about corrupt Iraqi border officials?

Why can the operation not seek to secure the loyalties of the Bedou clans?

Result? Well, none. If the goal is giving the soldiers some field training, and making the British public feel good about their military and just maybe the ruling government, ok, the mission might produce. But if the goal is significantly reducing smuggling across the Iran-Iraq border, it is a waste of time and a waste of money, and so is stupid policy.

Yeah you're right... Because trying to attain security and stop senseless killings of civilians, policemen and government officials is a waste of time and money in a counter-insurgency campaign. How stupid and naive of the British Army to want to try and weaken the insurgents and help establish the genuine rule of law.

Part of the solution here is to pay the bedouin

I'm sure the Chief of the Defence staff sleeps well at night knowing you razor sharp analysis is on the case.

When they [the Bedouin] see something, you call in the troops

No. They inform. Otherwise, they become the insurgent's enemy and are less useful.

If they get attacked, they call in the troops

This is unlikely if they don't make it obvious they are informing.

[the police] polices itself brutally.

I hope you don't mean that literally. Having internal-affairs type police unit and by upholding of the rule of law by which ALL are equal under the law means brutality in the literal or figurative sense is unnecessary.

A successful policing policy where corruption exists is to bring in officers from other regions so a mix of local knowledge and external incorruptibility co-exist.

Bigduke6, having vented your spleen at this cynical propaganda exercise by Tony Blair's government I hope the local command staff in Basra can take on board your advice and now adopt a policy of hunkering down, doing nothing, and blaming Bush and Blair for all the deaths in the region.

You make judgements about things you do not know or fully understand such as British Army methodologies and practices in these circumstances and opine that it is all a propaganda stunt in a sneering, cynical and churlish tone that is not flattering you in any way.

Possibly, if you were ask pointed questions such as "How do you think the British plan on controlling and securing the activities of the Bedouin?" rather than rubbishing the whole thing before it is even tested you will find yourself on sturdier intellectual ground.

[Bigduke6]

John,

Beaconsfield is a nice start. But to speak a foreign language well takes a lot more than a year (or six weeks, or six months, or whatever it is) course.

Even when given a fair understanding of the grammar, most people need a year or more to speak a Tarzan version of the foreign language, and three years or more to develop reasonable fluency.

Five years or more is the time most foreigners would require to master a foreign language sufficiently to do police work - and with the extremely rare exception of the truly gifted, they need to be immersed in the society to do it.

It's worth noting that learning to function in a foreign language is really assisted if the learner brings to the task a curiousity in a foreign culture, a flair for book-learning, a desire to talk to strangers, an open mind, and a willingness to "be different" and feel uncomfortable in a group of people: none of which characteristics are typical of the professional soldier.

That immersion is, pretty much, also the only way to learn the culture well enough to be able to do the job.

A deployment to Egypt or a tour in Iraq isn't going to cut it. We're talking living in the society day in, day out. This is a real problem for the military types who often, if they conceivably need the language training, have security clearances so high it precludes their living in a foreign place for any useful length of time without their superiors' supervision.

I can imagine - just - a few officers and senior NCOs doing their Beaconsfield course, then a year or two on exchange with the Royal Jordanian Army, and then maybe another tour with the military police or intelligence in Basra. A person like that I would say would be equipped for what the job: a knowledge of the Arabic language and the Arabic culture such that he can act as his own cop on the Iran-Iraq border.

That level of knowledge of a foreign language is really only the province of academics, the odd journalist or businessman, or of course locals in your pay - to wit spies.

If one in one hundred members of this Rat Patrol knew Arabic that well, I would be extremely surprised. I imagine there might be two or three: one officer who went the educational route, and two or three troopers brought up in an Arabic-speaking household. But more? Very improbable. This is not the Oxford Faculty of Oriental Languages, but the British Army we're talking about.

My guess, this Rat Patrol will be doing well indeed if each vehicle has one British soldier in it capable of asking "Seen any smugglers?" in language educated enough not to make a fool of himself outright. But for the next step - haggling properly with the Bedouin, in Arabic, to purchase the information -I think that skill would be awful rare in the British military.

Smiling broadly and speaking loudly won't cut it. To make this work you need trust, and if you can't speak their language, people usually don't trust you.

(I am of course leaving aside the hardly insignificant issue that to really do the job right, the person needs also to have the same ability in Persian: a completely different root language group from Arabic. But worth bearing in mind.)

Along the lines of your complaint about the false belief in techno quick fixes, I would say there is also an amazing lack of understanding on the part of English-speaking decision-makers, as to how critical knowledge of foreign language is to solving problems like this, and how resistant foreign languages are to technological short-cuts. It just takes years to learn a foreign language really well. Without those years, you have problems.

The reverse is a good example. Imagine an Iraqi with zero knowledge of English. Now send him to English language school for a year. Now send him to the U.S.-Mexico border. How many illegal migrants and drug smugglers is this guy going to stop? How well is he going to cooperate with the US and Mexican border police? How hard would it be for some one living on the border to lie convincingly to this Iraqi?

True, he could drive around the Arizona and New Mexico desert just fine. But that really isn't solving the problem, IMO.

Pretending crappy understanding of the foreign language will solve your problems on a poorly-policed international border is just that, pretending. I assume this is because English-speaking government leaders, by and large, are unable to speak foreign languages themselves.

Spies, of course, bypass the language barrier. Add enough money and time, and get smart people to do the recruiting, and that approach has a chance of solving the problem. Of course, the people footing the bill - the taxpayers - need to have faith the spooks will do their job right, and further be willing to tolerate failures, as no spy network is foolproof.

Theoretically infantry on the frontier could, of course, close the border to smuggling as well. Just a line of them 200 kilometers long, and they not the Iraqis run every check point.

But that of course brings us to another reason why this silly Rat Patrol is being touted as a good idea: the government has enough money to send the Land Rovers and Super Secret Troopers, without irritating taxpayers too much. It's only a biffy battalion at the end of the day, and if it's the SAS or similar the government doesn't even have to tell the public when things go wrong.

But the Corps or so of infantry needed to close several hundred kilometers of frontier is of course beyond the government's means. So they pretend the Rat Patrol will do something.

The really funny part is, of course, that even if it does have an effect - and be it far from me to underestimate the energy of well-trained British soldiers - the net result will be to shift the smuggling flows from where the British are, to where they aren't.

Fortuately for the smugglers, the Americans just pulled, what was it, a division? out of the sticks and dumped then into Baghdad. That probably did not help the situation on the Iran-Iraq border, I think.

[cassh]

Bigduke6 - You've set out a wonderful false logic where squaddies, NCOs and officers should be fluent in Arabic (not Farsi or Persian [sic]) and conducting ostensibly intelligence work, the interviewing of suspects and even interrogation. All of which are handled by "the intelligence community (skilled linguists)", the Iraqi police and the Iraqi security forces.

Bigduke6 said -

(I am of course leaving aside the hardly insignificant issue that to really do the job right, the person needs also to have the same ability in Persian: a completely different root language group from Arabic. But worth bearing in mind.)

They don't speak the ancient language Persian, or even the Iranian language Farsi but Arabic - hence the name "The Marsh Arabs" - see Thesiger for some background reading.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0140095128/202-8615798-4351818?v=glance&n=266239&s=gateway&v=glance

Interpreter - One who translates orally from one language into another

The reverse is a good example. Imagine an Iraqi with zero knowledge of English. Now send him to English language school for a year. Now send him to the U.S.-Mexico border. How many illegal migrants and drug smugglers is this guy going to stop? How well is he going to cooperate with the US and Mexican border police? How hard would it be for some one living on the border to lie convincingly to this Iraqi?

What if he works closely with American law enforcement officers and has an Interpreter for discussions that are more complex and questioning should he need it?

You've constructed a false logic where ever squaddie must be an Oxford Don specialising in the linguistics of the Marsh Arab dialect.

If you halt a party coming toward you, exchange pleasantries, ask the odd question and maybe search them if something seems up - how is this not possible with an Interpreter and some basic Arabic?

But that of course brings us to another reason why this silly Rat Patrol is being touted as a good idea: the government has enough money to send the Land Rovers and Super Secret Troopers, without irritating taxpayers too much. It's only a biffy battalion at the end of the day, and if it's the SAS or similar the government doesn't even have to tell the public when things go wrong.

Hmmm - could it possibly that the land rovers are actually more suitable to the terrain? God forbid someone actually do something that is not sinister with a subtext of some dastardly government sponsored ulterior motive.

How can it be a publicity stunt and propaganda on the one hand and a covert "black ops" type affair on the other. It cannot be both?

Your humbug and conspiracy theory-chippy outlook is I suppose your cross to bear.

[Bigduke6]

Cassh,

No conspiracy. Just a big fat waste of taxpayer money.

The government is conducting a fraud. Not hiding secret aliens, or faking landings on the moon. It is just lying to voters. Governments do that from time to time.

Specificially, the fraud being the contention that the British government knows how to deal with the Iraq border problem, and further that it has the tools to do so, and what's more that a few hundred soldiers trained for desert raiding are a rational choice for securing hundreds of kilometers of the Iran-Iraq border.

A bunch of overpaid, overtrained soldiers driving about the Iran-Iraq frontier will stick out like sharks in a goldfish bowl. They will be observed and tracked. Where they go, the smugglers will go elsewhere.

There is nothing that a wastefully expensive formation like a modern replication of the LRDG can do for this job, that decently-paid Iraqi policemen and police agents cannot do far better, for a fraction of the price.

Smuggling is a crime, and crimes are the province of the police and the court system. Not the military. It is impossible to do police work without language.

Unless, of course, you pretend.

Let's just wait until these guys deploy. They may get into a fire fight or two, and they may even get on CNN for a weapons cache.

But make a dent in the chaos on the border?

C'mon. Iraqs is country that smuggles (probably) hundreds of thousands of tons of oil every year, with the complicity of plenty of government officials. Iraq is a place where the central government can't collect taxes, where the courts are corrupt, and where there is a civil war in progress.

And a bunch of overtrained soldiers in Land Rovers, unable to speak Arabic, are going to seal the Iranian frontier, in that kind of situation?

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Beaconsfield is a nice start. But to speak a foreign language well takes a lot more than a year (or six weeks, or six months, or whatever it is) course.

Sure it does. But you don't need to speak the language that well to do lots of things. I only really speak two foreign langages, and am only really good in one, but I have functioned successfully at a basic level in a couple of others.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

It's worth noting that learning to function in a foreign language is really assisted if the learner brings to the task a curiousity in a foreign culture, a flair for book-learning, a desire to talk to strangers, an open mind, and a willingness to "be different" and feel uncomfortable in a group of people: none of which characteristics are typical of the professional soldier.

Which of these characteristics you think soldiers don't have? Have you actually met any serving soldiers from the British army?

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Smiling broadly and speaking loudly won't cut it. To make this work you need trust, and if you can't speak their language, people usually don't trust you.

I think you're right that trust is crucial. I also think that trust arises from people learning that you do what you say you will do, not from fluency in a language. Indeed in Anglophone culture there is a tendency not to trust people who have too much verbal facility. However, making people believe that you will do what you say is something the Army is very, very good at. The degree of language skill needed to do so is much less than you seem to imagine. I don't think the successful "Hearts & Minds" campaigns of the past have depended on the rank and file being trained to degree-standard language competence.

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Along the lines of your complaint about the false belief in techno quick fixes, I would say there is also an amazing lack of understanding on the part of English-speaking decision-makers, as to how critical knowledge of foreign language is to solving problems like this, and how resistant foreign languages are to technological short-cuts.

Unfortunately this doesn't stop people bidding to supply hand-held machine translators to the US armed forces. I haven't seen this particular flavour of silliness from the British defence procurement community yet, but I expect it will happen -- it's not just the army the decision-makers know nothing about, they're clueless about AI and foreign languages, too.

All the best,

John.