Eastern Front 1945-some thoughts

[Danny Chung]

Hi guys

In anticipation of CM2, whenever it is going to be released, I've been brushing up on the history of the Eastern Front. I've read Barbarossa by Alan Clark and Red Storm on the Reich by Christopher Duffy.

I'm particularly interested in the period Jan to May 1945.

There's one thing immediately clear from reading these books, especially Red Storm, and that's the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet forces in January 45 on the eve of the Vistula-Oder operation.

In the appendix of Red Storm, Duffy points out the rule of thumb that in general, one Panzer division was pitted against the equivalent of one Soviet Tank army. In addition, the Panzer divisions by 1945 were depleted formations.

Duffy also points to sources that say that in 1944, the German Army was killing or wounding 4 Russians for every casualty of its own and the only the Soviet numerical advantage permitted the Soviets to sustain this ratio.

Apart from having not enough men, the German forces in the East suffered from crippling shortages of fuel and ammunition due to destruction of synthetic oil refineries and the overrunning of the major industrial centres of the Reich. Naturally this prevented them from carrying out counterattacks and simply defending themselves effectively.

Hitler's insistence on a thin and forward defence also hampered freedom of movement for his generals.

According to Red Storm, in January 45, there was an enforced demechanisation of the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions in that truck establishment was reduced by 25%.

Duffy goes on to point out the classic tactic of unsupported German infantry lying low and allowing Soviet tanks to pass and emerging to engage the following infantry simply fell apart after the initial artillery strike especially on 12 Jan 45 when the Vistula-Oder operation started. It is well known that the Soviets amassed overwhelming artillery support to support this offensive.

Anyway for a scenario or operation to be historically accurate in CM2 when depicting the period of early 1945, it would be necessary for the German forces to be numerically outnumbered and depleted as well as short of fuel and ammunition. As such anyone wanting to play as the Germans in the Vistula-Oder operation would be very hard pressed to keep control of the available forces and resist the Soviet advance.

On a slighly more happier note, Red Storm also notes the welcome support of the Luftwaffe tank busting Ju-87s of Lieutenant Colonel Hans Rudel especially on the Soviet bridgeheads on the Oder. Although the Allies enjoyed total air supremacy in the latter half of the war, the Luftwaffe did enjoy local and temporary superiority in Feb 1945. There was a very high rate of sorties carried out with 5008 sorties on 2 and 3 February 1945 at the Oder.

In this regard, I hope CM2 will offer at least this air support, however limited it may be, to enable the Germans to at least blunt some of the Soviet attack.

While unavailable on CMBO, it would be historically accurate for naval artillery support to be available to German forces operating near the Baltic. Again Duffy notes that ships such as Prinz Eugen gave valuable fire support to troops inland.

And finally, it would also be welcome in CM2 if the Volksturm would be more determined in their defensive fighting. Red Storm again advises that Volksturm units in East fought noticably more resolutely than their comrades in the West.

If any of you have access to this book, I highly recommend you read it. The part on the siege of Breslau is riveting especially the part about the armoured train. On 20 March 1945, it destroyed 7 tanks and 3 aircraft. I wonder if the good folks at Battlefront are considering sticking an armoured train into CM2?

Danny

[Sergei]

You should note that in a CM battle you won't have a German division facing a Soviet army, or anything like that. The scope is tactical, and as such, even the underdog can achieve a local superiority - at least for as long as the Soviet reinforcements arrive, which means that Germans can win a single battle but after that they will be forced back.

[Doug Beman]

Adding to Sergei's reply, sheer numerical superiority does not automatically mean that in every company-sized engagement the Germans will be outnumbered 4:1. There have been many posts/threads (I don't have any titles, and a search is likely to turn up lots of unrelated posts because the words used are pretty common) that the German advantage in flexibility, even given fuel shortage, meant that they could offset their overall inferiority in men/materiel.

I recall from reading higher-level east front history that it took the Red Army, for all their crushing weight of total numbers, 2.5 years to retake territory the Germans, had taken in 1 or 1.5; furthermore even in the early war the Soviets "raw outnumbered" the Germans.

In CM, it's up to scenario designers to do their research and create historical, or fictional-but-believable, battles. Whether that involves a 4:1 Soviet advantage down at the company level or not, it's then up to the German commander to do what he can to counter that with superior C^3, individual unit skills, and some good dumb luck.

DjB

[Michael Dorosh]

I just read in WHEN TITANS CLASHED that the tactic of lightly defending forward also let Soviet reconaissance teams penetrate German lines up to 24 hours before an attack, giving them a good picture of German defences. The Germans, on the hand, by 1944 could not rely on the civil population for info on Russian rear areas, as they could in 1941-42, and were restricted in their ability to gather intelligence.

Did the Russians have Ultra?

The four-to-one ratio gets bandied about quite a bit; they were on the defensive a great deal of the time. What it says about tactics in general isn't all that clear. You read about, say, German tank crews racking up phenomenal scores - were there really no proficient Soviet tank crewmen who could do the same thing?

[dalem]

Terminology is important too. Soviet formations were generally smaller than their German or Western counterparts. So, at least in early- to mid-war periods, the "mechanized corps" aren't really that much bigger than a Panzer Division, etc.

Late war, which is the point of discussion, the ratios were changing, but I'm new to this East Front stuff, so I don't know off the top of my head what the comparitive sizes were.

-dale

[ March 20, 2002, 12:11 PM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

You read about, say, German tank crews racking up phenomenal scores - were there really no proficient Soviet tank crewmen who could do the same thing?

I am sure there were very proficient (crack/elite) russian tank crews. But it is a simple rule of logic that due to the numbers involved they would simply have less targets to shoot at. Less opportunity to rack up kills.

Something along the lines why there were no allied fighter aircraft aces in the league of Hartmanns, Barkhorns and the many other 100-plus aces.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

You read about, say, German tank crews racking up phenomenal scores - were there really no proficient Soviet tank crewmen who could do the same thing?

I am sure there were very proficient (crack/elite) russian tank crews. But it is a simple rule of logic that due to the numbers involved they would simply have less targets to shoot at. Less opportunity to rack up kills.

Something along the lines why there were no allied fighter aircraft aces in the league of Hartmanns, Barkhorns and the many other 100-plus aces.</font>

[RCHRD]

A mechanised corps of the mid to late war period had more infantry than a panzergrenadier division and more tanks than a panzer division.

[ March 20, 2002, 01:52 PM: Message edited by: RCHRD ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by RCHRD:

A mechanised corps of the mid to late war period had more infantry than a panzergrenadier division and more tanks than a panzer division.

Wouldn't you expect a corps to have more assets than a division? I think dalem mentioned that they were bigger, but not by much - do you have figures?

[Michael Emrys]

The Soviets did have superiority in numbers in just about every category, but this has been exaggerated over the years. By 1945 the Red Army was also suffering a manpower shortage. Most non-Guard divisions were seriously understrength. I have heard that recent scholarship taking advantage of access to the Russian archives reveals that instead of the 4:1 advantage cited above, the numerical superiority was more on the order of 2.5:1.

Also, after 1943 the Soviets acquired greater tactical acumen. Their victories were not simply the result of throwing an unlimited reservoir of bodies at the Germans until the latter ran out of ammunition, as has sometimes been suggested by those writers who seek to glorify the Germans.

Michael

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by RCHRD:

A mechanised corps of the mid to late war period had more infantry than a panzergrenadier division and more tanks than a panzer division.

Wouldn't you expect a corps to have more assets than a division? I think dalem mentioned that they were bigger, but not by much - do you have figures?</font>

[RCHRD]

Tank and mech corps in the Soviet army were divisions, in everything but name. Sure I have figures. Three mech brigades to a mech corps with each brigade having an organic tank 'Regiment'. 39 Tanks apiece. A mech corps could have a tank brigade too, or a brigade and a regiment, or two regiments, or even two brigades, composed as in the tank corps.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Wouldn't you expect a corps to have more assets than a division? I think dalem mentioned that they were bigger, but not by much - do you have figures?

You'd expect that, but it wasn't necessarily true in all cases. The prewar Soviet force structure essentially collapsed in 1941. It is sort of a long involved story, but here is a summary.

In June 1941 the Soviets had their tank and mechanized forces grouped in operational level combined arms formations called mechanized corps. These consisted of tank and mech divisions composed of maneuver regiments. The subunits of these divisions were quite large and unwieldy, and given the massive officer shortage of 1941 (due mostly to the expansion of the Red Army-- although the quality issues are probably more directly results of the late '30s purges), they were impossible for the Soviet commanders to effectively control.

As a result, in Summer 1941 the mechanized corps and tank divisions were abolished. Infantry units were all reorganized into rifle divisions and brigades, and tank units were reorganized into tank brigades. The tank brigades of 1941 often consisted of only a handful of tanks (IIRC the TO&E called for about 40 tanks and a battalion of infantry), and were the largest armored formation in the Red Army until grouped into tank corps in 1942. The new tank corps consisted of two tank brigades and a motorized rifle brigade, and were first used at Kharkov where the Germans slapped them silly and ate them for breakfast.

The Soviets reorganized the tank corps over time to include three tank brigades and a mech brigade (with its own tank regiment), for a total of 200ish tanks and six battalions of infantry by war's end. They also created a new mechanized corps consisting of the inverse-- 3 mech brigades and a tank brigade, and despite its name the mech corps had more tanks than a tank corps, and 10 infantry battalions to boot. They were commonly the "anchor" of the later war tank army.

The tank armies were created out of order-- that is, 3rd and 5th tank armies were the first created and participated in the Stalingrad counteroffensive. At this time the tank armies still had plain old rifle divisions attached to them-- as a result of the Stalingrad offensive the Soviets did away with this practice and set out to produce tank armies (eventually six in all) that were composed entirely of mobile formations.

The late war tank army was essentially a corps on steriods in Western terms. Two tank corps and a mech corps with supporting units totalled up to 600+ tanks in some situations.

These formations were employed as the mobile groups of fronts; the Soviets usually tried to avoid the common early-war German practice of attacking first with panzer formations, instead making a breakthrough with rifle formations and committing the entire tank army through the breach into the German rear area. In some cases, however, the rifle forces were insufficient to make the breakthrough quickly enough (or at all) and the mobile groups would be committed early to speed things up. This was clearly not the optimum solution, but at the time it was the best they had available.

Anyway, there were a few reasons that the Soviets called these formations 'corps' instead of divisions, but probably the most important was with regard to the commanders. While a Soviet tank brigade commander might only have 40-60 tanks and a battalion of infantry, he would still commonly be a colonel. In some cases, the commanders of tank armies actually outranked the front commanders of the fronts that they were assigned to; these formations typically had among the most aggressive and capable commanders in the Red Army.

There's some schizophrenia throughout the Red Army in WWII with regard to organization anyway. For most of the first and second periods of the war they did not use corps headquarters in their rifle formations-- rifle divisions reported directly to army headquarters. Since rifle divisions were chronically understrength anyway, this meant that a Soviet rifle army was typically on par manpower-wise with a German corps.

While they managed to very effectively cobble together new units early in the war, they were consistently outnumbered by the Germans in 1941 (November 1941 being the extreme case, if I remember correctly), and their numerical advantage did not really begin to tell until the summer of 1943. And while they were unable to match the Germans tactically until the summer of 1944, their immeasurably superior performance on the operational and strategic levels granted them victories on the battlefield from Kursk onward.

Anyway, wanted to help set the record straight a bit. Glad to see a broad-topic Eastern Front post and a chance to talk about force structure. Don't believe everything you read about the noble Germans fighting off hordes of antlike, godless communists, though-- underestimating the Soviets was the first reason for German defeat in the East. Not learning from their mistakes quickly enough (and those with the right ideas getting canned) was another.

Scott

PS: No sources on hand, but have a bunch at home if necessary - back to work for me!

[RCHRD]

I must disagree. The tank corps infantry brigade was a motorised rifle brigade with no organic tank regiment. The mechanised brigades, within the corps or independent, were the only ones with the organic tank regiment. Except for artillery the mechanised corps were immensly powerful.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by RCHRD:

I must disagree. The tank corps infantry brigade was a motorised rifle brigade with no organic tank regiment. The mechanised brigades, within the corps or independent, were the only ones with the organic tank regiment. Except for artillery the mechanised corps were immensly powerful.

Eh, okay. I think you're right - the need for a tank regiment in the MR Bde of a tank corps was probably minimal anyway. They certainly made up for it with SU attachments, etc.

Scott

[Grisha]

A 3:1 Soviet numerical superiority wasn't reached until late 1944. 4:1 was never reached in the entire war. What has been attested to numerous times in German memoirs(and by historians of German perspective) is really the result of maskirovka, or the Soviet operational method of clandestine redeployment. Vistula-Oder was a masterpiece in this regard, achieving 5:1 to 7:1 operational odds, and easily up to 10:1 tactical odds(I believe in one sector 16:1 odds were attained). Basically, the Soviets figured out how to shift their numerical superiority(without effective German detection) around so that it could be put to maximum effectiveness. The process of effective maskirovka had begun in winter '42-'43, and by 1945 it was a well developed Soviet operational and stragetical method.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by RCHRD:

I must disagree. The tank corps infantry brigade was a motorised rifle brigade with no organic tank regiment. The mechanised brigades, within the corps or independent, were the only ones with the organic tank regiment. Except for artillery the mechanised corps were immensly powerful.

I agree with Richard. In fact, tank regiments in the Mechanized brigades were often centralized for decisive armor action, giving you roughly two tank brigades overall. There were more Tank Corps simply because it required less resources than a Mech Corps to build and maintain. Of the two, the Mech Corps was by far the more powerful.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I agree with Richard. In fact, tank regiments in the Mechanized brigades were often centralized for decisive armor action, giving you roughly two tank brigades overall. There were more Tank Corps simply because it required less resources than a Mech Corps to build and maintain. Of the two, the Mech Corps was by far the more powerful.

Oh, I think he's right too, but I don't really like comparing tank and mechanized corps-- they were clearly designed to perform different missions. The presence or lack of a single 30-odd tank regiment in the 200+ tank & SU equipped '44 tank corps is a non-issue to me. The tank corps was a tank heavy combined arms formation and the mechanized corps was an infantry heavy combined arms formation. A tank corps would have either been broken up and used to support rifle formations in an attack or used independantly in a pursuit role, while a mechanized corps had enough organic infantry to do its own "heavy lifting." They performed complementary functions in a tank army, and the mech corps should be considered "more powerful" than the tank corps merely as a result of its size. Neither were well equipped with heavy fire support assets, although they could reasonably expect a higher degree of CAS when performing their intended missions, particularly during the opening stages of an operation.

While mechanized corps were more rare than tank corps due to the shortage of available infantry transports, tank corps were designed to perform a different mission and I believe a tank heavy combined arms formation would still have been a critical part of the Soviet mobile group.

Scott

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I just read in WHEN TITANS CLASHED that the tactic of lightly defending forward also let Soviet reconaissance teams penetrate German lines up to 24 hours before an attack, giving them a good picture of German defences.

Yes, Michael, the Soviets found that reconnaissance in force was not only a good method of determining any last minute changes in German defenses, but also it quite often could capture the first or second trenchline. This was because the Germans were now temporarily retreating to their second or third trenchline in anticipation of the Soviet artillery offensive, then reoccupying the front trenches as the barrage ended. In response, the Soviets initiated many attacks with either no artillery or a very short barrage, and usually in conjunction with the reconnaissance in force. Hence, the assault was in effect beginning with the initial reconnaissance, and the original assault force became the second echelon.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

The Duffy book is a great book, but since it was first published in 1991 the Russian archives have opened somewhat more. It is now possible to be a little more certain, but of course not totally certain, with regard to questions of Soviet losses and combat effectiveness relative to the Germans.

All of what follows relates to the period end June 43 to end March 45. Importantly, this period includes the heavy Soviet losses at Kursk but, correctly, excludes the round up of Germans during the last two months of the war. The figures are not skewed to the Soviet advantage.

In June 43 the Red Army numbered 6.3 million, rising to 6.5 by the end of the war. 1943 was the first year of the war in which Soviet losses were less than the annual intake of recruits. Importantly the Red Army was no longer being bled to death. It was official policy to allow Soviet infantry divisions to reduce to an average of 4,500 men while more troops were channelled into the mobile and mechanised forces. The 450 odd Soviet infantry divisions became very heavily armed brigades, by western standards. By “very heavily armed” I mean that they had a generous supply of heavy weapons for the number of frontline riflemen in the divisions. The average force ratio over the period was 2.7:1, Soviets to Germans. Close to 2:1 in June 43 and then slowly increasing.

When it comes to Soviet relative combat effectiveness the simplest way to calculate it is to assume the Germans were fighting an enemy whom, in terms of quality, were in every detail clones of the Germans themselves. After making the above assumption you then use the “actual, historical” figures for the number of Soviets. To cut a long story short, during the second half of the war if the Soviets had numbered what they actually did, but been of identical quality to the defending Germans in every detail, the loss ratio would have been expected to be 1.4:1, Soviet to German. The actual, historical loss ratio for the above period was 1.6:1. In turn this tells us that Soviet combat effectiveness relative to German, during the second half of the war, was 1.15:1. The lower the figure the better. To put this in perspective, both Commonwealth and US combat effectiveness relative to German in WW2 was 1.2:1. During the second half of the war all four of the main players had very similar combat effectiveness; the above figures are just as close as they look. To put the above in even greater perspective, the figures you reach for the first half of the war on the Eastern Front are 6:1, Soviet to German. Remember, the lower the figure the better.

In summary, the Soviets were just as tactically unsound, during the first half of the war, as the Germans claimed. However, during the second half of the war the Soviets improved far more than post war German accounts claimed. During the second half of the war a 1,000 man Soviet combat team was often the equal of its German opposite number.

I will stop boring everyone, but give just one last example. Soviet losses per 100 front line troops, per combat day, fell to levels equal to those of US troops by the autumn of 43. This still represented horror enough, but not the mass slaughter some German accounts would indicate was still the norm in late 43 and in 44.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. Small correction, the combat effectiveness figure of 6:1, Soviet to German, is for the “first year” of the war, not the first half of the war/two years. The figures for the first half of the war would not be nearly so bad for the Soviets.

[ March 20, 2002, 05:51 PM: Message edited by: kipanderson ]

[Roksovkiy]

Resources had a decisive influence on the outcome and in the end the massive difference in resources was greater than the differences in efficiency.

The soviet odds were much greater than 4:1 in weapons fielded for.

The idea that soviet strategic/operational skill was used to negate German tactical skill from 1943 onwards is an old myth perpetuated by so called “Soviet Experts”.

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks for the info, Kip. Can you indicate what your sources are?

Michael

[Fieldmarshall]

What about Operation Spring Awakening..That will be the first thing I do when I get CM:BB in my hands. Last major German offensive of the war, Germans, attempted to save the last of their natural oil reserves, from the Russians. March of 1945 although I have read conflicting dates putting the offensive anywhere from January of 1945 too March of 1945, this kind of conflicting info is truly irritating! I know it was an eleven day offensive..the Germans sent three up-to-strength, and slightly reduced armored divisions and infantry. It pushed about eight miles before they were halted, they dug in, and fought fiercly..then, their flanks were attacked, and they were driven back, slaughtered. I can't waite to do a 'campagn' on Spring Awakening..

[Grisha]

The idea that soviet strategic/operational skill was used to negate German tactical skill from 1943 onwards is an old myth perpetuated by so called “Soviet Experts”.

Resources had a lot to do with defeating the Germans. Especially when considering how long the German didn't bother to go on a home front wartime footing. But, to call the effectiveness of Soviet operational/strategic skill a myth is amazing. I've never considered the lifework of people like Glantz as mythology. Frankly, I don't have anything more to say on that. On what basis would you make such a rash statement?

And by the way, I do have proof to support my claim.

[ March 20, 2002, 07:53 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Skipper]

Consider that there is no data for german combat losses in 1945, and that in the end of the day the standing german army was taken POWs.

Also consider that in March-April 1945 Germans almost never enjoyed an opportunity to survey the battlefield after action. Which gave them an opportunity to fantasize more than usual. A lot more than usual in some cases.

Rudel is a Grandmaster of tall yarns. Any soviet analogs (Popel, anyone?) pale in comparison.

Also worth noting: during the same period (1944-45) Western allies covered what, 3 times less ground than RKKA? Facing much less determined and skilled resistance.

Grisha: c'mon, this is the guy who misspelled his own nick. What "basis" do you expect to learn about?