Question for the Battle of Budge experts

[Bigduke6]

Which puts into question the German strategy of attacking big in the Ardennes in the first place. The battle took place for two reasons: (1) The German leadership, i.e. old Adolf, was searching for a war-winning target, a sort of magic wand to reverse the course of the war.

The logic of the Bulge, from that POV, was that a breakthrough to Antwerp would lead, ideally, to the collapse of the Anglo-American alliance. Failing that, the idea was that the offensive would so cripple the U.S. Army, that the Allies would be forced onto the strategic defensive. That in turn, the logic went, would allow Germany to concentrate forces on the real danger: the Soviet Union.

All of which was pretty much in la-la land. The British and Americans December 1944 were not the 1939 Poles or the 1941 Soviets, by a long shot.

The other factor driving the German decision to attack in the Bulge was, of course, their main tool for warfare was a tactically efficient army, by which I mean ground force. The Luftwaffe wasn't going to pull Germany's fat out of the fire, nor were the diplomats, nor were the scientists and their wonder weapons. Oh sure, there was plenty of hoping and wishing, but the bottom line at the time was Germany's leaders had only one usable card left to play: The ability to defeat Allied forces of roughly even numbers on the tactical level, due to German small unit skill and equipment advantges. Not that the Germans absolutely outclassed their opponents on the battlefield, but at least in the tactical fight they were still able to hold their own.

This German advantage was the direct result of around two centuries of military tradition, and also recent wartime experience. Throughout the war, the Germans achieved their major successes by assembling forces sufficient to win on the tactical level, and then rolling the dice in hopes of an operationally decisive result.

There were more rational strategies out there, but the Germans intellectually were unable even to consider them. A pure defensive strategy forcing the Allies to pay the maximum price for space gained made more sense for Germany, than late-war offensives like the Bulge or Balaton. A German army coup killing Adolf and suing for immediate peace in the West also would have saved millions more German lives, than the strategy (fight to the bitter end) elected by the German leadership.

Heck, if the interests of Germany were really predominant, and rationally considered, in the minds of the German decision-makers in December 1944, the logical move was at minimum, surrender unconditionally and immediately.

None of that washed with the German decision-makers, in part because a certifiable nut case was in charge, but also - and this is the bit that the revisionist panzer-lovers have trouble accepting sometimes - because the German military staked the war on tactical superiority automatically, and always, trumping attrition strategy.

Which was wrong. That was an (just) effective approach during the days of Frederich the Great, but the German General Staff carried on with that hope - German quality will allow us to fight and to win two front wars - to achieve disastrous results in two World Wars. (Which kinda calls the supposed brilliance of the German General Staff into question, but that's another thread.)

The Bulge is a classic example of what was wrong with German military strategy. It was (yet another) knee-jerk attempt at winning the war by obtaining an operational victory due to advantages on the tactical level. The bottom line about the Bulge offensive was that it was a stupid idea put into effect by a military incapable of considering strategies besides "winning battles = winning the war".

The lesson of the Bulge is that, if you let your army limit the strategies available to a nation in wartime, the nation can lose the war, often disastrously.

On final note: It is really small-minded to attack JasonC's, or any one else's, arguements here in terms like "Hindsight is 20/20, so shame on you for arrogantly criticising history's decision-makers."

The point to this forum, as I see it, is to discuss the historical facts. If some one comes up with excellently-arrayed facts and logic, as JasonC often does, it is wrong for others - Krautdog for instance - to point fingers at that some one and effectively to accuse him of being too smart. You want stupid posts on WW2 history, there are always things like Il-2 forum. This is the CM forum.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

...the German General Staff carried on with that hope - German quality will allow us to fight and to win two front wars...

While warmly agreeing with most of your post, this is a point that may need revising. I am presently reading Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend, which is proving an eye-opener on several points. One is that neither the General Staff nor even Hitler began with the notion that a two-front war was winnable for Germany. But Hitler had persuaded himself and at least some of his generals that the Western Allies would not go to war against Germany, and that they could be picked off one by one when the time was ripe and at Germany's choosing. It came as a profound shock when Britain and France did declare. However, in for a penny, in for a pound. Aside from backing down and agreeing to Allied terms for peace, there was nothing for Hitler and Germany to do except proceed in the best ways that it could find.

That was not so easily nor immediately discoverable though. In fact, there were grave doubts about winning a war against just Britain and France. Their combined productive capacity exceeded Germany's, which meant that in a long war it was inevitable that Germany would lose. And that differential of productivity would even slip further to Germany's disadvantage due to the naval blockaded that those two nations would surely enforce against Germany, for very little of the necessary resources for a modern war could be found in lands that Germany controlled.

What's more, the initial planning for the campaign against France did not envision a speedy victory. Hitler and the General Staff were anticipating a more WW I-style war, possibly extending over more than one campaign seasons, as their production priorities show. This was a very grim prospect indeed, and viewed in that light the feelings of euphoria that seized the high command following the rapid collapse of the Third Republic and forcible ejection of the BEF from the Continent are understandable.

Given such an unexpectedly easy (in a relative sense; nearly 50,000 dead and missing are nothing to sneeze at) victory over what was at that time thought to be the world's most powerful army, ignorance and prejudice combined to blind the German High Command to the real strengths of the USSR and mislead them into thinking a similar speedy victory in the East was within their grasp. But as Army Chief of Staff Beck had said in 1938, "The idea of a Blitzkrieg...is an illusion. One should really have learned from the modern history of warfare that surprise attacks have hardly ever led to lasting success."

Michael

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

On final note: It is really small-minded to attack JasonC's, or any one else's, arguements here in terms like "Hindsight is 20/20, so shame on you for arrogantly criticising history's decision-makers."

The point to this forum, as I see it, is to discuss the historical facts. If some one comes up with excellently-arrayed facts and logic, as JasonC often does, it is wrong for others - Krautdog for instance - to point fingers at that some one and effectively to accuse him of being too smart. You want stupid posts on WW2 history, there are always things like Il-2 forum. This is the CM forum.

Although I agree with you here, I would also suggest cutting Krautdog a little slack. Jason has a certain way of getting his point across that rubs some the wrong way, especially those who haven't had the pleasure of going round and round with him on a particular subject

That he is walking encyclopedia on all things military goes without saying, and his contributions are always welcomed, no matter how wrong they are

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Which puts into question the German strategy of attacking big in the Ardennes in the first place. The battle took place for two reasons: (1) The German leadership, i.e. old Adolf, was searching for a war-winning target, a sort of magic wand to reverse the course of the war.

German strategy was sound. they acknowledged that it contained great risks, but it was practically the only thing they could do in that situtation.

All of which was pretty much in la-la land.

The other factor driving the German decision to attack in the Bulge was, of course, their main tool for warfare was a tactically efficient army, by which I mean ground force.

the lack of resources was the other driving factor, the key one being 100% certainty of coming succesful enemy offensives at all fronts.

Oh sure, there was plenty of hoping and wishing, but the bottom line at the time was Germany's leaders had only one usable card left to play: The ability to defeat Allied forces of roughly even numbers on the tactical level, due to German small unit skill and equipment advantges.

the card they had left, which they played, was to stablize the fronts one after another to prevent enemy offensives, gain initiative and buy time to man divisions and thus live to fight another day (and, less importantly, to get rid of the unconditional part of the peace terms, if you are after such things).

This German advantage was the direct result of around two centuries of military tradition, and also recent wartime experience.

the German advantage was that Allied commanders, decision-makers and soldiers were incompetent for most of the war. no need to credit Germans for the senility of the Allies, unless Allies were so demented just because Germans put something in their drinking water.

Throughout the war, the Germans achieved their major successes by assembling forces sufficient to win on the tactical level, and then rolling the dice in hopes of an operationally decisive result.

that's true, they never had operational, not to say strategical, targets. all they planned were isolated battalion-regimental-divisional sized battles. right?

There were more rational strategies out there, but the Germans intellectually were unable even to consider them.

that's true, they never managed to come to think about, not to mention *gasp* actually doing in reality, the kind of strategies you are suggesting, like trying to kill Hitler or fight a defensive war

A pure defensive strategy forcing the Allies to pay the maximum price for space gained made more sense for Germany, than late-war offensives like the Bulge or Balaton.

not one step back, that makes such a great strategy. isn't it puzzling how Germans never came to think about that? or what's even worse, if we for a short la-la-land moment imagine they did, they thought it would not be sufficient in itself. makes one really wonder what they were thinking. or rather, why did they not think at all!?!111

A German army coup killing Adolf and suing for immediate peace in the West

yes, how strange that those German generals never came to think about that!

also would have saved millions more German lives, than the strategy (fight to the bitter end) elected by the German leadership.

huh, for a while i thought you were just suggesting a defensive fight, but i guess it would have rocked for some other reason than saving "millions more German lives". it's always better to farm cows in deindustrialized Germany, cut trees in Siberia, die of famine or just get nuked in the cities (you find misuse of hindsight cool, so i thought i'd use it a bit as well).

Heck, if the interests of Germany were really predominant, and rationally considered, in the minds of the German decision-makers in December 1944, the logical move was at minimum, surrender unconditionally and immediately.

gee, what an interesting "at-minimum" strategy. what was this la-la-land you were talking about earlier, and could i hear some of the non-minimum strategies? is there a book about the subject? "The Art of Surrender-Monkeys"?

None of that washed with the German decision-makers, in part because a certifiable nut case was in charge, but also - and this is the bit that the revisionist panzer-lovers have trouble accepting sometimes - because the German military staked the war on tactical superiority automatically, and always, trumping attrition strategy.

i am more a fan of Soviet tanks, and i am a bit annoyed about any kind of revisionism, but i must agree i have trouble accepting what you are suggesting above, not least because Germans so clearly thought that they couldn't win a classical attrition war aginst the Allies.

Which was wrong. That was an (just) effective approach during the days of Frederich the Great, but the German General Staff carried on with that hope - German quality will allow us to fight and to win two front wars - to achieve disastrous results in two World Wars. (Which kinda calls the supposed brilliance of the German General Staff into question, but that's another thread.)

the above doesn't deserve the rolleyes graemlin. you get F- for this "WW2 101" class.

The Bulge is a classic example of what was wrong with German military strategy. It was (yet another) knee-jerk attempt at winning the war by obtaining an operational victory due to advantages on the tactical level. The bottom line about the Bulge offensive was that it was a stupid idea put into effect by a military incapable of considering strategies besides "winning battles = winning the war".

The lesson of the Bulge is that, if you let your army limit the strategies available to a nation in wartime, the nation can lose the war, often disastrously.

oh yes, it would be an error to try to evaluate the actual military reasons that lead to the failure. let's just say it failed because of the general German military STRATEGY and continue enjoying our pleasant aristocratic cup of tea or ponder the merits of Socialistic Realism.

[Son of Hamchuck]

Bigduke6,

While much of what you say, I can agree with, I take issue with "It is really small-minded to attack JasonC's, or any one else's, arguements here in terms like "Hindsight is 20/20, so shame on you for arrogantly criticising history's decision-makers.", if your applying it to my comment. I was attacking nobody. If anyone is arrogant and small minded, well than maybe you should reread the posts.

There's nothing wrong with second guessing, most on this forum like to think of ourselves as "armchair generals" to some small degree at least. The difference I see with JasonC, is he really belives he is ( or should have been ), a general( well maybe a colonel). My guess ( and it is only that ), is that he's never seen combat, and is both frustrated as both an author( Where are the books, as a previous poster inquired?) and general. My main point is to see things in context, how things were observed at the time by those involved, not to rip the particpants because they don't have todays hindsight and omniscience. If your going to rip them do it in context at least. End of rant, I'm outta here, have a nice day.