Armored Unit Forward Observers

[Stacheldraht]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Regarding your quote from Ian Hogg…OPs function as the Commonwealth equivalent of an FDC? <hr></blockquote>

I don't believe so, if I understand FDC and the page I skimmed correctly. I haven't read the book in some time.

"Each troop [4 of the 8 guns in a battery, with 3 batteries and one HQ battery per field regiment] provided one [OP (observation post party)] and each battery was also capable of providing one extra from the HQ section. ... The troop OPs would be deployed in some suitable area, as laid down by the CO after conferring with the infantry, so that the brigade front would be covered by observers." p.36

These were in addition to the mobile FOOs, so it sounds like the OPs were more along the lines of the arty spotter units you see in CM.

[Andreas]

Hmm, I always thought the CMBO spotters are more like the mobile spotter teams, while the OPs would me more like this:

That was my grandfather's OP outside Leningrad from 1941 to 1943/4. To be honest, in the conditions of the fighting in Northwest Europe I doubt that the OPs played a major role.

I think FDC was done at the battery command post for the Commonwealth (unless it was a fireplan, which would come from regimental or divisional HQ I believe), but it is one of these things I always forget. Age creeping up on me at 33, who would have thought.

[Stacheldraht]

Well, I suppose it depends on how you use your spotters in CM. If you're the AI, sending them ahead of your infantry to test for mines the hard way, then they're like the FOO's Seriously, I imagine the accuracy of the comparison either way depends on the scale of the particular CM battle.

[Andreas]

On Lexikon der Wehrmacht are some pictures of Panzer III observation variant. From those pictures, I'd venture the guess that it is a fake gun. Numbers produced are 225 in 1943 and another 43 in 1944.

Interestingly, it was equipped with two medium wave radios (30W transceiver Fu 4 and receiver Fu 8), a radio 'F' and a backpack radio set, presumably for dismounted service.

The same site in its OOB page for a German artillery regiment of the 1st Wave of divisions, gives 4 backpack radio sections (two on horseback, two on foot), two medium and one large telephone sections, and one artillery signals section (for connection to the supported infantry regiment) per battery. It is a very confusing organisational list, as it also includes to FOO sections (on horseback with radio, one observer, two signallers). Unfortunately the armoured element has not received the same detailed treatment, but I will check my copies of Engelmann, and a history of the 13th PD tonight.

[Jeff Duquette]

An excerpt from several questions I emailed Nigel Evans:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Dear Mr. Evans:

Firstly I wanted to thank you for your very informative web page on British Artillery in World War II. Your internet site provides a great deal of information not readily available to the casual military historian like myself. After reading through much of the information on your site, I was hoping you could clear up a few things for me.

1) I am not sure I understand the subtle difference between Observation Post Officers (OPO's) and Forward Observation Officers (FOO's).

2) Did Out Posts (OPs) function in a manner similar to US Army FDC's? In other words did FOO's call in fire orders to OP's and the OP's arranged all barrages and artillery plans, and relayed orders for shoots from its FOOs to batterys?

3) With respect to artillery observation for Armored Divisions; Would both OPOs and FOOs typically occupy armored vehicles during an advance? If so who provided these vehicles? In other words did the artillery unit have armored observation vehicles organic to there units or would OPOs and FOOs occupy vehicles provided to them by the armored unit to which they were attached?

4) Were OPO and FOO vehicles specialized AFV's or were common troop tanks employed by FOOs? I have read somewhere the British Army would remove the main-gun from tanks employed by OPOs to make room for additional radio gear.

Thank you for your time and consideration, and I hope to hear from you soon.

Sincerely

Jeff Duquette<hr></blockquote>

===================================

Nigel's reply

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Jeff

Taking your questions in turn, and noting that I may need to do some more editing to clarify.

OPO and FOO were different roles rather than different individuals. OPO manned an Observation Post, implying that it was static. An FOO moved with the infantry or armour when they were advancing (or withdrawing). Basically an OP party changed between roles as the tactical situation required. Obviously an FOO was limited to basic equipment whereas an OPO would probably set up tripod mounted binoculars, prepare a panorama and so forth. In an attack there would sometimes be a mix of 'anchor OPs' and FOOs, in some cases these might be by splitting the OP party. This would also be done to relay orders from an FOO with a low power manpack radio.

A US Army FDC was responsible for the technical work for the entire battalion of 3 batteries. The equivalent technical work in a British type regiment was done by each battery or troop command posts. An OPO, and perhaps less frequently a FOO, could produce minimal data and send it straight to his troop CP, who just had to select a charge and order the data to the guns. Because of gun rules there was no need for a CP to convert the range in yards to an elevation in degrees and minutes for each gun. However, for predicted and/or multi-battery shoots the battery CP would calculate data using the battery and target map references as their starting point, and troop CPs would do so for a troop target if the OPO/FOO identified it by map reference or target number. It was up to the OPO/FOO to decide how he would engage the target, but their 'calculations' were limited to measuring the range and switch from their map, they went nowhere near all the other calculations done by a CP of FDC.

SP field regiments were equipped with tanks for their OP parties instead of having armoured carriers, basically these were standard tanks of the same type as used by the supported armoured brigade. During the mid war period as far as I can currently ascertain both regiments in an armoured div had their OPs and BCs in tanks, there were also some other towed field regiments who had tank OPs. However, in 1944 it was decided that regiments outside armd divs would not hold tanks for their OPs, there would a be pool held in each independent armd or tank bde. In practice in some of these bdes had a field regiment with them for the duration so in effect were permanently equipped, although these tanks were supposed to have RAC crews less for the OPO and his assistant. Whether this was really how it worked is another matter, the problem would have been the training of signallers in artillery fire orders procedures.

Modifications were minor, basically to carry sufficient radios and external stowage for their tripod mounted binoculars, I suspect they carried their manpack set externally. I've not come across the use of dummy barrels because the radio fit was basically the same as that for a normal command and control tank (eg as used by sqn and regtl HQs). There was also policy established about responsibilities for ammo resupply of OP tanks, which implies they had a functioning gun. That said I've found some sources implying that BCs got yet another radio towards the end of the war (so they could be on bty, regt and supported arm 'radio groups' (nets)) and this might well have caused a space problem and it's possible that some types of tank did not have adequate space. It might also be that someone has mixed WW2 with current practice where the Warrior OPVs have dummy barrels to give space for optronics without looking different to the enemy.

Regards

Nigel<hr></blockquote>

===========================

I will say this again as it seemed to have gotten lost in translation. Ultimately the point is that FOs\FOOs operating from in support of armored units opperated from armored vehicles.

[Andreas]

Very interesting stuff Jeff. I think in the German case, with the extra backpack radio, there was definitely intent to give the FOO the opportunity to dismount and operate away from the tank very flexibly (i.e. without laying a line). If 'manpack set' refers to a backpack radio, I presume the intention was there for the Commonwealth as well.

BTW - While Panzer III OP tank production stopped in 1944, the slack was taken up by the production of almost 100 Panzer IV OP tanks. I guess the idea was to have an OP tank that did not stick out like a sore thumb.

[Stacheldraht]

A very interesting discussion, indeed. Perhaps there's some info on Soviet practices in this matter at The Russian Battlefield?

I suppose the big question is, what does BTS' research on this subject conclude and how, if at all, will these sorts of findings be modeled in CMBB?

[ 01-21-2002: Message edited by: Stacheldraht ]</p>

[Enoch]

I've run across some rather vauge references to the fact that within a US Armored Division each SP Artillery Bn might have a platoon of tanks assigned to it for use by observers. I have no idea how often this was actually the case, but it does reinforce the point that the US had no dedicated tank for use by artillery observers.

[JonS]

manpack = backpack. So yes, I would say the intent is to provide a dismounted FO-ing capability. Given that the FOs are there to call in artillery, and they were driving around in standard tanks to reduce their visibility, hopping out of the vehicle to call in a mission while remaining concealed is consistent behaviour.

There is a photo in "Villers Bocage Through the Lens" showing a knocked out Sherman covered in artillery tac markings, with a barrel stub in the turret and a splintered wooden barrel lying on the road beside it.*

Maybe there was a mix of 'gun' and 'dummy' FO tanks?

Regards

JonS

*IIRC, the photo is the one in the circle on the front cover. The picture has been cropped there, so you can't see the barrel. Now, if I could just remember who "x" is.

Edit: To prevent The Anglophile growling at me

[ 01-21-2002: Message edited by: JonS ]</p>

[JonS]

Doh! "x" (or "x-ray") is the BC. That would explain why he had a 'dummy' tank - more radios and a requirement for more space.

[Andreas]

Now, after this excursion into Britishness, let's see how the Hun did things.

The following is an excerpt from Hoffmann (2001) 'Die Magdeburger Division - zur Geschichte der 13. Infanterie - und Panzer - Division 1935-45', Mittler Verlag

The division was ordered to convert from infantry in October 1940.

Apologies for the translation (mutilation more like it).

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>In 1941, I. Abteilung [Artillerie-Regiment 13 (mot.)] was still organised like any other light motorised artillery detachment. Every battery of the I. Abteilung did however have one or to light armored observation cars [Panzer-Beobachtungswagen], an open-topped, half-tracked vehicle (Sdkfz.253) to accompany tank attacks. Very mobile FOOs (VB) sometimes however accompanied tank attacks in Kübelwagen, as did the light field howitzers, which often followed the tanks closely with their prime movers.<hr></blockquote>

An organisational table states that the Artillerie-Regiment 13 (mot.) contained the observation battery (Beobachtungsbatterie) 323 (Pz.), equipped with two lMG for weapons. A footnote states that this replaced the Beobachtungsabteilung (observation detachment) 13, which was detached from its assignment to the division in 1939.

Unfortunately the rebuilding of the division in 1943 according to the Panzer-Division 1943 TO&E is not covered with the same detail.

[JonS]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Very mobile FOOs (VB) sometimes however accompanied tank attacks in Kübelwagen<hr></blockquote>

:eek: :eek: :eek:

I'm the first to acknowledge Gunners as being all-round stout-fellows, but following an armoured attack in a Kübel? Yeepers!

Oh yeah - on the OP/FO distinction: (time to go back to things British ) One of the artillery commanders* responsibilities is to develop an observation plan which covers the entire front. 'Usually' this is done by having FOs from field regts spread across the front working with the inf and armour, and backstopped by OPs from mdm and hvy regts in static posns on their lonesome, situated on hilltops, in church steeples, and other convienient high spots. OPs are spread across the front so as to give continuous coverage. The British system of Mike, Uncle and Victor targets meant that this dispersed observation effort wasn't matched with a dispersed fire capability.

This worked well since the FOs from the field regt were affiliated with particular bns, and worked with them continuously thereby building up solid, longterm relationships (cf George Blackburn & Sydney Jary) with 'their' units. The mdm and hvy boys didn't have these relationships, but in the OP role it didn't matter as much.

Oh, and as Nigel Evans responded in Jeffs post - sometimes the difference between an FOO and and OPO just comes down to how deep and comfortable their hole is...

Regards

JonS

* commanders at all levels. However, the higher the level, the wider the responsibility and the more parties you have to use.

Edit: The Anglophile expects nothing less.

[ 01-21-2002: Message edited by: JonS ]</p>

[Enoch]

A quick glance through Chamberlain and Ellis turned up these:

-----------------------------------------------

Cavalier OP: 6pdr gun replaced by dummy barrel. Appearance as Centaur OP and Cromwell OP (qv).

Centaur OP: Conversion with dummy gun for artillery observation officers' use. Extra radio equipment fitted, plus telephones, etc.

Cromwell Command/OP: Mk IV, VI, or VIII fitted with dummy gun and extra radio equipment for use of formation commander or artillery observation officers.

Valentine OP/Command: Converted gun tank with dummy gun and extra communications equipment for battery commanders and OP officers of Archer-equipped SP units, 1944.

Priest OP: This was a conversion of a redundant Priest, 1944, by removal of the gun and installation of extra radio, field telephones, etc, to provide a vehicle for artillery observation officers. Appearance was similar to that of the Priest Kangaroo.

Ram OP/Command: Ram II designed for use as armoured observation post or command vehicle. Fitted with dummy gun and extra radio equipment, aerials, and telephone reels, etc. 84 built in 1943.

Sexton GPO: Introduced in late 1943 (the prototype was designated "G" vehicle), this was a Sexton with gun removed and extra equipment added for gun position officers (GPO) of Sexton batteries. It was fitted with extra radio, map tables, extra telephone cables, and an extra Tannoy unit.

Sherman OP/Command/Rear Link: Vehicle with extra radio equipment for use of OP officers of SP artillery regiments or senior officers of armored formations. OPs and some others had dummy gun.

-----------------------------------------------

There is no reference, that I saw, to the American use of such vehicles.

[ 01-21-2002: Message edited by: Enoch ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

The photo depicted in Daniel Taylor's "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" is indeed a battery commanders OP tank. This would seemingly corroborate the information sent to me by Nigel Evens. Specialized OP\Command tanks (i.e. Sherman's and the like with main-guns removed for map tables, extra radio sets, and other command paraphernalia) were employed by battery commanders (BCOs). FOOs\OPOs employed standard tanks.

Daniel Taylor in "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" indicates 3 tanks with artillery officer crewmembers were present with the Sharpshooters (4th County of London Yeomanry) around Villers-Bocage during Wittmann's attack. One of the tanks was Major Dennis Well's OP\Command tank. This is the infamous Sherman with the dummy main-gun barrel that JonS has brought to our attention. Maj. Wells was apparently the BCO of K-Battery, 5RHA, 7th Armored Division.

Although I don't wish to digress again on main-guns and no main guns, Taylor indicates that the other two tanks employed by OPOs\FOOs were standard Cromwell's. One Cromwell FOO tank was TC'd by Capt. Roy Dunlop, 5RHA. Dunlop's tank was KO'd near point 213 during the battle around Villers-Boccage. The second OPO\FOO Cromwell was apparently TC'd by Captain Paddy Victory, 5RHA. He was fortunate enough to have had some sort of mechanical difficulty and was somewhere near the rear of the Sharpshooters road march column when Wittmann struck. Curiously the photo depicting Capt. Dunlop's Cromwell has the same distinct "76" painted on the front upper hull plate. Makes me wonder if at least the Royal Horse Artillery had its own organic FOO and BCO tanks.

This practice of using standard tanks for FOOs\OPOs seems consistent with the US Army practice of popping FO's into Standard Shermans. When I say standard I mean company commander, platoon leader, or platoon sergeant type vehicles equipped with the more powerful command radios sets…SRC-508. I am assuming the approximate British equivalent was the Wireless Set No.19? But again gunless or not my main point is that forward observers attached to armored units operated from armored vehicles.

I went to the trouble of scanning and posting several photos from Taylor's excellent book "Villers-Bocage Through the Lens" on my web page. I have also included the captions to each of the photos as I felt Talyor's commentary and attention to detail are quite good. URL for photos:

http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff/OPtanks.html

[JonS]

Thanks for the extra info Jeff, and for the scans. I had only seen the book in a bookshop a while ago, and the price was a bit rich for my blood, so I was just recalling what I had seen then.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

... I am assuming the approximate British equivalent was the Wireless Set No.19? <hr></blockquote>

I think so - this was the standard radio for the armd boys, but I'm not sure if the RA used the same kit. I'll check when I get a chance. Actually - Andreas I think its covered in the handbook.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>... But again gunless or not my main point is that forward observers attached to armored units operated from armored vehicles.<hr></blockquote>

I agree - I didn't mean to throw out a red herring with the 'gun'/'dummy' distinction, just to clarify that at least sometimes these OP 'tanks' were simply mobile pillboxes that looked the same as the other tanks around them.

The troop commanders tanks (ie Capts Dunlop and Victory in the Villers Bocage example) create an interesting conundrum in terms of CMs experience ratings. Nominally these are fully armed an equipped tanks, but since they are gunners inside, their experience as an armoured vehicle should be low - certainly lower than the rest of the AFVs with them. However, as an FOO crew their experience should be quite high - as high or higher than the other AFVs.

Incidentally - the "RD" notation on Capt Dunlops' tank possibly bears more explanation: Each regt has three btys, each bty had two troops, and each troop of guns generated a single FO, manned by the troop commander plus a few sigs and an ack. 'A' troop creates one("RA"), 'B' troop creates one ("RB"), and so on. Capt Dunlops' tank carries "RD" since he is the troop commander from the second troop in the second bty in 5RHA. The specific battery is identified by the location of the red 'corner' in the blue square underneath the "RD" or "X". Top left is the first bty (A & B troops), top right is the second bty (C & D troops), bottom right is the third bty (E & F Troops).*

Regards

JonS

Shufti Cush huh?

* For historical reasons some RHA regts didn't follow the strict A,B,C,D,E,F troop progression. Incidentally neither did the artillery in 2(NZ)Div. However, the markings were consistent.

[JonS]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

... Curiously the photo depicting Capt. Dunlop's Cromwell has the same distinct "76" painted on the front upper hull plate. Makes me wonder if at least the Royal Horse Artillery had its own organic FOO and BCO tanks...<hr></blockquote>

Perhaps they were Sharpshooter tanks, but since the Sharpshooters would always be working with 5RHA FOs they decked them out as such?

Regards

JonS

[JonS]

Found the answer to the Radio Q on Evans' site.

Radio

Three different HF radios operating in overlapping parts of the 2 - 9 megahertz frequency band provided communications for artillery units. Nos 18, 19 and 22. No 38 and 48 were also used.

Wireless Set No 19

The standard armoured vehicle radio. It had two channels and crew intercom facilities: HF with a range of up to about 20 miles and VHF with a range of about 1 mile and used for inter-vehicle communications. It could have a handset remoted by cable to about half a mile away. The No 19 was the primary radio used on artillery regiment and battery radio nets.

note: with the remote capability, the FO wouldn't even have to break out the manpack if he wanted to hop out of the vehicle and observe from a nearby, convienient high spot.

Wireless Set No 18

A manpack radio having a range of about 5 miles with a tactical antenna. It weighed 34 lbs. If necessary the FOO's messages were relayed to the guns by an operator in his vehicle with the No 19 set. In Burma the No 48 set was used instead of No 18.

Wireless Set No 22

The standard portable radio used by the British Army, it could be vehicle installed or dismounted into a trench or building. It was issued from 1942 onwards to artillery observers to enable them to communicate with infantry and armoured units. It was also the primary radio on formation radio nets and in artillery soft-skinned vehicles. Its voice range with a short rod antenna was 15 - 30 miles and its remote control unit could be up to half a mile away, other antenna gave longer ranges. It could be manpacked as a 3 man load.

Wireless Set No 38

A manpack radio weighing about 26 lbs used primarily in infantry companies and between companies and tanks with a range of about 2 miles. Used by OP tanks for communications with supported infantry.

So, yes, the No 19 was the primary means, but not the only means.

[Jeff Duquette]

Thanks for the radio information JonS. Good stuff.

Just a bit of clarification to my previous post. Capt Victory's Cromwell was actually knocked out soon after Maj. Wells OP Sherman was KO'd. Victory's tank apparently became immobilized while backing up. Victory and crew bailed out. Wittmann's Tiger put an 88mm round through it shortly after. There is a photo on page 29 of Taylor's book depicting Victory's brewed-up Cromwell. It appears to be a standard 6-pdr armed Cromwell. The front of the tank is covered with soot from the brew-up so I can't tell if the "76" was painted on the upper hull.

==================================

While digging through Donald Grave's "South Albertas, A Canadian Regiment at War" it is indicated that FOOs routinely used a modified RAM-II tank. Douglas indicates the RAM-II would have its main gun removed to make room for additional artillery staff folks, map tables etc (nothing about an extra radio?). It is possible that these modified RAM-IIs actually represented OP\Command tanks for BCO's. But than again there does seem to be room for additional research regarding armed, non-armed, or whether a hodge-podge of both types of tanks were being employed by Commonwealth OPO/FOOs. See pages 359-360 of "South Albertas".

An interesting snippet from "South Albertas" is another incidence of Canadian Army armored officers calling for, and adjusting indirect fire. See page 134 in which the battalion CO Swatty Wotherspoon orders an artillery shoot from his RHQ\Command tank. The adjustments to this indirect fire mission were apparently conducted by ?Maj.? Dave Currie commanding C Squadron (Shermans). Amongst Commonwealth Armies was this peculiar to the Canadians? I had thought I read a thread here at the CMBO Forum indicating the British Army never used non-FOO's for ordering shoots?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Stacheldraht Said: Perhaps there's some info on Soviet practices in this matter at The Russian Battlefield?<hr></blockquote>

Actually I did post some information dealing with what appears to have been budding doctrine for the Red Army regarding armored FO's. See page one of this thread…"PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR DEFENSE ORDER No. 325, Dated 16 October 1942, Moscow"

[JonS]

Going once again to Evans and scolling down to "Organisation and Equipment - Observers", there is a note that supported arms could engage targets if their observer was unable to see it for some reason.

In the same passage is a fuller description on OP tanks. In summary:

In March 1944 the scale of OP tanks was as follows:

* Field Regiments (SP) of Armoured Divisions - 13 (ie CO, BCs, OPs)

* Field Regiments (towed) of Armoured Divisions - 6 (ie OPs)

* Headquarters of Independent Armoured Brigades - 8

* Headquarters of Tank Brigades - 8

IE, some OP tanks were owned by the gunners, and some by the armd chaps. So, I retract what I wrote before. The OP tanks in the photos from "Villers Bocage Through the Lens" did indeed belong to 5RHA. And since 5RHA is an SP unit, the BC had a OP tank, as noted in the photos Jeff posted, and in the org above.

The tanks held by brigade HQs were a pool for use by regiments in direct support of these formations. They had RAC crews who were joined by an OP officer and his OPA, unlike the tanks held by RA regiments that were fully crewed by RA.

The basic policy was that OP tanks should be the same type as used by the supported tank unit. Its interesting that 5RHA had a mix of OP Tanks (Sherman for the BC, Croms fro the FOs). Does anyone know what mix the Sharpshooters had? I had thought it was 100% Cromwells.

Radios were standardised as 2 × No 19 sets and 1 × No 38 set per OP tank and stowage modified for some artillery equipment. And presumably at the expense of some ammo storage.

Regards

JonS

PS There is an interesting note about the utility (or lack thereof) of WP, but since its off-topic I'll let you find it for yourselves

[ 01-22-2002: Message edited by: JonS because UBB bites. Just like Raid Across The Rhine. ]

[ 01-22-2002: Message edited by: JonS ]</p>

[Andreas]

I had another look at Lexikon der Wehrmacht regarding German FOO establishments.

For the 1940 artillery regiment, it seems that each battery of four guns had 2 FOO (VB) teams (mounted on horseback - they initially seem to have had a car too, but that was lost from TO&E later). They also seem to have had 2 backpack sections (I'll check with the guy whether these are the same). Does anybody else think that generous?

On top of that, the detachment staff battery had another 4 backpack radio sections, and two medium and one large telephone sections.

This to me would indicate a fairly well established signal net for the battery and the detachment. FDC was apparently done on battery level, at least there is a platoon for that.

Early war Panzerdivision artillery should be fairly similar, only that they were motorised and on HTs (or in Kuebels), as pointed out above.

Early war FAC was also done from HTs.

On top of this, TO&E called for a Beobachtungsabteilung (Observation/ranging detachment), but there were never enough to go round, so they ended up being Corps level assets, and it seems were replaced with a battery size unit, at least in 13. Panzer - maybe this was only in armoured divisions due to their higher mobility. From my grandfather's accounts, it seems that the Beobachtungsabteilungen never made it near the frontline during the mobile battles, either in Poland, France, or the Baltic states and Russia. He fought in a number of 'mopping up' operations though.

[Andreas]

Jeff, excellent and very interesting scans you provide there. I think I should get the book one day. Regarding non-FOOs ordering a shoot, I seem to recall something from 'Tug of war' (about the Sheldt battles) where it was said that the Riley BN OC Whitaker ordered a shoot. My memory is growing hazy though.

Major Currie and the SAR were in a very difficult position at St. Lambert, and AFAIK did not have an FOO present. Without the artillery support, they would most likely have been overrun, IIRC. This may have influenced the slightly unconventional procedure. Especially since their commanders could not pull their finger out and get infantry to them.

Jon - if Raid across the Rhine bites so much, why don't you review it. Or even better, write an AAR, to illustrate how it was your tactical ineptness, and not my hallowed design skills that were at fault

[Enoch]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

While digging through Donald Grave's "South Albertas, A Canadian Regiment at War" it is indicated that FOOs routinely used a modified RAM-II tank. Douglas indicates the RAM-II would have its main gun removed to make room for additional artillery staff folks, map tables etc (nothing about an extra radio?). It is possible that these modified RAM-IIs actually represented OP\Command tanks for BCO's. But than again there does seem to be room for additional research regarding armed, non-armed, or whether a hodge-podge of both types of tanks were being employed by Commonwealth OPO/FOOs. See pages 359-360 of "South Albertas".

<hr></blockquote>

Note my post above, 84 of the Ram II OP tanks were built. I am kind of surprised that these were ever employed as I thought none of the Ram tanks were ever shipped overseas.

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Enoch:

Note my post above, 84 of the Ram II OP tanks were built. I am kind of surprised that these were ever employed as I thought none of the Ram tanks were ever shipped overseas.<hr></blockquote>

I am quite sure that the SAR trained on the RAM II while in the UK. I also recall that the divisional commander 'nicked' a shipment of tanks due to go to the UK when they were in Nova Scotia to train on.

[JonS]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas:

I am quite sure that the SAR trained on the RAM II while in the UK. I also recall that the divisional commander 'nicked' a shipment of tanks due to go to the UK when they were in Nova Scotia to train on.<hr></blockquote>

This is correct - I've just finished reading that section. SAR (part of 4th Can Armd Div) re-equipped with Shermans early in 44. The shipment 'diverted' was destined for 5th Can Armd, in England at that time. AFAIK, none of the RAMs saw combat as tanks, but rather as OP tanks (possibly) and as APCs (definately).

Regards

JonS

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Enoch Said: Note my post above, 84 of the Ram II OP tanks were built. I am kind of surprised that these were ever employed as I thought none of the Ram tanks were ever shipped overseas.<hr></blockquote>

Graves is pretty clear about this point. Graves also relays a South Albertas account of an OP RAM-II getting knocked out in Normandy during an ambush…sometime in August 1944 I believe. I will scan\OCR and post the exact story this evening.

It is not uncommon for military historians\authors getting the facts mixed up. If you have a reference -- or references -- suggesting RAM-II OP tanks were not shipped to Europe it certainly would be interesting to take a look at this information. Perhaps the Command\OP vehicles Graves is refereeing to were actually Sherman OP tanks?