Thorn in the Tiger's side?

[Tifosi]

Originally posted by Mike:

Crews tend to get out of immobilsed tanks rather quickly if here's enemy infantry or aircraft about - I've read accounts of Tiger crews who felt utterly vulnerable to air attack and abandoned their tanks even with the aircraft had nothing more than 20mm cannon - they just felt so vulnerable and halpless.

20mm and .50cal were more than adequate for knocking out tanks (even Tigers) from the air. The RAF developed the tactic in the middle east, but basically you spot the tank, manouver yourself into a position whereby you will be attacking the tank from directly behind or ahead (behind was usually favoured) and straffe it.

The trick was, as you dived at the tank to aim for the ground a short way behind the tank an "walk" the stream of fire forward over the tank. It was "indirect" hits that did the killing - rounds which ricoched off the ground and went through the floor of the tank. Even if you didn't hit something combustible you stood a good chance of hitting something important and at least knocking it out.

[Egbert]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

"In the case of SPR..." it was a very rare Tiger I with T34 running gear!

Oh man, I missed that.

Now I have to go back and watch the darn thing again.

[Boo Radley]

Originally posted by Egbert:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MikeyD:

"In the case of SPR..." it was a very rare Tiger I with T34 running gear!

Oh man, I missed that.

Now I have to go back and watch the darn thing again. </font>

[Egbert]

Originally posted by Boo Radley:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Egbert:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MikeyD:

"In the case of SPR..." it was a very rare Tiger I with T34 running gear!

Oh man, I missed that.

Now I have to go back and watch the darn thing again. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Tifosi:

20mm and .50cal were more than adequate for knocking out tanks (even Tigers) from the air. The RAF developed the tactic in the middle east, but basically you spot the tank, manouver yourself into a position whereby you will be attacking the tank from directly behind or ahead (behind was usually favoured) and straffe it.

The trick was, as you dived at the tank to aim for the ground a short way behind the tank an "walk" the stream of fire forward over the tank. It was "indirect" hits that did the killing - rounds which ricoched off the ground and went through the floor of the tank. Even if you didn't hit something combustible you stood a good chance of hitting something important and at least knocking it out.

I remember hashing all this out several years ago after CMBO came out, and most of what you say is pure mythology. Yes, a hit from a .50 caliber or 20mm could do damage if it was lucky enough to hit some critically vulnerable point, like an opening in a grill. Usually though they would not penetrate even the thinner top armor of a tank because they would be striking at too oblique an angle and from too far away. And the whole notion of riccochets off the ground achieving penetrations of the underbelly is complete hogwash.

Michael

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by Tifosi:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mike:

Crews tend to get out of immobilsed tanks rather quickly if here's enemy infantry or aircraft about - I've read accounts of Tiger crews who felt utterly vulnerable to air attack and abandoned their tanks even with the aircraft had nothing more than 20mm cannon - they just felt so vulnerable and halpless.

20mm and .50cal were more than adequate for knocking out tanks (even Tigers) from the air. The RAF developed the tactic in the middle east, but basically you spot the tank, manouver yourself into a position whereby you will be attacking the tank from directly behind or ahead (behind was usually favoured) and straffe it.

The trick was, as you dived at the tank to aim for the ground a short way behind the tank an "walk" the stream of fire forward over the tank. It was "indirect" hits that did the killing - rounds which ricoched off the ground and went through the floor of the tank. Even if you didn't hit something combustible you stood a good chance of hitting something important and at least knocking it out. </font>

[Tifosi]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

And the whole notion of riccochets off the ground achieving penetrations of the underbelly is complete hogwash.

Michael

I have read accounts of this happening. Rare perhaps, but I'm certain it happened.

Not a huge issue really though, as by 1944 ground attack flights would have carried rockets too. Regardless of what effect the .50cal and 20mm had, it's fair to say you were pretty stuffed as soon as the Jugs and Typhoons turned up with their fireworks aboard.

[dieseltaylor]

Interesting point about vision blocks. I was aware the Russian ATR's would shoot for them but had never really considered the effect of being in a large tin can with all the vision ports screwed and infantry clambering around. Even if you have no fear of the infantry you are in no position to guarantee that enemy tanks are not now surrounding you - I assume that loss of aerials would render you blinded and then deaf to warnings from other tanks.

Would the onboard mortars be a danger to aerials? and therefore not widely used?

[JasonC]

Claims of tanks killed from the air are notoriously the least accurate claims made in warfare. The pilots of fast movers have no idea what they are actually achieving against the targets they hit on the ground. It requires detailed studies after the fact to determine what they actually accomplished. And the answer is, without effective AT weapons, precious little. Neither bombs, nor unguided rockets, nor ordinary aircraft armament, were effective tank killers from the air.

The first truly effective air delivered AT weapon was napalm. This was not a matter of design and was not realized at the time. After action studies in Korea found that only 1/5 claimed kills of an AFV from the air were from a napalm strike, but 4/5 of the actual kills on the ground were due to napalm strikes. Other weapons were less than a tenth as effective as pilots thought they were, including strafing by multiple 20mms and 5 inch rockets.

It is much more difficult to actually hit a vehicle sized target from the air, in a fast mover, using an unguided weapon, than the pilots suppose or than you see portrayed in most wargames, including CM. Only soft vehicles lost seriously to fighter bomber "armed recce" and strafing attacks in WW II. And one only needs to compare sortie rates and tonnages to other side losses to realize, it is completely impossible the average fighter bomber managed to hit a single truck on an average mission.

In CM you see one fighter bomber damage or destroy multiple fully armored AFVs in a single mission - this is a complete fantasy. Tens of thousands of FB sorties resulted in actual tank losses probably with two digits.

CAS and armed recce FB sorties in Normandy came to 12,800. Tanks claimed by the pilots were about 400 but German side reports show those are clearly far too high. 250 were claimed in the Mortain attempt alone, while the Germans only lost 50 to all causes and 10-20 to air attack on that occasion (the uncertainty comes from categories like "abandoned").

The Allies lost 1,700 FBs over Normandy (on other missions as well as CAS and armed recce it is true), most of them to light Flak or MG ground fire (at least 2/3 and possibly 9/10 - not all causes of loss are known). Armed recce missions flew above 3500 feet to avoid ground fire on the way to and from the target, going lower only on the actual firing passes.

The Brits surveyed 223 dead Panthers on their section of the Normandy front, and IDed causes of loss for about half - the others being "abandoned", "destroyed by crew" (many of those in the retreat in August) or "unknown". 11 were IDed as KOed by aircraft rockets and 3 by aircraft cannon.

[Tifosi]

I have to admit most of what I know on this topic is from reading memoirs, articles etc written by, or from the perspective of, pilots. I suppose it's a fair assumption that many would believe they had scored a hit when they hadn't - ANY claims made by any airforce during combat were invariably inflated. Not neccesarrily because pilots were falsely claiming (although it did happen) but largely because, as Jason points out it's simply so damn difficult to tell who hit what from the cockpit of fast moving aircraft.

On the issue of aircraft as tank-killers, I humbly stand corrected.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Tifosi:

I have to admit most of what I know on this topic is from reading memoirs, articles etc written by, or from the perspective of, pilots. I suppose it's a fair assumption that many would believe they had scored a hit when they hadn't - ANY claims made by any airforce during combat were invariably inflated. Not neccesarrily because pilots were falsely claiming (although it did happen) but largely because, as Jason points out it's simply so damn difficult to tell who hit what from the cockpit of fast moving aircraft.

That's the nub of it.

On the issue of aircraft as tank-killers, I humbly stand corrected.

Good man!

Michael

[Guest Mike]

A study of tanks KO'ed at Normandy is published in an old journal of Strategic Studies somewhere - I remember reading it in the early 90's.

that's where I got theimpression that Tankers were terrified of air attack, even if it did no harm - they thought they weer being singled out, that their tank was just a magnet for attack, and that they weer sitting ducks.

Hence they would often get out and run from a perfectly serviceable vehicle and abandon it. Which KO's it as effectlively as many otehr types of KO!

[JasonC]

Except they get right back in after the bombers have left. Terrified has nothing to do with it. People just prefer to be someplace besides the point of aim when 500 lb bombs are falling, when there is no cost in it. Doesn't mean any tanks are actually taken out.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Mike:

A study of tanks KO'ed at Normandy is published in an old journal of Strategic Studies somewhere - I remember reading it in the early 90's.

that's where I got theimpression that Tankers were terrified of air attack, even if it did no harm - they thought they weer being singled out, that their tank was just a magnet for attack, and that they weer sitting ducks.

Hence they would often get out and run from a perfectly serviceable vehicle and abandon it. Which KO's it as effectlively as many otehr types of KO!

As Jason points out, "many other" types of KO leave the vehicle unserviceable. A serviceable tank without a crew is not "knocked out." Tank crews spend more time outside their vehicles than they do inside them - by that logic, they are knocked out at for at least half of their service lives.

[JonS]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Except they get right back in after the bombers have left.

Except for those who didn't, of course. We know there were at least some who didn't because of the numbers* of empty, undamaged - or lightly damaged - tanks found in the vicinity of air attacks.

Still, that doesn't change the fact that tac a/c were woeful at attacking tanks.

Still, that raises an interesting question, in my mind at least. We know, now, that tac a/c were wasting their time going after tanks and other frontline targets, but soldiers on both sides of the line often remark on the effectiveness of CAS. It seems that the suppressive effect of a/c was out of all proportion to their material effectiveness.

Regards

JonS

* low numbers, to be sure, but numbers nonetheless.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

A serviceable tank without a crew is not "knocked out." Tank crews spend more time outside their vehicles than they do inside them - by that logic, they are knocked out at for at least half of their service lives.

Well, they are temporarily ineffective

[Sergei]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

Except they get right back in after the bombers have left.

Except for those who didn't, of course. We know there were at least some who didn't because of the numbers* of empty, undamaged - or lightly damaged - tanks found in the vicinity of air attacks.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Partly so because while .50cal MG can hardly damage a medium tank, it is definately lethal against an exposed crew - who, of course, have no idea if the a/c has bombs or rockets left, so they figure it's safer to run (or just panic).

So, you may end up with the tank remaining intact but the crew members lying in puddles of blood on the road.

This thought has been in my head too. I don't suppose there are any numbers available though...

Michael

[JasonC]

Armed Recce by FBs was the most effective use of air power in the period. It just didn't work on tanks directly, and going after targets that well protected was a waste of their firepower. Rockets and bombs delivered by whole squadrons work fine on trains, on soft skinned vehicles, on horses drawing wagons, etc. The net effect is reduced mobility, from fewer hours spent moving and less doing the hauling. Machineguns aren't ineffective because they don't take out tanks, 105mm howitzers firing indirect aren't ineffective because they don't take out tanks in any numbers. Armies do not consist of tanks. You are vastly better off strafing the fuel on its way to the front, than trying to get the tank that drinks it.

[Michael Emrys]

Yep. That's pretty much it in a nutshell.

Michael

[Baneman]

Very interesting discussion about the effectiveness of aircraft vs tanks.

Does anyone know more about this pertaining to the Eastern Front ? Since the IL2 Sturmovik was reputed a great tank-killer and the Stuka ace Hans Ulrich Rudel is credited with 518+ Tanks and 700 Trucks ( flying the 37mm armed Stuka mostly, I would think ).

I know that german air to air claim verification was fairly stringent - don't know how air to ground was assessed though.

[Michael Emrys]

I believe the tide of opinion is presently against Rudel. His claims may not only have been inflated, but hugely inflated. It's further suggested that most of his actual kills were with bombs. A 500 kilo bomb can do actual damage if dropped close enough, and a good Stuka pilot should be able to get within that radius at least once in a while.

Michael

[JasonC]

Baneman - "is credited" is one of those tell-tale passive voice constructions. For comparison, USAAF claims of tanks destroyed or damaged in the ETO (north, not counting the Med) are 2-4 times the total number of Germans tanks ever deployed in the ETO - and air got maybe 5% of those we can ID. Own side claims of air to ground kills are regularly high not by a factor of 2 (as even ground kill claims are), but by factors of 10 to 100 times.

US FBs flew 335,000 sorties in the ETO, not even counting the Brits and their Typhoons - anybody think they each had a 1/10 chance of bagging a tank? If so, air alone would have bagged the entire German tank fleet many times over. The Russians fielded 36000 IL-2s, about the number of Germans AFVs available for the Russian front. Anybody think they each took out even 1 German tank, over their entire operational lives? In CM they often take out several in one scenario. Which is a complete fantasy.

[rleete]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Russians fielded 36000 IL-2s, about the number of Germans AFVs available for the Russian front. Anybody think they each took out even 1 German tank, over their entire operational lives?

Of course not. Rudel had smoked them before they even got to the front. Surely a fine, upstanding Aryan wouldn't exagerate?

[Tiredboots]

Yet the russians,not known for frivolous weapons development, kept the IL2 production till the end of WWII. So there must have been some important tactical benefits derived from ground attacks on AFV from Jabos, logistics or psy. My father (field artillary)told me about recieving it both from the front & above, not fun. I can imagine the impact of such an experience on a tank crew, when all their supports are either running or in flames. As allway, very interesting.