Thorn in the Tiger's side?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Flying IL-2 seems dangerous : ) Il-2's out of total aircraft shot down by pilot ace

Oblt. Otto "Bruno" Kittel 94 267

Hptm. Joachim Brendel 88 189

Maj. etc.

web page

These kills were compared to Soviet documents after the war and the fall of the curtain? Or are these simply kill claims by pilots?

[Andreas]

No need to - they are Luftwaffe claims, which means that in terms of correctness they stand above the ten commandments in the version that Moses received.

I mean, you are not seriously doubting that they are incorrect, just because they have never been verified by comparing to the losses of the other side.

Whatever next - are you going to tell us that German tanker kill claims are incorrect?!

Ps. Does it smell like Lewis in this thread?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Ps. Does it smell like Lewis in this thread?

Hmmm, now that you mention it...

Will bear watching.

Michael

[Bigduke6]

Just because the Soviets tried out monster cannon in the IL-2, doesn't validate the theory bigger cannon are always better. The 37mm was fielded and it turned out to be fairly useless, because the gun flash obscured whatever the pilot was shooting at. Same deal with the Yak-9 and the 45mm.

The Soviets were quite willing to try all sorts of equipment wrinkles in combat: great time savings in the development cycle, although of course if you are the field tester it might suck, but then something like that never bothered the Soviets.

The aircraft's main function was flying artillery. It was not a tank buster per se, but rather an airplane designed to take a whole lot of punishment so it could get close to and hit ground targets defended by a lot of AA or fighters. This could be a tank column, but a fuel truck column or a train or one of those supply or repair depots the German army was so richly provided with (compared to the Soviets) was just as likely to be hit by Il-2. Anything high-value and well-defended, and needing (for Soviets) high accuracy - and beyond the range of artillery.

The Red Army was a lot worse than western armies at getting calls for air from the ground troops to the air force in general. If one is talking tacair vs. armor, from what I can tell, Il-2 squadrons - mostly - showed up above panzers when Red Army higher had planned for it, and not when some piddling colonel or major put an air request into the system.

An example would be the way 2nd Air Army dealt with German panzer counterattacks during Lvov-Sandormirz and Iassy-Kishenev: Effectively, an air planner put a circle on a map days or months prior to the operation and said "The German armor will probably counterattack THERE" and 2nd Air Army was instructed to have aircraft standing by to hit that spot on call.

The technique could have a pretty devastating anti-armor effect when it worked (well, at least if you belive 2nd Air Army's commander's memoir), but it was definately a less efficient use of aircraft for ground support than what the Luftwaffe came up with, and forget the Americans. No doubt the Red Air force bombed a lot of empty fields - after all the Red artillery did that, so why shouldn't the flyboys?

I think it is illustrative that although the Soviets had their air-to-air aces like Mukhin and Rechkalov (who preferred P-39, BTW) with confirmed kills in the double digits, but there never was a Soviet "Rudel", i.e., a tank-busting ace.

I guess in a CM environment the way to model IL-2 properly would be to make the airplane rare most of the time, but every once in a while it shows up, and when it does it does so in numbers and pretty much punishes anything that moves. A single Il-2 buzzing around anywhere is very un-Soviet - why did that pilot abandon his unit for unauthorized individual adventures?

Finally, as to Sturmovik survivability, some of you may not have heard the possibly apocyphal story out of Caiden's Tigers are Burning, which describes the interception of a single Il-2 by four Me-109 or FW-190 (I forget which). All four fighters one by one empty their entire ammunition load into the lumbering Iliushin, which keeps right on flying. When one pilot asks another what could possibly be keeping the Il-2 in the air, the answer allegedly came back "Herr Oberst, it is impossible to bite a porcupine in the ass."

It may not be true, but at least it's a good story.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Mike:

Presumably the Russians felt that the Tank killing properties of large calibre cannon were adequate, since they upgraded the Sturmovik from 20mm -> 23mm -> 37mm, liked the P39 & P63 with their 37mm, and put a 45mm into a Yak 9!!.

Then again, it speaks just as equally to the supposition that they found the smaller calibres inadequate and hence the constant desire to make the shells bigger. You could conclude just as easy that the 45mm shell was used becaue the 20, 23, and 37mms were ineffective, if that was the only logic or evidence you were examining.

[dieseltaylor]

JC

"Guys, I don't know how many times it has to be said before it registers, but claims of air to ground kills of any kind from the pilots themselves are complete fantasies, there is no reason whatever to assume they have any connection to reality, and they can easily by wrong by a factor of 20 without anyone having made anything up consciously."

I do not believe all that I read but on the other hand I am prepared to give some weight to the claims as they cannot all be complete hogwash. I think your requirement of proof is very high and suggests that the opposition keep accurate records to correlate against the pilots claims. Given the fun that can be had in who wiped Wittman I do not demand unreasonable high levels of proof if figure form.

If the Germans report skulking around and being inhibited by the constant threat of Jabo's then we may assume they fear them. We go to Mortain and on JC's figures we find that 20-40% of the enemy' 50 tanks left on the battlefield were taken out by airplanes. It should be remembered that the Germans were extremely good , and keen , on tank recovery from battlefields.

Now if we can get past the concept that the claimed kills are important to the actuality that the Germans skulked because they considered them dangerous as amply demonstrated by the kills at Mortain when they did deliberately attack.

Several aircraft shooting the same tank, or a previously dead tank, will lead to inflated claims but the number of claims is not what we are establishing. Aircraft do take out tanks. Establishing how inaccurate various nationalities pilots were is not that interesting or potentially fruitful. I am curious about Rudel's claimed score but have very little faith in accurate information being available. Particularly if the Germans had use for disabled Russian tanks removed from the battlefield

BTW some one remembered this vaguely - here is the full version. We can only assume that Lightening Joe did not really know what he was talking about:

"Besides their bomb and rocket payloads, the P-47 and the Typhoon both boasted powerful gun armaments. The Typhoon had four 20mm Hispano cannon. The P-47 carried eight .50 cal. machine guns with 400 rounds per gun, and it proved "particularly successful" against transports. The machine guns occasionally even caused casualties to tanks and tank crews. The .50 cal. armor-piercing bullets often penetrated the underside of vehicles after ricocheting off the road, or penetrated the exhaust system of the tanks, ricocheting around the interior of the armored hull, killing or wounding the crew and sometimes igniting the fuel supply or detonating ammunition storage. This seemed surprising at first, given the typically heavy armor of German tanks. Yet Maj. Gen. J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins, Commander of First Army's VII Corps, was impressed enough to mention to Quesada the success that P-47s had strafing tanks with .50 cal. machine gun fire."

USAAF site web page

[dieseltaylor]

Jason C said that armoured kills claimed at Mortain where 250. I had not questioned it however the Usaaf site gives these figures below for the entire Normandy campaign. There appears to be a huge discrepancy.

"Even allowing for some exaggeration and duplicate claims, the sortie claims of the Ninth AF and 2 TAF during the Normandy fighting is most impressive.

Fighter-bomber sortie claims in Normandy

2 TAF 9 AF Total

Sorties flown 9,896 2,891 12,787

Claims for motor transport destroyed

3,340 2,520 5,860

Claims for armor destroyed

257 134 391

Total claims 3,597 2,654 6,251

Claims per sortie 0.36 0.92 0.49

[dieseltaylor]

Other USAAF guff

" The effectiveness of the Anglo-American air support at Normandy-and through the collapse of Germany as well-is beyond question, attested to alike by airmen, ground commanders on both sides, soldiers in the field, and prisoners of war. A battalion commander in an armored regiment reported:

Our air cover has been excellent and has helped us out of many tight spots. At E1 Boeuf they knocked out eight German Mark V [Panther] and Mark VI [Tiger] tanks that were giving us a great deal of trouble. They also helped us at Tessy-sur-Vire by knocking out tanks. They are on call by any unit down to a platoon, calling through company and battalion, and giving the location of the target. Then the ASPO [Air Support Party Officer] contacts the air cover and gets a strike within a matter of minutes. I have seen the air strike within three minutes after the call was made. We like to know the air is there. We want it all the time.

Two other battalion commanders from the same regiment endorsed his remarks. VII Corps's "Lightning Joe" Collins stated that "we could not possibly have gotten as far as we did, as fast as we did, and with as few casualties, without the wonderful air support that we have consistently had."

Particularly interesting is the ability to call in support down to platoon level. I have seen opinions before saying that such and such support would not be available for small level encounters - learn something every day.

[JonS]

Deez,

Be careful not to conflate things.

Note the chain the 'request' from the pn had to go through before it was actioned. Note also that it isn't clear which 'call' the 3 minute timer started from. Finally, the KOs talked about ... were they confirmed by wrecks that the friendlies captured, were they simply driven off, or was it mere coincidence that they left at around the time the a/c turned up?

I'll have another rummage through some OR stuff I've got at home re: Mortain. I do recall, however, that the RAF were highly pissed at the Army OR report on the (in)effectiveness of a/c. So pissed that they refused to endorse the army rpt, and produced their own, more complimentary, one.

[JasonC]

If Stukas with 37s KOed hundreds of tanks, then you'd have tons of reports from ground commanders that read, "but then the Luftwaffe appeared, and totally destroyed our column". Or German side ones that says the same thing, and have eyewitness accounts from the ground officers, walking over the field afterward.

A guy in 2nd Panzer says the Jabos bothered him and he never saw the Luftwaffe - but he doesn't say they lost lots of tanks to Jabos.

If you believe USAAF claims, every German tank sent to the west was KOed from the air. Twice. None left to be hit from the ground.

Total Russian AFV losses were much higher of course. But if air got even 5% of them - which is doubtful - Rudel would have a tenth of the score himself. Which is, to put it mildly, unlikely.

Does anybody think the tiny German air force in Russia, compared to Tigers and Panthers and StuGs and 88s and PAK on the ground, plus mines and fausts etc, killed a larger portion of Russian armor, than US and British Jabos in the thousands, in the west, compared to ground forces with only some improved shooters, and lots of short 75 tanks, 57mm ATGs, and zooks?

I've read plenty of appreciative reports of CAS from US forces, but the actual kills are missing. E.g. a column of 50 odd AFVs pauses when they encounter a single StuG company, because they can, and 36 P-47s dive bomb sais StuGs. But in the aftermath one reads that the AFVs KOed 9 out of 10 of the StuGs themselves, after they had scattered and taken cover in woods.

Or let's consider the supposedly hellish tac air faced by the German panzer divisions converging on Normandy - easily some of the heaviest armed recce of the war at a great target. What do the German units report they actually lost on the move to the battlefield? Lehr lost 5 tanks. 17th SS lost 1 StuG.

I looked through the combat narratives of Germans on the southern front at Kursk looking for air action reports specifically about armor. The results are meager - a single report of Stukas KOing one Russian tank platoon. There are general reports of good support, heavy attacks, a few mentioning significant personnel losses, night raids keeping the men awake, one mentioning a CP hit and senior officers lost, one friendly fire incident that hurt a German SPW battalion, numerous claims of enemy AC shot down (about 10 per division typically). Not a single report of large friendly losses of armor to IL-2s, and only that one platoon of Russian tanks firmly IDed as KOed by Stukas. Meanwhile the narrative is full of accounts of attacks from 20 to 60 Russian tanks defeated with heavy loss by the German tanks and PzJgrs.

The Germans flew 27000 sorties at Kursk and the Russians around 35000, in the German offensive portion of the campaign. There is no sign whatever in the combat narratives that either side destroyed a material amount of armor from the air, in return.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mike:

Presumably the Russians felt that the Tank killing properties of large calibre cannon were adequate, since they upgraded the Sturmovik from 20mm -> 23mm -> 37mm, liked the P39 & P63 with their 37mm, and put a 45mm into a Yak 9!!.

Then again, it speaks just as equally to the supposition that they found the smaller calibres inadequate and hence the constant desire to make the shells bigger. You could conclude just as easy that the 45mm shell was used becaue the 20, 23, and 37mms were ineffective, if that was the only logic or evidence you were examining. </font>

[A.E.B]

Hi all

Until the advent of guided missiles and bombs, planes were less of a danger to MBTs than you might think.

One reason so many pilots claimed so many kills is that when straffing soft vehicles, if the vehicle suddenly stopped, then you probably had a kill.

A relation of mine crewed a Centurion Tank in the 1960s. He tells me that the instructions he received on reacting to straffing planes was to immediately stop the tank. Before gattling cannon with DPU rounds and WGATMs, it was unlikely that the 23mm/20mm cannon on planes in the 1960s would penetrate the tank. The danger came from hits on the track, or fragment damage to the engine. Stopping kept your tracks on and stopped you trashing the engine.

In reality, quick firing guns are better against point ground targets like vehicles. Those 8 0.50 Cal mgs will score far more hits than that slow firing 37mm or 45mm cannon. In straffing ROF is king.

CAS in Russia and Normandy probably contributed more by knocking out soft targets like supply convoys, and by restricting movement to the hours of darkness, than it ever achieved by killing tanks - more German tanks were no doubt blown up to avoid their capture after running out of fuel than were taken out by cannon or rockets from planes.

The first recorded infantry kill of a tank was in WWI, where a Mark 2 was disabled by a German Soldier jamming a barbed wire picket into the tracks: the tank stopped and another soldier forced a grenade into a gap that blew open a hatch.

A.E.B

[JonS]

No.2 OR Section, Report No.3

Investigation of an Attack on a German Column Near La Baleine

I. General Situation

As a result of the American break through (Operation COBRA), a retreating German column was attacked during the afternoon of 29 July by Rocket-firing Typhoons of 121 Wing, 83 Group and American Thunderbolts carrying 500 lb bombs. 99 sorties were made by 121 Wing.

It is not possible to state how long this particular German unit had been fighting as its name is not known but, on evidence of its abandoned equipment, it was a mixed column containing Panther tanks, SP guns, armoured troop carriers, lorry drawn A tk guns and howitzers, Pupschen rocket guns, armoured and staff cars.

According to local inhabitants the column was passing throughout the day and was joined by troops from the vicinity who looted as they left.

II. Terrain

The path of the German retreat in the area under consideration is shown in the appended map. It lay through country well dissected by deep narrow twisting valleys, much of the area being heavily wooded.

The side road which was used leaves the main road about 1 kilometre south of ST. DENIS LE-GAST (MR 315443) and descends rapidly to LA BALEINE where the River SIENNE is crossed. This road has a steep wooded cliff on one side and a sheer drop to the river on the other so that it was impossible for vehicles to draw off the road.

At LA BALEINE (MR 323427) the road crosses the river by a bridge which had been sufficiently damaged by 500 lb bombs dropped by Thunderbolts to prevent heavy traffic from crossing.

After crossing the bridge the road turns south, closely following the course of the river and a few feet above water level. On the east a densely wooded hill rises abruptly from the roadside making manoeuvre impossible. Half a mile down this stretch of the road (at point "A" on the attached map) the road twists sharply away from the river up a side valley. At this corner the road is well exposed to air observation and attack.

For the next quarter of a mile along the road as it climbs up towards the north east there is a fairly thick screening from the air, but just before the cross roads ("B") there is a short stretch that is much more open. At "B" the route followed by some, and perhaps all, the Germans turn south and continue to climb between high banks through farmlands and orchards. At several points along this stretch there are gaps in the road banks giving access to the fields.

To the east of "C" abandoned and destroyed vehicles were found along a fairly level road through fields with trees lining all the hedges and along a similar one turning south from it. As these roads are well outside the area attacked by the Typhoons the route was not examined further.

III. Details of Damage

(Note: Letters and numbers refer to points marked on the attached map.)

Point 1: Two camouflaged Panthers were placed in an orchard and facing the main road from ST. DENISLE GAST. They were probably in this position for several hours as there were signs that meals had been cooked. Craters caused by 500 lb bombs were seen within 50 yards of the tanks; these are thought to have been dropped by American Thunderbolts which are known to have been operating in the area. The tanks had not been hit but the crews apparently baled out, set fire to their tanks, and destroyed one of the guns by leaving an HE round in the chamber.

Point 2: A 75 mm SP with thick, concrete reinforcement of the turret was found pushed off the road by a Bulldozer. This SP was undamaged but 5 strikes from the air (cannon or machine gun) had made "cups" in the concrete. There was a 500 lb bomb crater 35 yards away. If the SP had been left to block the road it would have been set on fire by its crew; as it was not, the presumption is that it was abandoned in haste.

Points 3 and 4: Round about points 3 and 4 a number of 500 lb bomb craters were observed. At point 3 a Panther had been left on the road in perfect condition with full complement of petrol and ammunition. At, point 4 another Panther was found undamaged in every respect. If the commanders of these tanks had wished they could have travelled down the right hand bank of the stream and attempted a crossing as Shermans later succeeded in doing.

All along the river bank between point 2 and the bridge at LA BALEINE an assortment of "B" vehicles, all burnt out beyond recognition, had been pushed off the road by Bulldozers. A fair estimate would be eight vehicles (lorries and cars).

On the east side of the bridge a wrecked German saloon car was found at the foot of a 10 foot bank.

Point 5: A Panther was found to have been hit in the engine by a rocket projectile. It had brewed up.

Between the bridge and point 5 were a lorry towing a Howitzer and a saloon car; all three were completely wrecked and burnt out. RP strikes on the ground were numerous in this area.

One hundred yards south of Point 5 was another lorry towing a Howitzer; the lorry was a charred wreck but the Howitzer seemed to be undamaged.

A: Just north of corner A, by the edge of the wood, was a burnt out lorry which had been towing a 50 mm A tk gun. A Pupschen rocket gun was also found at this point; both guns were undamaged. At corner A, where many RP strikes were observed, was a Panther which had not been hit by anything and appeared to have been abandoned intact. Also at this corner were 5 armoured troop carriers (half tracks) which were all completely destroyed. RP was definitely responsible in one case and probably in all, but the damage was too great to allow accurate estimation.

Point 6: A troop carrying lorry was found burnt out; RP strikes were numerous in this area and the lorry was probably destroyed by this means.

Point 7: A Mark IV Special was found completely wrecked and pushed off the road; the great number of strikes in the immediate vicinity would suggest that it had been hit by RP.

A little further up the road were a saloon car and a lorry, both completely destroyed and burnt.

Point 8: A Panther was found wedged between a barn and a high bank; it also had stones in the tracks. A broken towing hook and tracks on the ground showed that another tank had tried to tow it and failed. This Panther had received no damage of any sort but was set on fire by the crew in the presence of the farmer.

In an orchard opposite Point 8 was a Volkswagen which had been hit in the engine by cannon or machine gun fire from the air.

A few yards up the road from Point 8 an armoured car (captured from the Americans and painted with German markings) had brewed up as a result of a hit in the engine. Although this looked like RP damage there were no strikes or debris anywhere near the point where the fire took place.

Point 9: A lorry was found burnt out; again there were no signs of rocket strikes.

In fields just off the road, at points marked x on the map, there were cars abandoned in various states of destruction. None of these had been hit by RP.

Point 10: A 75 mm SP gun was found burnt out but with no visible sign of the cause of the fire. A few yards away was a 50 mm A/tk gun, the breech of which had been deliberately destroyed.

Point 11: A Panther had an AP hit in the engine and another on the left driving sprocket; the left track was off. The gun had its barrel completely destroyed in the manner that suggested deliberate destruction on the part of the crew. This Panther had brewed up but the tyres were intact. It was a long way from the nearest area where rocket strikes were observed.

Throughout the area no German graves were found and only one German corpse, said by local inhabitants to have been that of a sniper shot subsequent to the passing of the column. It is possible that American forces had taken uhe dead to a distance to bury them but no proof or disproof of this could be found.

Many French civilians were examined in the area and their evidence confirmed the statements made in this report.

IV. Summary of Damage

The details of damage are summarised in the following table:

Note to Summary

The high proportion of abandoned Panther tanks to the total number of such tanks should be noted.

The MT was so mangled that identification of the causes of destruction was impossible; in consequence, the "unknown cause s" total has been unduly loaded. It would probably give a truer picture of events if the MT losses were spread over all the table in the same proportion as the other losses.

V. Conclusions

There can be no doubt of the success of the attack, the detailed results as stated above being compatible with a high degree of demoralisation resulting in an abandonment of vehicles. It should also be noted, as further confirmation of demoralisation, that in spite of material destruction no German graves were found in the vicinity

[ August 11, 2005, 08:25 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JonS]

Report No.4

Air Attacks on Enemy Tanks and Motor Transport in the Mortain Area, August 1944

Tactical Situation

1. At the beginning of August 1944, the Allied armies had begun their break out from the Normandy beach head; the British and Canadians were pushing southward from CAUMONT and CAEN and the Americans, having driven down the west coast of Normandy, were rapidly moving eastward and northwards thereby threatening to surround the German armies in Normandy.

2. The following diary of events in the MORTAIN area illustrates the circumstances in which the air attacks took place:

6 Aug. During the day the enemy counter attacked strongly against 30 Inf. Div in the MORTAIN area and they re occupied the town.

7 Aug. In the early morning the enemy launched a strong armoured attack in the MORTAIN area. Although small numbers of tanks penetrated U.S. positions at a few points, the situation was soon under control. During the day large enemy concentrations of tanks and MT were attacked from the air with excellent results.

8 Aug. Little change reported. Enemy still exerted pressure in the MORTAIN area.

9 Aug. The enemy continued his efforts to break through to Avranches with the greater part of his armoured formations. Although the enemy held MORTAIN, 4, 9 and 30 Inf. Divs. with 2 and 3 Armd. Divs. resisted strongly on the high ground to the north, west and south of the town. 35 Inf. Div. made some progress with an attack SW of MORTAIN.

10 Aug. SE of MORTAIN 2 Armd. Div. made progress, reaching a point 6 miles east of the town. Heavy concentrations of enemy armour (5 divisions) remained in the MORTAIN DOMFRONT area but no large scale counter attacks developed. 4, 9 and 30 Inf. Divs. continued to meet heavy opposition.

11 Aug. The enemy withdrew from the MORTAIN salient and the town was re occupied by troops of VII Corps. North and south of the town all divisions advanced against little or no opposition.

Air Effort

3. Bad weather prevented flying in the morning of 7 August but arrangements were made for the Second Tactical Air Force to come to the assistance of the IX US Air Force as soon as conditions permitted. The weather cleared quite suddenly about mid day, between which time and dusk 294 sorties were flown by typhoons of 2 TAF in support of the American ground forces in the MORTAIN area. Although, owing to their many other commitments in France, the IX USAAF only flew some 200 sorties to MORTAIN that afternoon, they continued their attacks over the next three days and flew 441 sorties in all.

4. Conditions on the afternoon of 7 August were ideal from the pilot's point of view as no opposition was encountered from enemy aircraft nor, till late in the day, was there any appreciable flak reaction. Under cover of mist and low cloud the Germans seemed to have neglected all normal precautions and, when the weather cleared, they were sighted in large numbers head to tail in narrow roads and lanes. The pilots reported that they were able to go in very close to attack, rockets being fired at 1000 yards range and cannon and machine guns from even closer. Claims made by the pilots during the MORTAIN Battle (7th 10th August) are shown in Table 1 below:

Table 1 - Pilots' Claims

. . . . Destroyed . Probably Destroyed . Damaged . Total

Armour

2 TAF . . . 84 . . 35 . . 21 . . 140

IX USAAF. . 69 . . .8 . . 35 . . 112

Totals. . . 153. . 43 . . 56 . . 252

MT

2 TAF . . . 54 . . 19 . . 39 . . 112

IX USAAF. . 94 . . .1 . . 21 . . 116

Totals. . .148 . . 20 . . 60 . . 228

Grand Total

(Armour & MT) . 301 . 63 . 116 . 480

Ground Investigation

5. Between 12 August and 20 August members of the Operational Research Sections from 21 Army Group and Second Tactical Air Force conducted separate ground investigations of the battle area around MORTAIN (see map at Appendix A). The results of the two investigations were compared and collated to produce the figures shown in Table II. (See opposite page)

6. It was not possible to discriminate between the victims of IX USAAF and of' 2 TAF because, although the 500 lb bomb was the favourite weapon of the former and the rocket that of the latter, American pilots fired some 600 rockets in the course of these attacks and British pilots dropped some bombs. The respective merits of the 50 calibre MG and the 20 mm cannon were not considered and all vehicles that had been destroyed by small projectiles fired from the air have been classed as "Cannon or MG."

7. Tanks and other vehicles classed as "abandoned" have not been included in the Air Total in Table 11 because, although they were probably abandoned as a result of air attack, they can hardly be considered to have been among those which the pilots claimed to have destroyed as such claims are generally supported by mentions of fire or explosion.

8. Similarly those enemy vehicles listed as "destroyed by crew" may be regarded as indirect victims of air attack but cannot justifiably be taken into consideration when comparing pilots' claims with what was found on the battlefield.

9. It is most unlikely that all of the unknown causes were due to air attack, particularly as many of them were found at considerable distances from the nearest signs of such attack and as ground forces were also fighting fierce battles in this area. However, if all the "Unknown causes" are added to the air totals, the resultant figures (armour, 21 + 15 = 36 and MT, 12 + 26 = 38) are still only about a quarter of the numbers claimed as destroyed by the air forces.

10. The area was not very extensive and as two teams were searching it over a period of several days it is not considered that any appreciable number vehicles was missed. This is confirmed by the fact that one of the investigators flew low over the area in an Auster, plotting the positions of vehicles seen from the air; no fresh vehicles were discovered by this means.

11. The efficiency of the German recovery system has been put forward as an explanation of the large discrepancy between the number of vehicles claimed to be destroyed and the actual numbers found. Tanks and lorries that are destroyed as a result of air attack are almost always burnt out and would not be worth salvaging unless time and labour were both plentiful. Many prisoners have been questioned on the subject of the recovery of tanks and it has been established that burnt out tanks are never salvaged. In addition it has been ascertained that, contrary to certain statements made about the MORTAIN battle, very little recovery was done in this part of Normandy at the time, in fact the repair and recovery teams were already pulling out of Normandy when the Battle of Mortain was at its height. In any case before considering the recovery of the "destroyed" tanks and MT, the "probably destroyed" (43 tanks and 20 MT) and the "damaged" (56 tanks and 60 MT) must have presented the recovery organisation with a large task without counting any that may have been damaged by the ground forces.

12. At Appendix B is a list of the vehicles found by members of No.2 Operational Research Section together with the causes of destruction where it was possible to assess them. No similar record is available for the vehicles which were examined only by members of ORS/2 TAF.

Conclusions

(a) The attacks by the Allied Air Forces had a considerable effect on the enemy's unsuccessful counter attack at MORTAIN.

( The number of vehicles claimed by the pilots as "destroyed" was about four times the actual number discovered.

© A number of vehicles, though not claimed by the pilots, were lost to the enemy by "indirect" air action (i.e. abandoned or destroyed by the crew).

Appendix B

1. Road Juvigny Le Tertre to St. Barthelmy

At pt 565145

2 Panthers

(a) AP shot above track on LHS of hull penetrated and killed some of crew. Gun, tracks, engine and petrol all O.K. No fire. Abandoned after AP hit but probably driven off road first.

( 105 mm HE ? strike 2 ft up from hull on LH rear corner of turret. Fragments damaged cupola and periscopes; also top hull plate torn (L shape 10” x 6”) just below strike: engine air louvres damaged.

Also 75 AP hit through bogies on LH side. Engine O.K. petrol O.K., gun O.K. Deep scoop by 75 AP on rear. Abandoned by crew unharmed: no bodies, no gore. There were 4 RP strikes in field on other side of road and one on this side hit tree at roadside.

Next field, same side of road

2 Panthers

(a) No visible sign of damage. Petrol, engine, tracks and gun all O.K. Even sights left on gun. Abandoned undamaged.

( Hit by 75 AP on LHSjust below turret in ammunition storage. Brewed up. Also hit on RH track and sprocket. None of these hits could have been from air.

Field north side of road, same place

3 Panthers, 1 Armd Car, 1 Armd Tp Carrier

(a) Panther received slanting blow into track and bogies on RHS. Definite RP hit as proved by debris but poor explosion as shown by small damage. Everything else in the tank quite O.K.

( Panther received 4 hits from 75 min AP (3 scooped and 1 penetrated) on underside of front, almost belly. This can only be exposed when climbing bank. Terrific brew up yet tyres on LHS untouched.

© Panther had 4 75 mm AP scoops on front glacis plate. Gun, engine, petrol and tracks all O.K. Deserted intact.

(d) Armd Car. RP crater and debris below RH front wheel; explosive force upwards and inwards. Brewed up.

(e) Armd Tp Carrier had 105 mm AP hit on LHS and was completed brewed up.

On N side of road, few yards further east.

Panther RP strike under rear had blown petrol tank and caused brew up.

At point 568147 in lane

Panther with two huge holes in turret from above. Also hit on leading edge of front glacis plate (probably RP). 2 75 AP scoops one on glacis and other on mantlet. Major damage (holes in turret) might have been RP but several bomb craters (500 lb.025 sec delay) within 15 yds suggest possible direct hit by bomb. Complete write off.

Few yards east along road

Armd Tp Carrier complete wreck as amn exploded and blew side off. Brew up from unknown causes.

Other side of road, same ref.

Panther RP strikes all along road but bazooka hit on LHS into amn stowage space caused brew up. Angle of attack suggests infantryman fired from high bank on roadside at almost point blank range could have been after desertion.

30 yds further east

2 Armd Tp Carriers, 1 Peoples Car (Amphibious)

(a) Arrad Tp Carrier with RP craters all round it. Complete wreck; looks like RP hit on RH rear corner.

( Armd Tp Carrier with downward strike through side armour and then floor. Almost definite RP.

© Peoples Car brewed up from unknown causes.

At point 570148

2 Armd Tp Carriers

(a) Direct hit RP. LH near burned out.

( RP hit from RH corner. Brew up.

South side of road

Panther with AP strike on turret. Brewed up.

Orchard W of cross roads

Ambulance and Armd Tp Carrier

(a) Ambulance peppered with fragments and abandoned.

( Armd Tp Carrier unknown causes brew up.

At cross roads 575144

Panther holes in floor over track which suggested downward attack but no possible entry for hit, therefore caused by explosion of gun. Unknown causes for brew up (possibly by crew).

2. Road from Cherence le Roussel via St. Barthelamy to Mortain

At point 556157

Arm Tp Carrier and Lorry

(a) Armd Tp Carrier: 3 RP strike very near; complete blow up and brew up; possible RP.

( Lorry completely wrecked by causes unknown.

Slightly east of 556157

Peoples' Car (Amphibious) completely destroyed by unknown causes. No RP strikes near.

In Bellefontaine

Opened Command Car with Rangefinder. 2 RP craters 2 yds from rear and many more in garden nearby. Brewed up probably RP.

East of Bellefontaine

Armd Tp Carrier and Lorry

(a) Armd Tp Carrier completely destroyed by unknown causes but RP strikes in neighbouring field.

( As above

Slightly further south

2 Panthers

(a) 5 AP hit in rear of hull caused brew up. Tracks O.K.

( Hit on RH sprocket. Abandoned and set on fire by crew.

Armd Tp Carrier: direct hit by unknown shell centre of LHS. Brew up.

At point 580138

Panther no visible cause of damage through bazooka and bits all around. Burnt out in entrance to lane; possibly set on fire by crew.

At same spot

Behind Panther in lane was a lorry quite burnt out and partly exploded. Destroyed by crew.

3. Road Mortain to Barenton

Note: No signs of RP strikes along this road. Some HE, but in general this main road was avoided by the Germans.

Panther wrecked from unknown causes at 619076.

At628071

An 88 mm gun riddled with HE fragments and end of barrel blown off.

Between there and Barenton

4 lorries destroyed by unknown causes; probably HE or cannon fire from air.

At point 620073

Panther on its side. Unknown shell hit (HE?)

4. Road Barenton to Ger. No RP strikes seen along this road.

88 mm A/T gun at 678066 abandoned.

4 lorries burnt out between Barenton and Le Gue Rochoux.

At point 693095

2 75 mm SP

(a) AP shot on LHS of gun shield. Brew up.

( Unknown hit on RHS. Brew up. Blew up and hurled gun away from chassis. Probably self destroyed as a result of bogging.

Other side of road

50 mm A/T gun with trail damaged but otherwise intact.

Armd Tp Carrier (to tow 50 mm A/T). Hole through bottom on RHS. LH wall blown off. Probably HE.

At point 695100

German saloon car riddled with HE fragments.

Half mile further on

Armd Tp Carrier amn exploded and blew back off. Front and engine O.K.

At 700105

Petrol carrying lorry burnt out and chassis warped by heat.

Another lorry wrecked just near.

This area bombed by 500 lb, one of which made crater across road near second lorry.

5. Ger Montain Road. No RP strikes seen near this road.

At 695137

German lorry burnt out. Causes unknown

1 km further on

Another burnt out lorry possibly HE.

Cross roads at Bire Feugeray

Burnt out lorry

1 km further west.

Ambulance and Lorry Both destroyed by unknown causes.

At 653124

Panther in lane. RH track very loose. Crew were about to repair when surprised. Petrol O.K. Gun O.K. Abandoned.

Few yds further west

75 SP (Mk 111 chassis) complete blow up with gun separate from body.

Peoples car abandoned.

Lorry burnt out.

At pt. 620119

2 lorries burnt out & 1 car wrecked unknown causes

At 597118

Armd Tp Carrier abandoned with front wheels removed (since).

One dead German on stretcher in back.

At 586123

Mk 111 with 75 mm hit by AP above track on RHS of hull. Brew up.

On other side of rly.

Another Mk 111 & Armd TP Carrier (both completely wrecked and burnt out).

6. Road Mortain to Sourdeval

At587140

German lorry burnt out with 500 lb bomb craters very near.

7/8 mile further north

Lorry and trailer burnt out.

At La Tournerie

Panther without turret, fitted up as recovery vehicle. Hole on front glacis plate exactly like that caused by magnetic bomb. Charred body inside. Burnt out lorry at same spot.

Between La Tournerie and Sourdeval

4 burnt out lorries, 2 M/C and Staff Cars burnt out; Peoples' Car abandoned (all possibly HE).

7. Road La Tournerie to St. Clement

Pt. 596145

Mk 111. RH track gone. Hit on rear at RHS by unknown shell. Inside O.K.

Pt. 610140

Panther. One bogey damaged. Both tracks off, being towed. Petrol O.K.; abandoned.

RP strikes in field each side of road and one on a tree at roadside near Panther.

Pt. 620142

Panther barrel gone. Minus tracks; was being recovered. Possibly self destroyed.

Tracked recce car, full of spare parts, used for recovery purposes. Burnt out on road and towed into field. Causes unknown.

Panther brewed up. Gun mantlet thrown forward suggesting demolition.

8. Road Le Gue Rochoux La Conerie Barenton

4 burnt out lorries. Causes unknown.

[JonS]

Background to the above two reports, written by Terry Copp, 2000:

If the work on heavy bomber targets could not be immediately applied it nevertheless provided a foundation for other studies of the battlefield. Schonland had long been anxious to know something concrete about the effectiveness of fighter and fighter bomber close support. This was an issue which was causing much difficulty between the army and air force and 21 Army Group badly wanted to know what was going on.

Major Pike had already studied one Typhoon attack on a German column near La Baleine in the American sector. Together with a young RAF Pilot Officer, Pike had surveyed the aftermath of the air attack and had noted that only one tank had actually been hit by a Typhoon rocket projectile. This report was not well received by Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) and the Pilot Officer was sent back to do the investigation again.99

On August 8th word came that the team was to proceed to the town of Mortain in the American zone. Here, the RAF proclaimed, the tactical air force had been "a decisive battle winning factor" in stopping the German counterattack to cut off the American troops south of Avranches. According to Air Marshal Coningham, the commander of Second Tactical Air Force, rocket firing typhoons claimed to have destroyed 89 tanks, probably destroyed another 56 tracked vehicles, set on fire 104 motor vehicles and saw 47 motor vehicles smoking. These claims do not include 56 enemy tanks damaged and 81 motor vehicles damaged. 100 It had been, the air force insisted, "The Day of the Typhoon."

The army OR section was not the only group interested in the Mortain battlefield. When Second Tactical Air Force was formed in 1943 it acquired operational research staff from Fighter and Army Cooperation Commands. Fighter Command had a good deal of experience with OR work and had amassed considerable information about attacks on ground targets. For example, in early 1943 a full scale model of a German artillery division with 48 mock guns and 558 dummy soldiers was created. "Every effort was made to aid the fighters and fighter bombers in their attack task, but neither Mustangs strafing, nor Typhoons firing their new rockets with 60 lb. warheads were able to inflict more than negligible damage on the position.""" A second experiment with a mock up troop of medium artillery produced equally dismal results.

A carefully controlled study of the ability of pilots to find specific positions on the ground produced even more startling information. Tactical Memorandum No.30, dated March 1943, reported that:

fighters, given a six figure map reference were unable to spot well camouflaged guns even when the guns were actually firing ... attacks on gun positions give negligible results for a high wastage and should only be ordered in an emergency. 102

After 2 TAF was established, OR studies continued to show that there were very real problems in attacking the kind of targets which were of interest to the army. Operations against a variety of targets were carefully examined in the pre D Day period. Typhoon rockets were found to hit a viaduct 500 yards long and 8 yards wide, one in 15 times. Bombs dropped from fighter bombers scored hits one in 82 times. Rocket Projectile (RP) attacks on gun positions produced results varying from 110 rockets fired at a casement in Courseulles sur Mer with zero hits to two hits out of 127 at Fontenay. Second TA F found all this disappointing, particularly since none of the targets had been "well defended."103

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) established a school for training fighter pilots in close support during 1944. Results were not encouraging, for while strafing was "outstandingly successful" for damaging or destroying soft skin vehicles, bombs and rockets could not be delivered accurately by average pilots. Near misses, it was found, did little damage. Even worse, accurate target location and identification of friendly troops proved to be an art which was readily mastered by very few pilotS.104

The AEAF operational research section concluded that the probability of pilot error in identifying friendly troops and the inaccuracy of rocket and bombing attacks meant that close support of army operations should be ordered only in an ernergenCy.105 This information confirmed 2 TAF's preference for missions involving armed reconnaissance, deep interdiction and the search for targets of opportunity well beyond the battle lines. Nothing in the first two months of the campaign had altered this view, but if the Typhoons had really stopped the German armour at Mortain the whole question of close support might need to be re examined and 2 TAF ordered its OR section to the scene of the battle.

The two rival OR groups began work at Mortain as soon as the German retreat cleared the area. For eight days, August 12th to August 20th, a not entirely friendly competition to locate and examine German tanks, self propelled guns and other vehicles was underway along the roads and lanes of the hilly countryside. Descriptive accounts of the battle, as well as air force claims, had prepared the investigators for scenes of devastation. A Panzer division, it was said, had been caught in a traffic jam caused by the crash of an Allied aircraft onto the lead tank in the column. Scores of panzers had been destroyed near St. Barth61emy, and this was just one among many stories that everyone had heard.

What the researchers saw was very different. Despite the most systematic search, very few wrecked tanks could be located. The army team borrowed an Auster aircraft to conduct a survey, but not a single additional vehicle was seen. In the end only 33 Panthers, 10 Mark IVs and 3 self propelled guns were uncovered. If armoured troop carriers, armoured cars and tank recovery vehicles were added, the total for all armour left behind in the area was 78. Nor was it possible to find many of the motor vehicles which the air force had claimed to have destroyed. Only 30 German trucks were available to investigate. While this discrepancy was difficult enough to account for, the results of the individual examination of vehicles was even more problematic. Nineteen of the 43 tanks had definitely been destroyed by US Army units. Only seven tanks showed signs of being struck by rocket projectiles. Two had been disabled by US Army Air Force bombing, seven had been abandoned without a mark on them, and four had been destroyed by their crews. The fate of just three tanks was judged to be from unknown causes .106

The Army OR group was quite prepared to accept the argument that air power might be credited for some of the abandoned and crew destroyed tanks. Their report, however, noted that these tanks could not be taken into consideration when comparing pilots' claims of having destroyed or damaged vehicles. Major Pike's dispassionate analysis of the evidence angered the RAF and provoked outrage at 2 TAF headquarters. An official air force review of the events was quickly developed. It is worth quoting at length:

Ground Investigation:

An attempt was made to examine the area on the ground within five days of the air attacks. However, at that time, fighting was still in progress and it was not until 20th August 1944 that the examination was completed. Nevertheless 39 tanks and 58 other vehicles, or the remains thereof, were examined. An analysis of the extent to which these were damaged is given below:

Destroyed . Damaged . Abandoned, Slightly damaged or untouched

Tanks . . . .24 . . 10 . . 5

Other Veh. . . 32 . . 23 . . 3

The German recovery service is remarkably efficient, and on this occasion there was very definite evidence that it had been as efficient as usual. Eye witnesses confirmed this fact. It can therefore be safely assumed that the vehicles found were only a small proportion of those actually destroyed and damaged, and probably an even smaller proportion of those which, although only slightly damaged, had been abandoned by their crews. To attribute destruction or damage to a particular arm or weapon is particularly difficult; however, taking into account the number of vehicles found, surrounded by rocket craters, and others with almost certain rocket or 20min strikes, it appears that the claims were reasonable. It is inevitable that when a large number of aircraft are operating in a comparatively small area, that certain claims will be duplicated. There is no reason to believe, however, that on this occasion the duplication resulted in anything but a small over statement of the damage inflicted.

Officers and other ranks who witnessed the attacks were effusive in their praise of their effectiveness. They freely admitted that had the counter attack continued with the same determination as before the Typhoons had appeared, they would have been unable to repel it."107

This was a serious distortion of the evidence which the Army OR group could not let pass unchallenged. Major Pike, in his report, directly contradicted the RAF view:

The efficiency of the German recovery system has been put forward as an explanation of the large discrepancy between the number of vehicles claimed to be destroyed and the actual number found. Tanks and lorries that are destroyed as a result of air attack are almost always burnt out and would not be worth salvaging unless time and labour were both very plentiful. Many prisoners have been questioned on the subject of the recovery of tanks and it has been established that burnt out tanks are never salvaged. In addition it has been ascertained that, contrary to certain statements made about the Mortain battle, very little recovery was done in this part of Normandy at the time; in fact the repair and recovery teams were already pulling out of Normandy when the battle of Mortain was at its height."108

The Army OR group agreed that the Allied Air Forces had a "considerable effect" on the German attack at Mortain. But nothing remotely resembling the air force claims could be justified. 1ndeed, in many areas of the battlefield, no signs of the characteristic rocket crater could be found. The RAF ought to have accepted this view, for it knew from its own recent research that there were serious aiming problems with rocket (and bomb equipped) Typhoons.

The most recent RAF study on the "accuracy of attacks" had been completed in June 1944. It showed that under the most favourable conditions average pilots were lucky to concentrate their rockets in a circle 150 yards in diameter. The report stated:

In order to hit a small target with R.P. the pilot must be at the right height and dive angle, have the correct speed, have his sight on the target and the right angular depression on his sight, make the correct wind allowances and be free from skid or'g .....

All of these factors are important but it is very difficult for a pilot to have them all right at the same time."109

The report raised the question of what really happened in combat when the pilot was also being harassed by anti aircraft fire. It concluded that previous views of the accuracy of RP attacks and of divebombing (which was even more subject to aiming error) were wrong. Such ideas must have been based on "the performance of a few very keen and experienced pilots who can hit small objects, such as tanks, with R.P.'s." Such men might be grouped into a "corps d’elite" capable of attacking special targets but only continual training and practice could improve the accuracy of most of the TAF pilots.""

The rival OR teams next raced north to examine the battlefield around Falaise and the roads leading to the Seine crossings. Here there were thousands of wrecked vehicles to investigate and a new round of argument over the role of air power to be waged. The army investigators would once again report that their three week investigation established beyond dispute that the devastation of the German forces in the area known as the "Shambles" was not due to direct air attack. Only 11 of 171 armoured fighting vehicles examined had been hit by bombs or rockets. No doubt the air force had assisted in destroying German morale strafing had accounted for a third of all soft skinned vehicle losses but, in the words of the OR report, the destruction of the German army had been achieved by 1and action.""'

The investigation of the Mortain battle continued to produce sparks. After one particularly nasty exchange, Brigadier Schonland suggested that "unless there were fairies in Normandy who could remove a large formation of tanks from the Mortain area,” 112 it was time to accept the evidence and act on the basis of fact, not fiction. But in the summer of 1944, 2 TAF was in no mood to discuss the issues raised by Army OR. In an official "Addenda" to the Army's Report the Air Force insisted that:

It would be wrong to regard the data provided in this report as yielding information on which to make recommendations for changes in weapons, tactics or operational doctrine, although the factual side of the report can itself be accepted. 113

If it was not permissible to use accepted data as the basis for recommendations about "changes in weapons, tactics or operational doctrine" then there was little point to further investigation of tactical air power. However, 21 Army Group was not about to give up its attempts to influence tactical air doctrine. A formal agreement was negotiated between Schonland and 2 TAF which provided for joint investigations of air operations against ground targets.

Air Force and Army OR researchers prepared four Joint Reports in the fall and winter of 1944-1945. 114 Again there was no disagreement about the evidence. For example, in Joint Report No.3 titled "Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of Military Operations," it was found that 350 rockets, involving 44 sorties, would have to be fired at a small gun position to obtain a fifty percent chance of a hit.115 Typhoons were clearly weapons which were best used to reduce enemy morale and raise the morale of Allied infantry. Both doctrine and the manner of planning operations needed to be revised to take account of this new information as had been done in the US Ninth Air Force.116 The RAF, however, would not budge. The German offensive in the Ardennes provided the section with another opportunity to study the hard evidence on the role of tactical air power and once again their findings challenged the accepted interpretation. Almost the entire section was involved in the ground search while D.N. Royce worked his way down the line of communications interviewing prisoners of war. 117

BTW, apologies for the large image sizes above.

Jon

[JonS]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Jason C

"250 were claimed in the Mortain attempt alone, while the Germans only lost 50 to all causes and 10-20 to air attack on that occasion (the uncertainty comes from categories like "abandoned")."

So taking out 20-40% of the destroyed tanks was not significant? Overclaims does not mean it was not worthwhile. Can we assume then that Mortain was a success because very rarely would the Germans try to attack in numbers in daylight because of the high risks involved. Therefore this is the proof provided at Hitler's insistence.

As can be seen from the above report, the Germans lost 78 pieces of armour at mortain, to all causes, of which 21 were definately caused by a/c. However, if we look at just the tanks (Pz IV and V), a total of 43 were KOd, of which just 9 were definately a/c, or 20%, from over 700 sorties. 'Day of the Typhoon' indeed.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mike:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mike:

Presumably the Russians felt that the Tank killing properties of large calibre cannon were adequate, since they upgraded the Sturmovik from 20mm -> 23mm -> 37mm, liked the P39 & P63 with their 37mm, and put a 45mm into a Yak 9!!.

Then again, it speaks just as equally to the supposition that they found the smaller calibres inadequate and hence the constant desire to make the shells bigger. You could conclude just as easy that the 45mm shell was used becaue the 20, 23, and 37mms were ineffective, if that was the only logic or evidence you were examining. </font>

[JasonC]

"This road has a steep wooded cliff on one side and a sheer drop to the river on the other so that it was impossible for vehicles to draw off the road.

At LA BALEINE (MR 323427) the road crosses the river by a bridge which had been sufficiently damaged by 500 lb bombs dropped by Thunderbolts to prevent heavy traffic from crossing."

Note, the actual KOs in that report are one Panther hit in the engine by a rocket and brewed up, and one Pz IV Special KOed by air or arty, probably air. All the rest are just a result of a blown bridge and a blocked road. Demoralization has nothing to do with it.

That report leads to the conclusion, attack bridges, not on tanks.

[ August 11, 2005, 05:48 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

In the second report, I read 2 confirmed kills by air attack, and 2-3 more probably M-killed by air attack. Along with some light armor. Most of the reported full AFVs were clearly lost to ground fire. It isn't even clear some of the damage ascribed to air attacks (e.g. just "downward" indications) wasn't caused by indirect artillery fire (which we know was massive).

[Holien]

Some great information here.

Jason,

Is the CMAK / CMBB Airpower over modelled?

Should we when designing games just forget about airpower?

H

[dieseltaylor]

Jason C

"That report leads to the conclusion, attack bridges, not on tanks."

Apparently from reading the postings the attacks on large fixed objects were not that effective either. It becomes more apparent that in effect CAS is a terror weapon that incidentally is very good at shooting up transports .

Like all terror weapons it plays with mind more than the actual effects warrant - if you were a tank crew.

Regarding the training of the TAF it seems that Rudel's concept of hunting down tanks at slow speed and the Allied's fast aircraft but ineffective results may be suggesting something.

I congratulate Battlefront for beefing it up until it becomes the "terror" weapon it was in 1944. To have left it from the game on the grounds of ineffectiveness or treated it so it was never worth buying would have been a weakening of the game experience.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Regarding the training of the TAF it seems that Rudel's concept of hunting down tanks at slow speed and the Allied's fast aircraft but ineffective results may be suggesting something.

It may suggest that the Germans had more and better light AAA than the Soviets. The Allied experience was that slow movers just didn't survive over the battlefield and fast movers had a hard enough time. It might seem at first that the small, light artillery spotters were an exception to that rule, and sometimes they were. But I am led to believe that mostly they survived by staying some distance from the enemy positions, preferably over theit own lines, and just using their superior altitude to function like normal artillery spotters. Spotting from over enemy ground was increasingly done with fast movers such as P-51s.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

I congratulate Battlefront for beefing it up until it becomes the "terror" weapon it was in 1944. To have left it from the game on the grounds of ineffectiveness or treated it so it was never worth buying would have been a weakening of the game experience.

Depends on what you want out of the game. If all you are looking for is an exciting fantasy, then yes, you are right. If you are looking for the most realistic possible depiction of WW II tactical warfare, that's something else again.

Michael

[Battlefront.com]

Remember that one reason kills were so infrequent compared to sorties flown is you have to see something in order to shoot. What proportion of sorties flown came up dry in terms of targets? In pitched battles the ratio of targets engaged to sorties flown would be much higher than general combat conditions. And how many of those sorties were affected by ground fire and called off before an effective strike could be executed? What's more, the more dense the forces engaged the more chance of finding a target, engaging it, and killing it.

Overall the post war look at CAS showed that, indeed, it was less effective than thought during the war. At least in terms of material damage. From a "terror" standpoint it was a rather huge factor. One of Jon's reports suggests that 3 Panthers and a SPA were torched by their crews out of fear of air attack. Hehe... and if we did that in CMx1 we'd have to shut down the forums

Steve

[Holien]

Steve the Panthers would be covered in the overall loss of Morale in the game.

In the situation described it would seem that the crews failed a morale test based upon what they were seeing around them.

This could be down to Artillery, AT fire as well as Airstrikes.

Do you think you have it right for the CM games?

I.e. Airpower effectiveness.

H