What exactly is the role of assault guns?

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

Intersting, thanks, i forgot the SU-122 and the ISU-122 were different vehicles, i think thats where i got the misconceptions. Thanks.

Iron Chef, please cut your quotes, bandwidth is not free yet and you make the threads hard to read.

[Keith]

One thing JasonC failed to point out in his article on the evolution of Russian SPGs is the fact that one of the prime motivations for the Russians was that they desperately needed responsive, dynamic artillery support, which they could not obtain through indirect artillery fires. The Russians lacked flexiblity with artillery due to a lack of radios, lack of trained personel with technical know how required for operation of artillery fire control centers, and the Russian centralization of command authority. In fact, during the first two years of the war the Russian artillery was only noted by the Germans when the Germans were fighting against static lines where the Russians could lay land lines in advance. So the Russian SPGs were seen as a way to overcome the short comings of the Russain artillery by providing infantry with direct fire artillery support.

[Stacheldraht]

For anyone wanting some detailed technical info and pics of the StuG's, you may want to read Walter J. Spielberger's Sturmgeschütz & Its Variants (Schiffer, 1993). In includes details on their original development, the various Ausführungen, and the industry behind them (with diagrams and photos of the plants, no less), production numbers, etc.

(Also available in the original German version as Sturmgeschütze, from Motorbuch Verlag.)

[JasonC]

The StuG was a minor vehicle with very limited AT capability before the upgrade to the long 75 gun. Through the end of 1941, non-turreted AFVs formed only 1/6th of the German AFV mix - 2/3rds of them StuG (thus 1/9th of the whole fleet), and 1/3rd 47mm SPAT conversions.

The 75L24 had a muzzle velocity of only 385 m/s, and AP capability about the same as a 50L42 gun. If a hit could be achieved, that is, which was distinctly non-trivial beyond about 500m, with such a low MV. By comparison, both the 37mm and 47mm AT guns had about twice the MV. The 47mm had marginally better AT performance, while the 37mm had less - but still sufficient for thin-walled pre-war Russian T-26s and BTs, which had only 13-15mm of armor.

But after the long 75 became available, the Germans dramatically increased the use of non-turreted AFVs. From 1/6th of the fleet they grew to half of all production in the second half of the war. StuG and StuH varieties were more than half of the non-turreted force, and more than 1/4 of all AFVs produced in the second half of the war. 3/4 of all StuG formations were created after the long 75mm was fielded.

As for claiming the Hetzer and Jagdpanzer were "cousins" of the StuG, it fails to make your argument and instead makes mine. The StuG was drifting into a predominately TD role, and those were purpose built TDs. They were not assigned to StuG brigades, but to Panzerjager battalions. The reason for them was to get some of the benefits of angled armor, and to replace the less survivable Marders. (Incidentally, Guderian wanted the Hetzer because it used the Pz38t chassis and armored was better than not. But he opposed the Jagd as detracting from turreted Pz IV production, since they were made at the expense of Pz IVs).

As for the other vehicles filling the initial assault gun role, I am well aware the SPWs and Bisons were not part of the StuG organizational structure. But they did have the same infantry support, HE chucking role as the pre-war StuG idea. I already noted that they came from mounting self-propelled the IGs the panzergrenadiers already had.

But they certainly did wind up performing infantry support duty for later mobile divisions. Many of which had StuG formations subordinated earlier, for the infantry support mission, and later kept the vehicles but used them in place of a Panzerjager battalion. The SS divisions in particular, which grew out of Pz Gdr formations. They had Sturmartillerie organic, but in place of Panzerjagers, and eventually some were so redesignated.

The evolution of the StuG formations themselves was from independent batteries initially, to battalions hardly distinguishable from mobile division Panzerjager formations, except in artillery nomenclature. It was the logic of tank fighting that dictated that shift. Armor vs. armor fighting is done in battalion or at the least company strength formations, not small batteries.

The small self-propelled IG groupings were much closer to what the first short-barreled StuGs had been at the inception (independent batteries, artillery arm, etc). Yes, the total number of vehicles involved (Brummbars and Bison varieties) was relatively modest. So was the initial role of short 75mm StuGs in the German fleet mix. There were only 822 short-75 StuGs produced, about the same number as Brummbars and Bison types combined. There were of course flocks more SPW-251/9s, since they required only a common halftrack and a common infantry gun.

Another fellow wanted examples of StuGs used to equip Panzer divisions. Gerob's Normandy OOB gives cases, though not of course whole panzer divisions. The 17th SS panzergrenadier had a StuG battalion rather than a Panzer battalion. (This was quite common for Panzergrenadier divisions). 10th SS Panzer had only 1 panzer battalion in its regiment, and half of it was equipped with StuG, the other half Pz IVs. (It had an independent Tiger battalion subordinated for most of the campaign, to make up for the missing Panther battalion). 9th SS had its Panther battalion, but again half of the Pz IV battalion used StuGs rather than Pz IVs. 1SS, 2SS, and 21st Panzer each had a battalion of StuG instead of Panzerjagers (not in place of tanks, but in place of Jagdpanzers); 21st had about half its Panzer regiment captured French tanks while the SS divisions had the TOE Panthers and Pz IVs.

Many German sources note the practice, calling it "incorrect" but required by equipment realities.

The increased role of the StuG over the course of the war was not due to a greater need for HE chucking to support attacking German infantry. In fact they found other means of doing that when it was all that was required, in the second half of the war. It was due to the improved AT ability of the long 75 version, and conversion of Pz III production capacity.

Which itself was not due to doctrine, but as I said before, mere engineering. If a long 75 had fit in the Pz III turret, the Germans would have produced lots of those in the second half of the war, instead of expanding the role of the StuG. Since it is a general engineering rule that the same chassis can carry a larger gun without a turret, however, the upgunning imperative perforce shifted the AFV fleet from 1/6 turretless to 1/2 turretless production. Even when it lead to substitutions like those mentioned above, contrary to all German armor doctrine. Doctrine was not in the driver's seat, the technical requirements of upgunning were.

[Bullethead]

JasonC said:

The Russians most certainly did not have excess production capacity for BT-5s, because the BT pre-war series had already been phased out when the war began.

Well, they really didn't need to make a turret-less assault gun version of these tanks because they already had turreted "assault gun" versions. They did the same thing the Brits did with their cruiser tanks--they had versions with small-caliber, high velocity guns for anti-tank work and other versions with 76mm howitzers in the turrets for infantry support. The howitzer-armed version of the BT-5 was the BT-5A with a 76.2mm L/16.5. There was also a BT-7A and an AT-26 with the same gun, and a BT-7M (aka BT-8) with a 76.2mm L/26.

The Russians soon dropped this idea of turreted assault tanks. The KV-2 was the last of this line for them. The Brits kept at it, however, with 95mm howitzer versions of the Cromwell and Churchill, and the US had the M4(105).

A more interesting question is why the Russians made so many TDs based on the T-34 chassis, when the T-34 itself was already a success - unlike the German Pz III. ... When the SU-85 was fielded, it did represent a significant upgunning compared to the T-34/76s then in service. But this was a temporary matter. Soon they had T-34/85s, and thus no extra oomph in return for sacrificing the turret. The SU-122 made more sense, as an HE support type (like the StuH) - more HE in return for less AT and no turret.

From what I can determine, the Russians only built 2050 SU-85s: 750 in 1943 and 1300 in 1944. (NOTE: all production figures herein taken from Zaloga's Red Army Handbook) This was about 3 times as many as T-34/85s built in 1943, but only 1/10 as many as T-34/85s in 1944. So it appears the Russians quickly realized the SU-85 was redundant and didn't spend much time or effort on it once T-34/85 production got going. IOW, the SU-85 was only a stop-gap thing to get 85mm guns up front ASAP. They got into SU-100 production as soon as possible thereafter.

The same sort of thing seems to apply to the SU-122, which was built in smaller numbers over a slightly longer timeframe than the SU-85. In 1943, they built 630 SU-122s compared to 705 SU-152s, and in 1944 they built only 493 SU-122s but 2510 ISU-122/152. It seems the Russians felt that in situations where defenses warranted a bigger gun than a 76 or 85mm, defensive fire warranted the armor of a heavy tank chassis.

There were of course differences in design philosophy, noticable in the second half of the war. The Russians went for gun caliber while the Germans went for maximum muzzle velocity. That tended to make the German guns better AT weapons, especially at long range (MV is a twofer on penetration and accuracy), while the Russian ones had better HE performance. Since the Russians were attacking and the Germans defending - with fewer AFVs and as many towed guns as AFVs - that difference makes perfect sense.

It should also be noted that Russian AFVs, even those with a big anti-tank role, usually carried about 2 HE shells for every 1 AP round. With German AFVs being so out-numbered, each AFV didn't need as many AP rounds to deal with the opposing AFVs. Thus they could carry more HE to deal with the more common soft targets.

[JasonC]

I agree with Keith that the Russians like SUs because their artillery was comparatively inflexible, and direct fire by towed guns is cumbersome and dangerous. But I submit they learned a bit about that by watching the use the Germans made of their StuGs. The Germans were attacking before they were, after all.

As for the reason the Russian artillery was not responsive, he mentioned 3 causes, lack of radios and centralized command being two. I agree those were factors, but I have become more and more convinced in recent times that the main factor was the third he mentioned. Especially early on (it got distinctly better over time).

He said "lack of trained personel with technical know how required for operation of artillery fire control centers". I will put this more bluntly. They didn't have men who knew trigonometry. They didn't have men who could read maps, below army level. They didn't have men who could multiply, or add. There are reports in Russian staff studies about divisional shoots in which those engaged in them calculated nothing. The guns just fired in what they hoped was the right general direction, and fall of shot was watched. The observors then called out corrections - but not in meters, not in mils, just in general terms "shoot farther", "more to the left".

Early on, the whole army was numerically challenged. Like Barbie, they found math hard. Note that fully half of the Russian population of the time worked in agriculture - it was still largely a peasant nation. Obviously, all of this is much easier to handle if the shooter can see everything he is doing. No abstractions and calculations stand between shooter and target when the fire is direct and observed by the gunner himself.

The reason the Russians centralized artillery control and planning so much, especially early on, was not a lack of radios. It was that there were so few competent officers in the technical military disciplines that they were all horded at army level. This problem could not significantly improve until the loss rate fell, because new men have to live long enough to learn by doing, and the expansion of the army continually shoved the surviving competent officers higher up the organizational charts. This made centralization not some institutional or doctrinal quirk, but simply the only way to utilized the truly scarce resource involved - trained minds.

That is my theory, for what it is worth. You just have to realize that the idea everyone knew enough math to do artillery jobs was by no means something the Russians could take for granted.

[MajorBooBoo]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the other vehicles filling the initial assault gun role, I am well aware the SPWs and Bisons were not part of the StuG organizational structure. But they did have the same infantry support, HE chucking role as the pre-war StuG idea. I already noted that they came from mounting self-propelled the IGs the panzergrenadiers already had.

There were of course flocks more SPW-251/9s, since they required only a common halftrack and a common infantry gun.

.

Jason

Are you claiming 251/9's used IG? They used the short 75mm from the StuG and early Panzer IV, no?

I read once that the germans even manufactured these L24s for SPW specifically. They werent all hand me downs.

[JasonC]

Bullethead has a fair point about there not being that many of the SUs made from the T-34 chassis. The numbers seem high only compared to lower German production figures. They are dwarfed by the higher Russian ones. The SU-85, SU-122, and SU-100 were all based on the T-34 chassis. The SU-152 and the ISUs were not; the former was a KV chassis and the latter the JS chassis. About 1/9th of T-34 chassis production went to the various SU types.

But the idea that they were only fielded as stop-gaps does not seem to me to hold water. The SU-85s were comparatively late vehicles themselves. Design was begun in August 43, the same time as the T-34/85. Both were motivated by the high tank losses at Kursk; the short 76mm had obviously gotten long in the tooth when up against mostly 80mm front Pz IV longs, stiffened by Tigers and Panthers.

SU-85s were produced concurrently with T-34/85s, throughout 1944, and were not withdrawn until the SU-100 was developed late in 1944. The first of them were produced late in 1943 but did not see action until mid 1944. I think the basic explanation was a certain inertia, and the concurrent design practices the Russians used.

They did not reason, "the T-34/85 will be ready just as soon and have a turret, so we will just make more of those". They developed both simultaneously, in response to the same need. And once they had the SU-85 design and factories making it, they went on making them until they had something similar but better, the SU-100. They apparently did not consider switching SU-85 factories to T-34/85 production.

To me this looks like an economic, industrial logic. Once you start making turretless vehicles off some chassis, your feeding suppliers become geared to support so and so many turrets produced, and so and so many chassis. They can expand at basically the same rate. The SU-122 was in production until the SU-85, and the SU-85 until the SU-100.

So T-34 chassis SU production goes 1400 in 1943, 1800 in 1944, 1175 in the first half of 1945. The type shifted. There was some vehicle commonality - the SU-122 superstructure design was used for the SU-85s, and the SU-100s started out with the SU-85 design and upgraded it. Even if the final assembly lines themselves were not "inherited", the whole parts production and feedstock system had to be, at least in large part.

Or, in condensed form, once they had made SU-122s, it was easier to go on making some portion of the T-34 series as SUs, than to convert them all to turreted T-34/85s. The 85s were preferred to the 122s because after Kursk, better AT performance looked essential.

[JasonC]

No, I mean organizational substitutes, not physical ones. The 251/9 did use a 75L24. The unit returns still refer to them as le.IG (Sf) (self-propelled light infantry gun), because they were the counterpart in armored Pz Gdr battalions of the towed le.IG guns in motorized Pz Gdr battalions.

The 37mm halftracks (platoon leaders in armored Pz Gdr battalions) used 37mm PAK of course, but you will sometimes see the unit returns list them that way too. "Infantry gun" can mean the specific type of short artillery piece, or it can simply mean all the light guns organic to the infantry, at regimental level and below.

The key thing to understand is that TOE was a kind of ownership right (or "ration card") for German military formations. They didn't always get the type they were supposed to, since all sorts of substitutions and swaps were used to deal with a local shortage of this or that, but they were entitled to get something fitting each TOE role.

[ February 25, 2002, 07:02 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Bullethead]

JasonC said:

Bullethead has a fair point about there not being that many of the SUs made from the T-34 chassis. ... But the idea that they were only fielded as stop-gaps does not seem to me to hold water.

I dunno. Zaloga says the SU-85 was in production before the T-34/85, was a stop-gap, and was primarily used to replace the SU-122. Once T-34/85 production got going, the SU-100 replaced the SU-85. Not having been there myself, I can only go by what I read in books like this. I'm sure there are other books with different opinions, but I don't have them.

And once they had the SU-85 design and factories making it, they went on making them until they had something similar but better, the SU-100. They apparently did not consider switching SU-85 factories to T-34/85 production.

The Russians had tactical needs for the long-tubed assault gun cum TD, just like the Germans did. That's why they continued building them.

Or, in condensed form, once they had made SU-122s, it was easier to go on making some portion of the T-34 series as SUs, than to convert them all to turreted T-34/85s. The 85s were preferred to the 122s because after Kursk, better AT performance looked essential.

There are some issues with wartime Soviet production that just don't make much sense. I mean, even though they could transplant whole factories thousands of miles, simultaneously expand them, and then have them crank out tens of thousands of AFVs a short time thereafter, you hear things like the T-60/T-70/SU-76 story.

This story goes that the Russians really didn't want the light tanks, because they knew they were useless by then, but the car factories making them couldn't handle making T-34s. So, to keep these factories making SOMETHING for the war effort, the light tanks continued in production until somebody found a better use for their parts: the SU-76. This wasn't too popular, either, and certainly had its limitations when compared to all other assault guns, but was built in numbers 2nd to none but the T-34.

So if the main Russian tank factories go do their big move and expansion, why couldn't these car factories get bigger tooling and start making more capable and useful vehicles? Or, failing that, why not turn these factories into sub-assembly plants for better stuff? Or have them make trucks, jeeps, etc?

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for claiming the Hetzer and Jagdpanzer were "cousins" of the StuG, it fails to make your argument and instead makes mine. The StuG was drifting into a predominately TD role, and those were purpose built TDs. They were not assigned to StuG brigades, but to Panzerjager battalions. The reason for them was to get some of the benefits of angled armor, and to replace the less survivable Marders. (Incidentally, Guderian wanted the Hetzer because it used the Pz38t chassis and armored was better than not. But he opposed the Jagd as detracting from turreted Pz IV production, since they were made at the expense of Pz IVs).

The Hetzer, JPIV, PIV/70(V) and PIV/70(A) were all designed as to meet in one way or another the WaPruf 6 tabling of the "Sturmgeschutz nuer art" specs as of September 1942, which was to replace the StuG. If anything the JPIV, PIV/70(V), PIV/70(A) and the Hetzer were the "children" of the StuG. Also Prior to 1944 the prototypes of the PIV/70 chassis which later became the JPIV and then later that year PzIV/70s were referred to as Sturmgeschutz 43 Gerat No.822. 820 ending up as the StuG IV and 823 a version with a 10,5cm gun that never got past the drawing board.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The StuG was a minor vehicle with very limited AT capability before the upgrade to the long 75 gun. Through the end of 1941, non-turreted AFVs formed only 1/6th of the German AFV mix - 2/3rds of them StuG (thus 1/9th of the whole fleet), and 1/3rd 47mm SPAT conversions.

von Manstein the originator of the 'StuG' idea seems to have thought otherwise in his memorandum to OKH in 1935. exerpt from H.mot.890/36g.Kdos of June 1936 after it was approved by Generaloberst von Fritch "In order to make them useful for other purposes, such as defensive, there is an additional requirment for the ability to be used as part of normal artillery-in an indirect fire role, into the main battle area usually a distence of seven kilometres at a minimum. Finally, they would be a superb antitank weapon and could replace the divisional anti-tank element in that role." (1993, Spielberger P 11). It goes on "The gun must be able to take enemy machine gun emplacements out of action with a few rounds. It must also be able to knock out enemy tanks." (1993, Spielberger P 11).

And then there were the Developmental requirements published June 15, 1936.

-the armament was to be a gun of at least 7,5cm caliber

-the gun was to be ble to traverse more than 30 degrees without movment of the vehicle itself

the gunelevation was to be sufficent for a minimum firing range of 6000m

-shells fired from the gun wereto be able to penetrate all types of armor known at the time at the distence up to 500 metres.

(1993, Spielberger P 18).

[ February 26, 2002, 05:23 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Claus B]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The StuG was a minor vehicle with very limited AT capability before the upgrade to the long 75 gun. Through the end of 1941, non-turreted AFVs formed only 1/6th of the German AFV mix - 2/3rds of them StuG (thus 1/9th of the whole fleet), and 1/3rd 47mm SPAT conversions.

The 75L24 had a muzzle velocity of only 385 m/s, and AP capability about the same as a 50L42 gun. If a hit could be achieved, that is, which was distinctly non-trivial beyond about 500m, with such a low MV. By comparison, both the 37mm and 47mm AT guns had about twice the MV. The 47mm had marginally better AT performance, while the 37mm had less - but still sufficient for thin-walled pre-war Russian T-26s and BTs, which had only 13-15mm of armor.

The simple and straight forward fact is that the StuG was designed from the start with three roles in mind as I previously stated.

In the design specification it says specifically that the armour penetration capability should be such that it could defeat 40mm at a range of 500m, which it did in fact do.

It should be pretty obvious that using a 3,7cm or 4.7cm gun in the StuG would violate the other two roles envisioned, that of being able to deliver a usefull high-explosive round in direct and indirect fire up to 6000 meters.

You also ignore other facts,namely that the German Army did not posess a 4,7cm gun at the time when the StuG was proposed and designed, just as there were no HE round available for the 3,7cm PaK.

Is the concept of a dual-purpose vehicle really so hard to understand?

Originally posted by JasonC:

The evolution of the StuG formations themselves was from independent batteries initially, to battalions hardly distinguishable from mobile division Panzerjager formations, except in artillery nomenclature. It was the logic of tank fighting that dictated that shift. Armor vs. armor fighting is done in battalion or at the least company strength formations, not small batteries.

Jason, I dont mean to be rude, but this is a-historic nonsense. The use of StuGs in independant batteries in 1940 was exclusively due to the lack of StuG vehicles. The use of StuGs in Abteilungen was the intent back in 1936 and the moment enough StuGs were available (later in 1940), they were formed into Abteilungen with three six-gun batteries for a total of 18.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Which itself was not due to doctrine, but as I said before, mere engineering. If a long 75 had fit in the Pz III turret, the Germans would have produced lots of those in the second half of the war, instead of expanding the role of the StuG. Since it is a general engineering rule that the same chassis can carry a larger gun without a turret, however, the upgunning imperative perforce shifted the AFV fleet from 1/6 turretless to 1/2 turretless production. Even when it lead to substitutions like those mentioned above, contrary to all German armor doctrine. Doctrine was not in the driver's seat, the technical requirements of upgunning were.

Jason, you are again flat-out ignoring the facts.

When StuG production was impeeded with the bombing of the Alkett factory in November 1943, it was choose to cut Panzer IV production (a tank with a turret that could carry the 7,5cm KwK 40) in order to keep up StuG production in the form of the StuG IV. Same gun, same vehicle but change in configuration from turreted tank to StuG because that was what they wanted - a vehicle conforming with the StuG doctrine. Had they simply wanted a 7,5cm gun on tracks, they could have shipped Panzer IVs to the StuG Abteilungen instead of disrupting production.

Claus B

[ February 26, 2002, 05:28 AM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

[Claus B]

Originally posted by redwolf:

Claus, I think your remarks Jason's post are a bit over the top.

While it is true that the reasoning for the planning of the StuG had the AT role in it, it occurs to me that this is rather an exaggeration like anybody in any office makes to his boss when he wants a new toy. The short 75mm just doesn't cut it and they knew in 1936, that's why the Pz IV with the same gun got a little teethy brother. There was no StuG 37mm. They wanted lots of 75mm HE shells.

See my response to Jason below. The need to penetrate 40mm at 500m was part of the design specification and the 3,7cm would have been utterly incapable of providing any support to the infantry as it had no HE round.

The StuG was envisioned to have a dual role and the 7,5cm StuK 37 was the only weapon that could fill both roles.

Claus B

[Claus B]

Double post - can be deleted

[ February 26, 2002, 05:50 AM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Claus B:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by redwolf:

Claus, I think your remarks Jason's post are a bit over the top.

While it is true that the reasoning for the planning of the StuG had the AT role in it, it occurs to me that this is rather an exaggeration like anybody in any office makes to his boss when he wants a new toy. The short 75mm just doesn't cut it and they knew in 1936, that's why the Pz IV with the same gun got a little teethy brother. There was no StuG 37mm. They wanted lots of 75mm HE shells.

See my response to Jason below. The need to penetrate 40mm at 500m was part of the design specification and the 3,7cm would have been utterly incapable of providing any support to the infantry as it had no HE round.

The StuG was envisioned to have a dual role and the 7,5cm StuK 37 was the only weapon that could fill both roles.

Claus B</font>

[Claus B]

Originally posted by Brian:

While I don't disagree with the gist of your argument, I will make a minor correction - the 3.7cm did have a HE round - the 3.7cm Sprgr Patr, fused AZ 39, according to Hogg.

It wouldn't be as effective as the 7.5cm, I agree but it did exist.

Not in 1936. The 3,7cm SprGr you (and Hogg) refer to was not available until after the Polish campaign.

Claus B

[MajorBooBoo]

Ive seen info that wespe were not built in 1945. That would shut down teh Panzer II line before the end of the war.

[gatpr]

My impression is that comparing the Su 76 and the Marder is comparing apples and oranges. At least as far as intentions went the Marder's primary role was AT. The SU76 was intended to be more of a classic Stug; infantry support couple with a limited anti-tank capability. The SU85 was a more apt comparison (overlooking caliber) to the Marder.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by gatpr:

The SU85 was a more apt comparison (overlooking caliber) to the Marder.

Not too sure about that. The SU-85 had a closed fighting compartment and (I think) heavier armor. I suppose you might be more correct in asserting the similarity of their roles, though.

Michael

[Redwolf]

I'm pretty sure gatpr meant to say it's like the Wespe or maybe one of the SP infantry guns.

[ February 26, 2002, 10:26 PM: Message edited by: redwolf ]

[gunnergoz]

Someone (JasonC?) made a passing reference to the SU-76 being used in an indirect fire role. I was of the impression that the SU-76 was pretty much strictly used in a direct fire role and seldom, if ever, did indirect fire like the M-7 Priest or Wespe. IIRC it saw less indirect use than did the US M-8 HMC or the Sherman 105. I'm not sure if this was due to doctrine or for some other reason. Can anyone clarify the issue for me? It sure looks from the outside as if it could have been a dandy light SPA article, yet it was used as an SPG/ATG. Anyone read Russian articles dealing with the issue?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by MajorBooBoo:

Ive seen info that wespe were not built in 1945. That would shut down teh Panzer II line before the end of the war.

Lexikon der Wehrmacht states that the last year of production of Panzer II derivatives was 1944, with 7 Luchs and 144 Wespe produced.

[ February 27, 2002, 03:25 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]