A couple of statistics

[Andreas]

I don't understand your point, to be honest.

Yes the Germans did well. Part of the reason they did so well was that the others were not particularly impressive. So there is an inherent reason for the Germans doing so well (good operational leadership and planning, thorough implementation of combined arms warfare, willingness to take risks), and an external reason they did so well (the other side's leadership was not up to the job).

If the Germans had just been great, they would still not have had these successes if the other side had been equally great. They needed bad opponents to carry out their plans in the way they did as much as they needed a good doctrine and good operational planning.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Yes the Germans did well. Part of the reason they did so well was that the others were not particularly impressive. So there is an inherent reason for the Germans doing so well (good operational leadership and planning, thorough implementation of combined arms warfare, willingness to take risks), and an external reason they did so well (the other side's leadership was not up to the job).

The Poles were not bad, they were unprepared. Well, we'll never know for sure about that but who knows what could have happeded if they had been fully mobilized and deployed when the attack came.

The French were fully prepared but indeed their leadership was poor or worse. They also had serious morale issues which made them vulnerable.

If the Germans had just been great, they would still not have had these successes if the other side had been equally great. They needed bad opponents to carry out their plans in the way they did as much as they needed a good doctrine and good operational planning.

What the Germans would have needed too was some effective counterespionage and security to prevent the plans from leaking to the opponents.

The Allies knew most of the German plans in advance. This was in no way insignificant in helping them when they were planning their own operations.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

The Allies knew most of the German plans in advance. This was in no way insignificant in helping them when they were planning their own operations.

So did the Germans when they were successful. The Sichelschnitt was based on the execution of the Anglo-French plan to move into Belgium in case her neutrality was ignored by Germany. Rommel had very good radio intercepts providing him with a lot of valuable information on the British.

[DrD]

Michael,

I believe the Char B1-bis was superior because its armor could not be pentrated at any angle by the German tank's guns EXCEPT at the radiator, while its gun could penetrate even the frontal armor of all German tanks arrayed in France in 1940. Every source I've read has indicated to me that the French tanks were superior but badly handled. True, the Germans learned to aim at the radiator, but wouldn't it be better if they could aim at the whole tank?

I don't doubt that you know alot about it, but I don't know you, and I have a tendency to believe things I've read in books as opposed to on a forum. If you have any references or recommended readings to support your views I'd be interested as I'm open-minded.

If CM ever covers the early West front, I'd wager you'd rather take a Char B than a Panzer II or III.

Also, about 40% of German armor in France in 1940 were Panzer I's, which also had a 2 man turret.

Furthermore, it seems the topic is again getting bogged down in minutae. I made several points in that sentence, but here we are discussing only the tanks.

If I concede that the Chars are over-rated (and the fact that there seems to be controversy means they are probably at least comparable to the Panzers, for instance no one argues that he Sherman was better than the Panther)it still leaves the other points.

But everything I've read (and I just looked it up again on the internet) suggests that the Char's were better, and that the German tanks outfought them due to better training of their crews and better tactical use of the tanks, which is exactly my point.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by Andreas:

They needed bad opponents to carry out their plans in the way they did as much as they needed a good doctrine and good operational planning.

if the armies that lost were bad, then why not simply point out the better and stronger ones of that period?

[Andreas]

Because that is only half the truth.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Tero:

3) Allies won the war through far superior strategic resources - no contest.

That's much too simplistic and sweeping a generalization. Material superiority was certainly part of the winning formula, and I'm sure the Germans would have been delighted to enjoy the same, if they could have managed to achieve it all through the war.

But all the materiel in the world would have availed little had not the soldiers at the front worked out how to use it effectively. That is one of the prime skills of 20th. century soldiering. And looking across the broad scope of the whole war, I do not find that the Allied soldier was greatly deficient in it compared to his German enemy, if at all.

Why is it so hard to extend tolerance to the rest of the German army in the realm of operational and tactical performance ?

It would not be had that performance not been so hugely overblown for so long.

The Red Army was every bit a tool of an evil regime the German armed forces were. Why is it OK to think highly of them in the realm of operational and tactical performance ?

Because that is a process of restoring a balance in history's estimation of that performance. During the Cold War, it was the practice in the West (and probably more in the US than elsewhere) to denigrate Soviet military skills wherever possible as a propaganda strategy. This move was lent added momentum by the memoirs of defeated German generals who, to protect their own reputations, distorted their reporting of how the Soviets conducted operations. That's over and above whatever lack of knowledge and understanding they may have also suffered from. Lastly, it was only with the opening of Russian archives to Western hisstorians after the collapse of the USSR that vital information on the Soviet conduct of the war became available.

So if Soviet military excellence is a little exaggerated at the present time, it has a lot of catching up to do to match the exaggerated reputation of the Germans. This is made abundantly clear every time one of these discussions breaks out in groups such as this one.

It seems to be OK to criticise the Red Army for poor performance. Even against the Germans. Why is it seemingly so hard to admit the Western Allies may have performed worse than the Germans ?

Given the number of books I've read in the English language that do precisely that, it doesn't seem hard at all.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

so which nations would have been not-very-bad or even *gasp* GOOD opponents in 1939-41? surely if Germans had faced, say, Spanish, Brazilian, Australian, American, Chinese or Finnish divisions the outcome would have been German loss? nay, i strongly suspect it would have still been a German victory.

you need to recalibrate your standards. it's not that e.g. France or UK would have been truly inferior in the art of war amongst the nations of our planet at the time of early ww2; it was that Germany was truly superior in its achievements.

for some reason it seems to be OK to say that Germans faced inferior opponents, but not OK to say that Germans were superior against their opponents. :confused:

*sigh*

The problem arises when people try to equate German early war superiority with their late war performance, when that superiority had in fact faded or even vanished altogether.

Why is that so hard to grasp?

Michael

[JonS]

On the 'we wuz a contender, it was only the material that did us in' apologia from German Genrals, I had an interesting insight last night. Rommel (Rommel Papers) talks about the Battle of Alamein (Op LIGHTFOOT), and describes the British on the first night as using, and I quote:

15 heavy[sic] artillery regiments - representing a total of 540 guns of a calibre greater than 105mm - in the northern sector.

And of course that makes it easy to understand why he lost, since the British were able to just crush him under a veritable mountain of heavy artillery.

But, see, the problem is that it's just complete bollocks. The British had a total of just 3 medium regts with only 48 guns. Even if you're super generous and include all the 4.2-in mortars and 105mm Priests, the total number greater than or equal to 105mm only comes to 84 guns, or less than 1/6th of what Rommel reported. It wasn't the material that did him in - he was just beaten.

Also, how is it that when the Germans leveraged their advantages in 39-41 they were super soldiers, yet when the Allies leveraged their advantages from 41-45 they weren't fighting fair and were just bad soldiers who couldn't win any other way :confused:

[ March 02, 2005, 01:40 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Becket]

Regarding Rommel and Alamein, you also have factor in the fact that Rommel ignored logistics as somewhat beneath him and the like, while Montgomery exceled at it. Montgomery's material superiority at Alamein wasn't an accident; and the fact that Rommel couldn't get supplies any more is directly tied to his failure to fully appreciate the devastating effect that the Malta garrison could have on Axis shipping.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JonS:

On the 'we wuz a contender, it was only the material that did us in' apologia from German Genrals, I had an interesting insight last night. Rommel (Rommel Papers) talks about the Battle of Alamein (Op LIGHTFOOT), and describes the British on the first night as using, and I quote:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />15 heavy[sic] artillery regiments - representing a total of 540 guns of a calibre greater than 105mm - in the northern sector.

And of course that makes it easy to understand why he lost and the British were able to crush him under a veritable mountain of heavy artillery.

But, see, the problem is that it's just complete bollocks. The British had a total of just 3 medium regts with only 48 guns. Even if you're super generous and include all the 4.2-in mortars and 105mm Priests, the total number greater than or equal to 105mm only comes to 84 guns, or less than 1/6th of what Rommel reported. It wasn't the material that did him in - he was just beaten. </font>

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Becket:

Regarding Rommel and Alamein, you also have factor in the fact that Rommel ignored logistics as somewhat beneath him and the like, while Montgomery exceled at it. Montgomery's material superiority at Alamein wasn't an accident; and the fact that Rommel couldn't get supplies any more is directly tied to his failure to fully appreciate the devastating effect that the Malta garrison could have on Axis shipping.

Admittedly he was in 'good' company there (Guderian anyone?). The German generals did not generally seem to believe in the 'amateurs study tactics, professionals logistics' saying. Or maybe they were just content with their status as amateurs.

[JonS]

Bex, I agree with your general (heh) sentiment, but the point I was trying to make was that the Germans kept running around telling themselves and anyone else who'd listen - that they were always outnumbered by such huge odds that there was just no feasible way they could win. If if you look at the numbers they used, they're right. And people did, and still do apparently, believe them.

The problem is that the numbers they used aren't just wrong, they are so badly wrong as to be worse than fantasy. Part of it could be down to their laughable intel services - but whose fault is that?

Also, and getting back specifically to Alamein and Montgomerys material advantage there, I came across this quote recently, which I think is rather pertinent:

the Eighth Army had generally a two-to-one superiority. The course of military history shows that such a ratio is not sufficient on its own to ensure victory to the attackers.

linky poo

Regards

JonS

[ March 02, 2005, 01:43 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Becket]

I don't disagree.

And remember, when in doubt, blame the Italians.

[DrD]

Let's all remember that we (for the most part) are not historians but historiographers.

The difference is that historians study primary sources, in fact, history is the study of writing.

Historiography is the study of history, and as we are all reading other people's histories that's what we are.

The point is that usually primary sources are biased towards the writer's viewpoint, and histories using one nation's sources are biased.

This is likely why the Soviet army does not gets its due, most of us read English, thus read English histories, which use English documents, which tend for various reasons to denigrate the Soviets. Histories that use Soviet documents are a different story.

Now here's the clincher:

Despite the fact that I read english language histories only (and a few translated), they still paint the German army as tough, professional, and skilled, for the most part, with some exceptions. The bias should be in the opposite direction, but it isn't. To me this implies that they were very good indeed.

I'd like to ask the forum if they've read alot of German histories, either translated or original, and if those histories paint a different picture of the German army.

My current reading, 6 Armies in Normandy by Keegan, consistently paints the German army as fighting very well despite tremendous odds. Not that other armies didn't do the same, but the Germans were much more consistent. It was rare for them to collapse, even when they were bombed, starved, and outnumbered.

So while I'm willing to accept some revisionist thinking, it is difficult for me to believe that the German army was just another army, or that its proficiency (however you want to define that) was no greater than that of its opponents.

[ March 02, 2005, 02:52 PM: Message edited by: DrD ]

[JonS]

oooh - the suspense is killing me!

[DrD]

Originally posted by JonS:

oooh - the suspense is killing me!

ha ha, I accidently posted before I finished. It will be done before cmx2, I promise you that.

[Becket]

Originally posted by DrD:

I accidently posted before I finished

They have clinics to help you with that now.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JonS:

On the 'we wuz a contender, it was only the material that did us in' apologia from German Genrals, I had an interesting insight last night. Rommel (Rommel Papers) talks about the Battle of Alamein (Op LIGHTFOOT), and describes the British on the first night as using, and I quote:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />15 heavy[sic] artillery regiments - representing a total of 540 guns of a calibre greater than 105mm - in the northern sector.

And of course that makes it easy to understand why he lost, since the British were able to just crush him under a veritable mountain of heavy artillery.

But, see, the problem is that it's just complete bollocks. The British had a total of just 3 medium regts with only 48 guns. Even if you're super generous and include all the 4.2-in mortars and 105mm Priests, the total number greater than or equal to 105mm only comes to 84 guns, or less than 1/6th of what Rommel reported. It wasn't the material that did him in - he was just beaten.

</font>

[DrD]

Originally posted by Becket:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by DrD:

I accidently posted before I finished

They have clinics to help you with that now. </font>

[JonS]

Yes, there were a lot a 25-prs there, but Rommel acknowledges them, and puts the 540 Heavys [sic. read as Mediums - 4.5-in, and 5.5-in.] as in addition.

A detailed breakdown of the Mediums was 32 x 4.5-in and 20 x 5.5-in (from Latimer, see below) in the whole of 8th Army. The 'extra' 4 were held by the Free French, way down south.

As to 25-pr numbers ... it depends how you define it. 9 Aus, 51 Highland, 2 NZ, and 1 SA Divs each had 72. The two active armd divs each had 48. Army Troops provided another five regts or 112 guns. So that's 496 guns. Adding all the guns used only just comes to Rommels number of Heavys/Mediums.

If you include 4 Ind Div and XIII Corps the numbers go up, but they weren't really involved in LIGHTFOOT. In the whole of 8th Army there were 832 x 25-pr. One could also, I suppose, add in all the 2- (x 521) and 6-prs (x 753), though I don't know why you would. Same for the 54-odd 40mm Bofors in each div (though, some of those were involved in the barrage as nav aids).

Oh, going back to an earlier point, while looking for the above information, I came across the following:

Thus British superiority amounted to around 2 to 1 - still less than the 3 to 1 generally accepted as necessary to assault prepared positions

Latimer, J. (2002), Alamein. John Murray, London.

Jon

[ March 03, 2005, 01:27 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Becket]

Originally posted by JonS:

Latimer, J. (2002), Alamein. John Murray, London.

Great book. Very readable and highly recommended.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by DrD:

Let's all remember that we (for the most part) are not historians but historiographers.

The difference is that historians study primary sources, in fact, history is the study of writing.

Historiography is the study of history, and as we are all reading other people's histories that's what we are.

Not exactly. Historiography is a comparative study of secondary sources to reach a conclusion on the secondary sources themselves. A histiographical study could be something like "Western Perception of German Military Prowess 1950-1990", in which the point of the study is not to learn something about German military prowess, but to learn something about what people thought about German military prowess...and of course to see how these perceptions changed.

It's meta-history, really. But I don't think it's what most people in the forum are doing - I think most people are trying to find out how things actually were - which is at least the goal of most historians. But, yeah, most people on the forum don't have access to primary sources (some people do, though), so perhaps the best word is "amateur historian."

The point is that usually primary sources are biased towards the writer's viewpoint, and histories using one nation's sources are biased.

This is true, but I think it's inconsistent with your next point.

This is likely why the Soviet army does not gets its due, most of us read English, thus read English histories, which use English documents, which tend for various reasons to denigrate the Soviets. Histories that use Soviet documents are a different story.

Now here's the clincher:

Despite the fact that I read english language histories only (and a few translated), they still paint the German army as tough, professional, and skilled, for the most part, with some exceptions. The bias should be in the opposite direction, but it isn't. To me this implies that they were very good indeed.

The problem with this analysis WRT the soviets is that almost all of the primary documents used American or European histories of the war in the east are German - very many from generals who definitely had an agenda. So the point of view in these histories of of course skewed.

I'd like to ask the forum if they've read alot of German histories, either translated or original, and if those histories paint a different picture of the German army.

My current reading, 6 Armies in Normandy by Keegan, consistently paints the German army as fighting very well despite tremendous odds. Not that other armies didn't do the same, but the Germans were much more consistent. It was rare for them to collapse, even when they were bombed, starved, and outnumbered.

So while I'm willing to accept some revisionist thinking, it is difficult for me to believe that the German army was just another army, or that its proficiency (however you want to define that) was no greater than that of its opponents.

Histories of the war in the west can be much better balanced because historians have access to primary sources on both sides. Having said that, though, I don't think that Keegan's portrayal of the Germans shows them to be at all ueber or even particularly better than the Allies.

If you take a step back and look at the fighting in France in '44, it's pretty much a disaster for the Germans from start to finish. That they held out at Caen for so long, or that it took 6 weeks for the US to break out of Normandy is impressive in a sense, but the result was never really in doubt. And German offensives in this time period - Mortain and the Bulge, for example - certainly don't the idea that the germans are some sort of superwarrior.

[roqf77]

especialy as the british held out in north afrika against odds also in early north africa, as well as giving a very good acount of themselves in 1940 considering about 1/3 of there ammo was plastic "dummy" rounds. The americans reacted very quickly after pearl harbour i believe and the japanese were just nuts. Every country did something that can be described as super human if you want to see it that way. Logistics is as important as training if not more so. In normandy the british lost 1,875 tanks approx, this was made good by september and early pre market garden september at that were the germans i believe made 3,000 all year.

[Becket]

Originally posted by roqf77:

The americans reacted very quickly after pearl harbour i believe and the japanese were just nuts.

Ernest King certainly isn't given enough credit for finding a way to prosecute the war in the pacific despite the country's decision to put Europe first. King, Vandegrift, Spruance, Nimitz - these men do not, I believe, get enough credit even in their own country. We get debates over just how great the Germans were, and no one remembers that Vandegrift employed incredibly unorthodox tactics to defend the 'canal against extremely unfavorable odds, or that Spruance led an outnumbered, outgunned carrier fleet to inflict the first and greatest defeat the IJN ever suffered.

Oops. Sowwy, hot button topic for me.

(BTW, I don't think the Japanese were "nuts". They were amazing fighters who lived up to every iota of their samurai inheritance. It's really hard to conceive of the fact that less than 3% of Japanese combat losses were POWs...the rest fought to death, even pretending to be dead, then blowing themselves up when the US medics came over to check on them.)