Armored Unit Forward Observers

[Jeff Duquette]

This is a spill over from another recent thread. The topic of this recent thread was rather vague and seemed to jump back and forth between the use of tanks as an indirect fire element and the use of armored FOs\FOOs. The subject of armored unit artillery observers was of most interest to me. I know the topic of Armored FO's has been brought up before so no need to direct me to a search. My intent is simply to present additional information on the use of armored FO's by various WWII Armies.

The following regards German Army FO practices for Panzer Units.

Of primary interest is:

• German FO's accompanying panzer units appear to have conducted their work from SPW's…half-tracks.
• In the absence of honest to goodness FO's, platoon & company commanders were trained to perform FO functions.

From: Wolfgang Schneider's "Panzertaktik" (pages 362 - 364)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In spite of all their firepower, tanks are dependant on the support of extensive indirect fire. That is especially important in attacking deeply echeloned defenses or preventing the prompt reinforcement of the enemy in defense.

As a rule, the battalion has several artillery forward observers under its operational control to coordinate the supporting fire. They are assigned to individual companies based upon the Schwerpunkt of the operation. The respective company commander involves the forward observer comprehensively in the total planning and command and control of the operation. Highest priority goes to choosing his position in the attack or his dismounted observation position. The forward observer must know:

Enemy situation

Concept of the operation (including Gelandetaufe, signals and emergency signals)

Positions of friendly troops and planned movements

Dead ground

Obstacles and

Location of the commanding officer.

The forward observer orients regarding:

Missions received

Target reference points (Zielpunkte), engagement areas {Feuerraume) and interdicting fire (Sperrfeuer)

Times and areas for adjusting fire {Einschiessen)

Time, location, type and duration of fires for effect (Wirkungsschiessen)

Changes in amount of support available (for example, priority to neighboring units).

The forward observer accompanies the tanks in his SPW, moving from cover to cover, skillfully taking advantage of the terrain while considering opportunities for observation. He is a member of the company command net on the radio. In combat he keeps close contact with the commander, puts in requests for fire, reports results of the observations of other forward observers and passes on information on the course of the artillery battle. On his own he makes recommendations for the use of artillery. Calls for fire from the platoon leader and company commander should contain:

Target location (where is the enemy?)

Target description (which enemy, what is he doing?)

Desired effect (e.g., destroy, pin down, interdict)

Time (when to fire and, if necessary, for how long).

If fire is requested for several targets, the company commander prioritizes the sequence of engagement. The decision for artillery commitment is made by the artillery battalion itself in coordination with the tactical commander.

Artillery can be assigned the following missions:

Destroy (Zerschlagen): Degrade the enemy's combat strength so that, for a limited time, he can not engage in operations or, as a minimum, can no longer carry out his intention.

Pin (Niederhalten): Force the enemy to take cover for a limited period of time and, in so doing, prevent him from fighting.

Blind (Blenden): Take away the enemy's vision for a limited time - to include firing smoke rounds - block his observation, prevent him from delivering observed fire or interfere with his movements.

Interdict (Abriegeln): Halt an attacking or retreating enemy in his movements for a limited time or prevent him from passing through a specified sector of terrain.

Cover {Uberwachen): Observe a specified area and be ready to combat an enemy with observed fire as soon as he enters it.

Harass (Storen): Harass the enemy, interfere with his operations and, in so doing, possibly cause him losses.

Illuminate (Beleuchten): Use of pyrotechnic illuminating rounds with parachutes.

All the details of the artillery plan are expressed in the fire plan {Feuerplan). If no forward observer is available, the platoon leader or company commander can direct indirect fire. That kind of call for fire is called line-of-sight method (Sehstreifenverfahren). The prerequisite for that method of firing is a radio link to the firing position of the battery doing the firing, the exact target distance (e.g., obtained From a range card) and the determination of ones own position and the direction to the target (e.g., by using a compass). If a fire plan is already worked out with the artillery (e.g., in the defense), target reference points can also be given. If necessary, place locations can DC given, so long as they are not too large in area. Map coordinates (Planzeiger -- SWAG) are more exact.<hr></blockquote>

[ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[kipanderson]

Jeff, hi,

Very interesting post. Reminds me how good a book Panzertaktik is. Sadly for me, most of my books are in storage, just moved house, so I cannot just go and give it a read!

Anyway, I am hopeful there may be some armoured FOs in CMBB. One day they certainly will be in some later version of CM, if not CMBB.

When it comes to company commanders being able to bring down called fire, there are a lot of conditions that have to be for filled. No doubt some line officers were trained for it, but as your post shows, many necessary conditions had to be in place.

Fun stuff. Looking forward to when I can get at all my books again!

All the best,

Kip.

[ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: kipanderson ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

For the sack of brevity I felt the need to bring these previous postings of mine over from the "Using Tanks as Howitzers" thread….

Within US ARMY Armored units in ETO artillery forward observers were typically attached at the company level. An FO would occupy a standard light or medium tank equipped with command radio sets….SRC-508's I think was the official designation. Within US Tank company's there were typically eight to nine tanks equipped with SRC-508's. These included both tanks of the HQ section, each of the platoon leaders as well as each of the platoon sergeants tanks (six Total). In addition the company assault gun -- if present -- was also equipped with an SRC-508 (this was a Sherman 105mm).

Digging through Hunnicutt's "Sherman", I have found no evidence suggesting a specialized Sherman, or Grant\Lee was built for US Army artillery FO's. FO's apparently employed standard light and medium tanks equipped with the SRC-508. It appears the FO would typically take over the TC position from a platoon sergeants or one of the HQ sections tanks...any of which were equipped with the more powerful SRC-508's as standard TO&E.

US Army Platoon Sergeants, Platoon leaders as well as company CO's within armor and infantry units were trained in the black arts of calling for artillery fire.

References:

Hunnicutt "Sherman"

US Army Small Unit Actions Series, "The Battle of Singling, Dec

1944"

American Tank Company Tactics (FM 17-32), November 1944

[ 01-18-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

Hey Kip.

Actually my intent is more to look at reference material available for Armored FO's and how they functioned. I think I would personally have a fair bit of confidence in the average German or US Army company commander or even senior NCO's abilities to call in fire missions.

Since your here perhaps you have run across information detailing Red Army Armored FO practices. I have run across late War references to Red Army use of Air liason officers for close air support, but nothing on armored unit FOO's.

Here is a bit more on the US ARMY...

And from FM 17-32 "Tank Company Tactics", November 1944 (pg 48)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>52. Use of Supporting Arms and Weapons

a. It is normal for the fires of the tank company to be coordinated with the fires of the tank battalion mortars and assault guns, supporting artillery, infantry, chemical mortars, other tank units and with available air bombardment. The tank company commander must have full knowledge of the supporting fire plan so that his company may take full advantage of this support in accomplishing its mission. (See fig. 33.) Nearly all such fires are prearranged by battalion or higher headquarters. FM 17-33 and 17-36 explain more fully the coordination and employment of supporting fires.

b. The following are fires over which the company may have some control:

(1) Artillery. Fires of supporting artillery are requested for large area targets and to screen distant points. (See FM 6-105.) Artillery time fire in front of or over tanks neutralizes gun crews and tank hunters. (See fig. 33.) During combat the company commander, platoon leaders, or even tank commanders may request artillery fires. They normally make the request through the battalion commander and the artillery forward observer and may observe and adjust the fire themselves if necessary (See FM 17-12). It is possible for radios to be netted with the artillery fire direction center for direct requests. The following are normal artillery missions:

(a) Support fire during movement to the attack position by counter battery fire, neutralization of antitank guns and supporting or screening of mine removal parties.

( Support during attack. The primary targets are antitank weapons, observation posts, and any hostile troops, weapons or areas of resistance holding up the advance. Tanks may operate directly under time fire (air bursts) on the objective. (See fig. 34.) After the objective is occupied, supporting weapons are prepared to fire on the target beyond it.

© Support against counterattack. Massed fires are used to break up enemy formations, especially armored threats. These normally are previously prepared defensive fires for the protection of the objective when taken.<hr></blockquote>

[JonS]

From Chamberlain and Doyle, Encyclopedia of German Tanks of WWII.

SdKfz143: modified PzIII, with main armament removed, and more armour added. 262 produced between Feb 43 and Apr 44. Used by Hummel and Wespe btys. Each Wespe and Hummel bty included 2 x SdKfz143.

SdKfz253: Similar to a SdKfz250. 285 produced from Mar 40 till Jun 41. Served with Sturmartillerie Batterien 640, 659, 660, and 665 in France in 1940, later with other assault btys in Russia. These btys equipped with Stugs.

SdKfz254: Sort of similar to SdKfz250. 128 produced between Jun 40 and Mar 41. Served in Russia and Africa with Panzerartillerie detachments from 1941.

Panzerbeobachtungswagen IV: Modified PzIV. Seems to have retained main armament. 90 converted between Jul 44 and Mar 45. Issued as replacements for SdKfz143 when PzIII chassis no longer available. Issued to Hummel btys.

Panzerbeobachtungswagen Panther: Modified Panther, with main armament removed. Included a stereoscopic rangefinder in turret (not on roof). 41 converted in late 44/45. No comment on where it served.

SdKfz250/5, SdKfz251/18, SdKfz251/20: no comment on quantities produced or where they served.

The 253 and 254 can be simulated in CM with just a 250 or a 251. This works fine except they can't call missions from in the back of the wagen.

The 142, IV, and Panther can sort of be simulated in CM by mounting an FO on the back of one of those tanks with the ammo wound down to zero (= no main armament). However, the FO team is not protected, and again they can't call down missions from on the back deck of the tank. It would be nice to see, at some stage, armoured FOs for at least the Western Allies and Germany. These 'should' have the ability to climb inside an observation tank and call down missions while inside, and also to be able to dismoun and call down missions from the ground. Finally, the reason all nations chose their stock tanks was to make the FOs inconspicuous alongside the other panzers/tanks, so these vehicles shouldn't necessarily be bullet-magets, the way AT and FT teams are.

FWIW

Regards

JonS

[Jeff Duquette]

JonS:

Great information. I hadn't thought about spreading my search to Chamberlain. I did run across a reference to a proposed Artillery Observation Panther. Jentz's "Panther Variants" elaborates on a Panzerbeobachtungswagon that was apparently never fielded. The standard 75mmL70 was removed and replaced with a 50mm Kw.K.39/1. This AFV also sported a series of add-on telescopes and periscopes for observing from turret down positions.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>JonS Said: Finally, the reason all nations chose their stock tanks was to make the FOs inconspicuous alongside the other panzers/tanks, so these vehicles shouldn't necessarily be bullet-magets, the way AT and FT teams are.<hr></blockquote>

Agreed...I will post some additional reference material on British Army Armoured FO's in the Western Desert tomorrow. This issue is discussed specifically.

[JonS]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Jentz's "Panther Variants" elaborates on a Panzerbeobachtungswagon that was apparently never fielded. The standard 75mmL70 was removed and replaced with a 50mm Kw.K.39/1. This AFV also sported a series of add-on telescopes and periscopes for observing from turret down positions.<hr></blockquote>

Again from C&D:

"In late 1944, a 'Beobachtungs Panzerwagen Panther' was converted from rebuilt Panther tanks. The main armament, the 7.5cm KwK, was removed and the front of the turret plated over. In the centre of this front plate were mounted a dummy gun and mantlet, adn to the right, a ball-mounted MG34. On the extremities of the new front plate, armoured flaps covered the openings for an EM 1.25m R (Pz) steereoscopic range-finder. ADditionally, the Beob Pz Wg carried a Blockstelle 0 range-plotting table and other instruments for use with artillery observation."

There is a photo showing this thing, and to be honest, it looks pretty poxy - the mantlet looks odd, and the 'barrel' looks far too short. Judging by the hull fittings (MG and drivers port), it looks like it's based on an Ausf D.

Regards

JonS

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JonS:

Again from C&D:

"In late 1944, a 'Beobachtungs Panzerwagen Panther' was converted from rebuilt Panther tanks. The main armament, the 7.5cm KwK, was removed and the front of the turret plated over. In the centre of this front plate were mounted a dummy gun and mantlet, adn to the right, a ball-mounted MG34. On the extremities of the new front plate, armoured flaps covered the openings for an EM 1.25m R (Pz) steereoscopic range-finder. ADditionally, the Beob Pz Wg carried a Blockstelle 0 range-plotting table and other instruments for use with artillery observation."

There is a photo showing this thing, and to be honest, it looks pretty poxy - the mantlet looks odd, and the 'barrel' looks far too short. Judging by the hull fittings (MG and drivers port), it looks like it's based on an Ausf D.

Regards

JonS<hr></blockquote>

There is apparently some debate about the numbers produced and whether or not they were ever fielded. From memory, there were about 50 built, which is awfully high for the mere production of prototypes as some sources I've read claim. The "barrel" of the gun, is as you mention, Jon, a particularly odd shape, I can remember attempting to scratchbuild it in 1/76 scale, upon the basis of the pictures I had available some 30 years ago and after several goes managing to created the odd series of curves. Once I'd done that, I was the only wargamer who had one...

[Jeff Duquette]

There is some added fluff to the following, but I felt the context may be of interest to some of the more serious students of military history here. My main point in posting the following is that it indicates British Army Armored artillery observers in the Western Desert would also occupy common troop tanks ala the US Army methodology described above. For those folks with things to do besides lurk at the CM forum the paragraphs I would like to draw your attention to have been italicized.

From: "Artillery in the Desert" Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1943 (pages 40 - 43)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr> b. Methods of Observation

Although the desert is not completely flat, suitable vantage points for observation posts are never very high. This lack of height, together with the heat waves rising from the hot sand and rocks, sometimes reduces visibility in the desert. Mid-day is the least satisfactory period for observing Fire.

Both sides endeavor to gain what high ground does exist in the desert. It has been noted that the German infantry in Libya, as elsewhere, have launched attacks for the purpose of obtaining observation posts for their artillery. In one instance such an attack was made to gain ground only 3 feet higher than the surrounding terrain. Similarly, German artillery officers have been known to ride on top of tanks in order to gain height for observation.

In both German and British armored divisions the artillery has its own armored vehicles for observation posts. However, even artillery with unarmored troops utilizes methods similar to those of the armored divisions. Forward observers are well out in front with those covering forces, armored cars, or carriers which arc deployed for reconnaissance and outpost duty. Often these mobile OP's must be with the armored-car screen, and they are then in an armored car or scout car. Many British officers have spoken highly of the U. S. M-3 Scout Car for this work. Its chief advantage is that it accommodates the entire OP party, whereas the armored car has room for only three persons. Armored cars or scout cars are assigned to and maintained by artillery units. Enough cars must be provided so that all radio sets allotted to a battalion can be mounted in such vehicles; these can then be used by forward observers. The advisability of providing more than a few such cars has been quickly realized, because they wear out soon and have a high casualty rate. Unless the OP is the same type of vehicle as that used by the supported troops, the enemy will concentrate its firepower on the OP vehicle.

The British have found it to be impossible to assign tanks to artillery regiments for OP purposes. But they do have arrangements whereby each regiment of tanks modifies and, on occasion, reserves for artillery observers a certain number of tanks.

A problem of observation was revealed in one fast-moving situation which occurred during the winter of 1941-1942. The battery commander was traveling with the tank regimental commander. Two observers, one per troop, were directing fire while traveling with the forward elements of the regiment. When contact was actually made, the observers had their tanks stay on the flanks and drop back slightly from the front in order to avoid becoming directly engaged. All control was by radio and the observer had his own radio operating in the artillery net, separate from the tank radio which operated in the tank net. Because of the limited number of frequencies available, it was necessary for all artillery units in a battery to be on the same frequency. The effect of this single frequency was unfortunate, for only one troop could be fired by one observer at a time, and a great deal of confusion occurred. When all control by observers breaks down, artillery support deteriorates into direct laying by individual pieces.

In addition to the armored OP's, gun towers have been used to gain height for observing Fire. These OP ladders are used both as dummies to draw fire and for observation. They are mounted on trucks or may be removed quickly and set up at an OP. The British observing towers are generally about 25 feet high. The Germans have a two-piece telescoping tube mounted on the side of their armored OP, which can be cranked up into observing position. To employ these gun towers effectively there must be a number of them-at least one to each four guns. These, like the tanks and the slight rises in the ground, aid in overcoming the flatness of the desert. Other difficulties arise in the desert which only keen eyes and training can surmount. There is the real problem which a forward artillery observer has in identifying his own bursts among the dust and heat waves when other units are also firing. Judging distance in the desert is as difficult as on the ocean. Lack of familiarity with the size and appearance of armored vehicles at various ranges is a frequent cause for misjudging distance. The fact that the enemy opens fire does not inevitably mean that the enemy is within range, for he can misjudge distance also. But it is even more important to remember that all tanks are not equipped with the same type of gun. German tanks armed with 75-mm guns can open effective firing at a range of 2,000 yards. Antitank guns with a smaller range waste ammunition by returning fire and, what is worse, give away their own positions.<hr></blockquote>

[offtaskagain]

Here's a pic of the Panzerbeobachtungswagen Panther from Achtung Panzer.

It certainly looks odd.

[Jeff Duquette]

While hunting through various references on Red Army armor and artillery I came across a pertinent snippet from Charles Sharp's "Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II" (Red Army Armor Tactics from Individual Vehicle to Company, Combat Regulations of 1944) Again there is a fair amount of added fluff to the following. The fluff is there only for those interested in additional context. I have italicized the passages, which I feel are most pertinent to the subject of this particular thread.

From: Charles Sharp's "Soviet Armor Tactics in World War II" (pages 73 - 74)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE ORDER No. 325

Dated 16 October 1942, Moscow:

The war experience against the German Fascists has shown that in the use of tank units we, thus far, have shown large shortcomings. The main shortcomings are as follows:

1. Our tanks when attacking the enemy defenses separate from the infantry and lose contact (with them), they fail to maintain cooperation with them. Infantry, cut off from the tanks by enemy fire, cannot support our tanks with their fire and with artillery fire. Tanks, losing contact with the infantry, face enemy artillery, tanks, and infantry in single combat, suffering great losses for this.

2. Tanks throw themselves at enemy defenses without proper artillery support. At the start of the tank attack the artillery is not suppressing antitank weapons on the forward edge of the enemy defenses, guns are not always employed in support of the tanks. When approaching the forward edge of the enemy defenses, tanks meet with enemy antitank fire and suffer great losses. Tank and artillery commanders are not coordinating their activities on the terrain by natural, objects and boundaries, and they are not establishing signals for ceasing artillery fires. Chiefs of artillery in support of a tank attack, direct artillery fire by remote observation posts and do not use radio-equipped tanks as mobile forward artillery observation posts.

3. Tanks are committed hurriedly to battle without reconnaissance of the terrain bordering the forward edge of the enemy defenses, without studying the terrain in the depth of the enemy positions, without thorough study by the tank crews of the enemy fire systems. Tank commanders, not having time to organize a tank attack, do not inform tank crews of their tasks; as a result of the ignorance of the enemy and of the terrain, the tanks attack with uncertainty and at a slow speed. Fire from the move is not conducted, organize weapons fire from the halt, and even then only the cannons. As a rule, tanks on the battlefield do not maneuver or use the terrain for hidden advances and surprise strikes into the flank and rear (of the enemy), but, most often, attack the enemy head-on. Combined arms commanders do not take the necessary time to technically prepare tanks for battle. They do not prepare the terrain, with respect to engineers, in the direction of the tank operation. Mine fields are poorly reconnoitered and are not cleared. Passages are not created through tank obstacles, and the necessary help is not rendered in overcoming difficult and crucial terrain sectors. Combat engineers are not always assigned to accompany the tanks. This results in tanks being blown up by mines and getting stuck in bogs and in antitank obstacles, so they cannot participate in the battle.

4. Tanks do not fulfill their basic objective of destroying enemy infantry, but wander into combat with enemy tanks and artillery. The growing volume of experience shows that to oppose an enemy tank attack with our tanks and become involved in tank battles appears incorrect and harmful.

5. Tank combat operations are not being provided with sufficient air cover, air reconnaissance and air support. Aviation, as a rule, does not accompany tank formations into the depth of the enemy position, and the tank attack is not accompanied by combat aviation.

6. Control of tanks on the battlefield is poorly organized. Radio, as a means of control, is insufficiently used. Commanders of tank units and formations, located at (fixed) command posts, are removed from the combat formation, and they cannot observe tank actions in battle or influence the course of the tank battle. Company and battalion commanders, moving in front of the tactical combat formation, do not have the capability to follow the tanks and to control the combat by their subunits and turn into the line tank commanders, and the units, lacking control, lose their orientation and wander around the battlefield, suffering unjustified losses. I order the following instructions be obeyed in the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations.

I. COMBAT APPLICATION OF TANK REGIMENTS, BRIGADES AND CORPS

1. Separate tank regiments and brigades designated to reinforce the infantry in the primary direction and operate in close cooperation with them as direct support tanks.

2. Tanks, operating with the infantry, have as their primary mission the destruction of enemy infantry and must not be separated from the infantry by more than 200 - 400 meters. In combat the tank unit commander organizes observation for his infantry's combat formation, If the infantry goes to ground and does not advance behind the tanks, the tank unit commander designates some of the tanks for destroying firing positions that hinder the advance of our infantry.

3. Infantry for securing tank operations must place all the weight of their fire, as well as the fire of their accompanying guns, on the enemy's antitank weapons, must locate and clear minefields, assist tanks in overcoming antitank obstacles and swampy terrain sectors, fight German tanks, determinedly follow behind the tanks in attack, quickly consolidate lines seized by them, ensure tanks are supplied with ammunition and fuel and help evacuate damaged tanks from the battlefield.

4. Before the commitment of tanks to the attack artillery must destroy antitank weapons in the enemy's defense. During the attack on the forward edge and in combat in the depth of the enemy's defense, it must fire on firing positions that hinder the advance of the tanks on signals from the tank commanders, by which the artillery commanders must direct artillery fire by forward mobile observation posts from tanks equipped with radios. Artillery and tank commanders together establish signals to call for the initiation and cessation of artillery fire.

5. When enemy tanks appear on the battlefield they are primarily engaged by artillery. Tanks engage enemy tanks only in cases where they have clear superiority in forces and advantageous conditions.

6. Our aviation's actions subject enemy antitank defenses to heavy fire, binders the commitment of his tanks to the battlefield, protects the combat formation of tank units from the influence of enemy aviation, and secures the combat operations of tank units through constant and continuous air reconnaissance.<hr></blockquote>

[ 01-19-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Andreas]

Excellent thread Jeff, as usual.

Patrick Delaforce (known to us as purveyour of often sub-standard divisional histories ) also was an FOO in 11th Armoured 'The Black Bull'. IIRC one of the Cromwells he was issued was found to be a training tank with 'soft' armour. They cottoned on to that when a German 20mm AA gun started shooting it up, and had it exchanged. I think that one went with a dummy gun.

In 'Tank tracks - the history of 9th RTR', the organisation chart for the Churchill regiment shows two OP tanks attached to Regimental HQ. In 'The South Albertas', the organisational diagram does not show any OP tanks attached to Regimental HQ of 4th Canadian Armoured's Armoured Reconnaissance Rgt. Maybe the difference is because of the very different tactical use of the formations, I honestly don't know.

[JonS]

Yes, thanks for the info Jeff.

Chamberlain and Ellis (British and American Tanks of WW2) don't go into as much detail on Allied OP tanks, but they do note that in British use nearly all marks had an OP variant. No detail is given about US OP tanks.

Jean Bouchery (The British Soldier Vol 2) shows the same org for a armd regt as that in the endpapers of South Albertas, except that two of the three tanks in each Sqn HQ Tp are depicted as OP tanks, and two of the four tanks in the RHQ Tp are also depicted as OP tanks. This gives eight OP tanks per regt, which seems too high. Also it omits the radio relay tanks discussed in the South Albertas.

George Forty (British Army Handbook 1939 - 45) has eight OP tanks per amoured brigade, giving on average* two per regt plus two for bde HQ. This marrys up with what The Anglophile has noted above. It also ties in with the information Jeff presented about the OP tanks being 'owned' by the armoured chaps, and used by the RA as required.

The problems Jeff highlights regarding RA communications had been resolved by new equipment and particularly by new procedures by the time of CM:BO.

Regards

JonS

*since they are Bde assets in this org, they could be concentrated all in one regt if required, or spread out to cover all regts. Also, OP tanks being armd bde assets would explain why the South Albertas didn't have any OP tanks, since the the SAs were a divisional asset (the divisional armd recce regt), rather than being brigaded.

[ 01-19-2002: Message edited by: JonS ]</p>

[Andreas]

Good point Jon and one I should really have come up with myself. D'uh. I have to have a much closer look at the handbook.

[kipanderson]

Jeff, hi,

All very interesting stuff.

However, I do not think I can help you much.

I will have a look, but do not recall coming across material on Soviet, armoured FOs. Normally when something like this comes up there is a distant bell rung in my head, I think, yup, I know where I have seen something on this subject. But not in this case.

All the best,

Kip.

[Jeff Duquette]

This is another bit suggesting Commonwealth armored units were using tanks as OP's for forward observation officers.

From: Patrick Delaforce's "The Black Bull, From Normandy to the Baltic with the 11th Armored Division" (pages 37 -38)

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>3 RTR were in action most of the day with 13 RHA FOOs bringing down divisional barrages and Typhoon fire on Tigers dug into woods.

Captain Philip Kinnersley, 13 RHA, brought down fire on his own OP since the tanks were so close. His tank was hit, mortar bombs rained down on him, his wireless set was smashed, all his crew including himself wounded, so he crawled to a hilltop with another wireless to continue bringing down 'Uncle' targets. Captain Nicoll, Ayrshire Yeomanry FOO, engaged four enemy tanks with his OP Sherman and lived to tell the tale. Over 300 enemy tanks were now attacking the salient from three sides, and fifty Nebelwerfers rained down their noisy mortar bombs incessantly. Sergeant Buck Kite of 3 RTR reported: 'The first thing we get at daybreak are the 'moaning minnies'. Jerry knew the range to a T and the bombs were stroking the top of the hill as they went over. HQ got the worst of it and we lost four NCOs who'd been caught outside their tanks. One a good chum, Dick Brill, who'd been right through the desert.' At Baron 4 KSLI had stood to at 0430 hrs and were getting quite blasé about snipers and 'moaning minnies'. Lieutenant 'Jenny' Wren noted: 'We did no patrolling, so just had to sit in our slit-trenches all day which was very demoralizing.' Their CO, 'Mossy' Miles, was relieved, 'a classic case of battle exhaustion', and replaced by Major Max Robinson. The 2 i/c Major Ned Thornburn complained bitterly of a shell fragment which passed through his shaving kit, but nevertheless 4 KSLI passed a relatively peaceful day.<hr></blockquote>

[Jeff Duquette]

A couple of additional bits on a Canadian operations report I came across. It would seemingly suggest that Commonwealth armour and infantry officers were trained (ala German Army and US Army folks) in the black arts of calling for fire.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>REPORT NO. 165

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

OPERATIONS OF 1 CDN INF DIV AND 1 CDN ARMD BDE IN ITALY

25 NOV 43 - 4 JAN 44

85. After two hours' fighting the attackers withdrew (W.D., P.P.C.L.I.,

6 Dec 43). For them, the effort had been costly, the prisoner count was over 40; the estimate of dead over 100 (Ware: op cit). Five tanks were destroyed, and the heap of booty included one anti-tank gun, three motorcycles, six 81-mm mortars, several machine-guns, rifles, pistols, wireless sets and telephones, and considerable clothing, blankets, food and cigarettes. The mortars and anti-tank guns were later put to use against their former owners. During both attacks artillery support was called for through Battalion Rear Headquarters, since early in the fighting both sets of the forward observation officer were destroyed by shell fire.

207. Two hundred enemy from a fresh battalion, it was estimated, took part in this counter-attack supported by artillery and tanks. The Companies contracted to withstand the shock and to allow some sort of safety margin for the artillery fire which was so hastily requested. "C" Sqn's Commander directed the fire of 98 Fd Regt, R.A. (S.P.); in fifteen minutes 1,400 rounds of 105-mm shells were centred on the enemy. By 1545 hrs the counter-attack was crippled, and the enemy withdrew leaving many dead and one Mk IV Special which had been hit by a shell from a "C" Sqn tank. (Ibid; and History of 11 Cdn Armd Regt, p. 20.<hr></blockquote>

[Andreas]

Jeff, good digging. The first of the two highlighted Canadian quotes could just mean that teh FOOs continued to operate, but had to go through the division net, instead of the artillery net, to get their targets plastered. I understand that they operated on different frequencies. The second one clearly indicates that a non-professional called the fire though.

[Splinty]

My only historical source for this topic is my father,who was an FO for the British 8th Army in North Africa and Italy. He says he was in a Sherman with "a bloody big radio"and in Italy was actually cross attached to the Divisional Arty for the American 1st Armored. I'll try to get more details from him when I get the chance. But at the moment he's in Florida and I'm in Michigan so it mat take a bit.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Andreas Said: The first of the two highlighted Canadian quotes could just mean that teh FOOs continued to operate, but had to go through the division net, instead of the artillery net,<hr></blockquote>

Yup...first time I went through the report I think I read it as the FOO's were killed. Sounds like they survived but their radio sets were KO'd. They seemingly proceeded to battalion HQ and employed the battalion sets.

I am wondering if in the case of Commonwealth observer\command tanks their function -- from an artillery usage stand point -- were as receptacles for FDC folks. Regardless, the point of all this is that armored FO's operated from armored vehicles. From what I have been able to dig up this practice was consistent within all the major belligerents.

[ 01-20-2002: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Stacheldraht]

Ian V. Hogg on the British field regiment of 44-45 in Barrage: The Guns in Action (Ballantine, 1970), p. 37:

"...mobile observation parties, known as forward observation officers (FOOs) were available as offshoots of the troop OPs [observation posts] in order to accompany the front infantry on foot or in armored vehicles [emphasis mine] while advancing. These FOOs were in radio contact with the OPs, who could relay their messages back to the gun troops." There might well be more in there, but the book isn't indexed, which is inexcusable for a work of non-fiction

(Otherwise, that's an excellent book, particulary in conjunction with Hogg's The Guns: 1939-45, for an overview of artillery design, evolution, practice, etc.)

From Ch. IV of the US War Department's Handbook on German Military Forces TM-E 30-451, p. 3, discussing Panzer division armored car recon patrols:

"Armored car patrols are normally composed of three armored reconnaissance cars, one of which is equipped with radio. An artillery observer often accompanies the patrol so that in an emergency fire can be brought down quickly."

p. 14:

"Liaison between artillery and tanks during the attack is established by the commanding officers and the artillery liaison group, which normally moves with the first wave. Artillery forward observers, if possible in armored observation posts, ride with the most forward elements. A German field expedient is to take along a forward observer in one of its tanks. It often happens that the tankman himself has to take over the observation for the artillery. He himself can request artillery fire and shift concentrations when the situation requires such changes."

(There's an illustration of a grid map with target reference points used by a panzer commander.)

[ 01-20-2002: Message edited by: Stacheldraht ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Splinty Said: He says he was in a Sherman with "a bloody big radio"<hr></blockquote>

This is actually an excellent bit of information...It begs the question; Why is it do you suppose that "leg" FOO's did the job with back portable radios, yet armored FOO's needed a special observer tank chalk full of "bloody big radio" gear?

Stacheldraht:

Good information….you beat me to the draw with the German Army Handbook references. I was preparing to scan\OCR\post this additional information.

[Andreas]

Actually, in the Commonwealth at least, the FOO party had a universal carrier with (no surprises there) a 'bloody big radio' in it. From it they trailed a wire to their OP. Crew was three including the battery officer I believe, and one man was back at the carrier to operate the radio, while the other was with the FOO, to assist, and repair the wire. All volunteers, except the officer. Blackburn describes this in quite a bit of detail.

[Louie the Toad]

Dear Jeff,

This is great information. Thank you.

In your research did you come across the use of recon by armored units? As you probably know there have been numerous debates on the Forum about using everything from Tigers to tank crew remnants to scout for armored units. As it is now, one has to make do and attach other units to recon for tanks. This is especially true in QBs.

One reads about a Recon Battalion, but Recon at that level is almost beyond the scope of the game. What I am talking about here is, who and or what in CM should move to the top of the next rise and see what is beyond, before the lead tank is committed?

"Stanley! Go see what that is." -- Oliver Hardy

Wondering Toad

[Jeff Duquette]

Stacheldraht:

Regarding your quote from Ian Hogg…OPs function as the Commonwealth equivalent of an FDC?

"mobile observation parties, known as forward observation officers (FOOs) were available as offshoots of the troop OPs [observation posts] in order to accompany the front infantry on foot or in armored vehicles [emphasis mine] while advancing. These FOOs were in radio contact with the OPs, who could relay their messages back to the gun troops."