Syrian TO&E thread

[rudel.dietrich]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Cassh,

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />I think we do the Syrians and the game a disservice by under playing their capabilities...

Who said we're doing that? The fact is that Syria has a fairly modest sized force that is capable of offensive action. The rest, and we're talking about the vast bulk, are for static fighting only. At best they would move forward in the wake of the maneuver elements, dig in, and hunker down. Syria tried to use their 2nd Line stuff as maneuver elements before and it had disasterous results.

As for tripod mounted MGs... even the Soviet Mech forces have hardly any. The reasoning is that they are too slow to move and deploy, which is what Rudel was certainly talking about. Meaning, the firepower is not irrelevant to an attack force, rather it is (according to Soviet doctrine) impractical to bring into action before the engagement is already decided. The armored AFVs, such as BMPs and BTRs, are supposed to make up the firepower difference.

Remember... Soviet doctrine is all about specialization whreas Western doctrine is about well rounded combined arms units capable of pretty much any mission. Some are a little more specialized for one thing vs. another (Airborne and Marines, for example), but their doctrine is quite flexible.

Steve </font>

[Battlefront.com]

Rudel,

My friends at the DoD are screwing me everytime we go out to lunch then!

I always have to pay since I am making the 'big bucks'

You misunderstood... in order to get the attention of the DoD (at the level we require) Battlefront woudl have hire guys in $5000 suits take the DoD guys out to lunch, baseball games, golfing trips, arrange for their kids to go to a good private school, etc. You also have to offer the DoD official a job at your company, for a ridiculous amount of money, after he retires from government service. It's totally illegal, of course, but it's how things are done (OK, it's how it is sometimes done ).

Steve

[rudel.dietrich]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Rudel,

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />My friends at the DoD are screwing me everytime we go out to lunch then!

I always have to pay since I am making the 'big bucks'

You misunderstood... in order to get the attention of the DoD (at the level we require) Battlefront woudl have hire guys in $5000 suits take the DoD guys out to lunch, baseball games, golfing trips, arrange for their kids to go to a good private school, etc. You also have to offer the DoD official a job at your company, for a ridiculous amount of money, after he retires from government service. It's totally illegal, of course, but it's how things are done (OK, it's how it is sometimes done ).

Steve </font>

[Battlefront.com]

As for the role of MGs, I think there is some terminology difference between what Rudel and Cassh. The US has completely done away with dismounted M2 .50cal MGs. True enough.

However, they do have 2x M240s per Rifle Platoon, usually fired from lightweight tripods (bipod is only for hasty situations). This Weapons Squad is intended to be used both offensively and defensively. They are light and can move about the battlefield in roughly the same way as a Rifle Squad. What they are not is a dedicated weapon based unit that sets up shop and blasts away at stuff while someone else closes with the enemy. Instead the Weapons Squad is seen as, basically, a bulked up Rifle Squad.

That's a very big difference from the traditional notion of team based MGs coming out of WWII and the Cold War. In fact, it's why there aren't dedicated MG units like in the days of old. They simply aren't needed since the firepower is integrated into the Rifle Platoon itself.

Steve

[cassh]

Steve said

However, they do have 2x M240s per Rifle Platoon, usually fired from lightweight tripods (bipod is only for hasty situations). This Weapons Squad is intended to be used both offensively and defensively. They are light and can move about the battlefield in roughly the same way as a Rifle Squad. What they are not is a dedicated weapon based unit that sets up shop and blasts away at stuff while someone else closes with the enemy. Instead the Weapons Squad is seen as, basically, a bulked up Rifle Squad.

That's a very big difference from the traditional notion of team based MGs coming out of WWII and the Cold War. In fact, it's why there aren't dedicated MG units like in the days of old. They simply aren't needed since the firepower is integrated into the Rifle Platoon itself.

Quite so.

Now look at the TO&E of a Czech, Hungarian, Polish or former East German motor rifle company that are now part of NATO and we can see clearly each company had between two and four Stepanov lightweight PKM tripods for dismounted action...

Rudel - just because the Syrian reserves are ****e and don’t know what they’re doing doesn’t mean they should be denied equipment. Let the game mechanics of conscript command and combat levels make them offensively inept, not a lack of equipment they actually have in the real world.

Rudel said –

No western army that I know of uses tripod mounted MMG or HMG machines in the attacking role or even the defense role.

Your lack of knowledge does not mean this is the case. A tripod mounted GPMG is in the SF role is a MMG. Hence the tripod, sight unit and heavy barrels for sustained fire.

I know Germany does not

Umm… tripod mounted MG3 GPMG.

I know the US does not.

Umm… tripod mounted M240 GPMG.

I am pretty sure Britian does not.

Umm… tripod mounted L7 GPMG.

Funnily enough the SF training of the British Army’s school of infantry at ranges such as Netheravon continues unabated even though we allegedly don’t use these weapons…strange that.

And I know both German and US Army units possess these weapon systems - so what do you think the likelihood of them being in their TO&E, but not be used or having any role?

Argue what you will, but these armies (US and British) possess these weapons - fact, and use them offensively in combat - fact.

[flamingknives]

To further cassh's point, the British Armed Forces also use tripod -mounted HMGs

Linky

Given that these are the Royal Marines (although HMGs have been spotted with the Paras) they're going to be used offensively (could the RM be anything else ) and there are plenty of pictures of them in fixed positions.

Although I'd argue that a GPMG in the Sustained Fire (SF) role, is not an MMG, but a GPMG in the SF role. But that's really just semantics.

[hellfish]

One thing I remember about my training with the Brits is that they had 6 GPMGs in an MG Platoon at Battalion level - I don't think they had them at the company or platoon level. The GPMGs were specifically for sustained plunging fire and other types of uses that I was never trained for as a platoon-level M60 gunner.

IIRC the GPMGs didn't even have buttstocks, just triggers and tripods.

[cassh]

fytinghellfish - each inf Bn has an SF platoon within the support company - however each rifle company has two SF kits and cadre trained teams to operate them since the early 1990s when we needed to have an excuse to retain these weapons (gimpys) once the 2 fire team LSWs replaced the gun group L7 in the light role at section level in the rifle companies.

The L7 buttstock is removable and is replaced with a special strengthened recoil buffer plate which is placed on the gun as you set it up in the SF role. Once you disassemble the SF GPMG to move anywhere the gunner replaces the normal buttstock to allow the gun to be used in the light role until you setup in the SF role somewhere else.

We digress – the Syrians have a **** load of PKM tripods – I suggest they should have the option to use them as US air supremacy would ensure the Syrians opted for a dismounted battle – and in this type of combat you need your firepower – even if you are inept at using it.

[Battlefront.com]

cassh,

We digress – the Syrians have a shit load of PKM tripods – I suggest they should have the option to use them as US air supremacy would ensure the Syrians opted for a dismounted battle – and in this type of combat you need your firepower – even if you are inept at using it.

Who said anything about the Syrians not having tripods for their PKMs? Certainly not I, and I is all that matters when it comes to this stuff The discussion was, instead, centered around the distribution of MGs within Syrian formations.

Rudel's research, which is better info than any of us have, shows that Infantry formations (which in Syrian terms are Reserves or Militia) have MGs organic to the lower level units we are simulating. Mech Infantry have none.

I checked out 1990s Soviet TO&E and this is fairly consistent. A Soviet Inf PLT has 3 PKM, which means 9 per Company and 27 per Battalion. A Mech Battalion only has 6 in total, held at the Battalion level. Syrian Infantry formations apparently have 4xPKM held at the Company level, for 12 total for a Battalion. Mech Infantry, on the other hand, apparently have none. While the Syrians are lower than the Soviet TO&E standards, they do reflect the Soviet doctrine of MGs for defensive roles and not offensive roles.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Oh, keep in mind that the Russians use the PKM instead of the RPK as their SAW. This is NOT the case for the Syrians. They are still stuck with a lot of outdated equipment and therefore are still using the RPD, RPK, and RPK-74 as their SAW. The PKM is strictly a GPMG assigned to distinctly seperate MG units.

Steve

[cassh]

they do reflect the Soviet doctrine of MGs for defensive roles and not offensive roles.

Steve, sorry have I missed something here. Where does this impression that the Russians/Soviets have a purely defensive MG doctrine come from. It that a hangover from WWII?

If one sees how the Soviet/Warpact motor rifle battalions' fire-plan is "laid on" in the attack, the use of MGs is a key element.

The adoption of the PKM with its Stepanov tripod over the original PK and the heavier Samozhenkov tripod mount is indicative and underscores that fact that the Soviets desired faster man-portable sustained fire weapons systems - giving them improved offensive capability. The aim being that the MG teams could keep up in the advance/attack with rifle teams.

It is clear the Syrian have a defensive mindset - that said however, there should probably be a 2-man PKM SF GPMG team at company level in the BTR motor rifle infantry battalions.

As the mechanised brigades of their mechanised divisions contain BTR motor rifle battalions rather than BMP mounted mechanised infantry battalions (which are in their armoured divisions' mechanised brigades) the number of these units means their structure will certainly influence game mechanics.

[hellfish]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Oh, keep in mind that the Russians use the PKM instead of the RPK as their SAW. This is NOT the case for the Syrians. They are still stuck with a lot of outdated equipment and therefore are still using the RPD, RPK, and RPK-74 as their SAW. The PKM is strictly a GPMG assigned to distinctly seperate MG units.

Steve

Are you sure about that? The RPK is still widely used by the Russians. As far as I can tell, there are only 2 PKMs in a Russian motor rifle battalion, which belong to the mortar battery.

[J Ruddy]

Not that it is important, but I do recall seeing tripod mounted C6 GPMGs (I think it was called a SF Kit), though it was quite a few years ago.

Imagine you have a platoon that is tasked with taking a hill. Though a bipod mounted GPMG might do OK, if you are maintaining a sustained rate of fire over long ranges, I'm thinking setting up a tripod mounted GPMG to provide sustained covering fire would be ideal.

But then I wasn't an infanteer, didn't get to play much with the nice toys, so I might be out to lunch.

[Battlefront.com]

Steve, sorry have I missed something here. Where does this impression that the Russians/Soviets have a purely defensive MG doctrine come from. It that a hangover from WWII?

If one sees how the Soviet/Warpact motor rifle battalions' fire-plan is "laid on" in the attack, the use of MGs is a key element.

Cassh,

If one sees how the Soviet/Warpact motor rifle battalions' fire-plan is "laid on" in the attack, the use of MGs is a key element.

Again, I think we're getting into terminology issues. Sure, for a planned "breakthrough" attack plan, the MG is a critical component of Soviet doctrine. But that isn't what Mechanized Infantry are for. They are for the "exploitation" phase. This is not the way Western doctrine handles an attack. The same type of forces doing the breakthrough are the same type doing the exploitation. As I said before, there are specialized exceptions (Airborne, Marines, Special Forces, etc.), but by and large this is the case with Western forces and not Soviet type organizations.

To put this into Syrian context, the breakthrough would be achieved by mass firepower. Infantry Brigades would slug it out with the enemy's immediate frontline area, the Armored divisions would go in to exploit the breach. After the Reserves would fill in to hold the terrain gained.

All of this, however, is academic. The Syrians appear to understand that to attack is to be defeated. The costs, both in terms of equipment and professionalization of the military, is far too expensive and intensive to contemplate. Therefore, they are heavily weighted towards defensive posture. Far cheaper and easier to do.

The adoption of the PKM with its Stepanov tripod over the original PK and the heavier Samozhenkov tripod mount is indicative and underscores that fact that the Soviets desired faster man-portable sustained fire weapons systems - giving them improved offensive capability. The aim being that the MG teams could keep up in the advance/attack with rifle teams.

Lighter and faster is always an advantage, regardless of doctrine. Less tired troops, less need for transport, more tactical deployment options, etc. So it is erroneous to presume that this has anything to do with a change to an offensive doctrine for MGs. Could be, but that's not an automatic link.

Also keep in mind that an offensive doctrine without a complimentary defensive doctrine is going to fail. The Germans found this out in WWII. The sudden breakthroughs in 1940 and Barbarossa produced huge problems because the offensive units (Panzer and Mot Infantry Divs) got over extended and were susceptible to counter attack, thus blunting the exploitation phase. The Infantry Divisions weren't necessarily needed for offensive actions, but since they were stuck walking (basically) to the expanding front they were not there to absorb the enemy's counter attacks. What Germany needed was a rapid defensive force to hold the immediate ground that was seized.

It is clear the Syrian have a defensive mindset - that said however, there should probably be a 2-man PKM SF GPMG team at company level in the BTR motor rifle infantry battalions.

Syrians should also have a professional officer class and an emphasis on strong junior leadership... but they don't So unless we find evidence that the Syrians do have GPMGs attached to a unit we won't do it in CM:SF. So far Rudel's information, which is the only relevant info we have access too, doesn't indicate that this is the case. There are probably reasons for this, and doctrine might not be one of them. There could be some logistical issue or non-battlefield reason for it.

Fytinghellfish,

Are you sure about that? The RPK is still widely used by the Russians. As far as I can tell, there are only 2 PKMs in a Russian motor rifle battalion, which belong to the mortar battery.

I could very well be wrong since I am not up on Russian TO&E and don't have the time or energy for them. My understanding is that the PKM is replacing the RPK in the SAW role since lessons in Grozny. Perhaps it is only for certain types of units, perhaps I'm just mistaken. In any event, even if I am correct it takes forever and a decade for anything to change in Soviet or Russian structures so I'd expect RPKs to be in use for some time to come. That being said, Putin is putting a LOT of money into the Russian armed forces as of late so all bets are off.

Steve

[cassh]

Steve,

Just to clarify some points

Again, I think we're getting into terminology issues. Sure, for a planned "breakthrough" attack plan, the MG is a critical component of Soviet doctrine. But that isn't what Mechanized Infantry are for.

We're not talking about Mechanised infantry - we're talking about motorised infantry (BTR-series)

They are for the "exploitation" phase.

The Warsaw Pact Motor Rifle Divisions usually had two regiments of BTRs and one of BMP. The Motor Rifle Division as structured below:

1 Tank Regiment (3x Tnk Bn, 1x BMP Bn)

1 Motor Rifle Regiments BMP (3x BMP Bn, 1x Tnk Bn)

2 Motor Rifle Regiments BTR (3x BTR Bn, 1x Tnk Bn)

(some exceptions occur as always where two BMP regiments were present)

Along with the Tank Division the Motor Rifle Division pretty much are the only two types of divisional size unit in the Warsaw Pact ground forces of the Western TVD (save 34th Artillery Division usually attached 3rd Shock Army).

Therefore, this default infantry is responsible for all three areas of operational theory:

1.holding element (ordinary force)

2.breakthrough element

3.exploitation element (extraordinary force)

The BTR regiments can fulfil each role as they see fit; when combat is to be given they dismount, otherwise they retain operational mobility via their armoured transports.

This is not the way Western doctrine handles an attack. The same type of forces doing the breakthrough are the same type doing the exploitation.

There is little or no difference in Soviet structure of TO&E for these two roles, but rather a question of which Army is tasked with breakthrough and which with exploitation. So for instance, the 8th Soviet Guards Army and 3rd Soviet Shock Army might breakthrough and the 1st and 2nd Soviet Guards Tank Army might exploit. However, this operational front assigned mission does not mean these armies' divisions were structured differently.

To put this into Syrian context, the breakthrough would be achieved by mass firepower. Infantry Brigades would slug it out with the enemy's immediate frontline area, the Armored divisions would go in to exploit the breach. After the Reserves would fill in to hold the terrain gained.

Steve - what you're discussing here is doctrine at the operational level where the campaign is fought.

The use of MGs is part of tactical doctrine and can be used in any one of the major operational roles of holding forces, breakthrough forces or exploitation forces.

All of this, however, is academic. The Syrians appear to understand that to attack is to be defeated.

and

Therefore, they are heavily weighted towards defensive posture.

Quite so. However, what you are describing is an operational defensive posture, not a tactical one.

For example a Motor Rifle Brigade/Regiment is deployed dismounted in a city on the operational defensive. However the dismounted infantry may launch local attacks and counter-attacks at anything up to Brigade level without severe disadvantages if the battle is MOUT and the Syrians are dismounted.

Also keep in mind that an offensive doctrine without a complimentary defensive doctrine is going to fail.

Sorry Steve - not quite sure what you are getting at here? I haven't commented on defensive doctrine at all other than to say GPMGs in the MMG role can be used both offensively and defensively?

Syrians should also have a professional officer class

Not when they only send 50 officers a year to military college in Moscow (was only 30 until 2003/4 arms deal when the Russian bled a little more money out of them as part of the deal)

So unless we find evidence that the Syrians do have GPMGs attached to a unit we won't do it in CM:SF.

As I said above - we know the composition of TO&E of former Warsaw Pact armies that joined NATO. And we know they have company level PKM tripods in BTR Bns.

We also fought along side the Syrians in 1991 in Kuwait so we know they try and closely model Russian doctrine and TO&E.

The old adage "always get a second source" no matter how reliable you believe the first to be is one I'd recommend.

I'll have a hunt around and see if I can find you some open source data that wont break the bank.

[J Ruddy]

I told you to do WWII, but did you listen to me??? Noooooo...

Regardless, I'm sure people are going to complain no matter what you put in the game.

(No! That lightbulb is a 120v frosted GE model, not the [insert obscure electrical reference here] Syrian model!)

Hurry up and finish SF so that you can start working on WWII or U.S. Civil War or whatever interesting historical thing you are doing next!!!!

[MikeyD]

No no no!

We're witnessing the birth of a whole new arena of Grogdom! Syrian reserve unit TO&E! This is great!

You can't seroiusly want another forum filled with people endlessly quoting Panther production statistics at eachother, can you? Lets have the chance to drop a few GPS-guided munition onto eachother before they force a rusty old Garand rifle back into our hands.

[cassh]

Yeah, amusing boys - but as these "reserve" formations form the bulk of Syrian ground forces and they're one side of this game/simulation its kind of important to try and get it right.

Even if you only ever plan to play as the Americans you might still want to adhere to the old maxim "know thy enemy"!

Unlike other games companies Steve, Charles and the rest of the team want to set the bench mark high - and that means detail and trying to be as accurate as possible.

[Battlefront.com]

Cassh,

The BTR regiments can fulfil each role as they see fit; when combat is to be given they dismount, otherwise they retain operational mobility via their armoured transports.

Here we go again The original argument was about the reliance upon GPMGs for offensive doctrine. As part of this discussion I pointed out that the Soviets have two types of formations and they Syrians have (basically) mimicked this. One type is designed more for attack and has next to no organic GPMGs, while the other is more designed for defense and it has quite a lot of GPMGs. You appear to be under the assumption that the BMP and BTR Regiments are largely they same. They are not.

The BMP is an IFV, the BTR is a APC. The former is better for offensive doctrine, the latter is a battlefield taxi. BMP formations have SP artillery while BTR towed howitzers + an Anti-Tank Platoon for each Battalion (BMP Battalions have none). Therefore, it seems pretty clear that one is better suited for attack than the other. But this is, as you say, a little besides the point.

The question of GPMGs is interesting. Late Soviet TO&E, as in late 1980s, shows that both BMP and BTR Companies have a platoon of 6xGPMGs (PKMs). However, more recent US military "OPFOR" sample TO&E shows few, if any, GPMGs with AFV/IFV infantry forces, and lots of GPMGs with motorized/static infantry forces. Since Soviet TO&E is only directly related to Soviet formations, and OPFOR estimates are based on a wider (and more recent) sampling, this is something to take note of. Especially since Rudel's info seems to be consistent with the OPFOR estimates (see further comments below)

The use of MGs is part of tactical doctrine and can be used in any one of the major operational roles of holding forces, breakthrough forces or exploitation forces.

Absolutely, unless they aren't there to be used at all And that is the main point here, right? Do they have GPMGs with x formation or don't they, not are GPMGs useful for this or that tactic. The latter is dependent on the former, not the other way around.

For example a Motor Rifle Brigade/Regiment is deployed dismounted in a city on the operational defensive. However the dismounted infantry may launch local attacks and counter-attacks at anything up to Brigade level without severe disadvantages if the battle is MOUT and the Syrians are dismounted.

We are not interested in artificially correcting mistakes/shortcomings of a force. You know your history well enough to know that forces are used with "severe disadvantages" in war all the time. We are not going to correct Syrian TO&E to overcome these problems any more than we corrected early Soviet, Romanian, Hungarian, or late war German TO&E in CMBB. If the shoe fits, they will wear it. So this argument you make is superfluous. The only argument is to show that the Syrians are organized the way you think they should be instead of how we think they should be. That's a legitimate debate and, in fact, is the point of this thread

Not when they only send 50 officers a year to military college in Moscow (was only 30 until 2003/4 arms deal when the Russian bled a little more money out of them as part of the deal)

Yeah, as I said... you say they should have GPMGs, I say they should have a professional officer class. Having 50 officers a year for a standing military force of 300,000+ seems a little shy of making a damned bit of difference. I'm not even going to mention the fact that this force is supposedly capable of doubling in the event of a conflict. Since CM's content is based on "what they have" and not "what they should have", arguments based on "should have" will always be trumpped by "do have".

As I said above - we know the composition of TO&E of former Warsaw Pact armies that joined NATO. And we know they have company level PKM tripods in BTR Bns.

Not very relevant unless you have some evidence to suggest that Soviet TO&E has been rigidly applied to all its client states *and* that the client states did not change one iota of that organization over the last 20 years. I know that neither case can be made, so we must take the Soviet TO&E with a grain of salt because we know for a fact that TO&E varies based on available equipment, cultural differences, and other peculiarities. Absent of other information, sure... I'd go with the Soviet TO&E "as is", but US military estimates and Rudel's research (which is SPECIFIC to Syria) compliment each other and contradict the Soviet model in places.

We also fought along side the Syrians in 1991 in Kuwait so we know they try and closely model Russian doctrine and TO&E.

Sure, and the Syrian TO&E that we've come up with so far is extremely close to Soviet TO&E. Not exact, but it is pretty much the same. I'd also suggest that the OPFOR TO&E could be based, in part, on the reality of the Syrian forces as seen in the field. In other words, a reflection of what the Syrian forces are.

The old adage "always get a second source" no matter how reliable you believe the first to be is one I'd recommend.

Obviously that is ideal, but so far we don't have much to go on. One source is generic TO&E that is technically only correct for Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces from the 1980s and early 1990s. The other source is Jane's assessment of Syrian forces, specifically and currently. Our third source is the US military's OPFOR TO&E that was constructed following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. It clearly shows more similarities to the Jane's info than the Soviet TO&E.

What this means is we have two sources that largely agree with each other, are more recent, and are more relevant to Syria. The third source, which is older and is specific to European nations only, is similar but has some individual points of disagreement. The way I see it is we would be foolish and irresponsible to override the first two sources with info from the third.

I'll have a hunt around and see if I can find you some open source data that wont break the bank.

The more the merrier!!

Remember, I am looking at this stuff as an impartial researcher. I only want to make the best estimate of what they have and go with that. If the info points to them having few to none, then they get few to none. I don't give a rat's hind quarters if that puts them at a disadvantage because we never have, and never will, purposefully screw with reality (or the best approximation we have of it) in order to balance things out.

In short... unless I see some good counter evidence to undermine the allocation of GPMGs as described by me above, things stay as is. It's the only sensible and responsible way to go, which makes it the only RIGHT way to go.

Steve

[ November 16, 2006, 07:40 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[John Kettler]

Steve,

The classic role for the BMP regiment is what the Soviets used to call "in the liver." IOW, the BTR regiments may open the engagement and create the tactical opportunity, but it is the BMP regiment, working with the tank regiment, which goes for the enemy's vitals after recon first identifies a weak point in the defenses. The difference between the role of the BTR regiments and the BMP regiment is both real and militarily significant. Interestingly, unlike their Cold War Soviet counterparts (see Suvorov's THE LIBERATORS), the Syrians actually have enough AFVs to operate with the planned Soviet era tactics.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

Hi John,

Yup, that's what I've been saying And the equipment reflects that to some degree.

As for the Syrians, they have enough armor to pull of Soviet style doctrine in a battlefield populated by, well, nobody! The equipment is pretty dated and the ability of them to conduct ops without significant air interdiction is just about nil. On top of that the combined arms training is apparently pretty dismal. You can hand a monkey paint, brushes, canvas, a subject to paint, and an art agent... but that doesn't mean he can produce anything worthy of an art gallery

BTW, if one scans back one will see that I've personally not disagreed with Cassh about the tactical role of GPMGs. When they are integrated and kept moderately light, they are a huge asset for an attacking force in a exploitive operation (as well as breakthrough). It's just that we don't see any evidence that the Syrians understand this and/or have acted upon it.

Steve

[cassh]

Steve said -

You appear to be under the assumption that the BMP and BTR Regiments are largely they same. They are not.

Yes, I'm quite aware of that - however BTR battalions and BMP battalions and their respective roles are significant at an operational level - not necessarily at tactical level.

A BTR regiment and a BMP regiment must both fight dismounted when facing organised and effective resistance. The difference is that once enemy cohesion has been shattered the BMP regiment is then more suited to exploit (rather than as you say attack - a small but key distinction) as it possesses mechanised supporting arms and IFVs.

If one is fighting a mobile battle, a weak enemy can be overrun using IFVs and AFVs. But against effective defences, BMPs are constrained by many of the limitations faced by APC borne troops and may need to fight a dismounted battle.

BMP is better suited to operational manoeuvre where one exploits a breakthrough, hence the BMP regiment and Tank regiment form the OMG in a Soviet Motor Rifle Division.

Therefore, it seems pretty clear that one is better suited for attack than the other. But this is, as you say, a little besides the point.

In open tank country, I completely agree. However, in close terrain it makes little difference. If Syrians have learnt anything for either Gulf War they will not offer battle in this way, but will seek the concealment and cover of close country such as urban terrain. In this type of engagement you fight dismounted anyway so BMP or BTR make marginal difference. A Javelin is going to make Swiss Cheese of either of these vehicles.

Late Soviet TO&E, as in late 1980s, shows that both BMP and BTR Companies have a platoon of 6xGPMGs (PKMs).

Bingo! So we agree they are there.

However, more recent US military "OPFOR" sample TO&E shows few, if any, GPMGs with AFV/IFV infantry forces, and lots of GPMGs with motorized/static infantry forces.

Bingo bingo - so we agree the GPMGs are with the BTR regiments who make up the bulk of the motorised forces rather than with the BMP "mechanised" units.

Absolutely, unless they aren't there to be used at all.

Which contradicts what you've just said.

And that is the main point here, right?

Steve, call me old fashioned here, but when you say on the one hand that there are "lots of GPMGs with motorized/static infantry forces" and then say "unless they aren't there to be used at all" one can only conclude that there is some confusion here?

Do they have GPMGs with x formation or don't they, not are GPMGs useful for this or that tactic. The latter is dependent on the former, not the other way around.

If I haven't made my self clear I apologise. So I'll make this unambiguous.

Each Rifle company of a BTR battalion should have a PKM GPMG team.

We never have, and never will, purposefully screw with reality (or the best approximation we have of it) in order to balance things out.

Good - that's what we all want.

In short... unless I see some good counter evidence to undermine the allocation of GPMGs as described by me above, things stay as is. It's the only sensible and responsible way to go, which makes it the only RIGHT way to go.

Wait one.

[Battlefront.com]

Cassh,

Yes, I'm quite aware of that - however BTR battalions and BMP battalions and their respective roles are significant at an operational level - not necessarily at tactical level.

Very true. But this speaks to the problems with Cold War thinking on the Soviet side as well as NATO side (though slightly different). The Soviets were set up for attack and counter attack on an operational level, just like in WWII. Why? Because it is their strength. Tactical level they know they can't match a Western force on a soldier by soldier, tank by tank basis. NATO, on the other hand, envisioned neutralizing the Soviet operational advantage by airpower and ensuring they did in fact win the tactical level by superior combined arms units.

Late Soviet TO&E, as in late 1980s, shows that both BMP and BTR Companies have a platoon of 6xGPMGs (PKMs).

Bingo! So we agree they are there.

Remember that Rudel's argument was about Western forces and more recent organizations, so up until now I haven't bothered to mention 20 year old TO&E from a nation that no longer exists. It's only a starting point to understanding where we are at now, just as WWII was for the period before this.

Bingo bingo - so we agree the GPMGs are with the BTR regiments who make up the bulk of the motorised forces rather than with the BMP "mechanised" units.

Ah, no. I said "motorized", not "mechanized". As you said yourself, "Mechanized" is both BMP and BTR based, not just BMP. As I said, the OPFOR TO&E shows BTR and BMP (Mechanized) units having no organic GPMGs at the Company level and only a few, probably for defense of mortars, at the Battalion level. Motorized (i.e. being moved around by trucks) and static infantry formations, on the other hand, have plenty of GPMGs. This makes sense from a doctrinal standpoint where the armored forces are supposed to be on the move and the infantry forces largely static (though strategically redeployable).

Which contradicts what you've just said.

No, because you are confusing Motorized and Mechanized, which I am not. Hopefully you now see the error you made and that my comments are completely consistent.

Steve, call me old fashioned here, but when you say on the one hand that there are "lots of GPMGs with motorized/static infantry forces" and then say "unless they aren't there to be used at all" one can only conclude that there is some confusion here?

Yep, one can only conclude this. However, I'm not the one confused

If I haven't made my self clear I apologise. So I'll make this unambiguous.

Each Rifle company of a BTR battalion should have a PKM GPMG team.

You've not been misunderstood at all. But what you are asking for is not supported by anything except your own personal opinion. Remember the last time we got into this... you were insisting that Stryker Sniper Teams should only have 2 men because your opinion was that is the way they should be, even though the Stryker TO&E and actual practice showed them to be 3 men teams.

Good - that's what we all want.

And that's what you're getting. What I've outlined could very well be wrong, but unless it is shown to be wrong (and it most certainly has not been) it will stay as is.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

If the Syrians are following the former Soviet organizational approach, then this directly affects the way troop quality is handled within a given formation, a topic which Suvorov extensively discusses in his INSIDE THE SOVIET ARMY and IMO, bears careful reading.

Briefly, the best quality troops, in any given size formation, are the recon troops, followed by those in the "private army" of the owning commander. For the MR case, this means that the tank regiment will have the best tankers in the division, as well as the best BMP battalion in the division. These formations will always be at or as close to possible to TO&E and manning requirements, for they are expected to win the day offensively and save it via counterattack defensively. Within these subunits, the first platoon, company, or what have you will always have priority.

The next most important combat formation is the previously mentioned BMP regiment, and the same rules apply. Whatever constitutes the commander's reserve will be the best he can get. Period.

At the bottom of the manpower and equipment pecking order in the MR are the two BTR regiments,

internally structured exactly as outlined above.

This, SOFAIK, is not the way we do things at all, but it is very important in how a Soviet/Soviet inspired force organizes and structures for combat. In essence, there's a herd which isn't very good per se but is numerous and "creates a quality of its own" thereby, and then there is the combat cream, which everyone else operates in support of. The latest, best, and most powerful weapons are in the hands of those most able to use them effectively. I believe this needs to be systematically reflected in scenario design and combat tasking.

I think people also need to understand the way fire support and reinforcements work in this situation. The decision criterion isn't which commander's screaming for help, but rather, which commander's doing something that actually contributes to the battle plan.

That's where you'll find not just the entire weight of the given formation's effort, but units not doing much or badly cut up may find themselves cut to the bone as well. Thus, the divisional commander's fire support, antitank and combat engineering assets would not only go there (with or without his reserve tank and mechanized forces, depending on his read of the situation), but he might start stripping the noncritical sectors of organic capabilites, such as their mortars, antitank units and the like. This is exactly what the Egyptians did in 1973 when they stripped the antitank weapons and crews out of a second echelon army and put them into the one defending the now breached Bar Lev line. The result was so horrific that for a time, many believed that the day of the tank was over.

The Soviets and all modeled on them breathe, think and eat in terms of the Schwerpunkt, to use the German form of the phrase "critical point." For a Soviet example, take a look at the measures used to slow and then stop the German armored juggernaut at Kursk, and how high up the food chain STAVKA reached to get the combat resources needed. ISTR it went all the way

to the Reserve of the High Command (RVGK) formations. While the Syrians obviously have nothing on par with that resource pool, the basic approach seems valid to me, albeit at a much lower organizational level.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

John,

This is the same thnking that the Syrians use, and for roughly the same reasons. Equipment is expensive and is a force multiplier. If you can't adequately train all your troops, then you need to rationalize who gets what. The best trained troops get the best equipment, simple as that. They are also selected for loyalty as well as military qualities. The Warsaw Pact also behaved like that, as well as Yugoslavia and probably most other repressive nations.

in the Syrian armed forces this means that the best units are the Special Forces, Airborne, a couple Republican Guard Armored Divisions, and a couple of independent Infantry Brigades. I think the Border Guards can also fit into this group. These units have the bulk of the more or less modern equipment, including small arms, armored vehicles, artillery, communications equipment, night vision, etc. The other units, including a Reserve Armored Division, have older stuff like T-62 tanks and RPD squad automatic weapons.

There is also a good logistics reason to keep equipment parcelled out in bulk of one type. Likewise, if you can't afford to refit your entire military force, it makes economic sense to get what you can to the best guys and have them give their stuff, as hand-me-downs, to the remaining forces. In fact, the West works this way as well, with US National Guard units generally having older stuff than active units (not so at the moment!). The difference is that the 2nd line units do get upgraded and upgraded within a fairly short period of time (2-10 years). And in the event of war they are upgraded rapidly, as was the case here in the US when OIF kicked off. In fact, the active Army units have robbed the National Guard of their equipment because of their own shortages!

Steve