CMBB: aviation

[bulletproofest]

I was just wondering how the plane system in CMBB will work( will there be special spotters to call in bomber strikes, or will it work like it did in CMBO?)

[Schrullenhaft]

It will work much like it does in CMBO. On the Eastern Front there was even less coordination between tactical forces on the ground and close-support aircraft.

[bulletproofest]

will there be any aircraft types( yak-9, migs, maybe bombers)?

[Schrullenhaft]

Yes, there will be a larger variety of aircraft with their unique load-outs represented in CMBB. The aircraft will even have their designations to differentiate them (unlike CMBO's 'Fighter-Bomber').

On the Eastern Front there were no aircraft equivalent to the Western Allies' bombers (of the 'strategic' variety). Both sides had smaller, quicker bombers that will get represented in CMBB.

[Grisha]

Schrullenhaft,

Actually air-ground coordination in the Russian Front was generally superior to the Western front. The Germans under Richtofen(?) developed very good close support systems during 1942. The Soviets by 1944 actually had air liaison personnel(w/radio) at the tactical-operational level. Both side's air force was tactical in nature, unlike the USAAF or RAF.

[ July 23, 2002, 06:20 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[bulletproofest]

but will the player be able to designate targets with special smoke grenades or anything, and can any of you guys who are making the game tell me some of the russian and german fighter names?

THANKS!

[KNac]

I agree 100% with what Grysha said.

The CAS in the western front was archived by numercal reasons but not because the cooperation was better than in the eastern front.

Also the usage and direct impact (on the battlefield) of air support in the westewrn front is a myst (like a bunch of things). I do not mean that they hadn´t any effect, but that it was much lower than what the average Joe thinks Air superiroty had much effect on supplies (and so, in the war of attrition) and in open travel or assembly and massification of forces.

Even that the germans were able to mass up a lot of forces for the battle of the Bulge (yep I know weather and terrain helped)

In fact the direct impact of CAS in eastern front in the tactical battlefield was much heavier than in the western front.

[apex]

J87G, "in" or "not in" please?

apex

[Schrullenhaft]

I will not confirm what aircrat are in CMBB since the lists may change.

I'm still of the opinion that the Western Allies had a more effective system of directing CAS at the tactical level than either the Germans or the Soviets, though it was far from perfect. I'm not overtly familiar with the systems used by the Germans and Soviets for directing CAS, but I'm under the impression that effective preplanned concentrations was the primary method of employing CAS on the Eastern Front. On top of this a long chain of communications was used to direct CAS assets to the correct spot (which took longer than the late-war Western systems).

On the Eastern Front CAS was probably utilized more often and in much higher concentrations (especially by the Soviets) than on the Western Front. Thus it had more of a tactical impact that it did in the West. The German and Soviet airforces were primarily tactical in nature and thus tended to have a lot of experience with and a lot of assets dedicated to CAS. The Western airforces on the other hand had a majority of their resources tasked to strategic bombing or logistical strikes far behind the front lines.

I'm not saying that the Western Allies had overall superior CAS, but the ground liason system that was coming into place late in the war was probably superior to the systems that the Germans and Soviets employed. Soviet and German aviation, much like their Western counterparts, had a command structure that was detached from the ground forces and that utilized a lot of preplanning for the employment of aerial assets (a necessary measure for such a large front to cover as the East was). These preplanned strikes were rarely coordinated by ground liason officers at the point of the attack. While both belligerants on the Eastern Front experimented with and started to employ systems that involved more tactical direction of CAS, I don't think that they had the logistics and command structure to consistently implement them as effectively as the Western Allies eventually would. Though CAS wasn't perfected by the Western Allies in WWII - it just got closer to what we think of it today. In fact CAS as we think of it today (with a ground liason officer directing the aircraft to a specific target during the heat of the battle) was actually practiced in the Pacific by the US Marines, in what was possibly the most effective CAS of WWII. In this theater the Navy and Marine air units took on a more tactical bent than a majority of their Army Air Corps brethren. With a much smaller front and numerous communications nets CAS was given an environment in which close tactical coordination was possible and a necessity (where fratricide could be even more common due to heavy foliage and close quarters of most front lines).

I'm not trying to disparage how effective the German and Soviets pilots were at CAS. They probably had more experience in flying tactical CAS missions and, from a pilot/flight perspective, were probably more effective at it than most Western pilots. So on the Eastern Front it is my opinion that a lot of the effectiveness of CAS came from concentration of CAS assets and pilot experience rather than tactical coordination by a ground liason officer in the strike zone. If the concentrations of CAS on the Eastern Front were significantly less than what they were, the impact on the battlefield probably would have been less too.

In the end, most people today probably associate too much effectiveness with CAS during WWII. The Western Allies actually benefitted more from the interdiction of logistics by air support than the direct tactical intervention of CAS.

Back to the point of what this thread was originally about... it would be unrealistic to have forward observer/ground liason officer requesting and directing a CAS attack so close to the actual strike zone. The liason officers used on the Eastern Front tended to be attached farther up the chain of command where they usually put in requests from divisonal-level and above command staffs for CAS support from the assigned aviation units. On the Western Front ground liason officers were starting to be used in a capacity that was similar to FO's in CMBO, but even these were not at all common and tended to be assigned only to certain attacks, etc.

[ July 23, 2002, 09:58 PM: Message edited by: Schrullenhaft ]

[BeauCoupDinkyDau]

Originally posted by apex:

J87G, "in" or "not in" please?

apex

No JU-87's. We bitch too much about bones, and the entire airstrike code had to be scrapped so we could get "sneak peaks" from Matt.

[bulletproofest]

Well Schrullenhaft, can you tell me the names of the planes that are currently being put in, or possible planes that can be put in the game? I'd really really really appreciate it!

SANKS!

[Schrullenhaft]

As I said before the list of aircraft can change. Since that is a possibility it would be worthless to list the aircraft if some of them don't make it and people start complaining since it was on the list. Besides, the NDA may prohibit me from giving out such specifics at this point without permission.

Madmatt or Steve might list some of the aircraft, but right now they are really tight for time and probably won't be able to respond to this thread.

[ July 23, 2002, 11:25 PM: Message edited by: Schrullenhaft ]

[bulletproofest]

well ok thanks I guess, looks like we need someone to close this topic.

[Grisha]

Hayward's book, Stopped at Stalingrad, is very enlightening on the process of German CAS. The major proponent of it was Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen when he commanded Fliegerkorps VIII up until July 1942. Through his work, the Luftwaffe became quite adept at CAS. There are even incidents of air units communicating with air liaison personnel during Blau to inform them of enemy troops up ahead. Specifically, tactical communications about impending enemy troops mere kilometers away. These air liason personnel stayed with the spearhead of the advance in order to more effectively utilize CAS. von Manstein always requested von Richthofen's units for his operations after their brilliant cooperation in the Crimea in 1942.

In House's Leavenworth paper Towards Combined Arms Warfare (he has since expanded on this paper and published it as a book) he states that US air-ground cooperation was poor until 'late in the war'.

In the interim, effective air support depended on personalities and initiative in the field.

The main reason for such poor cooperation was AAF doctrine, which defined three priorities for tactical aviation: 1) air superiority, 2) "isolation of the battlefield", meaning air interdiction, and 3) attacks on ground targets "in the zone of contact" between opposing armies. CAS was always priority 3. And even by 1946

AAF officers assigned to study the lessons learned from tactical air operations in Europe continued to describe close air support as a 'priority three' mission and recommended the continued use of AAF doctrine on this subject.

In the book Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century, John T. Greenwood contributed an article, titled 'Soviet Frontal Aviation in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945',

Attack aviation showed definite tactical refinement and maturity from 1943 on. Attack units operated either in support of or under assignment to ground force units. By far the most standard form of tactical air employment, support stressed centralized control of air armies in support of tank, mechanized, and combined-arms units. When operating under assignment, attack units were attached directly to specific ground formations, usually tank and mechanized units.

The development of improved air-to-air and air-to-ground radio communications and radio networks as well as better visual signals and marking techniques for ground forces made the attack arm more effective and responsive to ground force requirements. Air liaison officers were attached to ground units down to the regimental level to coordinate operations and direct attack elements to the most critical targets. Air army, attack air corps, and air division command posts were established close to the headquarters of the supported ground units, and auxiliary air command posts and checkpoints proliferated from 1943 on to control tactical support on the battlefield. 'In the clear' voice communications were often used to prevent confusion and make sure that the most important and time-sensitive targets were clearly identified and struck. Despite these improvements, poor tactical discipline in the air often hampered these direction efforts.

I included that last sentence to show that Soviet CAS wasn't perfect, but it was still very developed, and certainly more effective than their western allies' efforts.

[Hun Hunter]

Originally posted by Grisha:

...I included that last sentence to show that Soviet CAS wasn't perfect, but it was still very developed, and certainly more effective than their western allies' efforts.

"Then Rudel's fighter bombers appeared and dived on the Russian Tanks, antitank guns, and artillery positions. After so long it was a great feeling again for us old hands no longer to be exposed without hope to the enemy air force." - Hans Von Luck in Panzer Commander.

Please note that Luck's Division had just been transfered from the Western front where it had been fighting since D-Day (the above happened on 9 Feb 45. The fighter-bombers he describes above were STUKAS! Now maybe he was just experiencing effective Western Allied "interdiction" while fighting in the west and not "CAS" but I have read many similiar statements from Germans who fought on both fronts. I have no doubt that Soviet CAS was effective to say it was more effective that the Western Allies seems to fly in the face of admittidly anecdotal evidence. Surely there are some detailed (and impartial) studies on the matter.

Also, no matter what, against the Western Allies in 44-45 Rudel might have gotten a tank or two before he would have been splattered across the countryside by a (insert your favorite western fighter here). Yes, I know that's not CAS but it might have saved the Soviets a tank or two

Greg

[Pvt. Ryan]

Originally posted by bulletproofest:

Well Schrullenhaft, can you tell me the names of the planes that are currently being put in, or possible planes that can be put in the game? I'd really really really appreciate it!

SANKS!

Having attended the So Cal preview, I can tell you that many of the aircraft used by the nations that fought on the Russian front are included in CMBB. I hope that helps.

[John Kettler]

I was there, too, and I concur with Pvt. Ryan. Though we aren't allowed to supply specifics, I can say that not only did the list we saw have all kinds of tasty types, but the weapon loadouts put what we presently have to shame. I was quite excited by the range of aircraft models and variants, but was thrilled to find that we could now tailor ordnance loads. All in all, aipower modeling has been radically overhauled and expanded

in CMBB.

Hope this helps.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Hun Hunter:

I have no doubt that Soviet CAS was effective to say it was more effective that the Western Allies seems to fly in the face of admittidly anecdotal evidence. Surely there are some detailed (and impartial) studies on the matter.

Also, no matter what, against the Western Allies in 44-45 Rudel might have gotten a tank or two before he would have been splattered across the countryside by a (insert your favorite western fighter here). Yes, I know that's not CAS but it might have saved the Soviets a tank or two

Greg

A quote from Von Hardesty's book, Red Phoenix:

The Luftwaffe had survived as a fighting force in Russia in large part because of Soviet doctrine, which dictated that the VVS operate as an integral part of the combined-arms operations of the Soviet Army. If the VVS had been released for extensive and sustained operations as an independent air arm, the attrition in German aircraft would have been higher.

Also Christer Bergström (currently has written 2 volumes of the planned 6 vol. set on the air war in the Russian front) has this to say about the quality of Soviet pilots [click here].

The Soviet air arm known as the VVS was totally subordinated to the Red Army, and operated within the combined arms doctrines that were developed before the war then refined with war experience. As such, the VVS didn't general go on fighter sweeps much like the Germans did or the USAAF did during the latter part of the bombing campaign. Because of this, the Luftwaffe was able to operate even to the end of the war in the East. Thus, the quality of Soviet CAS cannot be judged on such factors as you have stated, Greg. It was far more important to the STAVKA to focus everything on the ground campaign, because what was going to stop the war was occupying Germany, at which point there would be no more airfields for the Luftwaffe to operate anyway. As it was, the Luftwaffe made little impact on Soviet operations from 1944 on. Basically, the Luftwaffe could still operate after 1943, but usually not where there were major Red Army operations in progress. By 1944 in main Red Army advance sectors Il-2 Shturmoviks were going on unescorted small formation (2-4 planes) 'free hunts' in search of targets of opportunity, because the VVS owned the skies above.

[Andreas]

That von Luck quote is interesting, but describing what was an almost isolated incident. Following the major operation in early 1945 (Vistula - Oder), the Red Army had crossed the whole of what was to become Poland after the war, and had outstripped its air-cover. The reason for this was that they only had grass fields to operate from east of the Oder and within operational reach, which were useless in the weather conditions of Spring. The Luftwaffe had access to concrete airfields around Berlin that were just a hop from the Soviet bridgeheads. Thus it could re-establish control of the air for a short time.

In general, from 1943 onwards the Luftwaffe ceased to play a major role in the east. Air superiority was with the Red Army, except in isolated circumstances. This was connected to the haemorraging of experienced (and new) fighter pilots in the air battles over the Reich. Desperation on the German side went to the extreme of using He 177 Greif strategic bombers in low-level attacks to stop the Red Army spearheads during Bagration. With predictable results.

Soviet air support was (like all the other support weapons in the Red Army) usually focussed at the point of breakthrough. If you read the quote in this thread (3rd or 4th post) you get an idea of the effectiveness.

Regarding tactical control. I have a quote from the assault on either Hangoe or Moon in 1941, where the Germans used air support 'like artillery'. So there was a measure of tactical control then. I also have a quote from Koniev relating to the Berlin operation 1945, when he observed a FW189 (called 'Frame' by the Soviets) circling unmenaced over the Soviet lines, and he muses how useful the plane was for reconnaissance and artillery fire control, and regrets that the Red Army did not have anything like it. The fact that this slow, and almost unarmed plane could be around at the time, shows that the control of the air was not as one-sided as in the west. When it came to the crunch though, past 1943 the Red Army held it, and before the Germans did.

[Olle Petersson]

Originally posted by Andreas:

... the Germans used air support 'like artillery'. So there was a measure of tactical control then.

Nothing new there. During the offensive on Benelux and France in 1940 the regular artillery couldn't keep up, so dive bombers were used as mobile artillery.

I'd expect this to be all pre-planned missions though, usually some kind of "map fire".

Cheers

Olle

[Hun Hunter]

Originally posted by Grisha:

..snip...Also Christer Bergström (currently has written 2 volumes of the planned 6 vol. set on the air war in the Russian front) has this to say about the quality of Soviet pilots [click here].

Very interesting. Also not real convincing on who had the better pilots (at least to me) but that's not the question anyway (Why do these discussions comparing the West & Soviets always turn into p*ssing matches? Of course if the Soviets really did have the best pilots they should have blown us out of the skies in Korean )

The Soviet air arm known as the VVS was totally subordinated to the Red Army, and operated within the combined arms doctrines that were developed before the war then refined with war experience. As such, the VVS didn't general go on fighter sweeps much like the Germans did or the USAAF did during the latter part of the bombing campaign. Because of this, the Luftwaffe was able to operate even to the end of the war in the East. Thus, the quality of Soviet CAS cannot be judged on such factors as you have stated, Greg. It was far more important to the STAVKA to focus everything on the ground campaign, because what was going to stop the war was occupying Germany, at which point there would be no more airfields for the Luftwaffe to operate anyway. As it was, the Luftwaffe made little impact on Soviet operations from 1944 on. Basically, the Luftwaffe could still operate after 1943, but usually not where there were major Red Army operations in progress. By 1944 in main Red Army advance sectors Il-2 Shturmoviks were going on unescorted small formation (2-4 planes) 'free hunts' in search of targets of opportunity, because the VVS owned the skies above.[/QB]

Ok, I'm with you. So the situation was in general (after 1943), were major operations were underway the Soviets had complete air superiority but elsewhere parity or even Axis superiority.

I really interested in the claim that their CAS was better and why. Especially compared to the Allies in Normandy and after. Can you point me at anything that gives more accounts of Soviet CAS especially being directed by ground units and/or in immediate direct support of them (like on or near the MLR.

Greg

[Jotte]

http://www.iremember.ru/pilots/khukhrikov/khukhrikov.html

[Hun Hunter]

Originally posted by Andreas:

That von Luck quote is interesting, but describing what was an almost isolated incident. Following the major operation in early 1945 (Vistula - Oder), the Red Army had crossed the whole of what was to become Poland after the war, and had outstripped its air-cover. The reason for this was that they only had grass fields to operate from east of the Oder and within operational reach, which were useless in the weather conditions of Spring. The Luftwaffe had access to concrete airfields around Berlin that were just a hop from the Soviet bridgeheads. Thus it could re-establish control of the air for a short time.

Did this situation last until May '45?

In general, from 1943 onwards the Luftwaffe ceased to play a major role in the east. Air superiority was with the Red Army, except in isolated circumstances. This was connected to the haemorraging of experienced (and new) fighter pilots in the air battles over the Reich. Desperation on the German side went to the extreme of using He 177 Greif strategic bombers in low-level attacks to stop the Red Army spearheads during Bagration. With predictable results.

Is the any place online that gives the aircraft numbers and types in each theater? About how much of the Luftwaffe was deployed on the Eastern Front (I'm mainly interested in 44-45).

Soviet air support was (like all the other support weapons in the Red Army) usually focussed at the point of breakthrough. If you read the quote in this thread (3rd or 4th post) you get an idea of the effectiveness.

I'm not getting the impression that these air activities were in direct support of the frontline troops (i.e. directed against targets the grunts could see and were being shot at by). They seem to be more in the character of fighter-bomber sweeps ahead of the advance. Probably nitpicking but in CM terms the difference between starting the battle with less or having 2-4 Il-2s showing up on turn 3. Maybe both :eek:

Thanks for any info / answers. I also apologize for 24 hours between posts, the job/wife/kids/lawn/dog/shooting at neighbors takes up too much of my day.

Greg

[Grisha]

Very interesting. Also not real convincing on who had the better pilots (at least to me) but that's not the question anyway (Why do these discussions comparing the West & Soviets always turn into p*ssing matches? Of course if the Soviets really did have the best pilots they should have blown us out of the skies in Korean )

The reason I added Bergstrõm's link was not to prove superiority, but to emphasize the role played by the VVS, which was in contrast to the Luftwaffe, particularly the jagdfliegeren.

I really interested in the claim that their CAS was better and why. Especially compared to the Allies in Normandy and after. Can you point me at anything that gives more accounts of Soviet CAS especially being directed by ground units and/or in immediate direct support of them (like on or near the MLR.

It's difficult to find Soviet aerial accounts translated into english, and the field of historical military aviation studies of the VVS has really only barely begun in the West. Two of the planned six volumes on the air war in Russia by Bergstrõm & Mikhailov have already been published, and are very good. Unfortunately, volume 2 only takes the war to mid-1942.

As to why I believe the VVS was better at CAS than the western allies has less to do with innovative methods or training than it does with focus and quantity. It would appear that the methods of air-ground coordination were fairly similar between the allies, and even the Luftwaffe as well. How well the respective military forces practiced such coordination may have varied to degrees for a number of reasons, but the methods were by and large the same. What made the VVS different was that it was:</font>

• Almost entirely an air force based on tactical aviation.</font>
• subordinated to Red Army ground operations.</font>

These two factors did much to focus VVS operations en masse to specific ground operations as a support arm within a combined arms doctrine. What I'm trying to convey is that rather than asking an independent air arm to offer support with an impending ground operation, the VVS was an integral part of Red Army ground operations and fully expected to perform as a support arm of the Red Army. For all practical purposes, the VVS was very much the 'flying artillery' of the Red Army. By 1944, it was not unusual for 1,000-2,000 operational Soviet combat aircraft to support a frontage of 200-400kms. I know this doesn't answer to what degree VVS tactical aviation was CAS or interdiction, but from what I've read both were of equal importance.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Hun Hunter:

1. Did this situation last until May '45?

2. Is the any place online that gives the aircraft numbers and types in each theater? About how much of the Luftwaffe was deployed on the Eastern Front (I'm mainly interested in 44-45).

3. I'm not getting the impression that these air activities were in direct support of the frontline troops (i.e. directed against targets the grunts could see and were being shot at by). They seem to be more in the character of fighter-bomber sweeps ahead of the advance. Probably nitpicking but in CM terms the difference between starting the battle with less or having 2-4 Il-2s showing up on turn 3. Maybe both :eek:

1. No, I think the Red Army brought this under control and reasserted its superiority probably by about late March/early April, when the weather cleared.

2. No idea.

3. This was part of the pre-planned barrage. I think that this was really where the Red Army aviation was primarily used. No point p*ssing about on a jolly (sorry, free hunt behind enemy lines) when a centralised and co-ordinated use of your assets at the point of breakthrough gives you the result described in the quote.

I seriously doubt that any Soviet air force officer ever dared say things about the infantry relying 'too much' on planes, as Tedder's infamous line 'the army has been drugged with bombs' suggests (he was speaking of the use of heavy bombers though).