Dandelion, can you expound on this?

[Andreas]

I have a discussion on this topic ongoing on the AHF here.

In the time 6 June to 8 July 12 SS lost 84 tanks as total write offs (TWOs). In the time to 3rd July it claimed 144. So even if we accept these claims as kills and add a few to cover the time out to 8th July, the kill ratio is going to be less than 2:1: This is excluding the kills by the Tigers of 101 schwere SS Panzer.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

The Germans had a bad system for replacing losses. Instead of feeding in smaller replacment units, they would keep a unit at the front until it could be relieved (or was totally spent), then would withdraw it for rebuilding somewhere in the rear.

Steve - as RMC points out, this is really not correct. The German system was almost certainly superior to the US system, and quite comparable from my reading to the British system, since both were based on a column replacement (called 'Draft' in British, and 'Marschbatallion' in German lingo). Under this replacements were grouped together under the command of an officer, and would be fed into a division as a unit. Sometimes several hundred men in one go.

Also, the ideal German solution was to have a Feldersatzbatallion (Field training battalion) present in a division, which would allow new arrivals with no combat experience to be trained in the combat area before sending them to the line units - this deteriorated very quickly after 1941, but as soon as possible attempts were made to revive them in a period of calm.

I am not sure your view of bleeding them dry and then taking them out is correct for non-armoured units. It is my understanding that infantry divisions stayed in the line, or in the immediate rear, whereever possible, and were rebuilt there. Armoured formations are a different matter, and since they should not stay in the line anyway, this makes sense.

The German system had drawbacks, such as the regional association of the depot battalions whence reinforcements were received. This meant that e.g. AG North received more replacements than other Army Groups, because it was based on units from East Prussia primarily. So the distribution of replacements was not according to needs as much.

But I am certain that a study of replacement systems would find the ideal German system to be better than the Allied ones, and the real system still better than the US system and on a par with the British.

[Battlefront.com]

This isn't entirely correct. The Germans did feed regular replacements into the line from the ersatzbataillonen. This system could not replace the men as quickly as they were lost and so they were from time to time required to withdraw units for rebuild.

I had not forgot about them This worked in theory, but the system was badly broken by the time Normandy rolled around. Not only were the recruits being misdirected to newly formed formations, but the ersatz units were often employed in combat situations and were therefore difficult to extract. In the East, and this was determined to be a mistake by the Germans, replacement units were assigned security duties in the rear. It seemed like a wise use of manpower. But unfortunately it led to lower readiness and other issues (such as unnecessary losses). When the front broke these units were also sometimes caught up in the fight without being integrated correctly into their parent units, not to mention without time to adjust. These units were nothing more than cannon fodder in such cases because they lacked pretty much everything except for light small arms (generally not even LMGs).

The Germans also recognized that units should be rotated out from combat on a periodic basis in order to reduce the psychiatric casualties.

Yes, it was recognized but it was quite difficult to do because of the over extension of the fronts, high losses, and the retention of manpower outside of the combat theater for rebuilding. A steady system of replacements would have allowed semi-spent untis to be withdrawn shorter distances and rebuilt quicker. They would also not have had to leave behind all of their equipment because some unit forming back in central Germany was getting priority of all the replacements.

Nope, instead the units generally stayed put until they were needed for another front or were so badly beat up that they were a liability to their section of front (and even then they sometimes weren't removed).

And of course, don't even get me started on Luftwaffe Field Divisions

The US system, with the steady stream of replacements from the depot did allow units to stay in the line pretty much indefinitely. In terms of numbers this kept the combat strength of the units up, but with the training shortfalls and issues with cohesion I question whether these units really maintained their combat power over time.

Very true. No system is perfect. But this comes back to the same argument about Shermans vs. Panthers. If I have 10,000 troops along KM of front backed by artillery and a rich assortment of transport and armor, not to mention tons of supplies, and you have 3000 grizzled veterans with a couple of pea shooters and a promisary note for reinforcements should you get into trouble... how badly do you think cohesion and training issues are going to affect the outcome?

The problem with the German forces in the East and West was that the Allies were able to keep the pressure on. Like in Normandy, where the Germans dished out a lot of pain... they couldn't afford to take it. If you're in a kinfe fight with 10 guys, chances are one of them is going to get you even if it is lucky. And if two or three cut you bad enough, you're not going to be in any shape to take on the next couple.

While I disagree with the notion that superior numbers won the war for the Allies, it certainly made a huge impact. Keeping the pressure on, always with a reserve, and always coming back stronger after each setback... it was only a matter of time before Germany was defeated. Good skills, morale, and equipment only hastened it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

But I am certain that a study of replacement systems would find the ideal German system to be better than the Allied ones, and the real system still better than the US system and on a par with the British.

I am unfamiliar with the British system, but I do have a nice study doing a compare contrast of the German and Soviet systems. I am also aware of the US system.

Yes, in theory the German system works better overall. But in practice it had a serious shortcoming in that the manpower wasn't nationalized and instead stuck to the Wehrkreis system. This is where the US replacement system was superior when a unit sustained serious losses. It also was better in terms of flexibility of specialities. If the US Army needed 10,000 engineers, it had the entire military age population to draw upon. Not so with the regionalized systems used by most European Armies that I am aware of (I assume the British stuck to this method, but IIRC they did bend on it?).

But as I said above, the German system broke down VERY badly after the big losses in the East. The system simply wasn't capable of supporting a Total War effort which involved massive distances and huge losses. What it did do was keep unit cohesion and experience relatively high despite massive losses. In this sense it could be said that the German replacement system might have been the only reason it was able to sustain its losses as long as it did without a fatal reduction in fighting ability.

Yes, I am aware that many infantry units were kept local to rest and refit, unlike the mobile units which were far more likely to be pulled hundreds or thousands of KMs away from the front. Some infantry units were posted to rear duty instead of truly resting and refitting. Others were moved great distances to shore up other fronts or to refit while manning fortification lines (like the Atlantic Wall). But it is fair to say that, overall, they were kept in the line long after they should have been relieved. But then again, generalizations are just that

What I was really talking about was the units at the front, either in the line or refitting, that were dennied replacements because somewhere back in Germany Hitler had decided it would be nice to make another unit. And since manpower and material were always in short supply, either the newly forming unit got stiffed or the one at the front did. Because a new unit always requires more equipment than several existing ones, the impact of a single new Infantry Division was probably felt by several existing ones (depending on depletion level). However, it is true that sometimes it was the newly forming unit that found itself short on practically everything. This happened more and more as the war went on because there simply wasn't enough for either the new units or the ones in the field. Neither was there enough supplies, such as gasoline or heavy ammunition, for propper training. Later the interference by enemy air forces also took their toll.

Also note that part of the reason the system broke down had nothing to do with the system itself, but instead the political idiots (some of which were in uniform!) who screwed around with who got what, when, and where. Not to mention incompetent central planning and horribly unrealistic expectations of military capabilities.

Steve

[ July 19, 2005, 03:52 AM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Yes, in theory the German system works better overall. But in practice it had a serious shortcoming in that the manpower wasn't nationalized and instead stuck to the Wehrkreis system. This is where the US replacement system was superior when a unit sustained serious losses. It also was better in terms of flexibility of specialities. If the US Army needed 10,000 engineers, it had the entire military age population to draw upon. Not so with the regionalized systems used by most European Armies that I am aware of (I assume the British stuck to this method, but IIRC they did bend on it?).

Steve

I am not sure if the Germans would not have been able to equally draw on the whole manpower pool. Specialised formations were supplied through specialised depots, not the general ones. E.g. Beobachtungsersatzabteilung 6 in Lemgo served at least three Beobachtungsabteilungen (6, 26 and 30 are the ones I know of), and was part of a larger artillery depot. I presume the same would apply to pioneers etc. who would go through special branch depots.

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

But as I said above, the German system broke down VERY badly after the big losses in the East. The system simply wasn't capable of supporting a Total War effort which involved massive distances and huge losses. What it did do was keep unit cohesion and experience relatively high despite massive losses. In this sense it could be said that the German replacement system might have been the only reason it was able to sustain its losses as long as it did without a fatal reduction in fighting ability.

The system broke down after summer 1944 that is correct, but until then it managed reasonably well. It is a common misperception that most/all replacements went to new formations, while the formations in the line were bled dry. This is not correct - by summer 1944 the German infantry formations in the east were at full, or over-strength, on the reduced tables following the 1942 revisions. The net increase in troops in the east in early 1944 is quite remarkable, and a significant comeback from the nadir of winter 42/43. Achieved by disbanding a lot of formations, and e.g. assembling them in Korpsabteilungen. At the same time as the system was building up the strength in the west.

Where it failed was under the simultaneous hits in the east and the west in summer 1944. But then again - I am 120% certain that the UK or US system would also have failed in providing 1.2m replacements in the space of three months, regardless of the depth of the pool. IOW - faced with the same strain, they would also have broken. They would not have been able to drain the pool quickly enough to cope with this. The German system managed to bounce back one last time in late 1944, but it could never make good the bloodletting of the summer.

[juan_gigante]

Really, the thing to keep in mind with all these comparisons is that by 1944, Germany was in deep sh*t. They just weren't able to resupply and reinforce their army as well as we could. So of course 12SS was destroyed! It was a foregone conclusion, given the situation they were in. The point is, they and other German military formations did a damn good job in a tough spot despite being relatively inexperienced.

[Dandelion]

Wonderful debate to return to after a satisfying vacation down the Mosel and Rhein.

On the 12th SS, they went into action June 6th and were pulled out September 18th. They were incorporated into the Ardennes offensive and moved to staging areas December 12th. Thus they enjoyed a 2 month rest in between these major battles. At no point was the division destroyed, the structural integrity of the division remained.

I wish to reinforce Andreas' point on the men being led by a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs, the majority of these had seen at least on year of war before transfer to the 12th, and all of the higher (battallion and up) leadership had seen four to five years.

Good point IMHO by Steve there also on the training, the men received training from the same veterans who led them.

And in fact, 18 year olds make better soldiers than mature men, so age was a success factor rather than a handicap. As it was, the majority ages of this division were 19-21 years, i.e. same average age as US in Vietnam, UK in Korea etc.

She did not fight the 3rd Can Inf alone Michael. Between June 6th and August 20th she had hurled at her nine separate infantry divisions (2nd Can, 3rd Can, 4th Can, 15th UK, 43rd UK, 49th UK, 50th UK, 51st UK, 53rd UK) supported by their 9 Amd Bdes, plus three separate armoured divisions (4th Can, 11th UK, Gds).

I was asked to expound some here, but I find that several others have already done so. In very short, the reference to unfailing methods in the East was aggression.

German assault units, such as the LSSAH, were in a role of perpetual attack. As any frontline - expanding or contracting - stabilised, they were pulled out to assault someplace else. In the greater scope of things, the Germans were on the defense. But for these units, it meant little difference, since they were tasked with counterattack, rather than static defense. Principally, infantry divisions did the defending.

The officers of the 12th SS came from LSSAH, her sister unit. They implemented the same shock assault methods with the 12th as they had always used. Their previous experience from the East was that it always worked. And as the 12th SS was pulled out of the West and deployed to Hungary, they again picked up the same methods, and these again worked.

Cheers

Dandelion

[ July 23, 2005, 03:47 AM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

[Michael Emrys]

Bummer. Try again.

Michael

[Dandelion]

Thanks Mike

A general note on the German army use of "cadre".

In the German army, the meaning of a "cadre" was that a man received training to do his own job, plus the job of his next superior in line. Thus a squadleader was also a fully trained platoon leader.

The whole of the Reichsheer was trained like that.

That way one can take a limited group of men, say a band of squadleaders, to fully man the need of platoon leaders in a sister unit. The donor unit would not be critically bled white. It was a point to take a cadre from one unit, using men who knew eachother and who had fought together. It rarely worked, as the war progressed, to get everyone from a single donor unit. But that was the ambition anyway.

During the war the pre-trained cadres were rapidly exhausted, and when using cadre to form new units - such as that given by LSSAH (and many other units, including army) to the 12th SS - you also needed a period of time to train the cadre for their new (one step higher) positions. As this could be done while the recruits were being trained (by the cadre), it was not a problem.

That's how it worked. Thus Andreas is quite right to assume that the majority (bayonet side) of platoon commanders and up in the 12th, and any other cadre created division, were veterans.

Just thought I'd add that.

Yours

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by Sergei:

In German, ö and oe are pronounced the same way

Not really. Compare pronounciation of the town of "Soeft" (Sou-eh-ft).

It is only the limitations of international communities that force the use of oe instead of ö. It has done so for some time now, so some names - particularly people names - use oe though they mean ö.

Same goes for ue and ü. Compare pron. of the name "Lueger" (Lou-eh-ger).

We actually need the oe for quite another sound than ö, and ue for another sound than ü, so it is nice that Microsoft provides everyone with umlauts these days.

In the case of Goebbels of course, it's an ö sound.

Dandelion

[Sergei]

Damn you LingoGrog!

BFC should hire you so that CMX2 would support umlauts in map labels.

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by aragorn2002:

Dandelion, where are you?

As you wrote that I was in Bacharach, astride the Rhein, looting vineyards.

Of course, couldn't help inspecting the US crossing points at St Goar and Boppard nearby

Cheers

Dandelion

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

She did not fight the 3rd Can Inf alone Michael. Between June 6th and August 20th she had hurled at her nine separate infantry divisions (2nd Can, 3rd Can, 4th Can, 15th UK, 43rd UK, 49th UK, 50th UK, 51st UK, 53rd UK) supported by their 9 Amd Bdes, plus three separate armoured divisions (4th Can, 11th UK, Gds).

I would add to this list the 7th UK armd, 59th UK and 1st Polish, and take away 4th Can from the infantry division listing.

[Aragorn2002]

The battle between the HJ and the Canadians will never end, I think. A matter of national pride, I guess. I can understand that. If I were Canadian I would feel the same way.

It is true the HJ recruts received their training from veterans. It is also true that during their training there was a disturbing lack of fuel and ammo. Hubert Meyer shows in his book how a number of Sdkfz. 232's during firing exercise had to be towed by some sort of train vehicle, due to lack of fuel. And the Divisionsbegleitkompagnie had to tow their 2cm Flak by hand, because of the same lack of fuel. That must have been a very big problem if you want to train a Panzerdivision. I guess it (the lack of fuel during the training period) would help to explain the mistakes the Panzer crews of the HJ made in the first clashes, especially at Norrey.

So why did these dashing shock assaults work in the east, but not in the west? Perhaps it is also important to mention that in the east it only worked when surprise was complete or when the enemy wasn't prepared for a quick follow-up counterattack, before they could consolidate their newly conquered positions.

[ July 23, 2005, 06:10 AM: Message edited by: Aragorn2002 ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

...it is nice that Microsoft provides everyone with umlauts these days.

I might point out that Macs have had that feature for ages.

Michael

[Andreas]

Good info dandelion