Ardennes: The Small Solution?

[CombinedArms]

Hi, all... I've recently been reading a series of books about the Ardennes Offensive, aka The Battle of the Bulge, and the whole campaign seems to, well, bulge with interesting tactical and strategic questions. I thought it might be fun if I proposed some of these questions for debate on the forum.

Let's start with the so-called "Small Solution." When Hitler first proposed his counter-offensive in the Ardennes, the generals he designated to command it, particularly Mantueffel and Model, countered with what came to be called "the small solution." According to the small solution, the aim would not be to drive all the way to Antwerp, as Hitler proposed—and which they thought dangerously unrealistic—but instead to make a sharp right turn north after the initial penetration, aiming toward Liege. Such a drive might have encircled and perhaps destroyed several US divisions--especially if combined with a sharp attack, to the north, in the Aachen area, thereby, at least in theory, completing the double envelopment.

Hitler rejected the small solution then, and kept rejecting it whenever the idea came up again, as it persistently did both before and during the actual battle.

Were Hitler's generals right? Did the small solution make more sense? Did it have a reasonably good chance of succeeding? And if it did succeed--bagging perhaps a half-dozen US divisions--would it have made a significant difference in the outcome of the war? Or would it merely, as Hitler probably felt, impose a small delay on the Allied juggernaut.

You make the call!

[Kingfish]

IMO, it would have brought the pincers too close to the allied concentrations around Aachen and the Rhoer river dams.

I'm not sure of the prospects for the northern pincer, but the southern arm would have run into the same problems as 6th SS Panzer army did around Elsenborn ridge, Stavelot and Trois ponts.

[simovitch]

I think that the "small solution" was a far superior operational plan when compared to Hitler's idea of capturing Antwerp.

The task of getting enough mechanized forces across the Meuse river (quite a formidable obstacle even in 1940) with enough gas to fight their way to Antwerp meanwhile holding the flanks was next to impossible, even if the skies stayed overcast (indefinitely?) grounding allied aircraft. The german high command never even considered what to do with the British, Canadian, and American armies that would be trapped by a successful Wacht am Rhein.

Interestingly enough, the 1 SS panzer regiment had the key to successfully turning the flank of the V Corps on the morning of December 17th near Bullingen. given the more Northerly impetus of the "small solution" perhaps Peiper would have turned north toward Wirtzfeld and Rocherath and overrun the elsenborn ridge before an organized defense could be formed there. This maneuver would have likely trapped the bulk of the 2nd and 99th divisions, and removed a major obstacle from the path of the I SS Panzer Corps and could have quite possibly changed the whole outcome of the battle. perhaps then the US gasoline reserve stockpiles near Stavelot and Spa would have been captured as well.

Its all conjecture of course, and in the end I believe the outcome would have been the same; the partition of Germany was already determined at Yalta.

[CombinedArms]

On the face of it, the small solution does seem to have more potential for success--the Germans seemed to treat "crossing the Meuse" as a kind of holy grail, with little reference to what might be accomplished after the crossing, if anything.

But if Peiper had turned north behind the Elsenborn ridge, he would have cut off a very narrow slice of the Allied line--encircling at most two divisions (99th and 2nd). Even the 'small solution' advocates envisioned a drive toward Liege--much further than Elsenborn. And Peiper was effectively blocked by the 30th Div and elements of the 3rd Armored before he could have made that Liege turn. So could it have worked?

[Richie]

Hitler bled the East Front to carry out the operation in the first place. The following offensive by the Soviets in the East was more successful as a result. Units that could never be replaced were lost.

Any assault in the west would cost the integrity of the eastern defence when it was needed the most, without any definite, realisable gain.

Berlin was taken by the Soviets...

If Hitler had not pushed for the assault, the face of central Europe may have looked very different for the last 60 years.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Richie:

Hitler bled the East Front to carry out the operation in the first place.

I was under the impression that by the time, the situation in the east was already hopeless for Germans.

[Bertram]

I don't think the "small solution" would have been a succes.

First, north of the battlefield lies the Hohe Venne, or the "high marshes". The terrain there is worse then the Ardennes through which the Germans had to fight in history. (Even now it is a prime area for survival courses. It is "famous" for having winter when it is stil autum around it, or already spring elsewhere, even though it is just a little higher. It is also famous for keepng wet all summer). This is also the reason all those Battle of the Bulge maps cut off where they do in the north: nothing much is going to happen there.

Second Liege is a medieval town, build right were it is for the defensive value. It is in the Maas valley, with hills on the sides, and the bridges going through the town. Even as late as 5 years ago you still had to pass through the town (more or less, you skirted the centre, but drove along the river side) when traveling from Maastricht to Luxembourgh. In short, it is a major obstacle, and not somethng to take on an autumn afternoon.

So, apart fromn taking Elsborn, and bagging 2 divisions, there was no no (long term) goal the Germans realistically could have accomplished.

In my opinion they would have been better of using the divisions defensive. Would not have chnged the outcome, but would have bought them more time. Of course that was not in their way of thinking: they defended by counter attacking. And beside, the divisions were transferred from the east with the purpose of a fast hit, after which they would have transferred back (such optimism).

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Richie:

Hitler bled the East Front to carry out the operation in the first place.

I was under the impression that by the time, the situation in the east was already hopeless for Germans. </font>

[Pzman]

The divisions sent to the west would not have made all that much difference in the east. That said, it took the Russians three months to break through the last real line of defences there, but I don't think a few extra divisions would have done much aside from lower the number of Volkssturm units used at any given time.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Bertram:

I don't think the "small solution" would have been a succes.

First, north of the battlefield lies the Hohe Venne, or the "high marshes". The terrain there is worse then the Ardennes... [snip]

Second Liege is a medieval town, build right were it is for the defensive value. ...[snip] In short, it is a major obstacle, and not somethng to take on an autumn afternoon.

So, apart fromn taking Elsborn, and bagging 2 divisions, there was no no (long term) goal the Germans realistically could have accomplished.

Bertram--thanks for the very valuable geography lesson--none of this tends to be covered in the histories I have seen.

Was there any way for the Germans to take advantage of the Allied weakness in the Ardennes, esp. given the high degree of suprise they achieved? What about smashing the 106th and 28th divisions and encircling the 99th and 2nd—and letting it go at that? That is, simply be content with a shallow penetration, then withdraw your armored units relatively unscathed and send them to the Russian front. I know that wasn't in anybody's thinking, least of all Hitler's--but perhaps a "spoiling attack" with strong forces but comparatively modest goals would really have had some success. What do you think?

[Pzman]

I think that it would have worked well, and still would have caused a great deal of disorder. It would also have left allied moral lower, and units would start fearing such attacks in any other weak sectors.

[Richie]

Originally posted by Panzerman:

but I don't think a few extra divisions would have done much aside from lower the number of Volkssturm units used at any given time.

I think the Fifth Panzer Army, the Sixth Panzer Army, and the Seventh Army probably equals more than a 'few divisions'.

Figures I have indicate in November/December the Germans 'sent 2277 new AFV's west and only 919 new AFV's east.' (Osprey, Ardennes 1944, James R Arnold)

The 'small solution' is at least realististic. Hitler's plan involved them 'capturing' fuel supplies along the way.

If I was a gambling man I'd say he was rolling the dice and hoping for snake eyes every time.

[JonS]

If the Small Solution had succeeded 100% the Germans would still have lost, and it probably wouldn't have even made that much of a difference to the Western Allies. If the plan followed had been totally successful (i.e., got to Antwerp and established a viable cordon), the Germans would probably still have lost, but the Western Allies wouldn't have played much part in the last year of the war.

So ...

Choice 1: reasonable chance of a brilliantly successful offensive which won't change a damn thing, or

Choice 2: nearly no chance of a brilliantly successful offensive which could change the course and outcome of the war.

Which would you choose? FWIW, I think Hitler did the right thing by sticking to his guns during the planning phase.

As it happens the ArdOff, as it actually played out, probbably did as much damage to the Western Allied armies as the Small Solution could reasonably have been exected to do.

Regards

JonS

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by JonS:

As it happens the ArdOff, as it actually played out, probbably did as much damage to the Western Allied armies as the Small Solution could reasonably have been exected to do.

Regards

JonS

Possibly, but didn't it do much greater damage to the German war effort than the small solution might have done?

However, is there any evidence that the small solution would have worked, either? The Germans didn't reach Liege as it was. Is there any reason to believe they might have made it if that had been their objective? It looks like the road net in that sector was pretty much saturated as it was. Could they send any more force than they did in pursuit of a short hook encirclement through Liege? Or, alternatively, did bad luck do Pieper in? If a couple of bridges hadn't been blown at the right moment, or if he'd found the right fuel dump, might he have made it?

[JonS]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Possibly, but didn't it do much greater damage to the German war effort than the small solution might have done?

Probably, but does it matter? Is it better to win a war with a wrecked army, or to lose a war with an intact army?

The Germans didn't reach Liege as it was.

No, but I don't think they were trying to either. IMO, the Small Solution would not, could not, have won the war for them. Everything else flows from that.

Regards

JonS

[Wisbech_lad]

Maybe he was just trying to add some interest to wargamers' lives?

I mean, without the heroic gambles of Market Garden and ArdOff, the last 6-8 months in the West are pretty bland. Trying to change history with a wild gamble is much more gameable than clearing the Sheldt, or trying to get the logistics sorted out...

[Pzman]

Originally posted by Richie:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panzerman:

but I don't think a few extra divisions would have done much aside from lower the number of Volkssturm units used at any given time.

I think the Fifth Panzer Army, the Sixth Panzer Army, and the Seventh Army probably equals more than a 'few divisions'. </font>

[Sergei]

Of course, you could look at it in this way: suppose you're waiting to be executed, wouldn't you use any chance you had to escape, even if that chance was small? And Hitler probably, in his illness and surrounded by career sycophants, believed in Germany's chances to get out of the trouble - if Fredrick the Great could win against enemies coming from all directions, then he could as well!

[K_Tiger]

It was more a "Bring as mutch men to the front..." to avoid a bigger revolt in the back of the army and of course in the "Reich".

[Mies]

Personally I would have been in favour of the “Small Solution”. When not looking at the operational difficulties caused by the terrain the spoils could have been bigger than the cost. The war of attrition that the Ardennes Offensive now became because of the all or nothing gamble it turned out to be, was bound to be lost by the Germans.

However look at what the Germans did in the east after the defeats at Stalingrad and after that at Kursk. Wherever possible seeing that Hitler was a firm believer of the “no step back” policy the defence was conduct in a non static manner. Keeping the frontline elastic in stead of static and strike with panzer formations grouped together against the exposed Russian flanks or troop build up proved successful. Off course by the overwhelming numbers in man and material that the Russian could field the Germans were fighting a loosing battle anyway. What the Germans did accomplish was to either prevent or take the sting out of new Russian offensives when given the opportunity an thus buy time and free up units for operations elsewhere. This they accomplished by using not nearly as many man and material as the Russians. They also accomplished it by concentrating armour, striking where the enemy least expected it and not going for all out victories but by being satisfied by reaching the goals set for the operation. On top of that the Germans exploited there tactical superiority and they used the change to manoeuvre on the flat Russian steppes. A lot of those operations aimed to encircle and destroy multiple Russian divisions and to loose as few recourses them self.

If I take the liberty to project this same tactic to the Ardennes the Germans could have gained some valuable things in only aiming for the “Small Solution”. I know that the terrain as explained in previous posts was significantly different than the open Russian planes thus limiting the ability to quickly manoeuvre panzers. What the Germans did have was the element of surprise, a relatively weak opponent in the Ardennes, superiority in armour and able commanders that earned there marks on the Eastern front.

Now what if the Germans had fully opted to go for the encirclement of lets say 3 to 4 Allied divisions (if I recall correctly there were also some CC’s in the area) in the Liege - Maas - Bastogne pocket. I’m still working on the assumption that both brake troughs in the Ardennes and in the Maastricht – Liege area could have been successful if that had been the main objective of the operation. The distance that would have been needed to cover wouldn’t have been as big as the distance to Antwerp. The flanks of the advance wouldn’t have been as exposed (although of course that is relative) as with the trust directly forward in the general direction of Antwerp. More over the aim there would have been to save the panzers to fight another day.

So let’s suppose the 2 pincers would have met and would have trapped some 40.000 allied men. The allied high command would have been faced with a serious situation of those men trapped and with a big gap that the Germans would have created in the Allied lines. No doubt they would have stopped any offensive operations / plans and diverted troops to the area, as happened during the Battle of the Bulge.

At that stage of the war it was all about time for the Germans. Prolong the war to try to gain some form of peace other than unconditional surrender. Perhaps with sharp quick jabs like proposed in the “Small Solution” they possibly could have gone a longer way in getting there.

Mies

[Alsatian]

Here's an even more speculative question. If 3 or 4 U.S. divisions really were to be cut off in a Small Solution operation, would they have surrendered?

We all know that Bastogne didn't surrender, but we're talking 101st in a concetrated defense. Would average U.S. divisions have held out as well? If they had, would the German forces have been more at risk of being surrounded themselves when the weather broke and the allies counterattacked?

[Richie]

So, no offence to Combined Arms here, but the question being raised now is,

Had the Germans lost already by December 1944 and there was no way they could force a peace by any means?

I wonder what all those resources could have done if they were used in the east...

Regardless, the Allies in the west had to cross their biggest obstacle, the Rhine.

PS, nice post Mies

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Alsatian:

Here's an even more speculative question. If 3 or 4 U.S. divisions really were to be cut off in a Small Solution operation, would they have surrendered?

We all know that Bastogne didn't surrender, but we're talking 101st in a concetrated defense. Would average U.S. divisions have held out as well? If they had, would the German forces have been more at risk of being surrounded themselves when the weather broke and the allies counterattacked?

It's a good question and I think the answer depends on how long the encirclement might have lasted and how successfully they could have been resupplied by air. The pocket hinged on Liege might have included some veteran division--the 2nd, 9th, possibly the 1st --and these divisions fought very effectively in their actual roles but had the advantage of massive amounts of arty ammo--encircled, they wouldn't have had the same supplies. Allied efforts to hammer open the encirclement from the north would have been prompt and could have called on veteran divisons nearby in the Aachen area--so it's possible the encirclement wouldn't have lasted for too long. I think this is one of those questions that can't be decisively settled, but it would be interesting to hear some detailed commentary.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Richie:

So, no offence to Combined Arms here, but the question being raised now is,

Had the Germans lost already by December 1944 and there was no way they could force a peace by any means?

I wonder what all those resources could have done if they were used in the east...

Regardless, the Allies in the west had to cross their biggest obstacle, the Rhine.

PS, nice post Mies

No worries about shifts in topics--and I like Mies post, too. Mies states:

Originally posted by Mies:

What the Germans did have was the element of surprise, a relatively weak opponent in the Ardennes, superiority in armour and able commanders that earned there marks on the Eastern front.

Agreed on all points, BUT then why did Hitler assign Sepp Dietrich to command his main effort via the 6th Panzer Army? The more I read about his efforts, the more I think he bears a lot of the blame for the comparative failure of the schwerpunkt. Could the small solution or even the big solution have worked if someone like Mantueffel had been commanding 6th Panzer Army? And why did Hitler give his old SS crony such a vital assignment when there were many better commaners available?

BTW, I do think the war was strategically lost by Dec '44.

[simovitch]

After July 20th, Adolf was running out of trusted generals. A alcoholic ex-butcher was probably all he could find.