Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk

[ParaBellum]

Yeah, sure...

The red hordes just charged headless again and again in suicidal mass attacks until the Germans ran out of ammo.

The soviet army just had more men then the Germans bullets...

[JasonC]

The defense system was sound, certainly, and worked. It made use of the overall odds the Russians had gathered for the battle to neutralize local offensive concentration. But it did this primarily in a simple and old fashioned way that anybody can understand, not in some new fangled scheme or especially Russian mid-war system. The principle involved was simply that of reserves. Which neutralize local odds achieved by attacker concentration, by simply massing available reserves behind the points of main effort.

What Glantz's narrative shows is that the German attacks succeeded until such reserves arrived, and then failed. In other words, that local odds was the magic bullet on both sides; that trench systems and minefields and intricate defense layouts and AT batteries did not stop diddly on their own until they redressed the local odds imbalance. And likewise that combined arms, tank infantry cooperation, artillery massing, narrow frontages, supposed tactical virtuousity etc, did not do diddly on the attacking German side either - once local odds had evaporated through commitment of sufficient reserves. They doubtless helped before then, and perhaps marginally even after - but not enough to matter compared to the main process.

The principle of reserves neutralizes the principle of offensive initiative, leaving overall odds the deciding factor. That is what the narrative actually shows. This is not because the Germans charged recklessly with unsupported tanks (they didn't). It is not because they were too slow (they cut through second line division on the second day in some cases).

It also shows, however, that it is nonsense that the Russians needed 10 to 1 to fight the Germans or any such rot. The Germans achieved their earlier successes by getting local many-on-few odds and then fighting advantageous local battles in sequence. They could not duplicate that at Kursk because Russian reserves arrived at the threatened points in enough numbers to neutralize local odds. And once that happened, you see bloody stalemate, not continued break-in slicing and evaporating Russian formations. Showing that the successful break-in slicing and evaporating defending formations were due to many-on-few engagements at the point of attack.

Is this the story Glantz is peddling? He acknowledges it in part, of course, because he must. His narrative shows it clearly enough, and he undoubtedly understands it as a discrete point. He has a tendency to want to make everything else he knows about the Russian defense scheme in mid 43 more important than it probably was. And to make logically weaker statements like "all the rest of this stuff helped enough that reserves worked". When it is not obvious all the rest of the stuff mattered much at all.

The main case he is trying to make is that Kursk was not a foregone conclusion due simply to overall odds. And that is correct in a strict enough sense - meaning, deployments of the Russian forces were possible that would be boneheaded enough they could have been sliced and diced by local odds advantages in 1941 fashion. But avoiding that only required a sufficiently thorough application of the simple conservative principle of reserves.

Which was indeed unprecedented to that time. Nobody had thought it necessary to have entire army groups without assigned frontage, in reserve behind others. People would have told you it was silly, a waste of resources, and would split the defenders front to back, making the front line weaker than it need be. It was useful, and it allowed a full 2/3rds of the Russian defending force to engage the more successful main southern prong, for instance.

There was still some tendency for reserves to be used locally wherever there was a crisis - so e.g. the 3 Panzer corps attack was probably overbalanced. But overall, a rigorous, even overboard application of the principle of reserves made for a defense that local concentration alone could not defeat.

If there was any other component of the actual defensive success that was vital, it was probably combined arms. And Glantz can be faulted for not stressing that enough. All the key turning points in his own narrative turn on commitments of reserve Russian *armor* formations. Because the German attack scheme - exploiting the initiative by local massing - also depended on achieving "armor multiplier" effects at the points of main effort, by greater concentration of their armor. And reserve armor in very large numbers was able to counter that (whole tank armies e.g.).

That is a vital point, because others made mistakes about the necessity for specifically *armored* reserve formations to defeat attack concentration. In particular, the Germans later on tended to either leave their Panzer divisions in the line for long periods on extended frontages, or if they did pull them out into reserves, use those reserves for grandious counterattacks, instead of defensively.

Which was an overestimate of the importance of being the local attacker, and thus of the initiative. What is really important is concentration and counterconcentration, and on defense one achieves the latter by defensive armor reserves, not by trying to "seize the initiative" prematurely. After enemy attacks have been defeated, fine, use reserves remaining and uncommitted for offensives.

But the critical period is won by husbanding armor reserves to meet enemy attacks, which cannot be stopped without them, because the attacker can choose where to concentrate his armor and no defense can stop concentrated combined arms without combined arms counter-concentration of reserves itself.

For those with ears to hear...

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Mike:

Err...OK - then the German idea of My overall point is that the German concept of the attack was bankrupt - armoured formations are best used to exploit holes created by infantry, notas battering rams to make those holes.

I find this an unusual conclusion to draw since Models attacks in the North opened with only one Panzer Division (20 PD) along with 216 ID, 78 Assault (super Infantry Div), 86 ID, 292 ID, 6 ID, 31 ID 7 ID and 285 ID. Models attack plan resulted in less ground taken and only 1.5 times the casualties inflicted on the Russian Central Front. Manstein's plan of leading with Panzer Div netted “deeper” penetrations, greater absolute casualties for both Russian and Germans and 4.6 time greater casualties inflicted on the Russians relative to their own. (Zetterling 2000 Pg 118-119).

[ August 26, 2002, 12:40 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Guest Mike]

Oh I'm not saying that Model's plan was any better either.

In fact by this time the whole idea of "blitzkreig" was past its use-by date anyway. It relied upon lack of enemy resolve, reserves and mobility, and these erquirements were no longer present.

without massive technological, material and/or or numerical advantages attacks simply could not succeed any more - well they never could really, but the difference between 1941 and 1943 was quiet marked in that the Germans had plenty of those at important points in 1941, but could no longer manage them by 1943.

[Grisha]

For what it's worth, the Soviets pretty much decided that armor was needed for both initial penetration and exploitation. Heavy tanks/SUs supported the penetration, then mobile groups (primarily with T-34s) would be introduced by the time the 2nd defensive belt[edit] was taken to develop exploitation into German operational depths. But the brunt of the initial penetration was the job of infantry. By 1944, a kilometer of frontage in an Soviet main assault sector had a tactical density of:</font>

• 6-8 rifle battalions</font>
• 200-250 guns/mortars</font>
• 20-30 tanks/SUs
  </font>

These forces would be echeloned as well.

The key to creating the local numerical superiority necessary for a rapid penetration of tactical defenses was by masking the build-up of forces. Initially, this was something the Germans were much better at than the Soviets, but by mid-1943 this capability was reversed.

[ August 26, 2002, 01:54 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Mike:

Oh I'm not saying that Model's plan was any better either.

In fact by this time the whole idea of "blitzkreig" was past its use-by date anyway. It relied upon lack of enemy resolve, reserves and mobility, and these erquirements were no longer present.

without massive technological, material and/or or numerical advantages attacks simply could not succeed any more - well they never could really, but the difference between 1941 and 1943 was quiet marked in that the Germans had plenty of those at important points in 1941, but could no longer manage them by 1943.

But Models plan was Infantry to breach and Panzers to exploit. It failed as well without causing the damage that Manstein's Panzers as battering rams plan netted.

You've just circled round to Jason’s argument that it's local superiority that matters. In the Initial penetrations by Manstein’s forces they had them, after the Russians transferred in reserves and ended up with more troops than in the initial defence setup they (4th Pz Kp and Army Detachment Kempf) lost that edge.

[Andreas]

Basty (can I call you Basty?) - I think another reason for the failure to break in more deeply in the north could also be what I said in an earlier post - Zhukov's statement that it was an intel failure on the part of the Soviets to anticipate the main thrust from the north, and consequently assigning more defensive assets up there. I have not studied Kursk in any depth, so I do not know whether that statement is just post-war/memoir politics, but it sounded fairly reasonable.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Basty (can I call you Basty?) - I think another reason for the failure to break in more deeply in the north could also be what I said in an earlier post - Zhukov's statement that it was an intel failure on the part of the Soviets to anticipate the main thrust from the north, and consequently assigning more defensive assets up there. I have not studied Kursk in any depth, so I do not know whether that statement is just post-war/memoir politics, but it sounded fairly reasonable.

No you may not call me basty, Its Sir Bust a balls for scum such as yourself.

At any rate Zetterling lists on Pg 20

Central Front (North)

711,575 Men

1,785 Tanks and SP Guns

12,453 Guns and Mortars

Voronezh Front (South)

625,591 Men

1,704 Tanks

9,751 Guns

The Discrepency is not that large and somewhat odd if the greater attack is expected in the north when the Number of GHQ units for anti tank guns is compared (Zetterling Pg 21)

Anti Tank brigades: 3 Central 7 Voronezh

Anti Tank regt: 8 Central 27 Voronezh

Of course the exact opposite is seen with GHQ RD and Brigades.

So the Russians had enough info to guess where the greater number of Panzers would attack from yet guessed the main attack would come from the North. Zetterling makes a point though that the 9th Armee was stronger in heavy arty and therfore the Russian thought that the Germans would emulate Russian breakthrough tactics leading to the assumption of the main thrust in the north. I just can't belive the Russian were that blinkered in their intel assesments. They had been fighting with the Germans for almost 3 years and must have noticed that the Germans relied on Panzer formations to create and then exploit holes in the line. They knew the position and numbers of German aircraft locations to hit Luftwaffe airfields mere hours before the German attack yet failed to note that

1st air DIvision commited 730 aircraft in supporting 9th Armee. While VIII air Korp commited 1,110 aircraft in support of the southern attack. Odd odd and dam odd.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Basty (can I call you Basty?) - I think another reason for the failure to break in more deeply in the north could also be what I said in an earlier post - Zhukov's statement that it was an intel failure on the part of the Soviets to anticipate the main thrust from the north, and consequently assigning more defensive assets up there. I have not studied Kursk in any depth, so I do not know whether that statement is just post-war/memoir politics, but it sounded fairly reasonable.

Rokossovsky remarked in his memoirs on the greater advance into Vatutin's front, saying something to the effect that Vatutin placed his forces more evenly without consideration to a main attack direction. In fact, more forces were used down south than in the north, and Rokossovsky had to make due with what he had as part of Central Front, since STAVKA reserves were routed to Voronezh Front almost from the beginning. Glantz says that the reason for the greater advance down south was that the main attack direction was easier to determine up north due to various factors, including terrain. Down south there was the possibility of advancing in a number of key directions, resulting in a defensive dilemma for Vatutin.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Then why don't you? If your posts are all going to be along the line of:

'The Soviets were crap, the Germans were great, why - because I say so', you can spare the time to post them. Some people here are trying to get some serious discussion going, and just throwing out stuff like you do that is:

1) not backed up by anything

2) plain wrong (which would not be so bad if you at least tried to argue the case)

is both pointless and annoying. Either put up some evidence, or leave those who are prepared to talk about the topic like adults to get on with it, watch and learn.

Wow, ain't that rich!

Last I checked, this was a public forum. Last I checked, expressing one's opinion, no matter how off the wall it is, is allowed here as long as you stay within the rules. Last I checked, only the moderators can tell someone if they are allowed to post. And finally, last I checked, you are not a moderator.

You may resume with your serious discussion.

[bsd]

Jason, I wonder if Glantz was specifically asked to write a paper on the layout of the Russian defences at Kursk, not why the whole battle was won/lost.

Like you, he knew those defence structures were not as important as - for example - the sheer number of Russian reserves, so he hinted at these other factors while talking specifically about the defences.

I think he is looking at a smaller picture (the Russian defences, at regiment level, particularly the front line) and you are looking at the big picture (the whole battle).

Or I may have missed the point entirely...

[JasonC]

On north and south, the first obvious point is that one or the other had to succeed more, relatively. Second, the reserve front was thrown in against the one that did better, and the whole point of having an entire front in reserve was that you did not have to guess beforehand which direction would be more successful, but could watch and see, and send the reserve that way. That is the joy of interior lines, after all. The Germans could not switch weights from north to south, the Russians could.

As for why the south wound up more successful, there are a number of obvious reasons. The planned penetration by armor in the north was narrower. 41 corps had only 1 panzer division. The breakthough sector had 5, plus 2 PzGdr and attached heavies - but was deployed in two echelons on a sector only one panzer corps wide. The armor was set for one deep cut, in other words. That cut had to succeed dramatically and right away. The bulk of the rest of the northern attack was infantry based.

Whereas in the south, the main drive was two panzer corps wide, and there was in addition the subsidiary drive directed farther east by an additional panzer corps. Which attracted half a dozen reserve divisions. The main difference, though, was probably the side by side deployment of the two panzer corps in the main southern thrust, instead of one behind the other. It is easier to walk on two legs than one. The 2-1 deployments the Russians were using were particularly well suited to sealing off *one* penetration (because the back "one" at every echelon backs up the same spot).

The Russians still had to throw in the reserve tank army of the northern front to stop the northern drive. Overall weight of armor was high enough to require that, however narrow the attempt. In the south, the reserve front was needed, but again its tank army in particular is what eventually did the job.

There isn't all that much difference, and it is vain to exaggerate it. One or the other was going to draw in the reserve front's armor, after all, and naturally that would be whichever got farther beforehand. That is how 2-1 deployments work - double thickness behind the successful sector.

[Grisha]

To add to what Jason posted, if you look at the southern advance by von Manstein's forces what you get by the crucial time of 13 July is very much visually like the backhand view of a left hand with the forefinger and thumb sticking out and up. The 'forefinger' is Totenkopf, and the 'thumb' is Kempf's group. This was the result of relentless Soviet counterattacks all along the flanks that kept the spearhead of the advance limited to a very narrow frontage. It was only after Zitadelle was called off that the Soviet salient between the 'thumb' and 'forefinger' was eliminated.

The problem on defense is you never know where the attacker is planning to go. When elements of II SS Pz Corps 'sidestepped' right on their way to Oboian, it made Vatutin's decision to employ 1st Tank Army defensively on the left (rather than remain as a mobile reserve for counterattack))look bad. Hence, the dire need for 5th Guards Tank Army of Steppe Front to head off the advance.

The frustration of the Germans down south was that they could never get their forces abreast of one another once the advance progressed. The continual Soviet counterattacks on the flanks of the German units required constant attention and assets. While, tactically, the Germans were able to repulse many of these attacks, operationally, it denied the Germans sufficient freedom of action to coordinate their plans any further. Basically, the German advance, while powerful was denied the ability to focus its drive north.

It should be added that sufficient Soviet forces were available to plug any gaps as well. Definitely, reserves won the day, but how they were used had much to do with the Soviet victory.

[ August 27, 2002, 05:22 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Bastables:

You've just circled round to Jason’s argument that it's local superiority that matters.

Actually I thought Jason circled round to that himself - I thought it was patently obvious and has been since the time the first cave man picked up a stone to make his punch harder!!

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Grisha:

[QB]To add to what Jason posted, if you look at the southern advance by von Manstein's forces what you get by the crucial time of 13 July is very much visually like the backhand view of a

[QB]

Full agreement.

[Lee_DiSantis]

Want to know something funny? I was such a dork in my earlier years (actually, 4 years ago) that I wrote a ten page paper on the battle of Kursk for freshman english in high school. It was actually a pretty good paper, and i think i got an A. Ever since I did the research for that paper, I've been fascinated by Ferdinands. That's one of the main reasons I'm so excited for CMBB; though I'm not sure I'm so psyched for the Soviet infantrymen climbing on and destroying them because Hitler forgot to put machine guns on the things.

If I were to make any addition to this conversation, it would be this: no matter what the details were, the battle of Kursk was essentially lost by the Germans (Hitler, really) before it began. The Soviets had far too many resources for the Germans to be throwing away their last viable panzer arm in a massed frontal attack. Given the excessive head's up the Soviet's had, the outnumbered Germans (though using far superior equipment man to man) never had any hope. The only conclusion one can come to is that Hitler was a dumbass. The eastern war could have been won in '41, but god forbid he send some coats to his men...

It's ok, I'm currently quite happy with the results of WWII. Unhappy with the perpetual stupidity of man. And unhappy with our perpetual eagerness to destroy each other.

[ August 27, 2002, 03:31 AM: Message edited by: Lee_DiSantis ]

[JasonC]

To Lee - there wasn't any way of making the Kursk attack a brilliant success by tweaking three knobs on the German side, I agree. But that is not sufficient to make the case that it was "decided before it began" by overall odds. I do think the attack decision was a mistake, sure. But Glantz has a point, when he argues the result was less predetermined by overall odds alone than after the fact views often suppose.

The Russians had overall odds out the wazoo at the time of Barbarossa, too. I forget who it was who said, "if we had known they really had 20,000 tanks, that it wasn't just propaganda, we never would have attacked". The armor odds on the first day were 6 to 1 against the Germans. They romped anyway. You do mention one key additional factor that was different - strategic surprise in one case (despite repeated warning, incidentally) and thorough preparation in the other case. But I think Glantz makes a pretty strong case that wasn't the only difference. The Russians were flat smarter in 1943, about how to fight a modern war.

The Germans did not succeed *before* Kursk because the Russian had never had such overall odds against them. They faced superior odds before Kursk, without the result looking like Kursk. They used local odds and offensive maneuver to defeat overall odds advantages in favor of the Russians. That was the promise of maneuver, after all - that it could make something else trump overall odds, by the when and where and how fast aspects of combat. They hadn't forgotten how to do this at Kursk. But it no longer worked its old magic.

The opponent was different, not the implimentation or the idea or the fact that the opponent had odds. The opponent used his odds better. The Russians understood the threat by mid 1943. They may have analyzed it less than exhaustively, but they analyzed the danger as local odds ratios combined with armor concentration. And that was right enough that countering that one aspect of German attacks would shut down the maneuver multipliers the Germans had hitherto enjoyed. The Russians only had to *neutralize* a factor that *had* been working in the Germans' favor previously, to "let out" the overall odds they enjoyed. But they did have to accomplish that much, and it was by no means automatic.

The principle of reserves, applied it is important to add *on a scale never seen before in warfare*, accomplished that. It was still possible to make mistakes (or at least second-guessable judgment calls, if mistakes is perhaps too strong) - reserve armor sent to the spoiling attack by 41 corps instead of the main northern prong, premature counterattack in the north instead of putting most of the armor in front of the main prong deployed defensively, half a dozen divisions sent to stop AD Kempf rather than the main drive, the need for a second tank army to stop the main southern drive because the first had only stopped part of it. But a reserve *army group*, numerous reserve *armies* - covered a lot of contingencies.

The basic reality remained that offensive maneuver could be countered by defensive maneuver in the form of a thoroughgoing application of the principle of reserves, particularly to large armor formations. This was by no means obvious before the Germans attacked. The Germans did not understand it themselves, or agree with it, or they would have used their own armor as just such a defensive reserve. They certainly had not already faced the same thing, so they did not have to be complete boneheads to get it wrong.

They believed that the initiative, being locally on the attack, confered local odds multipliers automatically, and that therefore their chances were best fighting deep in the Russian defended zone rather than deep in their own defended zone. In retrospect, that was wrong, and can even seem a crazy idea. But against opponents without sufficient reserve depth in their deployment - even opponents with overall odds - it worked just fine. Ask the French, or the Russians of 1941.

The new element of the equation was not odds, it was how smart the defense was. Not in minutae about each ATG battery, but in the grand deployment decisions about scale of reserves and echelon depth and where, when and how to use the defender's armor. The Germans had previously been relying on their opponents being relatively dumb about such things. Only "relatively" dumb, because nobody - including the Germans - had figured out the right defending formula before Kursk.

The importance of the battle for the history not of just WW II, but the history of military theory, is that it is the point at which mobile defense in depth doctrine really comes of age. Before it, the attacker had an edge because the proper way of using odds and armor concentrations on defense against combined arms offensive maneuver had not yet been worked out. At it, and after it, that was no longer true.

Which was not any obvious, forgone conclusion before the event. That the principle of reserves is a higher card in the same suit as offensive maneuver by concentrated armor had to be discovered, and it was discovered at Kursk.

I hope this is interesting.

[JasonC]

It is not "that local superiority matters", it is how overall superiority can be made to trump offensive maneuvering for local superiority. Whether it was possible at all, or the offense always had an edge due to ability to pick the point of concentrated attack, or not. And if not, how? The answer, which was not at all blindingly obvious, being that yes it is possible to defeat offensive concentration (aka "the initiative"), and the method is a thoroughgoing application of the principle of defensive reserves. Which simply neutralizes local superiorities, and thus lets overall odds "back out" as the dominant factor.

You may say, that is so simple and so obviously true that everyone since the cavemen must have known it. But while the principle is indeed true, that everyone always knew it is empirically false. The French did not know it in 1940. The Russians did not know it in 1941. The Germans, even, did not know it as late as 1943, or even late 1944 - which is why they were always attacking, in search of offensive maneuver multipliers that had evaporated on them, as at Kursk and Ardennes. But the Russians who did not know it in 1941, did know it in 1943 - and won the war because of it. Making it, let us say, "other than" trivial.

[ August 27, 2002, 11:18 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[TSword]

Some snippets from Glantz's book:

11th July near Prokhorovka...

"..Quickly turning on me (Rotmistrov), and with a touch of annoyance in his voice, Aleksandr Mikhailovich asked me, "General! What's going on ? Where you not forewarned that the enemy must not know about the arrival of our tanks ? And they stroll about in the light of day under the German's eyes.." Instantly, i raised my binoculars. - Indeed, tens of tanks in combat formation, firing from the march from their short-barreled guns, were crossing the field and stirring up the ripenenend grain.- "However, Comrade General, they are not our tanks. They are German..."

-> 4th PA had overrun the assembly area of 5th GTA of Rotmistrov quite unexpected it seems...

Bakharov's full force of about 190 tanks would strike LAH's 2.PzGrenReg and right flank of Regiment Eicke..

General Kirichenko's 29th Tankcorps (191 tanks)occupied a dubious place of honour in the center of Rotmistrov's formation astride the Prokhorovka road.

General Burdeiny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps reprouped it's surviving 120 tanks into new assemply areas against Das Reich forces.

Popov's two weakened brigades of 2nd TC would attempt to join the effort. Rotmistrov hoped Popov would atleast protect his flanks. For insurance he deployed the army's reserve 53rd Guards Tank Regiment in Popovs rear area and kept the 228 tanks of 5th Guard Mechanized Corps in reserve

(Man i really become blurry by all this regiments, corpses and armies..)

..However the superior armor and armament of the newest German tanks and assault guns made it imperative that Rotmistrov's tankers fight at range 500 m or less. Rotmistorv ordered all his commanders to close with Gemran armored formations at high speed and "gang up" on each German target, in particular the heavy Tigers.

12. July at Prokhorovka:

"As we waited to see if further enemy tanks were going to appear, I looked around as was my habit, what i saw left me speechless. From beyond the shallow rise about 150-200 in front of me appeared fifteen, then thirty, then forty tanks. Finally there were too many to count. The T-34s were rolling forward at high speed, carrying mounted infantry"

Simultaneously LAH's 1st SS PzReg. 13th Cpy Tiger (On 11. July 4 Tigers reported operational) ran into a force of sixty Soviet tanks, which it engaged at a range of 600 - 1000 meters. As the ranges rapidly closed another Russian force of like strength descended on the 13th company. A swirling, deadly, three-hour battle ensued, during which the Soviet tanks suffered appalling losses. (1 Tiger knocked out, 9 under repair) II./SSPzReg 1 reports 163 enemy tanks knocked out.

Rotimistrov observed some of the fighting by himself:

"...The T-34's were knocking out Tigers at extremely close range, since their powerful guns and massive armor no longer gave them an advantage in close combat. The tanks of both side were in closest possible contact...On the black, scorched earth the gutted tanks burnt like torches. It was difficult to establish which side was attacking and which defending..."

..As evocative and accurate as Rotmistrov's dramatic desription of the battlefield was, he failed to mention that the bulk of the burning tank hulks were Soviet.."

"..Moiseev's brigade fought a prolonged and costly battle, losing fully half of it's tanks while driving LAH's PzReg back to Oktiabr'skii"

"However, incessant German counterattacks and heavy air strikes halted the drive and forced the Soviets to dig in."

"At a cost of 48 killed, 321 wounded and 5 missing LAH claimed to have destroyed 192 tanks and 19 AT-guns and captured 253 prisoners. In the process the Germans reported losing fewer than half of their own tanks. Even allowing for some German inflation of Soviet cas. and double counting of Soviet tank kills, the two Soviet tank corps had lost nearly half their initial strength..The position of both corps was made even more precarious by the failure of 2nd Guards Tank Corp's attack on their right flank and by the progress made by Totenkopf north of the Psel river..."

At 12. July LAH was meeted by:

170, 30, 32, 25, 169 TB

53 MRB

55 & 53 GTR

1000 ATR

23, 28, 26 GAbnr

LAH gained no ground but repelled several attacks

Tot was meeted by:

181, 110 TB

24 GTB

10 GMB

11, 32 MRB

36, 51 GTR

287, 290, 284 GRR

Tot advanced 5 kilometers on 12 July

Das Reich gained some ground on the right flank of LAH but lost some on it's own right flank.

Excerpt from Col. Mellenthin Chief of Staff 48th PzCorps (Det. Kempf) about Panzer tactics at Kursk:

"..The russians copied these tactics and soon became past masters of them, as we learned to our cost in Citadel. It was a Russian speciality to fortify these Pakfronts (Russ: PTOP -> Antitank defense points) combined into an antitank region (PTOR) with minefields or antitank ditches, and to scatter mines haphazard among the mine belts..In this connection mention should be made again of the masterly camouflage work of the Russians. Meither minefields nor Pakfronts could be detected until the first tank blew up, or the first Russian antitank gun openend fire.

The question how it was possible for the German armor to fight it's way through these Russian antitank defenses is difficult to answer: the method chosen depended upon local conditions and on the forces available for the operation.. Up to Citadel the German armor moved and fought in wedge formation, the Panzerkeil, which up to then had proven very effective indeed: the spearhead of the wedge was formed by the heaviest tanks, and the Tigers proved their worth against the Russian antitank fronts organized in depth.. Our Mark IVs were not good enough to effect a breakthrough against a deep antitank front, and the capture of so many Russian positions was due to the perfect cooperation of all heavy weapons.

Citadel and other operations proved that the fire of the antitank front can be neutralized by the concentric and expertly conducted fire of the attacking armor. To put this theory into practice called for changes in armored formations and tactics. The tank wedge was replaced by the Panzerglocke (Armored Bell). This Panzerglocke with super heavy tanks in the center, medium tanks to the right and left rear in a widening arch, light tanks behind the center and held ready for pursuit, was the best formation to bring to bear against a wide fire front. The Panzer Commander together with observers for all heavy weapons, traveled in the Glocke (Bell) immediately behind the leading medium tanks. He had to be in wireless communication with the commander of the fighter-bombers and other aircraft supporting the ground troops. Engineers in armored vehicles traveled just behind the forward tanks of the bell, ready to clear gaps through minefields. An attack along these lines was generally succesful if the attacking formations practiced close cooperation of all weapons.

Night attack proved another means of breaking through deep antitank fronts, although a night attack was always regarded with some trepidation. The terrain had to be suitable for armor, and the weather had to be favorable; moonlight nights were preferred. The ground had to be reconnoitered during daylight by the officers concerned. As we had no suitable compasses for the tanks, a road clearly visible at night or a sand track were used to indicate direction. Even in night attacks the Panzerglocke proved it's usefulness; the advance was made in closer formation and with shorter distances between tanks....Well trained officers and experienced tank drivers were indispensable.

My Comment:

Soviet defensive tactics at Kursk were very good as long they were stationary -> Deeply echeloned defenses. As soon they moved they could only stop the german advance by superior numbers. Glantz mentions a 8:1 ratio in tank vs. tank on page 135 "This loss ratio of one German to eight Russian tanks persisted throughout much of the operation".

The germans didn't fail on the tactical level (4th Pz Army fought on until 17. July, encircled a russian forces and joined Kempf), but were instead outmanouvred strategically in case of the Kursk battle and thus couldn't reach their Operational objectives which were:

- Destroy enemy forces in the Kursk Bulge by means of a two pronged attack on Kursk by 9th and 4th Panzerarmy.

- Free reserves by shortening of frontline

The subsequent Russian offesives Kutuzov (Launch 12. th July to cutoff the Orel salient) and Rumiantsev to recapture Kharkov were extremely costly to the Russian army (Which other army could take such cas and not collapse ?):

Kutuzov 500'000 casualties "Skillful German defense against overwhelming odds succeeded in denying Soviet commanders the rapid and dramatic offensive success they so ardantly sought and in the process cost the Red Army almost a half million casualties (Glantz pg 240)."

Rumiantsev (980'000 men, 12'000 guns, 2400 tanks):

250'000 cas. 1000 tanks lost

"At Bogodukhov Katukov lost 100 tanks when surrounded, pg 249".

After the Kharkov Desaster starting 1943 the Russian High-Command acted cautiously and let the germans first attack before their own operations.

Massed deep defenses and gigantic reserves (Steppe and Brianks Front over 1 Million men)ensured success no matter what. Reserves on the german side were two mere tankdivisions and some security detachments.....

I doubt if the Russian Operational Art was superior to the German Operational Art (i think it cannot be compared). However the Russian way is unique and correct and fitted perfectly the possibilities of the country. Operational Level fitted Strategical and vice versa. On the German side Operational Art was compromised as soon the Strategical goal was out of reach (Collapse of Soviet Union) in autumn 1941. Afterwards German Operational Art had to cope with Strategical objectives rather blurry and out of scope. The Operational level is the intermediate between the strategical- and the tactical- level, if the first is distorted or flawed the whole chain becomes distorted necessarily.

Greets

Daniel

[Grisha]

I doubt if the Russian Operational Art was superior to the German Operational Art

Daniel, you must not have studied what operational art is. During WWII, the Soviets were the only ones to have a distinct understanding of operational art. Nobody else even understood the need for it. Most everyone else saw the need for operations in the sense of a logistical-operational 'boundary' for a series of tactical actions (i.e. battles), but only the Soviets realized that it would improve operations to actually study the theory and practice of operations just as thoroughly as strategy and tactics. Hence, while everyone else had two levels of military art, strategy and tactics, the Soviets had three, strategy, operational art and tactics. It took them until 1943 to lay down a practical foundation for their theoretical development of deep battle and deep operations, but by 1944-45 the Soviets were conducting amazing operations in terms of scale, interdependency, and effectiveness.