Question for the Battle of Budge experts

[SgtMuhammed]

You are probably confusing Lehr and 2 Panzer. Lehr had the opportunity to roll straight into Bastogne but Baylerlein prettymuch lost his nerve. Lehr ended up dropping of a PGD reg to help 26th VGD take Bastogne but they were otherwise whole when they bypassed the town. 7th Army was to hold the south Bastogne was out of their sector.

[Son of Hamchuck]

Would have to disagree( well my source disagrees anyway), if anyone was to blame, it was the XLVII Panzer Corps commander (Luettwitz), who decided to mop up an American pocket, rather than attempt to immediately sieze Bastogne when the opportunity was there. Both Lehr and 2nd pz were heavily involved in the initial attempt to take Bastogne before being ordered to bypass it. Your correct on 7th army, it was intended to be a buffer only.

[SgtMuhammed]

The closest 2nd Pz got to Bastogne was Noville.

Bayerlein let himself be convinced that the Americans had brought up heavy tanks around Mageret and stopped and put out mines. The truth was that had he pushed forward he would have been in Bastogne while the 101st was still deploying.

[Son of Hamchuck]

Well I guess your source(?) and mine (http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_Cont.htm#toc) will just have to agree to disagree.

"Although the 501st had deployed successfully astride the main road east of Bastogne and had developed a sketchy outline of the most advanced German positions, it had not at any time confronted the main German forces. These, the bulk of Panzer Lehr and the two forward regiments of the 26th Volks Grenadier Division, spent most of the day chopping down the American column trapped between Mageret and Longvilly. Kokott apparently had expected to push his two grenadier regiments unopposed through Longvilly, as soon as they were rested, in a circling march to

enter Bastogne from the north, but the German corps commander,

General Luettwitz, himself took these regiments out of Kokott's hand and thrust them into the battle with the American rear guard at Longvilly-which held there longer than expected-and against the retreating column en route to Mageret. Suffice it to say that the 501st had been effectively debarred from the Longvilly arena by the Panzer Lehr troops holding Neffe, Hill 510, and the stopper position at Mageret. By the evening of the 19th the American troops east of Mageret were in varying stages of tactical dissolution-all but Team Ryerson, still clutching its piece of Mageret village. Luettwitz was elated by this victory over the American armor (which as an old tanker he attributed in large part to the superiority of the Panther tank gun), but he realized that a precious day had been lost and with it the chance of an armored coup de main at Bastogne.

"

[coe]

In response to an earlier post:

British best on defense? really? why is that?

In addition I have heard some statements that maybe the British had the best infantry what would make that so given the weapons were reasonably similar and other things?

C.

[JasonC]

All the "coulda taken Bastogne" stories miss the real reason it held. The Germans didn't have enough infantry. By the time they put a ring around the place and stopped more from getting in, there were about 13 US infantry type battalions inside the perimeter, with artillery engineers service troops etc swelling the infantry numbers.

The German force that was trying to (a) encircle them, ( exploit west, and © crush the pocket as well, had 2 Heer pattern PDs and 1 2-regiment VG division, the latter somewhat reduced by earlier fighting. At full strength that is 14 infantry battalions (4, 4 and 6), plus 2 recon and 3 pioneer. If the recon and armored Pz Gdrs were supposed to exploit west, you have no better than even odds on the Americans inside the pocket.

Concentric attacks at 1 to 1 odds don't typically produce rapid victories. It isn't all about the footrace. Attackers are expected to have odds, and if they don't (because reserves have arrived, offset the original concentration for the whole offensive, etc), then there are all sorts of things they can't accomplish anymore.

By the time additional Germans came up, the PDs were trying to get farther west, and met large scale additional US force outside the pocket. Armor facing the Bastogne perimeter guys declined, leaving 1 to 1 infantry and little else Better arty resupply, at best. Over a limited road net though, a lot of it horsedrawn etc. Nothing to write home about. Then portions of the force south of Bastogne had to face about to deal with Patton's guys.

The areas controlled can make it look like the 101 was a small beleagered cut off force that the whole German army could concentrate against. That comes from imagining all the space as equally filled with troops, and any space where there isn't enemy as allowing easy passage of any number of forces. Neither was true. The beseiged men had a lousy supply situation (some airdrops though), but they were not heavily outnumbered.

In those circumstances, it would have been stupid to batter away at them at 1 to 1 odds and waste the only thing the Germans had going for them at that point, local armor superiority and freedom of movement. Bypassing was entirely sensible.

It also was not responsible for the later defeat that e.g. 2nd Panzer suffered around Celles. They were strung out in exploitation mode with limited supplies, and a much more concentrated US 2nd Armored then hit them. Shermans beat Panthers in that one, lopsidedly. Did it by getting on ridges on several sides of the Germans, thus generating flank shots. Plus firepower arms superiority (air, arty easier to supply and backed by corps level groups of 155s etc. Against what little ammo the German had left that far forward).

[Son of Hamchuck]

Originally posted by coe:

In response to an earlier post:

British best on defense? really? why is that?

In addition I have heard some statements that maybe the British had the best infantry what would make that so given the weapons were reasonably similar and other things?

C.

Probably meant in the context of temperment. The British historicly have been very solid defenders, do not give ground or panic easily. They are typically more cautious on offense, in contrast to the American's, and therefore the two, when used properly, made a good combination in WWII.

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

No argument on the infantry, they started the offensive with two little ( no choice at that stage of the war ), and sacrificed a signifigant portion of what they did have in desparate,sometimes suicidal attacks to try and force breakthru's.

Bypassing was the only real option once the chance for a quick seizure evaporated. The German's basicly tried a bluff to get McCaullife to surrender as they knew they didn't have the strength to storm the place.

In a nutshell, as the German's continued to fall signifigantly behind what was an insanely unrealistic schedule to begin with( reach the Meuse in two days IIRC), the shortcomings in logistics and manpower took away what small chance for even limited sucess remained. They needed an extreme amount of breaks to fall their way, and they didn't get nearly enough of them.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by frenchfried_krautdog:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by coe:

In response to an earlier post:

British best on defense? really? why is that?

In addition I have heard some statements that maybe the British had the best infantry what would make that so given the weapons were reasonably similar and other things?

C.

Probably meant in the context of temperment. The British historicly have been very solid defenders, do not give ground or panic easily. They are typically more cautious on offense, in contrast to the American's, and therefore the two, when used properly, made a good combination in WWII. </font>

[JasonC]

f-k - there was no absolute shortage of infantry due to the stage of the war, though quality had declined. They misused it badly in the initial breakthrough fighting, trying to use high level doctines about infantry making the holes and armor exploiting them. In practice, that got a third of the infantry wiped out to no purpose, then the tanks came up and helped anyway, and everywhere they did they immediately broke through.

In addition, the infantry alone did well in the few places it was used in a more sensible manner - to inflitrate through woods, off road, and cut roads behind the thin US positions. The Germans had plenty of arty at the jump off line, too. If they had used their combined arms capabilities effective - infantry not armor bypassing early not late, and arty and armor hitting the thin isolated US positions that resulted - they could have made it through the US front line positions with much lower losses.

German doctrines on the roles of infantry and armor were hopelessly narrow, and not adapted to Ardennes terrain. So no, the argument that they could not possibly have done better doesn't fly either. Not that they would have won the overall offensive, they wouldn't have. (Russians, mid January, 300 divisions, etc). But it was emphatically not a case of doing everything right and losing anyway.

[coe]

can you define "high doctrine"? is that mean - if the troops were well trained it would have worked?

Hmmm, I wonder about the infiltration thing...I've heard accounts about the Germans being good at that but for some reason they would get discovered then wiped out. when you say Armor doesn't infiltrate but punches at the stuff the infantry left behind...I assume that means armor with some infantry?

To the people about British good at defense...better than the italians? germans? russians? was it tactics?

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

If there was no shortage of infantry, then why was 7th Army ( for example ) as thin as it was? Surely they could have a couple of extra divisions( even lower quality ones), at least.

I don't recall saying in any of my posts that they couldn't have done better tacticly or otherwise.

They needed a couple of major breaks ( early seizure of Bastogne & capture of a fuel dump), to give them a half decent chance of crossing the Muese. Or baring capturing Bastogne then an early commitment to it ( leaving a serious threat to their flank ). If they didn't get those major breaks, then they needed a lot of smaller ones to fall their way ( that didn't ). They underestimated the resolve of the average US GI to stand and fight, the rapid movement of allied reinforcements, and the plan simply wasn't realistic given the road net, and surrounding terrain.

But it sure is a whole lot more fun speculating and conjecturing about the AO, then if they had just sat behind the Siegfried Line parrying thrusts with their reconsituted mobile reserves.

[Son of Hamchuck]

Should have typed:

...

Or baring capturing Bastogne then an early commitment to masking it ( leaving a serious threat to their flank ). ...

[JasonC]

coe - what I mean by "high doctrine" is detached brass about 4 pay levels above reality trying to dictate to field officers how they should fight, based on vapid generalizations about past accomplishments, or loose general impressions of different arms. I mean cookie cutter (one size fits all) solutions from 3 star generals and up. Rather than tactically clever, well motivate thought applied to the particular problem in front of them.

For instance, the idea that the way to use artillery to support a general offensive is to fire off most of your ammo in a 4 hour long prep barrage at every point you can think of. That is sometimes sensible, when the enemy is dense on the ground and the point is to punish a too-forward deployment. Against the thin American screens in the Ardennes, 90% of it was wasted. Time and surprise wasted too. And a lot less artillery support available later on, because the rounds had already been fired off, at poorly located, low density targets.

For instance, the idea that infantry makes the holes and armor exploits them. Which assumes infantry has no operational mobility, and armor does, that the point is to free the armor, that once the armor is loose everything solves itself. This paid no attention to the terrain. The tactical mobility of infantry was actually much higher than long columns of vehicles stoppered by modest roadblocks on poor, muddy, forested roads. When sizable infantry forces moved off road, they enveloped such positions with ease.

For instance, the idea that the purpose of armor is to move, that its essence is it speed, particularly in offensive employment. So send as much of it as possible as far west as possible with as little of anything else in the way taking up road space, as you can. Which led to things like all of 1SS's armor caught in thin cul de sacs with less than 2 battalions of infantry along, surrounded by 20 battalions of US infantry. After which whole battalions of tanks were simply abandoned and the men evaded on foot.

Meanwhile, infantry attacks straight down the roads and straight at villages, without armor support, because their job was to clear routes for the armor. They were there to serve the armor, not the other way around, because armor is supposedly the decisive arm. And the infantry doesn't go around, because the road must be opened as soon as possible, so an attack must be made immediately, and there isn't time to coordinate much in the way of artillery, so off you go.

Compare the Chinese at the Yalu. No tanks. Worse terrain. Complete envelopments readily accomplished and the UN forces set back on their ear. Not just front line guys in thin sectors, the reserves too. How? By viewing the object not as clearing a road, but as trapping the defenders. By seeing a foot race alright, to the defenders rear. Operative word "foot".

Breakthroughs work by parallel pursuit logic. Meaning, once the attackers are through anywhere, they march to the defenders rear faster than the defenders can retreat. If defenders want to instead hold somewhere, let 'em, and push deeper in the other places. More defenders farther forward means fewer behind them, which is where the real battle is being fought. Spread behind them. Clear roads after the forward guys are cut off, or after they see what is happening and try to bug out.

The Germans thought they needed to deliver a boatload of tanks to the opposite side of a forest with a limited road net, and to do so in as little time as possible. So they tried to open as many roads as possible. There was little reinforcing of success. A few times at the Our, some Heer PDs shifted to an easier sector where others had already broken through. But only after their infantry ahead of them had failed to open the roads straight ahead, despite head on battering. This was stupid.

They did not see their infantry as a decisive offensive arm. They did not see the improved ability of tanks to smash isolated positions, rather than hitting them head on with infantry, or being stopped by them without having any infantry to turn them with. That let the same formations stop a column, backpeddle, stop it again, backpeddle, stop it again, etc. Put one infantry battalion on the road behind those defenders one dark night, and the sequence stops. Defenders evaporate.

Not enough focus on inflicting losses rather than grabbing ground. St. Vith, for example. They nearly pocketed a division plus. But all the emphasis was on getting past it and west. They battered it frontally the whole time, trying to improve the cleared road net. Arty didn't help as much as it might have, because the roads went to armor, and because they had shot off much of their ammo in the prep.

When Peiper gets through, it is all Meuse Meuse Meuse, that's the plan. So he doesn't take the time to cut off the men to his south, when he readily could have. Instead he keeps looking for the next bridge, always thinking just one more will mean no more defenders in front if him. Hello, there are defenders in front of him clear back to Normandy. But he might have taken out the ones in St. Vith, and tripled the force up abrest of him. More than tripled its infantry, too.

When the SS up north hit the Elsenborn position, they batter it frontally. Why? South of them there is a breakthrough, why aren't they shifting behind it to exploit? Need more road net to move more tanks. Um, you might have sent a full FJ division off road, around the southern flank of the Elsenborn position. Stoppered roads do not mean not opportunities for decisive maneuver. But the German brass could not grok subordinating tanks to infantry because of infantry superior mobility. That does not compute. Entirely true as a fact, in Ardennes terrain - or Korean mountains, same point - but they could not let go of ideas learned in wide open, armor-friendly terrain.

German performance in the Bulge was pretty darn bad, for what they had and for how asleep they caught the defenders. As for the odes to the bravery of the Americans stopping them, um, a division surrendered outright and most of a corps ran for their lives. There was plenty of morale failure on the defending side. But it didn't take much to disorganize so ham-fisted an attack.

As for what they ought to have done with their armor instead, in the grand scheme of things, they should have put real reserves in western Poland. Then maybe the Russian January offensive might not have made it to 35 miles from Berlin in one jump, wrecking an entire army in the process.

From every military point of view, it was collosally stupid to throw away so much armor, and it led directly to catastrophy for eastern Germany. 46 years of it.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Where, oh where, are your books? No, not your library, though I'd love to see it. I mean books written by you for our libraries. Please write some!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Son of Hamchuck]

Well a tidal torrent has swept over my position, and so I crawl wearily out of my foxhole to defend.

The German ( Hitler's ) plan was completely predicated on speed of advance, it wasn't designed to be a set piece battle. It was in fact supposed to be a quick smash breakthru, then a sprint to the Meuese and beyond. Everything was to be sacraficed to that end, men,equipement,supplies, everything. That is why there wasn't effort given to grinding down pockets ( an exception was the near Bastogne, and it cost the Germans capture of that town ).

As for artillery, or lack of it after the initial bombardments, there was a simple explanation for that, it was called transport( the heavy guns needed prime movers). The Germans didn't have it. They also were so short of fuel, that what they did have was prioritized for the armor. Operating in mountainous windy roaded terrain, took up a lot more fuel than expected ( poor planning ).

Also the road's were jammed going back for a hundred kilometers + into Germany, things just had a way of not getting to where they were needed, when they were needed.

The Germans did wait too long to shift forces from 6th SSpz Army to exploit the sucess at Model's AG, although again given the road constraints, it's difficult to gauge just how much of difference that would have made. The attack was being funneled, and with the creation of "hard shoulders" on each side, much of the forces diverted would be needed simply for flank defence.

Bottom line the offensive had one slim hope, hit hard, move fast, cross the Meuse and attempt to cutoff as large a chunk of the Allied armies in the north as possible, before the weather changed and the allied air forces pounded the exposed forces to powder.

Regarding the German's inability to subordinate infantry to armor, in fact they did just that. On 6th SSpz army front, the infantry was given the role of punching the initial holes in the defense, into which the armor would then pour thru. This tactic failed to achieve the desired results.

The American troops in the Ardennes were for the most part, either green ( the two regiments of the 106 that surrendered after being surrounded ), or battle fatigued. Sure some panicked, but enough stuck around to seriously upset the German timetable. They weren't supermen, in fact other armies might have considered them somewhat spoiled ( logisticly anyway ), but they gave a good showing here.

As for the Chinese at the Yalu, I guess I just miss the signifigance there. Are you saying the German's should have used human wave assaults ( they did ) to swamp the defenders. The problem was when they tried that, many times they were decimated by American light and heavy artillery. The Chinese surprised a UN force that was advancing at breakneck speed, a big difference between that and an American force dug in and sited for defence.

I would give the German performance in the Bulge an "B+" for effort, and a "C+" for execution, given what they had to work with. The fact that did as well as they did, given the minimal time alloted for planning,logistical difficulties, and the secrecy involved, is to me, somewhat amazing.

My comment about how the Germans should have used their armored reserves, was sorta tongue in cheek, I just left out the smiley face. In any event, Hitler was running the show, not the German high command. An he didn't give a rat's a** what happened to Germany when he wasn't running it anymore. That's the prizm that any analysis of events at that stage of the war must filter through.

I sneak back to my foxhole to await the next salvo.

[JasonC]

"Regarding the German's inability to subordinate infantry to armor, in fact they did just that."

Has it exactly backwards. The inability to even comprehend the point being made is a perfect example of the disease diagnosed. It continues to be believed, for reasons of overall doctrine if not status hierarchy among the branches, that armor is always the decisive element and all must serve it.

"On 6th SSpz army front, the infantry was given the role of punching the initial holes in the defense, into which the armor would then pour thru. This tactic failed to achieve the desired results."

Duh, that is one of the things I criticized as mindless, dictated from higher echelons and forced down on the field commanders, completely unadapted to the actual task and terrain.

What the Chinese did at the Yalu was not mindless human wave assaults. They infiltrated infantry through the high ground and enveloped the road-bound UN forces, setting up blocking positions behind them. The main body of the infiltrating forces then marched south, parallel pursuit fashion, seeking to reach positions south of the still holding UN forces. Leave the roads to the UN until well south, then spread across them from east and west, leaving additional roadblocks.

Repeat, deeper each time. Haul ass and bypass with leg infantry, through the mountains. Mobility does not equal motorized, and maneuver does not equal armor. Mountain infantry was the decisive *maneuver* arm.

Then and only then, you can hit the road-bound forward guys all you want. They can't hold, regardless of what they do.

The entire point of the comparison is that leg infantry had *superior*, not inferior, *operational mobility*, to armored and motorized forces, due to the *terrain*. The Chinese attack fully exploited that fact. The German hamfisted Ardennes one, did not. It instead tried to apply one-size fits all, armor-centric solutions, in terrain that made utter nonsense of them.

Some of the VG divisions showed the initiative to use infiltration tactics anyway, starting before their own barrage and continuing while it was still in progress, instead of waiting for it to end. They readily got through the thin US screens by the simple tactic of completely ignoring the road net. When well in the rear of those screens, they went back to roads, to block them not use them. Also attacked artillery positions. Called down artillery fire on bypassed units. Etc.

But this was an exception in a few sectors. In most, the brass directives on infantry clearing roads for the armor after the barrage, armor only to be "released" after holes were made and the task of the infantry being to open roads by frontal attack along them, were followed to the letter. With hopeless results - whole battalions of good infantry thrown away to no purpose, no holes, armor backed up and useless.

When armor was allowed to hit the line with the infantry, they broke in readily enough. They then took the lead, "according to plan", yes, the plan was stupid that is the whole point. Armor heavy forces leading, run into roadblocks, get stopped, back everybody up. Hit those frontally, kill a few and make others back up 5 km and do it again.

Along every road. Thus, every place that holds gets hit 4-5 times, and everybody through in places that didn't, helps them out not one bit.

What they should have done is put the infantry in the lead not to attack but to infiltrate and bypass, ignoring the roads not trying to clear them. Then, along the roads, the armor hits positions frontally, with all arms support. Infantry already being behind those positions, when they are beaten they will evaporate, not stand again 5 km back. With armor involved in all those frontal attack portions, no useless fiascos of whole infantry battalions shot to pieces to accomplish nothing.

The infantry is the maneuver element. The armor is a battering ram to hit the hold outs. Infantry goes deep as fast as their legs will carry them, stringing roadblocks behind every US position still holding forward. Armor, on the other hand, batters ahead along the roads easiest to clear because infantry is through and behind them. Once all the way clear, it focuses not on road trips or bridges, but on trapping as many defenders as possible and battering the hold-outs. Arty likewise, sets up on the east side of holdouts and shells them.

They got all the roles wrong among the combat arms. They made infantry the road-opening battering ram, armor the deep exploiter (when it could barely move), gave all the road space to armor so it had to do the shelling of towns etc because the arty was left behind or out of ammo wasted on the prep or both, etc.

Why? Because they did not adapt to the task in front of them. To thin defenders, to achieved surprise, to waves of road-mobile reserves, to the flow of the battle in other sectors so far, above all to the terrain.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

What the Chinese did at the Yalu was not mindless human wave assaults. They infiltrated infantry through the high ground and enveloped the road-bound UN forces, setting up blocking positions behind them. The main body of the infiltrating forces then marched south, parallel pursuit fashion, seeking to reach positions south of the still holding UN forces. Leave the roads to the UN until well south, then spread across them from east and west, leaving additional roadblocks.

Repeat, deeper each time. Haul ass and bypass with leg infantry, through the mountains. Mobility does not equal motorized, and maneuver does not equal armor. Mountain infantry was the decisive *maneuver* arm.

The differences between a VG and Chinese division in terms of organization, logistics and tactics is such that you can't really compare how the two were employed and what they accomplished (or didn't).

The infantry is the maneuver element. The armor is a battering ram to hit the hold outs. Infantry goes deep as fast as their legs will carry them, stringing roadblocks behind every US position still holding forward. Armor, on the other hand, batters ahead along the roads easiest to clear because infantry is through and behind them. Once all the way clear, it focuses not on road trips or bridges, but on trapping as many defenders as possible and battering the hold-outs. Arty likewise, sets up on the east side of holdouts and shells them.

They got all the roles wrong among the combat arms. They made infantry the road-opening battering ram, armor the deep exploiter (when it could barely move), gave all the road space to armor so it had to do the shelling of towns etc because the arty was left behind or out of ammo wasted on the prep or both, etc.

As Krautdog has stated, the offensive called for a rapid thrust deep, something that could not be achieved if the entire attack was dependent on inflitration by foot infantry. This may work if your ultimate objective was Bastogne and St. Vith, but certainly not if you are shooting for Bruxelles and Antwerp. Especially against an opponent that is fully motorized and enjoys complete air superiority.

At some point the armor has to take their rightful place at the head of the column.

[Son of Hamchuck]

JasonC,

Well come to think of it, perhaps the only thing the German's really lacked, was you being there personally directing traffic! Hindsight does indeed make gods of us all. Perhaps you should chill a bit, you take this stuff way too seriously, and personally.

[JasonC]

Kingfish - after you kill all the defenders between the Our and the Meuse, you can put the armor in the lead, if you can still keep going at that point.

In case everybody forgot, when Guderian got over the Meuse in 1940, infantry led the way to the far bank, while everything else just supported by fire. Armor leading is a tactical decision and depends on the immediate task. It should not be dictated from army group level.

Doctrine makes idiots of people who take it too literally and apply it in too formal a manner.

As for what VG could do via infiltration, they proved it in the sectors where it was tried.

As for the supposed need for speed, the maximum penetration actually achieved was about 60 miles in about one week, for a rate of 9 miles a day on average. The main objective, Antwerp, was 110 miles from the start line.

In the first phase offensive in Korea, over worse ground, Chinese infantry moved the line 30 to 40 miles in 3 and 4 days, respectively, on the eastern and western ends of the line, enveloping several divisions in the east, and destroying a ROK corps in the west.

There ought to have been opportunities for some more rapid moves within an infantry spearheaded offensive, when e.g. a certain road was cleared and some armor let loose. If would grab a portion of the road net and isolate additional defenders, instead of all running up one road.

But the general surge west could have been conducted at a cross country, foot pace, and it would not have been appreciably slower than the rate actually achieved by armor columns along the roads, given the frequent roadblock fighting they faced.

[JasonC]

Consider the formation of armored groups to lead the attack. What is the rationale for them? They were formed on conventional lines, the way they always were, not with a view to the terrain and enemy conditions.

The normal rationale for an armored group consisting of basically an entire panzer regiment with only a battalion or so of armored infantry, was to be able to overload enemy AT defenses along a limited frontage, typically 1-2 km hit with 50 tanks per km. That promised to overload local AT defenses and rapidly punch into the depths of the enemy defensive zone.

But for that to work, you have to be able to meaningfully deploy 50 plus tanks in a tactically coordinated way. If you are running down a forest road with only the lead platoon of vehicles able to see anything, the rest of the column is superfluous. You can't clear a roadblock consisting of AT mines or downed trees or a blown bridge, by throwing 50-100 tanks at it along a one-land road.

The way you actually clear such positions tactically, is to turn them with dismounted infantry moving off road. A modest number of tanks, working with infantry and pioneers, can threaten up the road too, of course. But they aren't the tactically decisive element, the turning movement is.

So the right composition of a leading KG in such terrain is a company or so of heavy tanks (Panther and up), a company of pioneers tied to them, and plenty of infantry astride the route of advance. Not 200 armored vehicles in column with a frontage of one Panther.

When you encounter e.g. a held village, by all means bring up several companies of tanks. Shell the place, then send the tanks in. Preferably with infantry already behind it. Don't send a full battalion of infantry at it frontally over open snowy fields. Those are the kind of positions where you will want the bulk of your heavy stuff - holdout busting, not on point.

The German army was constitutionally incapable of acting flexibly in such matters. It was built and led for one doctrine only, and a whole command hierarchy, pecking order, etc was constructed around an idealization of how things were "supposed" to work. The same can be seen in the instance on using armor to attack, not to defend, etc.

That "rightful place" comment illustrates the same idiocy. The right place for any arm is where it does the most overall good in the actual conditions faced. Not how it worked in France in 1940, or in Russia in 1941. It isn't 1941 and that isn't where you are. Flush that image, it is not helpful. You can't copy glories past -which incidentally were not themselves achieved by copying prior occasions, but by tactically imaginative new (at the time) uses of all available arms. Think through the existing (new) problem, instead.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But the general surge west could have been conducted at a cross country, foot pace, and it would not have been appreciably slower than the rate actually achieved by armor columns along the roads, given the frequent roadblock fighting they faced.

I can't honestly see how this would be successful given the strength and mobility of the allies. The whole point of launching the offensive in the Ardennes is that no one expected it there, but that advantage is lost right away, and from that point on the terrain begins to work against the Germans. Thus it is paramount that they push through this very difficult country and get across the Meuse as fast as possible.

Slowing down the surge westward to a foot pace, as you suggest, would only guarantee one thing - by the time they were to have reached Bastogne and St. Vith they would have found not single divisions, but entire corps in defensive positions.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for what VG could do via infiltration, they proved it in the sectors where it was tried.

Duh, you stretch 4 division on an 80+ mile front and I'll walk entire regiments through the woods.

Now do that for an entire week and watch the woods get jammed with American infantry backed by pre-registered Arty.

[JasonC]

Kingfish - you pretend a foot pace is slower than a tank pace, and my whole point is that it simply wasn't. Assuming the conclusion is not much on an argument. Tanks in the lead they made 9 miles a day. Not exactly blazing. They failed to pocket the forces in St. Vith and they failed to seriously hurt the forces in Bastogne they did pocket.

So what did merely hoping to go fast get them? Not a darn thing. Putting armor in the lead once through the line did not make them faster. In one case it got a full Panzer regiment annihilated. Using up the infantry trying to make the initial holes, to spare the armor, did spare the armor but did not make it faster or keep the infantry alive to help.

If the US forces in the sector had all been destroyed by the time the airborne corps arrived, and much of that airborne corps were then pocketed and demolished, the Americans would have been in much worse shape than they actually were. It is quite feasible with the forces they used, used in a quite different manner.

The frontage expanded dramatically after the break-in succeeded. About three times, maybe four if you count interior walls for pockets and such. Yes the Americans rushed men to the sector, but that extra space swallowed quite a few of them. They were not appreciably denser off the road net at Christmas. On the north flank maybe, and a thin sector on the south flank as 3rd Army approached. But they didn't have to stop infantry infiltration, they only had to block the limited roads.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Kingfish - you pretend a foot pace is slower than a tank pace, and my whole point is that it simply wasn't. Assuming the conclusion is not much on an argument. Tanks in the lead they made 9 miles a day. Not exactly blazing. They failed to pocket the forces in St. Vith and they failed to seriously hurt the forces in Bastogne they did pocket.

No, but they came close on several occasions of breaking the front wide open. There was nothing in front of KG Peiper when it reached Stavelot except for a squad of Engineers.

Putting armor in the lead once through the line did not make them faster.

You are correct, but then again you have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. They put their armor in the lead because it held the potential for a rapid breakthrough, something an infantry-paced attack could never accomplish.

Again, the advantage of surprise that the Germans gained from launching Op Wacht am Rhine in the Ardennes in the winter evaporated after a day or two, so all they had left was the initiative. This could never be maintained if the attack was paced to that of a foot marching soldier. Not against an opponent that can truck in 60,000 fresh troops in a single day.