.50's from above

[gunnergoz]

To WBS...are you sure about the "M-3 .50 cal. machinegun" part? I'm pretty sure that the M-2 or "Ma Deuce" still reigns supreme 60 years after WW2. An M-3 .50 just doesn't ring any bells with me...and Lordie knows that the History Channel never gets anything wrong!

Seriously, the post-war versions of the .50 have had modifications but it is still referred to as the M-2 even after all these years. Perhaps they were referring to cannon-armed versions of the sabre mounting 20mm guns (IIRC the Navy Sabre, called the FJ Fury, had a cannon armament, for one.)

[Michael Emrys]

I hesitate to try this one because my memory on this subject is so vague, but AIR the .50s on aircraft were set to fire at 1,000 RPM. Also, they would have had special feed arrangements, charging by electric solenoid, etc. that might have warranted a different model number. I think the M2 ground version fired 600 RPM or less.

Michael

[ March 21, 2002, 01:44 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Charlie Rock]

From "P-47 pilots" by Thomas Glenn, 1998.

page 90

"Now he pulls something we've been told will work. When a tank is on a hard surfaced road, you can knock it out by flying directly at it, head on, and shooting a flat trajectory onto the roadway ahead of the tank: the bottom is the least armored and the most vulnerable spot. Once a bullet penetrates the floor and gets inside, it tears the hell out of anything and everybody in there as it flies around like a buzz saw."

"He makes the attack and pulls up. Our flight leader comes on the air, ' Blue flight, get in

trail. We're going for the tracks.' We dive down from 1,000 feet, level out on the deck, and come in broadside, aiming for the front sprocket gear that controls the track; shoot that gear out and that tank can't go anywhere. As we come in from the side, the gun turret doesen't turn. The squadron leader's frontal attack may have worked."

"We assemble at 2,000 feet and circle the tanks. No one got out of the three that are burning; we're sure of that. The fate of the front tank is in doubt. The crew could be dead or faking it, no longer shooting to make us believe they're dead. There's no way we can tell for sure, but the tank is no longer able to move, so it's effectively out of action..."

Anyway,

1. A bomb beats a rocket which beats 20mm cannon which beats .50 cal.

2. Whether the ricochet technique worked or didn't really should have no significant bearing on game play, it should be modeled as an attack, and was probably a low probability chance of kill.

3. If it did not work, than obviously the author is mistaken, because he and his squadron thought it did.

4. If it did work, it was probably infrequently successful. A pilot may have gotten lucky due to a fluke shot, came back and told his unit, and as a result a lot of ammo was shot off for occaisional gains. Loss of velocity, tumbling, angles, range, velocity and all the other ballistical data would indicate this would be successful only occaisionally.

5. I personally would think an attack against the engine deck would be more successful, and would think unless "seeing is believing" caused pilots to believe otherwise,that would be the preferred method. Obviously for a certain degree of bellyarmor plate this technique is POSSIBLE. That degree may be as low as 1 mm, could be as high as 20-30 mm, probably in the middle.

6. I think an M3 is an M2 machine gun that fired off a solenoid or had some other electrical rig that was specific to the F86. I am not positive. It had no handles, obviously, and operated the same, other than the electrical system that released the sear. Not 100% sure.

[Ozzy]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

[QBNevertheless, I still suspect that a good sized aerial bomb could lift at least one tank up in the air a bit, or tip it over on it's side. I'm just guessing from the size of bomb craters that I've seen, but it seems that these bombs move an awful lot of dirt, so I don't see why they wouldn't be able to move a bunch of steel, too.

[/QB]

Because of mass inertia - 27 tons of dirt are 27 tons of small stones, sand and pieces of mud, while 27 tons of steel are one massive, rigid body

[Thomm]

There is something I do not understand:

If the bullets ricochet from the street surface in the first place, why should it not, subsequently, ricochet also from a steel plate (tank belly), which is parallel to the street surface?

Does ricocheting consistently alter the path of the bullet such that after the event the bullets trajectory is "steeper" than before?! If yes, doesn't this consume an enormous amount of kinetic energy?

Regards, Thomm

[l3w53r]

Originally posted by illo:

I've seen footage where 3 t-34s are thrown in air by blast of single 1000kg bomb from Stuka.

I'm not a grog but I think you mean 1,100lbs (500kg); not 1000kg. I'm trying to come up with some sort of witty remark about the metric and imperial systems, but I could'nt think of anything remotely amusing.

I'm doing this one from memory but I think the the JU-87D could carry 1,800lbs of external ordnance.

And just wondering(again, and yeah it's off topic, but hey... ), weren't mines designed to attack the tracks and not the belly?

[Thomm]

From http://140.116.5.2/~chungho/antonio.htm

Our study revealed that bullets which ricochet off solid surfaces usually ricochet at an angle that is smaller than the angle at impact to the surface from the muzzle. At the same angle of impact, the softer wood intermediary object resulted in a higher angle of ricochet.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by l3w53r:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by illo:

I've seen footage where 3 t-34s are thrown in air by blast of single 1000kg bomb from Stuka.

I'm not a grog but I think you mean 1,100lbs (500kg); not 1000kg. I'm trying to come up with some sort of witty remark about the metric and imperial systems, but I could'nt think of anything remotely amusing.

I'm doing this one from memory but I think the the JU-87D could carry 1,800lbs of external ordnance.

And just wondering(again, and yeah it's off topic, but hey... ), weren't mines designed to attack the tracks and not the belly?</font>

[illo]

Originally posted by l3w53r:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by illo:

I've seen footage where 3 t-34s are thrown in air by blast of single 1000kg bomb from Stuka.

I'm not a grog but I think you mean 1,100lbs (500kg); not 1000kg. I'm trying to come up with some sort of witty remark about the metric and imperial systems, but I could'nt think of anything remotely amusing.

I'm doing this one from memory but I think the the JU-87D could carry 1,800lbs of external ordnance.

And just wondering(again, and yeah it's off topic, but hey... ), weren't mines designed to attack the tracks and not the belly?</font>

[illo]

Regarding Rudel's claims - the Wehrmacht was unable to actually confirm most of them, because they did not own the battlefields after the fight. I am sure that he and the two witnesses believed what they saw was a disabled tank. I am also sure that most of the Allied pilots believed their claims to be correct. yet when operational research was undertaken it was found that they overclaimed by a ration in excess of 10:1. If anyone thinks that the Germans somehow were smarter at this or for some other reason did not have an overclaims problem, fine. I don't. Whether Rudel was the highest decorated soldier in the German army does not come into this - looking at the figures it appears to me that he got this decoration on the basis of inflated claims.

Yes, I agree.

[wbs]

From Gunnergoz:

To WBS...are you sure about the "M-3 .50 cal. machinegun" part? I'm pretty sure that the M-2 or "Ma Deuce" still reigns supreme 60 years after WW2. An M-3 .50 just doesn't ring any bells with me...and Lordie knows that the History Channel never gets anything wrong!

I just double-checked to make sure. As it turns out, there is an M-3 .50 caliber Machine Gun. I got this off of the website of a gun dealer:

M-3 Browning Aircraft

Machine Gun

Government

Part Number

Description

Price

7312953 Booster $45.00

5153192 Screw for Retaining Booster $2.00

7265216-22 Aircraft Shims #1-7 (specify which # you need when ordering). $6.00each

M3-001 Complete Set of 12 Shims $49.50

7265160 Bracket $45.00

7313868 Positioner Assembly $10.00

7265619 Link Chute Adapter $75.00

7313313 Guide $20.00

5032232 Nut $2.00

446162 Washer $2.00

5504047 Barrel Jacket $85.00

5504052 Trunnion Adapter $75.00

7312745 Left Depressor $25.00

7312744 Right Depressor $25.00

7312647 Cam, Extr. P.O.R.

7312704 Breech Lock Cam $29.50

7313228 Belt Holding pawl Pin Assembly $8.50

7312646 Extractor (Side Plate) Switch $25.00

7312637 Switch Spring $3.50

M3-002 Trigger Bar (Lever Belt Feed) $14.50

7265622 Retaining Screw $5.00

M3-003 Trigger Bar Adjustable Stop Assembly $36.50

7162757 Removable Bolt Hold-Down Bracket P.O.R.

M-3 BACKPLATE

5009356 Spring $2.00

9313153 Latch $9.50

5009275 Pin $2.00

7312665 Spring $2.00

7313162 Stop $6.00

7313157 Plunger $3.00

7313160 Lock $9.50

7313160 Spring $1.00

7313161 Buffer Spring (Alternate For Coil #7313161) - Call for Availability $20.00

7313156 Plate $7.50

7266300 Disk $6.00

7313158 Screw $12.50

7313155 Backplate, Stripped $150.00

M3-004 Backplate, Grade II $60.00

M3-005 Complete M-3 Backplate $195.00

M-3 BUFFER

7312759 Buffer Body $60.00

M3-006 Buffer Assembly with Body $130.00

M3-007 Buffer Assembly without Body $50.00

7312764 Tube Assembly $20.00

7132686 Piston $9.50

7312682 Rod Assembly $15.00

7312689 Valve $5.00

7312662 Pin $2.00

7312688 Retainer $5.00

7312683 Cap $9.00

7312679 Accelerator $18.50

7312707 Pin $4.50

6008782 Spring $6.00

7312687 Spring $2.00

6008782 Guide $9.50

M-3 TOP COVER

A13515 Plunger $4.00

A13516 Spring $2.00

7161711 Spring $5.00

7161712 Belt Feed Lever $32.50

7161710 Top Cover Stripped $150.00

M3-008 Complete Top Cover $245.00

7161705 Retainer $17.50

7312642 Pin $3.00

7313175 Pin $5.00

7313716 Pawl Assembly $20.00

7312677 Spring $2.00

A9352 Spring $2.00

7162761 Arm $9.50

7313180 Slide $18.50

M-3 BOLT GROUP PARTS

7162763 Extension Assembly $25.00

7265183 Stop Assembly $12.50

7162764 Firing Pin $20.00

7266161 Pin $3.50

5009382 Retaining Pin for Spring is also the same as the M-2 $2.00

5009353 Firing Pin Spring (Same as M-3) $4.00

7265603 Spring $2.00

7265211 Cocking Lever $12.50

7265110 Sear $12.50

7162700 Sear Spring $2.00

7313752 Extractor $100.00

7265455 Switch $15.00

2 for $25.00

7265604 Pin P.O.R.

7265608 Pin $5.00

7312709 Slide, Sear $8.00

M3-009 M-3 Bolt $325.00

M3-010 M-3 Drive Spring $20.00

Bulk Pricing Available - Call Machine Gun Dave

The link is:

http://www.sarcoinc.com/m3bmg.html

[ March 21, 2002, 08:32 PM: Message edited by: wbs ]

[gunnergoz]

In re: M-3's, it sounds like grunt grogs need to keep their noses to the ground and let airdale grogs have their turf to themselves...

[Bastables]

'Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront', London 1998, contains

a couple of cases studies.

I. Roncey Pocket.

In the wake of the Allied breakout from Normandy, Operation COBRA

which began on 25 July 1944, large German forces in the Cotentin

peninsula were forced to risk air attack by moving in daylight to

avoid being encircled by American armour. Just south of Coutances,

near Roncey, some six German divisions were cut off in what became

known as the Roncey 'Pocket'. Choking the roads, the German columns

became ideal targets for attacks by Allied fighter-bombers whose

attacks succeeded in preventing any organised breakout [...]

Some indication of the destruction caused specifically by air weapons

is provided by an RAF anti-armour operation on the same day [29 July].

Rocket Typhoons of 2nd TAF were requested by US forces to attack a

concentration of some 50 German tanks observed in the Roncey area,

near Gavray. Consequently Typhoons of No.121 Wing of No.83 Group flew

99 sorties in the area between late afternoon and dusk, and claimed

the destruction of 17 tanks with a further 27 damaged. The pilots

reported that there was little sign of life or movement during their

attacks and the area was littered with damaged and burning tanks,

making target selection difficult. There was no flak, and pilots were

able to attack at very low level. Only one Typhoon was lost, hit by

flying debris and forced to crash-land.

The Typhoon effort had been concentrated mainly against a German

column near the village of la Baleine, and shortly after the air

attacks this area was investigated by the British Army's No.2 ORS. The

column had been a formidable mix of armour and transport, including

Panther tanks. The surrounding terrain was heavily wooded and

dissected by deep, narrow valleys and the column had used a side road

which descended to la Baleine where a bridge crossed the river Sienne.

On one side of this road was a steep, wooded cliff and on the other a

sheer drop to the river; caught by fighter-bombers at this point the

vehicles had been unable to pull off the road. P-47s had attacked the

area with 500-lb bombs before Typhoons had been called for, and the

bridge over the river had been sufficiently damaged by their bombs to

prevent heavy vehicles from crossing. After examining the tanks and

vehicles the ORS outlined the causes of destruction. This is shown in

the following table:

LA BALEINE - LOSSES AND CAUSES

Destroyed Possibly Unknown Unknown Aban-

by Rockets Rockets Shells Causes Crew doned Totals

Panthers 1 - 1 - 3 3 8

Pz Mk IV 1 - - - - - 1

Armoured Cars - 1 - - - - 1

Armd. troop carr. 5 - - - - - 5

75 mm SP Guns - - - 1 - 1 2

50 mm AT Guns - - - - 1 1 2

Howitzers - 1 - - - 1 2

Rocket launchers - - - - - 1 1

Lorries - - - 8 - - 8

Cars - - - 10 - - 10

___________________________________________________________________

Totals 7 2 1 19 4 7 40

The motor transport was so mangled that identification of the cause of

destruction was impossible and the ORS acknowledged their 'unknown

causes' table to be unduly loaded. They suggested that a more accurate

picture would be provided by the motor transport being spread over the

table in the same proportion as the other losses. Although rockets

appear as the biggest single known cause of destruction, the amount

attributed to them is small compared to the relatively high number of

Panthers destroyed by their crews or abandoned intact. How they had

been left suggested abandonment in haste, almost certainly as a result

of air attack or the threat of such attack, and possibly even before

the arrival of the Typhoons. Craters of 500-lb bombs were found in an

orchard within 50 yards of two Panthers; neither tank had been hit but

the crews obviously baled out and later set fire to the tanks, one of

the guns being destroyed by a high-explosive round left in the

chamber.

Although lack of fuel in a retreat could be expected to result in the

abandonment or destruction of tanks by their crews, this was not the

case at La Baleine; near similar bomb craters two Panthers were found

completely undamaged, their fighting ability unimpaired with full

complements of petrol and ammunition. One of the 75 mm self-propelled

guns, its armour reinforced with concrete, was found abandoned

undamaged 35 yards from a bomb crater. As it had not been set on fire

by its crew it was considered more likely to have been abandoned in

haste rather than left as a deliberate roadblock.

Possibly the tanks had been abandoned or destroyed by their crews

because they could not negotiate the damaged bridge. The ORS noted

that the German crews could have forced the river further downstream,

as American Sherman tanks later succeeded in doing, but this ignores

the fact that in their hurry to escape encirclement the Germans

probably had little time to reconnoitre the area. That all the troop

carriers discovered had been destroyed by rockets suggests the

possibility that other similar types may have escaped over the bridge,

not needing to be abandoned like the heavier tanks. At la Baleine the

most significant evidence of demoralisation was that there were no

German graves. Only one German corpse was found and local civilians,

many of whoom were interviewed, confirmed that it was of a sniper

killed after the air attacks, while no evidence could be found that

American forces had removed bodies for burial. This suggests that the

German troops may have dispersed from the column when it became

obvious air attack was imminent, which squares with the Typhoon pilots

observing little German activity during their attacks.

La Baleine was the first ORS investigation of its type, and certainly

reflects the shortcomings of air-to-ground weapons against tanks.

Despite the craters none of the tanks or self-propelled guns had been

knocked out by bombs, and the number destroyed by rockets is

unimpressive. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of evidence

discovered by the ORS at la Baleine to suggest that air attack was

responsible, even if indirectly, for the disruption and abandonment of

the column, and that the German crews preferred to abandon or destroy

their armour rather than invite further air attack by attempting to

salvage combat-worthy tanks.

II. Mortain

Similar evidence of German tanks being abandoned under air attack is

seen in the example of the only large-scale German armoured offensive

mounted in Normandy. Early on the morning of 7 August 1944, the strike

force of XLVII Panzer Corps, the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 2nd Panzer

divisions, attacked positions held by the US 30th and 9th Infantry

divisions near Mortain with the ultimate objective of reaching the

Cotentin coast at Avranches and cutting off American armoured

spearheads from their supplies. Although tank strength was depleted

after weeks of heavy fighting the Germans mustered 70 Panthers, 75 Mk

IVs, and 32 self-propelled guns for the attack. By noon on 7 August

they were within nine miles of Avranches after penetrating the front

of 30th Division to a depth of about three miles. Having arrived in

Mortain only the day before, 30th Division had nothing but its 57 mm

towed anti-tank guns and 3 inch gun tank-destroyers with which to

engage the German tanks at close range. Despite its determined

defence, the credit for bringing the German attack to a decisive halt

on the afternoon of 7 August is generally regarded as belonging to

Allied fighter-bombers, particularly the RAF Typhoons, which were

called to intervene.

The response of the Allied tactical air forces to the German attack

was swift. The Typhoons of No.83 Group RAF were made available, and

plans co-ordinated directly between the headquarters of No.83 Group

and IX Tactical Air Command. Rocket Typhoons were to engage the German

tanks, while American fighter-bombers were to attack transport moving

to and from the battle area. The Ninth Air Force was also to provide a

fighter screen to intercept German aircraft, a vital task as the

Luftwaffe had planned to make an all-out effort to support the attack

with some 300 planes. The German command had relied upon fog,

prevalent on previous days and which had been forecast for 7 August,

to protect their armoured spearheads from air observation and attack,

but at about 11 am that day the fog over the battle area began to

clear.

At about midday the first Typhoons took off for the American sector

from their advanced landing grounds, and went into action just before

1 p.m. against a concentration of some 60 tanks and 200 vehicles

observed along a hedge-lined road near Mortain. The tanks, some

heavily camouflaged, were grouped closely together as if unprepared

for the rapid lifting of the fog. After overflying at low level to

confirm them as German, the Typhoons commenced dive attacks upon the

front and rear of the column, which was immediately brought to a halt.

The pilots observed that their attacks caused great confusion, and saw

German tank crews bailing out and running for cover regardless of

whether or not their tanks were left blocking the road. Also at this

time the first American fighter-bombers arrived in the area, with

P-47s, including the squadron equipped with rockets, attacking German

transport.

The weather remained clear and between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. flights of

five or six Typhoons were taking off roughly every 20 minutes to

attack, returning to refuel and rearm before setting off again for

Mortain. As the afternoon wore on the pilots found the task of

locating the German tanks increasingly difficult due to their

dispersion and to clouds of dust and smoke in the battle area, but the

forward movement of the German attack had been halted. By the end of

the day No.83 Group had flown 294 sorties and IX Tactical Air Command

200 sorties in the Mortain area. Three Typhoons and pilots had been

lost. Though the level of flak had initially been light, it had

increased during the day with box-like patterns being put up over the

tanks, and many of the Typhoons were found to have suffered damage

from this and small-arms fire.

German accounts clearly attribute the failure of their attack on 7

August to the fighter-bombers. The commander of 2nd Panzer Division,

von Luttwitz, later recalled that his tanks had made a swift advance

of about ten miles when suddenly the fighter-bombers appeared,

They came in hundreds, firing their rockets at the

concentrated tanks and vehicles. We could do nothing

against them and we could make no further progress.

Hans Speidel, then the Chief of Staff of the German Army Group B,

later wrote of Mortain that

it was possible for the Allied air forces alone to wreck

this Panzer operation with the help of a well co-ordinated

ground-to-air communication system.

The German troops received no air support on 7 Aug. Their aircraft

attempting to reach the battle area were intercepted by strong

American fighter patrols and none reached within 40 miles of Mortain.

Although fighting continued in the area for several days, with Mortain

being recaptured by American forces on 12 August, the Germans made no

further attempt to reach Avranches after 7 August. Typhoons took no

part in the battle after that date, with responsibility for air

support reverting to the IX Tactical Air Command. The claims made by

the Allied fighter-bomber pilots for the period 7 - 10 August are

impressive, and are shown below:

ALLIED FIGHTER-BOMBER CLAIMS, 7 - 10 AUGUST 1944

Probably

Armour Destroyed Destroyed Damaged Total

2nd TAF 8 35 21 140

9th AF 69 8 35 112

Motor Ttansport

2nd TAF 54 19 39 112

9th AF 94 1 21 116

Yet these claims are misleading and cannot be substantiated. During

12 - 20 August the Mortain battle area was examined by two separate

British ORS teams; No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. No German vehicles were

missed by the investigation as the areas was not extensive; moreover

the area was examined from an observation aircraft at low level with

no further vehicles discovered. The destruction attributed to various

weapons can be tabulated as shown in the following table, which is a

compilation of both the RAF and Army reports:

DESTRUCTION ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS WEAPONS,

MORTAIN AREA, AUGUST 1944

FORM OF DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALISATION

Cannon/ Aband.

TYPE Rockets MG Bomb intact Crew US Army Unknown Total

Panther 5 - 1 6 4 14 3 33

Mk IV 2 - 1 1 - 5 1 10

SP Guns - - - - - 1 2 3

Arm.Troop Carr. 7 4 - 1 - 3 8 23

Arm.Cars 1 - - 1 - 5 1 8

Arm Recov.Veh. - - - - - 1 - 1

88 mm Guns - - - - - 1 1 2

75 mm Guns - - - - - 1 - 1

50 mm Guns - - - 1 - - - 1

Cars 2 2 - - - 4 3 11

Lorries - 6 - 1 1 2 20 30

Ambulances - 2 - 2 - - 1 5

Motor Cycles - - - 1 1 1 2 4

_____________________________________________________________________

Totals 17 14 2 14 5 38 42 132

This shows that a total of only 46 German tanks and self-propelled

guns were actually found in the battle area, and of these only nine

were considered to have been destroyed by air weapons.

It was not possible to discriminate between victims of British and

American aircraft as the latter had also fired some 600 rockets. Many

of the 'unknown causes' were found some distance from any sign of air

attack - such as cannon and machine gun strikes on the ground and

rocket or bomb craters - and could not be considered as possible air

victims. An obvious question is whether the Germans had been able to

recover any of their tanks. The presence of a German tank recovery

vehicle would seem to confirm they had but, while it is likely that

some tanks were recovered, this can hardly be an adequate explanation

for the discrepancy between air claims and the destruction found.

Armoured and motor vehicles destroyed by air weapons were invariably

burnt out, and for recovery purposes damaged and abandoned vehicles

had priority over such. German prisoners, many of whoom were

questioned on this subject, consistently stated that burnt out tanks

were never salvaged. In effect, a tank hit by a rocket or bomb was not

worth recovering and the ORS should have found what was left of it.

Another question is whether German accounts of the fighting can shed

more light on the number of tanks and vehicles destroyed by air

attack. The histories of the German divisions that fought at Mortain,

compiled post-war, stress how decisive the intervention of the

fighter-bombers had been, but are ambiguous with regard to the

question of losses. That of the 2nd Panzer Division states of the

Typhoons that they attacked with great accuracy and succeeded in

knocking out even the heaviest tanks, but the number of tanks actually

lost in this way is not given. The history of the 1st SS Panzer

Division (LAH) is similarly unclear as to the actual number of tanks

knocked out from the air, though it implies that the number was

considerable and quotes an account of the air attacks by a panzer

grenadier who recalled seeing many black oil clouds indicating the

position of destroyed tanks. Also quoted is a panzer grenadier officer

who, after describing how a fighter-bomber shot down by flak crashed

onto a tank and put it out of action, adds that most of the other

tanks and armoured personnel carriers also fell victim to the intense,

hour-long, low-level attacks. Yet such German accounts attributing

heavy tank and vehicle losses to air attack are misleading. They take

little cognizance of the losses inflicted by US ground forces which,

though almost certainly overestimated at the time in the confusion of

battle, were none the less considerable. American accounts of the

fighting indicate that, on 7 August, the forward troops of the US 30th

and 9th Divisions claimed the destruction of at least eighteen German

tanks, fourteen of them by the 30th Division's attached 823rd Tank

Destroyer Battalion alone. Moreover, the ORS confirmed that US troops

accounted for more heavy German armour than the fighter-bombers, the

destruction of twenty of the total of forty-six tanks and SP guns

found being attributed to US ground weapons.

The principal reason why such German accounts should be regarded with

caution, however, is that they provide no explanation as to what had

become of the tanks and vehicles destroyed by the fighter-bombers by

the time the ORS examined the battle area. Nor do they explain the not

inconsiderable number of tanks found abandoned or destroyed by their

own crews. To some extent, German attribution of tank losses to air

attack may stem from the confusion of battle, but it may also suggest

both a reluctance to acknowledge the morale effect of such attack, and

a desire to ascribe the halting of the armoured thrust, which was much

in the nature of a forlorn hope, to Allied air power rather than to

defeat at the hands of US ground forces.

Despite the toll taken of the German armour by US ground weapons, the

commanders of the US units engaged on 7 August later confirmed that it

was the fighter-bombers that brought the German thrust to a halt. At

the time of the ground survey, a member of ORS 2nd TAF visited the

headquarters of the US 9th Division's 39th Infantry Regiment. He was

told by the Commander how the German attack had cut off part of his

regiment from its headquarters and how his anti-tank guns had been

insufficient to halt such a large number of tanks. He also told how he

had remained 'vulnerable and anxious' until Typhoons arrived to attack

the German spearhead. A visit was also made to the Commander of the

30th Division's 117th Infantry Regiment, which had been in the path of

the 2nd Panzer and 1st SS Panzer Divisions on 7 August. He recalled

that when the mist lifted at about 12.30,

Thunderbolt and Typhoon aircraft came in immediately and

attacked, Typhoons attacking for what seemed to him to be

about two hours. This, added to the resistance of the ground

forces, stopped the thrust.

Such appreciation of the close air support on 7 August is significant

in view of the tendency of Allied aircraft to attack friendly

positions inadvertently in what was a very fluid ground battle. The US

30th Division recorded that the Typhoons and P-47s often attacked its

positions, the 120th Regiment alone receiving ten such attacks during

the day.

Given the lack of tank destruction by air weapons, the undoubted

effectiveness of the sustained fighter-bomber assault on 7 August must

have been largely the result of completely disrupting the German

attack by compelling tanks to seek cover or their crews to abandon

them. The level of destruction attributed to air weapons by the ORS is

too insignificant to have been decisive, and even if the unknown

causes for destruction of both armour and motor transport were added

to the air attack totals the number would not be a quarter of those

claimed. Yet no fewer than ten of the 33 Panthers found, or 30 per

cent, had been abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. This was an

important discovery at that time, and a contemporary RAF tactical

study stressing the demoralising effect of the 3-inch rocket (RP)

projectile offered this explanation for the German abandonment of

tanks and vehicles at Mortain:

Interrogation of prisoners has shown without question

that German tank crews are extremely frightened of

attacks by RP...Crews are very aware that if an RP

does hit a tank, their chance of survival is small.

It is admitted that the chances of a direct hit are

slight; nevertheless, this would hardly be appreciated

by a crew whose first thought would be of the disastrous

results if a hit was obtained.

Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of air

attack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the later

joint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated an

irrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relative

safety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:

The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the

air they remained in their tanks which had no more than

superficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses from

bombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-

experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.

It is certainly plausible that tank crews under a heavy scale of air

attack would be induced to bale out, despite the interior of the tank

being possibly the safest place to be, and in this way the bombs and

rockets did not need to strike the tanks to be effective. When asked

for an opinion by the ORS on the number of abandoned tanks in the

Mortain battle area, an experienced NCO of a US anti-tank unit

replied,

There is nothing but air attack that would

make a crack Panzer crew do that.

III. Falaise Pocket

The retreat of the German army towards the River Seine in order to

escape encirclement in the Falaise 'Pocket' in August 1944 also

provided the Allied tactical air forces with an abundance of targets,

and great claims of destruction were made. On 18 August RAF 2nd TAF

alone claimed 1 159 vehicles destroyed and 1 700 damaged together with

124 tanks destroyed and 100 damaged. On the same day the Ninth Air

Force claimed 400 vehicles destroyed.

During the period of this retreat nearly 9 900 sorties were flown by

the RAF. Destruction was claimed of 3 340 soft and 257 armoured

vehicles or some 36 targets destroyed for every hundred sorties. The

USAAF claimed 2 520 soft and 134 armoured vehicles destroyed during

nearly 2 900 sorties, or some 91 successes per hundred. Overall claims

therefore amount to a successful strike approximately every second

sortie.

SORTIES AND CLAIMS BY ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES

FALAISE POCKET, AUGUST 1944

RAF 2nd TAF US 9th AF Total

Sorties 9 896 2 891 12 787

MT destroyed 3 340 2 520 5 860

Armour destroyed 257 134 391

____________________________________________________________

Total claims 3 597 2 654 6 251

Claims per sortie 0.36 0.91 0.49

Shortly after the pocket had been closed No.2 ORS conducted an

extensive investigation in the area to determine the German losses

caused by air attack and the effectiveness of air-to-ground

weapons.The principal roads taken by the Germans were patrolled in

three areas; the 'Pocket' itself around Falaise, the area at the mouth

of the pocket near Chambois and referred to as the 'Shambles', and the

area known as the 'Chase' which led to the Seine crossings. The result

of the investigation is shown in the following tables:

GERMAN ARMOURED AND MT VEHICLE LOSSES IN THE FALAISE 'POCKET'

AUGUST 1944

Abandonded/

TYPE Rockets Bombs Cannon/MG Destr.b.crew Total

Tanks, SP Guns, AFVs 11 4 18 100 133

Lorries, cars, mcs 4 43 278 376 701

Guns - - 1 50 51

__________________________________________________________________

Totals 15 47 297 526 885

Percentages 1.7 5.5 33.5 59.5

Of the 133 armoured vehicles of all types located by the ORS in the

'Pocket', only 33 had been the victim of any form of air attack. The

remaining hundred had been destroyed by their crews or simply

abandoned. Air attacks were far more effective against soft-skinned

vehicles. Of 701 cars, trucks and motor cycles found in the 'Pocket',

325 had been the victim of attack from the air, and of these 85 per

cent were hit by cannon or machine-gun fire - a testament to the

effectiveness of this form of attack. The fact however remains that of

a total of 885 vehicles of all types lost by the Germans in the

Falaise pocket nearly 60 per cent were destroyed or abandoned by their

crews rather than as the direct result of attack from the air. The

large number of armoured and motor vehicles abandoned or destroyed by

their crews is hardly surprising in such a retreat, and it was thought

many of those destroyed by air weapons had already been abandoned. Air

attack, though, was considered responsible for much of the abandonment

as a result of causing disorganisation; moreover, destroyed vehicles

had completely blocked roads. Cannon and machine gun attacks had

proved to be extremely effective against the densely-packed motor

transport. Such vehicles hit by cannon or machine gun rounds were

invariably burnt out, and the report noted that where pock marks of

strikes appeared in the roads a burnt vehicle was usually found.

GERMAN ARMOUR LOSSES IN THE 'SHAMBLES' AREA

AUGUST 1944

Ground

Fire Rocket Crew Abandoned Unknown Total

TYPE

Pzkw VI - - 9 3 - 12

Pzkv V 3 - 8 11 - 22

Pzkv IV 2 2 12 6 - 22

Pzkv III 2 - 1 1 1 5

SP Guns 1 - 8 12 - 21

______________________________________________________________

Totals 8 2 38 33 1 82

Percentages 9.7 2.2 46.3 40.2 1.2

In the 'Shambles' so many German vehicles were found that it was

impossible to examine each in detail; they were classes either as

burnt or unburnt as an indication of wether they had been hit by air

weapons or abandoned. A total of 1 411 tanks and vehicles were classed

as burnt, and 1 380 as unburnt. Of the 187 tanks and SP guns found in

this area, 82 were examined in detail, of these only two were

destroyed by attack from the air and eight by ground fire, while all

but one of the remainder were either burnt by their crews or merely

abandoned. There was no evidence - such as rocket craters - to suggest

that any appreciable number of those burnt tanks and SP guns not

examined had been destroyed by air weapons. A sample of 330 of the

softskin vehicles, and 31 of the lightly armoured vehicles, found in

the 'Shambles' were also examined in detail. Of the softskin vehicles,

110 were found to have been destroyed by air weapons and 135 abandoned

intact, while of the lightly armoured vehicles 6 were credited to air

weapons and 13 were found abandoned intact. The effectiveness of

strafing against soft-skin and light armoured vehicles was again

confirmed, this being the greatest known cause of destruction.

GERMAN ARMOUR LOSSES IN THE 'CHASE' AREA

AUGUST 1944

Ground

Fire Crew Abandoned Unknown Total

TYPE

Pzkw VI - 7 4 - 11

Pzkv V 2 23 1 2 28

Pzkv IV 3 16 7 2 28

Other tanks - - 2 1 3

SP Guns 3 9 12 4 28

______________________________________________________________

Totals 8 55 26 9 98

Percentages 8.1 56.1 26.5 9.1

The 'Chase' area yielded a count of 3 648 vehicles and guns, and of

3 332 light armoured and soft-skin vehicles, 2 390 were classed as

burnt and 942 unburnt. The ORS were unable to cover every road in such

an extensive area, so the absolute number of vehicles and guns was

unknown but thought to be less than twice that recorded. Of the 150

tanks and self-propelled guns 98 were examined. None were found to

have been destroyed by rockets, nor were there any craters to suggest

rocket attacks had been made in the area. Most, amounting to some 81

per cent, had been destroyed by their crews or abandoned.

To allow for the possibility of German vehicles and guns being missed

in wooded terrain or along unchecked roads, No.2 ORS estimated that

the Germans had lost some 10 000 vehicles and guns during the retreat,

a figure not thought to be in error by more than 2 000 either way.

This was broken down as 1 500 in the 'Pocket' area, 3 500 in the

'Shambles', and 5 000 in the 'Chase'. As it was estimated that the

Germans must have had a total of some 30 000 vehicles it was

considered that two-thirds, including about 250 tanks and SP guns, had

escaped across the Seine. This was regarded as the result of the air

forces attempting general destruction rather than trying to achieve

interdiction by attacking key 'choke' points, a charge strongly

refuted by 2nd TAF as taking no account of weather, flak levels, or

bomblines set by friendly ground forces. In fact No.2 ORS

overestimated the number of German tanks that had escaped, as on 22 -

23 August the German Army Group B, reporting on the state of its eight

surviving Panzer divisions, listed only some 72 tanks.

The retreat to the Seine clearly reveals the limitations of Allied

air-to-ground weapons against tanks, particularly the 3-inch rocket.

Only ten out of 301 tanks and SP guns examined, and three out of 87

armoured troop carriers examined, were found to have been destroyed by

this weapon - these figures must be compared with 222 claims of armour

destruction made by Typhoon pilots alone. In contrast is the marked

effectiveness of cannon and machine guns, and to a lesser extent

bombs, against soft-skin transport vehicles. By destroying large

numbers of these, thus blocking roads and increasing congestion, the

fighter-bombers indirectly caused the abandonment of many tanks.

Moreover, many of the tanks and SP guns were found abandoned without

petrol, not least because trucks carrying their fuel had been shot up

from the air. German prisoners described how the threat of air attack

restricted movement to the hours of darkness until congestion and

haste compelled movement by day. They also told how whenever aircraft

appeared crews stopped to take cover and vehicles were driven off the

main roads into side roads which in turn became blocked. In effect,

the almost continuous fighter-bomber attacks in daylight, within a

restricted area upon retreating troops, caused a great deal of

demoralization and delay which prevented many tanks and vehicles

escaping.

IV. Ardennes

The influence of Allied tactical air power upon German ability to

carry out large-scale armoured operations was so great by the end of

1944 that the timing of the German Ardennes offensive was dictated by

the occurence of bad weather. In the early stages of the offensive,

which began on 16 Dec 1944, fog and low cloud protected the tank

spearheads from aerial observation and attack. Then the weather

cleared and Allied fighter-bomber pilots were presented with targets

such as they had not seen since Normandy and, as in Normandy, they

made large claims for the destruction of armour. Between 17 December

1944 and 16 January 1945 the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands of the

Ninth Air Force and RAF 2nd TAF claimed a total of 413 German armoured

vehicles destroyed in the Ardennes salient, 324 of which were claimed

as tanks. In early January No.2 ORS began an investigation of these

claims, in the middle of the month they were joined by ORS 2nd TAF and

a joint report was produced.

Although hampered by thick snow which prevented the discovery of

rocket craters and burnt patches caused by napalm bombs, the ORS were

able to examine 101 armoured vehicles - the practice being to search

an area within 2 - 3 kilometres of each claim. The claims for

destruction within the salient are shown below:

ALLIED AIR CLAIMS FOR GERMAN ARMOUR DESTROYED

IN THE ARDENNES SALIENT

IN AREA EXAMINED BY ORS IN WHOLE SALIENT

Armor. Armor.

Tanks Vehic. Total Tanks Vehic. Total

IX TAC 62 23 85 140 69 209

XIX TAC 2 0 2 176 19 195

2nd TAF 2 1 3 8 1 9

_____________________________ _____________________

Totals 66 24 90 324 89 413

The air weapons used were general purpose high-explosive bombs,

fragmentation bombs, napalm fire bombs, and rockets. Many of the tanks

claimed by Ninth Air Force had also been engaged by machine guns, some

only by this means. For the 101 tanks and armoured vehicles examined,

damage was atrributed as in the following table:

Light

Tiger II Panther Mk IV SP Gun Armour Total

AIR

Bomb 1 - - - - 1

Possibly

air attack - 3 - 2* 1 6*

GROUND

AP Shot 1 16 1 9* 8 36

HE Shell - 3 - 1 4 8

Demolition 2 10 1 - 4 17

Abandoned 1 10 - 4 7 22

Other Cause - - 1 1 - 2

Unknown - 5 2 1 2 10

________________________________________________________

Total 5 47 5 18 26 101

Considering that this represents the investigation of claims for the

destruction of 66 tanks and 24 armoured vehicles the effect of air

attack seems unimpressive; a maximum of seven out of 101 vehicles

examined, some six per cent. It was found that fighter-bomber attack

had also involved some wastage, with bombs dropped among tanks already

knocked out by American troops, and it is revealing that even when

these bombs landed within 15 yards of the tanks no additional damage

was done. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that, while the

contribution of the air forces to stemming the German offensive had

been considerable, this

was not by the direct destruction of armour, which appears

to have been insignificant; but rather by the strafing and

bombing of supply routes, which prevented essential supplies

from reaching the front.

V. The Identification of Kills

As regards the reliability of the ORS ground surveys, one may wonder

if tanks attributed to destruction by ground weapons had in fact been

knocked out by aircraft and subsequently used as target practice by

Allied troops. However, such mistakes were very unlikely. Bombs and

rockets were harly ever, if at all, used singly, and near vehicles

destroyed by such weapons were always found the craters of near

misses. Moreover, rocket craters were distinctive, oval in shape and

usually with part of the rocket tube or fins in or near them. Parts of

the rocket were also often found in tanks or vehicles destroyed by the

weapon. In or near tanks and vehicles destroyed by their crews were

often found the metal cases that had contained German demolition

charges, these being placed in a specific part of the tank, such as

under engine hatches. Pock marks on roads or holes roughly six inches

in diameter in the ground indicated machine gun or cannon attacks, and

tanks and vehicles that had been strafed bore holes or dents on upper

surfaces. It is possible that tanks abandoned intact were subsequently

used for target practice, and attributed to a particular ground

weapon, but this has little relevance to the effectiveness of air

weapons.

Reposted again due tot he number of people apparently ignoring the findings of the ORS reference the efficacy of bomb and gun/cannon kills.'

RE Charlie Rock

So the P-47 flight commander ignores attacking the top decks because they are too heavily armoured. The rest of the flight also ignores shooting the top decks in favour of shooting suspension components. Apparently the top armour is considered too thick to enable a kill with .50cal. He states that the belly armour is considered weaker than the other armoured surfaces, which is only true in the In the PIV. The forward belly of the Panther was almost double the thickness of ‘top armour’ (30mm) the StuG top and belly armour were identical at 16mm and directly comparable to the 16mm top superstructure and top turret armour of late PIV J and top armour of the Panther. Gaining better angles through ricochets defeats velocity and deforms rounds thereby reducing their effectiveness at perforating armour. The pilots note themselves that they could not be sure.

[ March 22, 2002, 01:13 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Gyrene]

Originally posted by gunnergoz:

To WBS...are you sure about the "M-3 .50 cal. machinegun" part? I'm pretty sure that the M-2 or "Ma Deuce" still reigns supreme 60 years after WW2. An M-3 .50 just doesn't ring any bells with me...and Lordie knows that the History Channel never gets anything wrong!

Seriously, the post-war versions of the .50 have had modifications but it is still referred to as the M-2 even after all these years. Perhaps they were referring to cannon-armed versions of the sabre mounting 20mm guns (IIRC the Navy Sabre, called the FJ Fury, had a cannon armament, for one.)

I don't think many aircraft ever mounted the M2.

While the receivers might have been the same there were significant barrel and recoil absorber differences between ground & air .50's and so they used different part numbers.

Gyrene

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks for posting, Bastables. Though your charts got muddled by the BB, the text should have been clear enough. I hope this puts the right ideas into some empty heads.

Michael

[Ozzy]

Originally posted by Rollstoy:

There is something I do not understand:

If the bullets ricochet from the street surface in the first place, why should it not, subsequently, ricochet also from a steel plate (tank belly), which is parallel to the street surface?

Does ricocheting consistently alter the path of the bullet such that after the event the bullets trajectory is "steeper" than before?! If yes, doesn't this consume an enormous amount of kinetic energy?

Regards, Thomm

Well, again, I am no ballistics expert, but there are some certain basics of projectile trajectory and penetration capabilities

a) projectiles do not fly "statically", but have a rotation due to the rifled barrel of the gun/rifle that fired it to stabilize the trajectory. This is the reason for differing ricochet angles when hitting a surface.

If it ricochets, three things happen:

- the surface will be deformed

- the trajectory is changed (i.e. the projectile is accelerated to other vectors)

- the projectile will be deformed or even breaks apart

all this consumes pretty much kinetic energy, thus reducing its penetration capacity.

The deformation of the projectile additionally de-stabilizes its trajectory, which de-accelerates it even more.

c) the deformation of the projectile reduces its penetration ability additionally, as it looses its sharp lined body, thus the forces and stresses on and in the armour are no longer very concentrated.

I still think that this method is very ineffective

[TSword]

ciks,

You are wrong, the Tiger's late toparmor was increased because of Artillery, and not the M2.

Very few tanks (Tigers and KT's) were actually lost due to fighterbomberattacks in contrary to popular belief. The M2 has not the penetrating power to pierce 25 mm armor at angles.

Both Tiger and Panther are vulnerable against 12.7 mm fire or even smaller calibres, because of the engine radiator fans. Those fans sit right under slitted openings on the reardeck, which will likely brake even on some load of small arms fire and stop functioning, this renders the tank immobilized after some time (dependent on climatic

conditions, the fan's speed was regulated by a thermostat).

There was a fieldmod for the Panther in late 1944 which covered the radiator fan intakes with some armored plates against this type of harassment and ari-shell-fragments.

[TSword]

Gyrene,

The 12.7's mounted in P-47's, P-51's and so fort had a muzzle velocity of over 800 m/s. Futhermore the 12.7's mounted for instance in the B-17 look exactly the same as those in Jeeps, tankroofs, Halftracks, even the mountings are very similar. They all were called M2 (Source Bill Gunston on Aircraft armament)

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by TSword:

...the 12.7's mounted for instance in the B-17 look exactly the same as those in Jeeps, tankroofs, Halftracks, even the mountings are very similar.

True for the flexible mounts on bombers. The guns mounted in the wings of fighters or as, for instance, the cheek packs on medium bombers such as the B-25 and B-26 were another matter.

Michael

[TSword]

Micheal,

Ok, Gunston's book may be a bit unclear about the detailed naming, but the performances of the different "M-2 derivatives" (WWII-Models) where almost similar, right ?

[Michael Emrys]

Tsword,

Can't say for sure if the ground pounders and flyboys shared the same ammo types, but probably they did. That would be the big determinant of ballistics, along with barrel length. As noted earlier, the flying guns were tuned to a higher ROF, were electrically fired, had different feed mechanisms, and were charged by solenoid (which presumably was also the way they tried to clear jams). There were probably other detail differences. Whether any or all of that would effect what you call "performance" I would hesitate to guess.

Michael

[YankeeDog]

Bastables -

Thanks for a very informative post. The actual kill figures for aerial attack on AFVs I had heard elsewehere, but the Abandoned/Destroyed by crew figures are new to me, and quite surprising. It's especially notable that many of the abandoning crews were from already blooded units, and therefore presumably not raw recruits.

One is tempted to say that the crews must have been abandoning for a good reason, and I guess this may have been true in some cases - the crews of tanks in a column that had had all of its fuel trucks destroyed by strafing attacks would probably be loathe to sit around in tanks with no fuel waiting for enemy infantry to catch up with them. At the same time, your data does seem to support the idea that there at least some of the abandonments were due to a somewhat irrational fear of air attack.

I guess it just goes to show how the psychological the effect of some weapons can be just as important as the acutal physical effect. Now that vehicle crew morale is going to be a factor in CM:BB, I guess this would be the most important 'tweak' to the air attack model in CM to consider.

I'd personally be very pissed off if my Tiger crew bailed out as a result of an air attack, but I have to admit that it might not be unrealistic, even if the attack was unlikely to actually physically damage or KO the tank.

Cheers,

YD

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

I guess it just goes to show how the psychological the effect of some weapons can be just as important as the acutal physical effect.

I think this is most strikingly true of airpower in WW II. Guys on the ground most emphatically did not like getting bombed from the air. The reasons for this might make an interesting study for a psychologist. There seems to have been a profound feeling of impotence that often (there have been exceptions) infected troops subjected to attack from the air. Conversely, they were inordinately cheered in the instances when they managed to shoot one of "the bastards" down. I think this may be an outstanding example of Napoleon's dictum that "The moral is to the physical as three is to one."

Michael

[Bastables]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

Bastables -

Thanks for a very informative post. The actual kill figures for aerial attack on AFVs I had heard elsewehere, but the Abandoned/Destroyed by crew figures are new to me, and quite surprising. It's especially notable that many of the abandoning crews were from already blooded units, and therefore presumably not raw recruits.

One is tempted to say that the crews must have been abandoning for a good reason, and I guess this may have been true in some cases - the crews of tanks in a column that had had all of its fuel trucks destroyed by strafing attacks would probably be loathe to sit around in tanks with no fuel waiting for enemy infantry to catch up with them. At the same time, your data does seem to support the idea that there at least some of the abandonments were due to a somewhat irrational fear of air attack.

I guess it just goes to show how the psychological the effect of some weapons can be just as important as the acutal physical effect. Now that vehicle crew morale is going to be a factor in CM:BB, I guess this would be the most important 'tweak' to the air attack model in CM to consider.

I'd personally be very pissed off if my Tiger crew bailed out as a result of an air attack, but I have to admit that it might not be unrealistic, even if the attack was unlikely to actually physically damage or KO the tank.

Cheers,

YD

Sort of, most of the abandonments were due to the nowhere to go killer.

Also the PW data tells of only 'green' crews abandoning under fire.

'Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of air

attack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the later

joint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated an

irrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relative

safety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:

The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the

air they remained in their tanks which had no more than

superficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses from

bombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-

experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.'

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Also the PW data tells of only 'green' crews abandoning under fire.

'Prisoner of war data further confirmed the demoralising effect of air

attack upon tank crews. German tank crewmen questioned for the later

joint RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness indicated an

irrational compulsion among inexperienced men to leave the relative

safety of their tank and seek alternative cover during air attack:

The experienced crews stated that when attacked from the

air they remained in their tanks which had no more than

superficial damage (cannon strikes or near misses from

bombs). They had a great difficulty in preventing the in-

experienced men from baling out when our aircraft attacked.'

Good point. As I understand your thrust, then, ideally in CM:BB if a tank crew is green or maybe regular (would a conscript tank crew ever exist?? Maybe for the russians...) it might bail under air attack. Otherwise, it just sits tight and weathers the storm. It's hard to see where the 'nowhere to go' factor could come into play in a CM battle.

Thanks again for some great stuff,

YD