Questions on 75mm L/24 ammunition for the early Panzer IV's

[Little_Black_Devil]

I've been doing some reading up on the "early" or "earlier" tanks which the Germans would have been using on the Eastern Front - you know, all in preperation (or should I say anticipation) of my next addiction.

Anyhow, I was reading up on the early Panzer IV's, in particular the ones armed with the short barrelled low velocity 75mm L/24 gun. The term "T-34 Bait" comes to mind.

Back to my point - I'm wondering if anyone here can answer these questions.

I have run into a bit of confusion surrounding the types of rounds the 75mm L/24 gun would have fired (during the opening stages of Barbarosa), either specifically in an anti-armour role or against other hard targets (like bunkers for instance).

The biggest issue I have run into is the K.Gr.rot.Pz round. Is it AP, APC or APCBC?

Would this round still have been in use by the time Barbarosa rolled around, or would it likely have been replaced by the Pzgr.39 round, which I believe is APCBC?

In regards to the initial hollow charge or HEAT rounds, I understand the very first one available for the Stuk37 L/24 (for the early StuG III's) to have been the Gr.38 HL or Gr.38 H1, succedded by the Gr.38 H1/A.

Which of these would have likely been in service by June 1941 - and moreover would the early L/24 equipt PzIV's have carried any of these at all?

Thanks in advance for your help.

P.S. - sorry if this is a double post, the first one didn't seem to appear.

[Andreas]

There is a statement in 'The initial period of war' by a German officer that 'HEAT was not available then', when talking about the impossibility of dealing with gamey Red Army Ubertanks when all you have is either a Panzer 38t or a Panzer IV kurz during the opening battles of Barbarossa. The guy was either in 1. or 6. PD.

[M Hofbauer]

this page might be of interest to you:

Panzer IV Universe

other comments: "H1" (h - one) looks like a typo/confusion with what should really be "Hl" (h - small "L").

IIRC we had a discussion about this, and the HL ammo was introduced late in 1941, and not available immediately. Hope someone else has a better memory, or his books at hand.

[Mattias]

Hmm.. The last time we brought it up I think there was some indications that the HL rounds were put in limited production as early as 1940 but that they were withheld from deployment in the early stages of Barbarossa.

This is right off the top of my head, and it sounds a bit odd to begin with... The big game starts soon so I don't have time to check it out

M.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mattias:

The big game starts soon so I don't have time to check it out

M.

See, I told you that you need not worry about the World Cup finals interfering with the Bovington trip.

[Mattias]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Just rub it in you nasty person

Tough luck we had, but that way it goes when ball round is...

At least now I can watch the rest of the games without my heart in the throat, even cheer a bit for Sven Göran and that nation playing for him.

But hey, onward to more important matters! Did you get my last mail about the free beer etc? Just want to hear if we are "go" as suggested

M.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mattias:

At least now I can watch the rest of the games without my heart in the throat, even cheer a bit for Sven Göran and that nation playing for him.

But hey, onward to more important matters! Did you get my last mail about the free beer etc? Just want to hear if we are "go" as suggested

M.

I am sure that they suggest abdication and making Sven Göran interim king until David Beckham grows up soon, if yesterday is anything to go by. My word.

Yep, we are all systems go. Got the email, but due to other CM related matters did not have a lot of time responding.

[Little_Black_Devil]

Thanks for the responses guys.

I already had PzIV Universe bookmarked - great site.

I'm still left wondering though, whether the K.Gr.rot.Pz was AP,APC or APCBC and which (if any) HEAT round the PzIV would have carried as a standard loadout by June 1941.

[Pak40]

Originally posted by Little_Black_Devil:

Thanks for the responses guys.

I already had PzIV Universe bookmarked - great site.

I'm still left wondering though, whether the K.Gr.rot.Pz was AP,APC or APCBC and which (if any) HEAT round the PzIV would have carried as a standard loadout by June 1941.

Have you looked in the Handbook of German Military Forces? My copy is at home, I will give it a look when I get home tonight. But, my personal opinion is that there was a AP round for this gun, although it wouldn't be very effective because of the low velocity. They did make a HEAT round but I have no idea when it became available.

[Little_Black_Devil]

Originally posted by Pak40;

Have you looked in the Handbook of German Military Forces? My copy is at home, I will give it a look when I get home tonight. But, my personal opinion is that there was a AP round for this gun, although it wouldn't be very effective because of the low velocity. They did make a HEAT round but I have no idea when it became available.

Yup, I checked my copy of the good 'ol "Handbook" - no dice. I know for certain that the low velocity 75mm L/24 gun did fire an AP round, I'm just not exactly sure what exactly it was at this stage of the war (K.Gr.rot.Pz or Pzgr39? - AP/APC or APCBC?).

I also know that this gun had access to hollow charge rounds (like the Gr.38 HL/A or Gr.38 H1/A). What I don't know, is specifically what type of Hollow Charge/HEAT round would have been issued during the opening stages of Barbarossa - and in particular, if these rounds were only issued to assault guns or the L/24 armed PzIV's.

I guess these aren't exactly the types of questions which can easily be answered by any single comprehensive source.

Anyone know these answers?

[JasonC]

I have seen no indications that any HEAT was available for them. Some anecdotal bits of information strongly suggest they were not. For instance, as late as October, describing tank fighting on the road to Tula, Guderian describes what Pz IVs needed to do to knock out T-34s, and no mention of HEAT is made. Instead they were supposed to maneuver for a rear turret shot (!). Another anecdote is that some of the later German tank aces who fought in this period did record several kills vs. T-34s with 75L24 - but did so by hitting the turret ring and similar weak points with plain AP. I doubt very much we'd hear either sort of thing from sources that prominent if every 75L24 was packing T-34 killing HEAT.

[Little_Black_Devil]

Thats entirely possible. Seems difficult to actually confirm though.

I find it interesting however, that the PzIIIN for instance, was fitted with the 75mm L/24 gun to provide a fighting platform which could throw around the very effective 75mm HE round, while also having access to the more modern and successful HEAT rounds (like the HL/B and C). These "newer" HEAT rounds, either had surpassed or were surpassing the 50mm L/60 AP rounds penetration capability, and were seen as a welcome addition to the front in order to help deal with the ever menacing T-34. This had to have counted on the supply of HEAT rounds for the L/24 gun were being steadily available, as even the 75mm L/24 Pzgr39 (APCBC) round was not effective enough to realistically deal with T-34's.

I imagine that this is the first "real" advent of widespread HEAT rounds with the exclusive intent for use in the anti-armour role, and - the answer to part of my question here. I just can't seem to clearly confirm it.

I think maybe I need to get my hands on some of Ian V. Hogg's older books which deal with some related subject matter.

The people at Amazon.com/Amazon.ca must love me.

In any event, earlier HEAT rounds may have existed in service - and been used even as early as 1940. I also imagine, that these rounds were more likely to have been limited to StuG's with their availability being quite rare, and their use being intended for bunkers and other hard targets - but not exclusively as anti-armour weapons.

Thats all conjecture though - based off of more of those darned anecdotes.

[WWB]

WRT to penetration, the 50l60 and 75l24 with HEAT were pretty similar at ranges where you could expect to hit something with the short 75. I think the big difference is that if you hit something with a 75mm HEAT round it had a much more likely chance of being instantly out of action. 50mm just did not have enough KE to clearly kill a T34 on the first hit. And when you were outnumbered like the germans were, you needed first hit kills.

But the IIINs were not built with an anti-armor role in mind, but a 'keep infantry off real anti-armor tanks role.' This is evidenced by their early employment--as supporting tanks to tigers.

WWB

[mike_the_wino]

Originally posted by JasonC

. Some anecdotal bits of information strongly suggest they were not. For instance, as late as October, describing tank fighting on the road to Tula, Guderian describes what Pz IVs needed to do to knock out T-34s, and no mention of HEAT is made. Instead they were supposed to maneuver for a rear turret shot (!). Another anecdote is that some of the later German tank aces who fought in this period did record several kills vs. T-34s with 75L24 - but did so by hitting the turret ring and similar weak points with plain AP.

Gawd, I love this forum. There is some much I don't have a freaking clue about and then...BAM!! Here it is.

This may sound stupid but here goes. If German tanks were so under-gunned then how did they (Germans)achieve such advances through Russia? I understand surprise played a big part coupled w/ air cover for the first part of the offensive. But the Germans were outmanned and it sounds like out-gunned. Short answers, with small words please, as I am obviously thickheaded for this not to occuring to me before.

[Little_Black_Devil]

Your absolutely correct wwb_99.

Sorry if I came accross as saying that the PzIIIN was developed as an exlusive anti-armour platform - thats not what I was trying to say.

My intent was to illustrate what I'am aware of; as the first (and perhaps easiest to find) obvious widespread employment of the hollow charge/HEAT round with the intent of its use in the anti-armour role. Thats not to say that the PzIIIN was designed as an anti-armour asset (not at all), but rather the HEAT rounds it was being equipt with (more as general practice) were intended to give it a fighting chance in tank vs. tank combat, IF the PzIIIN found itself in a situation where it was faced against enemy armour. (Not that it sought out enemy armour)

These HEAT rounds were substantially more effective than the underpowered 75mm L/24 APCBC rounds against armour. I just wonder when the Germans realized this and made a concious decision to employ the hollow charge rounds as anti-armour weapons, and which 75mm L/24 armed vehicles would have recieved these rounds with the anti-armour capabilities in mind.

Now, in the case of the early PzIV's which were armed with the 75mm L/24 at the begining of Barbarossa - would they likely have been armed with these "newer" HEAT rounds like the Gr.38 HL/B and C, or would they have been limited to the older HEAT rounds like the Gr.38 HL and/or HL/A? Thats ultimately what I'm after, which is - did the L/24 armed PzIV's carry HEAT rounds as general practice when Barbarosa began, with the intent of using them in the anti-armour role? Or had the necessity for these rounds to be used as anti-armour weapons yet to evolve?

Wow - did I just make that way too complicating or what?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Halfdane:

If German tanks were so under-gunned then how did they (Germans)achieve such advances through Russia? I understand surprise played a big part coupled w/ air cover for the first part of the offensive. But the Germans were outmanned and it sounds like out-gunned. Short answers, with small words please, as I am obviously thickheaded for this not to occuring to me before.

You can try this tactically now. Get in some Shermans (green/conscript). Remove most of the ammo (all of the ammo for some of them). Button them. Let the AI attack you, with no infantry support. Defend with infantry, Panzer II, Pak38 and the odd 88 Flak 36 thrown in. Buy German air support. Now imagine you had a vehicle morale and command model and what that would do to the Sherman attack.

When Barbarossa started, the vast majority of Soviet tanks were of the light T26 and BTx variety, which could be handled perfectly well by Panzer 38t, Panzer II, Panzer III and Panzer IV short. There were a good number of KV1 and T34 in the Soviet arsenal, and while these could be devastating, most of them suffered from some or all of the following:

- untrained crews (many of the vehicles only reached their units in April/May 1941)

- absence of ammo

- drivetrain prone to failure on the KV1

- absence of fuel

- lack of air cover

- badly trained unit leaders (there was a massive expansion programme going on in the Red Army, but it could not cope with demand for qualified junior leaders)

- absence of radios

- 2-man turrets

- absence of formation training. The Soviet tank forces were reorganised, reorganised again, and because that had been so much fun, reorganised some more, prior to 1941.

- Unwieldy formations. The initial tank formations were just too large, and suffered from weakness in combined arms

Err, that's probably not it, but that should be a good start.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Little_Black_Devil:

The biggest issue I have run into is the K.Gr.rot.Pz round. Is it AP, APC or APCBC?

Would this round still have been in use by the time Barbarosa rolled around, or would it likely have been replaced by the Pzgr.39 round, which I believe is APCBC?

[snips]

I have never seen mention of a PzGr 39 round for the 7.5cm L24, but it seems to me that the striking velocity would be so low that there is no thing to be gained by having a piercing cap. I can't find a description of the 7.5cm K Gr rot Pz round, but I would think it most likely to be APHE, which was more or less the customary AP nature for low-velocity weapons.

All the best,

John.

[rexford]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Little_Black_Devil:

The biggest issue I have run into is the K.Gr.rot.Pz round. Is it AP, APC or APCBC?

Would this round still have been in use by the time Barbarosa rolled around, or would it likely have been replaced by the Pzgr.39 round, which I believe is APCBC?

[snips]

I have never seen mention of a PzGr 39 round for the 7.5cm L24, but it seems to me that the striking velocity would be so low that there is no thing to be gained by having a piercing cap. I can't find a description of the 7.5cm K Gr rot Pz round, but I would think it most likely to be APHE, which was more or less the customary AP nature for low-velocity weapons.

All the best,

John.</font>

[JasonC]

Andreas has given part of the answer. To flesh it out one needs only to add a few things specific to the Russia case, some common early war cases, and a few things that generalize over the whole war.

One in the last category and probably the most important is to simply recognize that tank gun-armor specs were never decisive at the operational or strategic level at any point in the war. The "tech dominance" idea that many tactical gamers apparently absorb with tables of stats just does not generalize to higher scales. The guys with the thicker tanks and bigger guns just do not win. This is not particular to nationalities or periods, it is true over the whole war and on every front. Whatever effects such advantages do have up at the larger scales is swamped by larger factors of other kinds.

Thus, the Germans conquered France in Pz IIs, when the French had Char-Bs. They conquered western Russia in Pz IIIs, when the Russians had T-34s. The Russians then took it back in T-34s (still with short 76mm guns), when the Germans had already fielded Tigers and Panthers. The Germans beat Matildas and Valentines and Grants in North Africa, mostly in Pz III Hs with short 50mm guns. The Allies later took Tunisia against Pz IV longs and even a few Tigers, with nothing better than Sherman 75s. Later the Allies took all of France with mostly Sherman 75s, against Tigers and Panthers. By the time the western Allies had many long 76mm AFVs, the Germans had King Tigers and Jagdpanthers - and still lost. The biggest tank on the field was never decisive at the operational or strategy scale.

Other factors mattered more. Numbers, logistical depth, support of other arms (related to both, since infantry depends on numbers and artillery depends on logistics), doctrine (combined arms vs. armor heavy TOEs e.g.), operational handling (the "moves on the map"), surprise and intel or lack thereof, etc.

Next there are early war factors that had mostly gone away by mid war (say Kursk) but were strongly present in Barbarossa. Chief among these were the initial German edge in armor doctrine, and the superiority of the "soft" aspects of their tank designs. By the latter I mean larger turrets, better vision, radios, and good maneuverability characteristics. German tanks were made to be able to see and hear, as Guderian put it, instead of being blind and deaf, like WW I tanks had been. It is not commonly realised just how poorly the early war Allied tanks looked in these respects.

The doctrinal difference is frequently misunderstood by oversimplifiers. There were two distinct errors made by the early war Allies, who veered from one initial mistake to another just as bad in the opposite direction, before learning what actually worked. The errors can be called in shorthand, "infantry thinking" and "cavalry thinking". The former characterized much of French doctrine in 1940, and some of Russian in 1941. The latter characterized the remainder of their doctrines in those periods, British and American doctrine through 1942, and Russian doctrine until about mid 1943.

The infantry thinking error was to parcel tanks out all along the line to support infantry divisions, instead of massing it at decisive points. This was half right and half wrong. Not massing was an error. Working with infantry was not an error, but correct. The cavalry mistake mis-IDed the source of the error. It thought the correction was the mass the tanks and use them independent of the infantry. This resulted in very tank heavy formations that lacked combined arms. The cavalry error was right about massing the tanks. It was wrong about tanks operating alone.

Either error was deadly. The infantry error left most tanks out of position and let the enemy achieve armor superiority at breakthrough locations. The cavalry error exposed the massed tanks to enemy combined arms counters (PAK fronts, gun fronts, etc). The paradigmatic case of infantry error is Guderian having an entire Panzer corps at the key Meuse crossing site in France in 1940, against only about a brigade of French armor. Paradigmatic cases of cavalry error continued as late as Knightsbridge in 1942, where the Brits lost the better part of 3 armor brigades in one day, trying to attack a German PAK front in North Africa.

The right answer, armor thinking as opposed to either of the errors, was to mass the tanks but also support them with motorized infantry and artillery in sufficient strength to achieve combined arms effects. Compared to the infantry error, it preserved combined arms but put the armor in the driver's seat, and massed it. Compared to the cavalry error, it did mass the tanks but did not deprive them of the support of other arms. So e.g. against a PAK front, there was artillery to suppress defending guns. Against infantry in built up terrain or behind a river, there was supporting infantry to dig them out or force a crossing.

The Allies did not fully learn these lessons until around mid war. They IDed the infantry error relatively early, but mistakening veered in the other direction, thinking that in doing so they were imitating the Germans. As well as following the teachings of early British armor theorists like Fuller and BHL Hart, who had indeed inspired German armor doctrine, but had been surpassed in the pre-war German armor experiments which clearly showed the need for combined arms. The Germans had a minor penchant for the cavalry error (nothing like as bad as the Allies had it) at the time of the Polish and to a lesser extent the French campaign. By the time of the Russian one, they had sorted it all out.

You can track these doctrinal developments in changes in the TOE of armor formations. Early French armor was about half distributed in independent battalions and brigades meant to support infantry formations. You see that in Russia too. Armor divisions had very little infantry, with often 2 tank regiments to a single infantry regiment, sometimes a regiment to a battalion, thus 2-1 to 3-1 tank heavy force mixes (e.g. the US pattern 1942 AD, British pattern 1942 armor brigades). That is what cavalry thinking looks like, and it does not work.

In constrast, by the time of Barbarossa the Germans are using 2-4 tank to infantry battalion ratios in their panzer divisions. The US goes to 3-3 in their 1943 pattern AD, which proves to be an improvement but still light on the infantry side. They also develop the combat command flexible brigade structure, akin to German KG tasking, to handle combined arms. British ADs reduce the number of tanks and increase the infantry, with a 4-4 mix (recce armor, 3 armor battalions in the armor brigade, one infantry battalion there and 3 in the infantry brigade - or 4-5 if you count the engineers). The Russians adopt the tank and mechanized corps structures, which use component brigades much like US combat commands or German KGs, and reach a more sensible tank-infantry mix - but not until late 1942, and the bugs aren't worked out of the system until mid 1943.

So doctrinally, the Germans still had a big edge at the time of Barbarossa. They also had tanks with 3 man turrets, commanders who only had to command, radios in every tank, etc. The edge those things gave increased the larger the fight was. In a one on one, gun and armor specs look all important, and they remain important in a 4 on 4. But make the fight 15 on 15 or 50 on 50, and suddenly being deaf and blind matters a whole lot more. Because you can't track the battle, while the other guy can.

In the AARs about France 1940, for example, you see the German kill ratio explode as the size of an armor engagement increases, even with overall odds of 1:1 to 4:3. They don't do particularly well in the small fights, even when they bring numbers. They clobber the French in the big fights, even when the numbers are even. That is "soft system dominance", an effect of increased tactical *coordination* between the actions of this tank or tank platoon that that tank or tank platoon.

Then there are factors particular to Russia 1941. Some of which Andreas already covered. Only 1/6 of the Russian tank fleet were T-34s or KVs. The rest were 45mm gun light tanks, as good as the German ones in gun terms though lighter on the armor, but in no way superior and easily handled by the soft system and doctrinal edges the Germans had. In addition, there was strategic surprise, which has very large effects. The day of the attack, 90% of the Russian tank fleet was listed as in need of at least minor repairs. Readiness was very low. Many units, committed anyway, had numerous tanks break down irreparably after short road marches, and where subsequently abandoned by their crews as the Germans broken through almost everywhere.

There were cases where large numbers of running Russian heavies were nevertheless committed. An early one was in front of von Kleist's armor group, leading AG South. It halted the Germans for a few days and inflicted some losses. But the doctrinal weaknesses of the Russians prevented any grander result. They lacked combined arms, and the Germans reacted with gun fronts (a technique they had learned in France dealing with heavier Allied armor). Smaller actions later in the campaign also made a difference. Guderian's drive on Tula was halted for several weeeks by the intervention of Russian T-34s in strength.

But overall, there were not enough such occasions, and too many German breakthroughs, for them to appreciably alter the course of the campaign. Most of the German armor attacked in areas where there weren't any tanks, or only light 45mm ones, or only a handful of heavies that merely delayed them or forced minor detours. Bypassed, they could accomplish little. If they broke down they were abandoned, if not they still had to come back.

Small units of heavies could also be dealt with tactically by "hail" fire, meaning a whole company or battalion firing at one platoon for several minutes. Even without penetrations, the targets could be disabled or scared off by repeated hits, in much the same way Tigers at Kursk were dinged around by a blizzard of ATR, 45mm, and 76mm AP fire. In CM terms, you've seen 40mm Bofors or 37mm FLAK racked up so many hits that eventual gun damage and track hits wreck the targeted vehicle. Same kind of thing.

I hope that helps. Sorry it is not briefer, but it is an important subject with several aspects to it.

[Incognito]

Originally posted by JasonC:

For instance, as late as October, describing tank fighting on the road to Tula, Guderian describes what Pz IVs needed to do to knock out T-34s, and no mention of HEAT is made. Instead they were supposed to maneuver for a rear turret shot (!).

by hitting the turret ring and similar weak points with plain AP

.

But in CMBO crews dont try to hit "weak spots" becaus they producd killer bees (we all ready have stuarts vs Pz4 )

So is this going to be different in CMBB?

Or do veteran crews just have better chance to hit in weak spot?

Also I Would like to ask beta-testers opinion how accurate the tanks are in generally?

I feel they are little too so in CMBO.

[rexford]

Wittmann knocked out several T34 at Rowno with one shot per tank, with the StuG IIIA.

PzKpfw III with short 50mm gun beat out T34 in a cross country race experiment conducted by Russians. The multiple gears helped the PzKpfw III, as well as the suspension.

StuG III used high magnification scissors scopes which allowed better range estimation and precise aim points. And with scissors scopes a StuG could go vehicle down and still watch for ambush victims.

[Little_Black_Devil]

Wow - thaks guys.

I guess - the evidence and or sources suggest that its more likely that the K.Gr.rot.Pz was an APCBC round.

If there were an APHE round for the L/24 gun, then I imagine it was likely phased out of service before Barbarossa. I wonder if it saw any action during the war - or moreover, IF it actually existed at all?

Aside from that - I'am still curious as to the availability and implementation of the respective Hollow Charge/HEAT rounds for the L/24 gun and which one(s) would have likely been the "standard" HEAT round then available. Aside from that - who (which types of tanks/assault guns) would have carried them?

[James Crowley]

I have the following references:

Panzerkampfwagen (Ellis & Doyle 1976): APCBC shell, black, marked '7.5 cm Pzgr'

Fire and Movement (RAC tank Museum 1975) : APCBC

Armoured Firepower (Peter Gudgin 1997) APCBC(Pzgr39) - described as 'relatively ineffective'

[Mattias]

This must all, surely, have been covered before? It sounds familiar at least..

As I recall it the, brief, history of the 7,5 cm HL rounds was as follows:

The 7,5 cm Panzergrantpatrone 38 (HL) was made available in June 1940. The improved versions A, B and C followed, beginning at the end of 1941 and onwards into 1943.

After 1943 the production of 7,5 cm HL rounds stopped after something like 1.7 million having been produced. At this time the production of regular AP munitions for the long barrelled 7,5 cm guns had been ramped up, and the new weapon had relegating the “stumps” to a secondary role.

The use of the HL rounds however did not stop as there was still L/24 guns being deployed in fair numbers as well as plenty of HL being fired by long barrelled, primarily Pak, guns.

The HL rounds were fired by all types of guns capable of delivering them though they were, logically, less often used by weapons that had access to a more efficient AP projectile relying on kinetic energy. However the lack of regular AP ammunition saw them pressed into use with long barrelled weapons until the very end of the war.

Hmm, and on the PzGr 39..

I have a cut away drawing of a 7,5 cm “AP” round, Panzergranatpatrone rot that is quite obviously a APCBC round containing a bursting charge. It has a short, 243 mm, shell casing so it must be intended for the L/24 gun.

M.

[Tomb]

Mattius

do you have a reference for the info on the 38 HEAT round ?

regards

Tomb