Close air support?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Bottomline to him was that the Luftwaffe was wasted in direct support of the Army, when it should have become a strategic weapon. Obviously he had read his Douhet...

I agree with him. Relatively, the Luftwaffe could have been much more effective in a strategic role (especially in the ETO where it would have mattered most). If the GAF had managed to develop a reliable 4-engine bomber AND a long-range fighter to escort it this forum might be in German, but thanks in part to the Luftwaffe officials' fascination with dive-bombing (otherwise known as Stukamania ) its in English.

Really, a large part of the question revolves around resources and leadership. Germany never planned for a long war because, quite simply, it could not afford one. Not because it was poor (although this was obviously a factor), but rather because it was so susceptible to blockade. Most of the resources required to fight a war (except coal) were imported to one degree or another. This factor alone probably determined the better part of German strategic thinking.

(Germany clearly wanted lightning campaigns. No one will argue this point. Whether or not the immense success of the air-supported armoured columns was intentional is open to debate. There is a great deal of evidence suggesting the Germans were as surprised as everyone else by the success of the Blitzkrieg and NO evidence Hitler ever imagined armour being the decisive factor.)

Despite this fact, most of the Luftwaffe's commanders were enamoured with the idea of a strategic bombing campaign and would have loved to have the means to conduct one. Unfortunately, they did not, but this fact didn't stop them from convincing Hitler that they did. In fact, if not for the work of Richthofen (the Red Baron's cousin) with the Condor Legion in Spain, which he did against everyone's wishes, the Luftwaffe would not have had CAS capability either.

The tactics developed by Richthofen in the Spanish Civil War were those used in Poland and France (and later in Russia although they had been much improved by then). The relative success of his tactics was a major factor in the shocking success of the German armoured divisions, but ironically also THE major factor in the Luftwaffe's defeat in 43 and 44.

The success of the Stuka led to an obsession with dive-bombing which prompted Ernest Udet to order that all bombers be given the ability to dive bomb. This order spelled doom for the Ju-88 and the He-177 which, otherwise, might have become the mainstay of a German strategic air campaign.

Following the victories against the Allies Germany attempted a strategic campaign against England, but with a force of only medium bombers and, more importantly, the relative short range of the Bf-109, the plan failed.

Later in Russia, the Germans realized their mistakes when they lacked the ability to strike at Russian industry and became victims of a war of attrition they could not win.

The ability to conduct a strategic air campaign would have enabled the Luftwaffe to make a vast difference in the outcome of the war. Instead it spent most of its considerable strength carrying out tactical missions in support of the army. While overwhelmingly successful in this role the Luftwaffe could not win a war of attrition with Russia. Allied bombing and inability to respond eventually crippled it.

After the war, Lt. Gen. Adolf Galland (who was present throughout the proceedings) wrote:

The German Air Force attained its reputation as a strategic air force in the quick wars of 1939 and 1940, particularly those against Poland and France. In reality this was a false reputation, for in all those instances where the Luftwaffe achieved unquestionable success it was used as a tactical weapon. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Becket:

BFC gives us the ability to edit our post titles BLAH BLAH BLEE BLOOH BLEE...

BFC? Oh, you mean the guys that started this forum and then left it to evolve independant of their input. Not unlike how God supposedly created the universe and left it running like a clock to later be taken over by a race of greedy rodents known as grogs, I mean, humans. Sure, what's your point? </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Carby's original post:

It is my intention to use this thread as a means of presenting documentation and evidence which will help resolve the current debate centered on the inclusion of an improved close air support model in future versions of Combat Mission. It is also my intention to invite any and all participation, of any kind, in the discussion. My ultimate goal is to present the results of this argument to the designers of the aforementioned game. Personally, I do so, for three reasons. First, the manner in which this debate has been handled has included little or no valid evidence for either argument except for limited references to isolated occurrences. Second, I believe the designers of CM are dedicated to producing a quality product. Third, in all honesty, to improve upon arguments I previously made and was unable to support in any credible manner.

It is not my intention to prove myself correct, but rather to arrive at an informed conclusion.

The most impressive works dealing with this topic, close air support in WWII, are worthy of praise for their in-depth and honest assessment of the effectiveness of doctrine concerning allocation of these assets. I relied heavily on them when forming this argument. Richard P. Hallion’s “Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945”, Daniel R. Mortensen’s “A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support in North Africa”, and Peter C. Smith’s “Close Air Support: An Illustrated History, 1914 to the Present” are the most complete texts I have found.

In addition, I had the pleasure of speaking to a Dr. Jim Kitchens, historian with the US Air Force Historical Research Agency and with Mr. Mortensen, author of the aforementioned text.

Unfortunately, my investigations into the doctrines and operations of the RAF and RCAF have not been as successful. Any information regarding the actions of these two branches of the Allied forces would be much appreciated.

Based on a number of articles made available by the USAF Air University, especially the lengthy work of Peter A. Costello, I would like to make the following assertions.

1. The evolution of CAS (and all other roles played by air assets), changes dramatically in the 1950’s as a result of the nuclear arms race (and in no small way to the advent of rotary-wing aircraft). Therefore, I will attempt to confine any arguments to matters concerning the three wars most directly related to Combat Mission: WWI, WWII and Korea.

2. The debate surrounding the most effective use of airpower is as old as airpower itself. Traditionally, there are two schools of thought concerning the most effective use of aircraft in achieving the goals of any military campaign. According to Peter A. Costello: the traditional land power advocates wanted the continued subordination of airpower to the will of the ground force commander (while) the airpower zealots sought its freedom from such tethers to conduct independent and war-winning operations.

3. American doctrine concerning the proper allocation of air assets changed greatly between the two wars, but by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, had really only managed to produce effective means for the use of large numbers of aircraft in a strategic role. The role of CAS was largely ignored despite what Hallion referred to as “an element of combined arms warfare (which) displayed a flexibility of application, a degree of mobility, and a psychological impact that surpassed the expectations of even its prewar supporters.”

4. Shocking German successes in their initial campaigns forced this doctrine to be modified when Allied commanders, seeing the astounding impact of Luftwaffe attacks, were forced to soften their views. Air Corps Field Manual FM 1-5, published in 1940, stated “Fighters were not suitable for ground attack other than on personnel or light material except for temporary employment during emergencies” and “Support aviation is not employed against objectives which can be effectively engaged by available ground weapons within time required.” However, a later version of that manual (FM 1-10), published the same year, advocated “the importance of command, control and communications, particularly with friendly armoured forces, using prearranged signals, pyrotechnic devices, and panels.” It also emphasized greatly the need for direct radio communication between armour and air units. However, according to Costello, these ideas were not implemented either quickly or effectively until 1942.

5. American operations in North Africa proved to be the testing/proving grounds for the AAF and its new doctrine regarding CAS. By 1942 the Air Corps Field Manual included a detailed plan for the organization of air support (but unfortunately not much in the way of actual techniques) consisting of a complex network of “Air Support Parties, Air Support Control Centers and an Air Support Command.” According to Mortensen (and paraphrasing Costello), this system allowed for the Corps commander and staff to have their own “mini” air force on call for their use. The results of which were, according to Hallion, “a built-in tendency to try to stem enemy air and ground attacks at the FLOT, instead of striking deeper and more effectively at the enemy’s rear.”

6. As a result of the lessons learned in North Africa, Allied doctrine on the subject was changed dramatically leading to a highly visible change in the usage of CAS in the MTO and later in the WTO. William M. Momyer states, in his book “Air Power in Three Wars”, in the beginning stages of the North African campaign, “Tactical airpower was adapted to the demands of ground battle. As such there was no concerted effort to gain air superiority over the theatre of operations.” The campaign culminated in a very different Air Corps Field Manual now featuring a remarkable addition written in bold text. “LAND AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDANT FORCES: NEITHER IS AN AUXLIARY OF THE OTHER.” It further stated that all air campaigns should consist of three stages. Attain air superiority, prevent movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theatre of operations or within the theatre, and participate in a combined effort of the air and ground forces, in the battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces.

7. Finally, this new doctrine, further improved from lessons learned in the direct support given to amphibious landings in both Sicily and Italy (and lessons learned throughout the Italian campaign) led to the final overwhelming effect of CAS witnessed in the Normandy Campaign. Quoting Costello, “Even though CAS was still a tertiary mission, the numbers of fighter-bombers available led to de facto OPCON of a tactical air command by each field army. CAS was “pushed” forward and made continuously and immediately available to the ground manoeuvre units. Many times more sorties were available than targets, with the excess released for “armed reconnaissance.”

Above all I found the comments of Dr. Jim Kitchens fascinating. Dr. Kitchens felt the obvious wealth of available material concerning strategic airpower in WWII leads to a tendency to omit the important role of CAS from many discussions, but that the ultimate proof of its importance was the amount of resources allocated to it. He stated that Allied commanders would most likely have used those aircraft in other ways if they believed it more beneficial to their ultimate goal. The fact that they did not is evidence in itself.

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"War is wrong and the worst part of human nature, but it does make for good video games and movies."

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IP: Logged

Cabron66

Member

Member # 13269

posted 19 September, 2003 12:08

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Assertion #4

It has been difficult to find concrete evidence of the effectiveness of German close support in the early years of WWII. In fact, despite my best efforts I have been unable to find any detailed information on the topic.

What I have found is frequent reference to the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe in an interdiction role and the psychological impact of the Stuka.

Although I have found evidence of German CAS in the form of radio operators in AFVs operating in battle areas and am quite sure an organized attempt at CAS was made (through the work of Wolfram von Richthofen) I am not sure how extensive that program was or how effective it might have been.

In fact, it has become and has been the focus of my investigation to answer these questions.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Originally posted by Micheal Emrys

"The Germans could have gotten along with a more modest defence of the Reich had it not been for Göring's indiscrete boast that not one bomb would ever fall on Germany."

Agreed. Goering's enormous mouth and Hitler's vast overreaction made the Allied bombing campaign far more successful than it ever should have been. Successful in an indirect sense, of course. This is exactly my argument. Although the campaign was poorly organized and often inneffectual it did accomplish a great deal by forcing the Germans to expend a large part of their resources in the defense of the Fatherland. Resources which they could not afford to expend.

Of course, as you have pointed out, they probably could have gotten along with a much lighter defence, but now, unfortunately, we will never know. There are countless possible scenarios that could have ended in millions of different ways.

The only thing we know for sure is that they did overreact and that overreaction contributed enormously to their downfall. It was not the chief cause of their defeat, but it was a very big link in the chain.

"A fair amount of the shift in production that you list would have occurred in any case even without the strategic bombing campaign, as the overall strategic initiative shifted from the Axis to the Allies. I think that is what you are seeing in the figures for 1943..."

This is an interesting theory, but I think you would find it hard to support. It is speculation in an argument which does not require any. The shift did occur and it did occur as a result of the Anglo-American bombing campaign. I am unaware of any arguments to the contrary.

"I don't dispute your figures which seem accurate enough for me. They are a little beside the point I was trying to make however, which point was not as clear as I should have made it. I was referring to production loss due to bomb damage of plant and communication."

Your point was well-taken and accurate. The renewed Allied bombing campaign in the summer of 1944 was extremely effective. However, it was the continuation of work started in 1943.

Once again, in retrospect, the Allies should have concentrated their attacks on these targets in the first place. If they had the war might have gone differently, but they did not and it did not.

They made the decision to attack German aircraft production capacity directly and were not wrong in doing so. In theory, the idea was as sound as any other, but in practice it did not work as well. Luckily, the German overreaction to the campaign accomplished the same goal by slowly wearing down the already strained Luftwaffe. The most notable effect of which was TOTAL air superiority over Northern France. A factor which greatly facilitated the Allied landings and subsequent drive.

"The fighters were going to be burning fuel wherever they were. And fighters burn a lot less fuel than bombers."

Fighters do burn less fuel than bombers, but this is a bit of a moot point. In this case fighter production was increased leading to a rise in the number of first line aircraft in addition to the wholesale shift of aircraft already in operation. Eventually the production of fighters not only overshadowed that of bombers, but eclipsed it leading to vast clouds of fighters over Germany vs. undefended skies in all other theatres.

Also, it is important to remember the significant amount of wastage which inevitably occurs as a result of this kind of production shift and forced increase. In peacetime wastage can be kept to a minimum, but not in wartime. In this case, the German aircraft industry suffered from its worst wastage throughout 1944 as it strained itself to the limit.

In essence, the Germans were able to delay the inevitable by giving up air superiority over Europe and by sacrificing the Luftwaffe.

Quoted for posterity

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

Originally posted by Micheal Emrys

"The Germans could have gotten along with a more modest defence of the Reich had it not been for Göring's indiscrete boast that not one bomb would ever fall on Germany."

Agreed. Goering's enormous mouth and Hitler's vast overreaction made the Allied bombing campaign far more successful than it ever should have been. Successful in an indirect sense, of course. This is exactly my argument. Although the campaign was poorly organized and often inneffectual it did accomplish a great deal by forcing the Germans to expend a large part of their resources in the defense of the Fatherland. Resources which they could not afford to expend.

Of course, as you have pointed out, they probably could have gotten along with a much lighter defence, but now, unfortunately, we will never know. There are countless possible scenarios that could have ended in millions of different ways.

The only thing we know for sure is that they did overreact and that overreaction contributed enormously to their downfall. It was not the chief cause of their defeat, but it was a very big link in the chain.

"A fair amount of the shift in production that you list would have occurred in any case even without the strategic bombing campaign, as the overall strategic initiative shifted from the Axis to the Allies. I think that is what you are seeing in the figures for 1943..."

This is an interesting theory, but I think you would find it hard to support. It is speculation in an argument which does not require any. The shift did occur and it did occur as a result of the Anglo-American bombing campaign. I am unaware of any arguments to the contrary.

"I don't dispute your figures which seem accurate enough for me. They are a little beside the point I was trying to make however, which point was not as clear as I should have made it. I was referring to production loss due to bomb damage of plant and communication."

Your point was well-taken and accurate. The renewed Allied bombing campaign in the summer of 1944 was extremely effective. However, it was the continuation of work started in 1943.

Once again, in retrospect, the Allies should have concentrated their attacks on these targets in the first place. If they had the war might have gone differently, but they did not and it did not.

They made the decision to attack German aircraft production capacity directly and were not wrong in doing so. In theory, the idea was as sound as any other, but in practice it did not work as well. Luckily, the German overreaction to the campaign accomplished the same goal by slowly wearing down the already strained Luftwaffe. The most notable effect of which was TOTAL air superiority over Northern France. A factor which greatly facilitated the Allied landings and subsequent drive.

"The fighters were going to be burning fuel wherever they were. And fighters burn a lot less fuel than bombers."

Fighters do burn less fuel than bombers, but this is a bit of a moot point. In this case fighter production was increased leading to a rise in the number of first line aircraft in addition to the wholesale shift of aircraft already in operation. Eventually the production of fighters not only overshadowed that of bombers, but eclipsed it leading to vast clouds of fighters over Germany vs. undefended skies in all other theatres.

Also, it is important to remember the significant amount of wastage which inevitably occurs as a result of this kind of production shift and forced increase. In peacetime wastage can be kept to a minimum, but not in wartime. In this case, the German aircraft industry suffered from its worst wastage throughout 1944 as it strained itself to the limit.

In essence, the Germans were able to delay the inevitable by giving up air superiority over Europe and by sacrificing the Luftwaffe.

Quoted for posterity

[imported_Wildman]

Gentlemen,

No offence, and I'm sure that you have some reason I can't fathom for coping his posts, but please...

This is an interesting subject let's not take up valuable space and time with such cheap theatrics.

[imported_Wildman]

Move along, nothing to see here.

[ September 21, 2003, 02:15 PM: Message edited by: Wildman ]

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Wildman:

Gentlemen,

No offence, and I'm sure that you have some reason I can't fathom for coping his posts, but please...

This is an interesting subject let's not take up valuable space and time with such cheap theatrics.

It is because this is an interesting subject that there is some value in preserving Cabron66's comments. Since he has already replaced his initial posts with rhetoric, it makes sense to me that for there to be anything worth saving those posts should be kept. This was originally a productive thread, and while Cabron66 seems to have more or less spectacularly flamed out in the meantime, it's still one of the more worthwhile posts we've had in recent weeks (and now with added entertainment value ).

Scott

[Becket]

Originally posted by Wildman:

I'm sure that you have some reason I can't fathom for copying his posts.

I suspect it's because Cabron chose to edit his title and initial post into a mockery, and thus could be expected to do the same to the others.

[ September 21, 2003, 12:40 AM: Message edited by: Becket ]

[Grisha]

Yes, Scott, I have to agree. This was a very nice thread up until the last 1-2 pages. Why on earth Cabron utterly lost it is amazing given the professionalism of his earlier posts. I admit this crowd likes to verbally rumble at times, but that's how it is in many forums. Unfortunate, really.

But, now that we're here - Cabron, please refrain in future from less than adoring comments about the Pengers. They may be not unlike stinky teddy bears, but they're our stinky teddy bears, thank you very much.

[JonS]

Becket,

yes, that's a good thing Here is a review of Alamein I found on Stone & Stone, and some counterpoints to the review. It was based on these that I chose to buy this one, rather than any of the other new-uns (though I do have several other volumes covering El Alamein in whole or in part). Of course, with a first name like his, how could Latimer go wrong!

I've found the passage you quoted, and will have a rummage for something that puts 'light' into some context.

Regards

JonS

[Cabron66]

What's your point, Micheal ? While I freely admit I very much dislike JonS, and have since the first time I saw one of his sniveling posts, I have NO qualms with Grisha or dieseltaylor and until this whole mess occured had no problems with you.

The bridge has been burned, though, and I find it very hard to believe we will ever be friends (which I'm sure is as heartbreaking to you as to me), but please do not attempt to poison my relations with people who have nothing to do with this dispute.

[ September 21, 2003, 03:36 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Cabron66:

What's your point, Micheal ? While I freely admit I very much dislike JonS and have since the first time I saw one of his sniveling posts I have NO qualms with Grisha or dieseltaylor and until this whole mess occured had no problems with you.

The bridge has been burned, though, and I find it very hard to believe we will ever be friends (which I'm sure is as heartbreaking to you as to me), but please do not attempt to poison my relations with people who have nothing to do with this dispute.

Cabron; you're officially a non-entity as far as I'm concerned. I've quoted your material to further the discussion and let others know why you self-destructed; your deficiencies as far as historical discussion are plain for all to see; your mental instabilities are now also a matter of public record.

The points you fail to understand are

a) you are not the centre of attention of this thread or forum

you will be judged by what you say, not what others say about you (or your nationality or ethnic heritage, for that matter). Perhaps this is why you feel disadvantaged? No matter to me.

At any rate, JonS, what were we on about again? What is it we are contending vis a vis CAS in the African theatre?

PS - tsk tsk Jon, you haven't rated my first book on Stone&Stone yet? I'm pleased to see it there but wish they carried my second book, as frankly, it's much better.

[ September 21, 2003, 03:30 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Cabron66]

I would simply like to clarify one point. The origin of my recent explosion did not take place on this thread but in another which I will not name. If I have offended anyone indirectly as a result of the nature of my comments than I am sorry. To those that I offended directly I offer no apology as I believe my actions to be more than justified.

The unfortunate evolution of this post is the result of actions taken by others (whom I do not wish to name) and not myself.

My efforts here were made with the sincere intention of resolving this dispute in an effective manner. I no longer believe that to be possible given the current climate of the forum.

However, if anyone would be interested in contacting me directly they are most welcome to. My e-mail address is readily available in my profile and I am further willing to provide my telephone number if requested. Beyond that my participation here is at an end. I will be continuing this dispute by other means.

I see no reason to continue a struggle in which I am so vastly outnumbered.

If you persist in attacking me indirectly than you have nothing but my contempt and utter disrespect.

[ September 21, 2003, 07:05 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[JonS]

Bwahahahaha! You spin so fast they should wire you up to the National Grid - you could power New York and California

[Cabron66]

Originally posted by JonS:

Bwahahahaha! You spin so fast they should wire you up to the National Grid - you could power New York and California

No, JonS, in one thing I have remained unchanged. My utter contempt for you.

[Andreas]

Well, I just found a nice example of what cab ranks could do when they worked.

22nd April 1945, near Segni. Unit is 17/21st Lancers. 'A Squadron on the right lost two tanks to German Panther tanks and the Hurribomber - Roger David - was called in. This resulted in a direct hit one Panther and the other badly crippled.'

Treat that as as reliable as any eye-witness account.

This is from the IWM book on the war in Italy, Field Marshal Lord Carver.

[Cabron66]

One final clarification. I have removed all of my initial comments from this thread, but left the title unchanged. This I have done for a reason. As Micheal Dorosh pointed out I began the thread with the intention of controlling it to some degree. While I did not do so with malicious intent I admit that my approach was flawed.

This is an open forum and should not be the property of one man or one group. I apologize to Micheal and any others who were offended by my overzealous efforts to control what should not be controlled.

[Cabron66]

Andreas

I have contacted you directly at the e-mail address included in your profile.

[ September 21, 2003, 07:06 AM: Message edited by: Cabron66 ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Well, I just found a nice example of what cab ranks could do when they worked.

22nd April 1945, near Segni. Unit is 17/21st Lancers. 'A Squadron on the right lost two tanks to German Panther tanks and the Hurribomber - Roger David - was called in. This resulted in a direct hit one Panther and the other badly crippled.'

Treat that as as reliable as any eye-witness account.

This is from the IWM book on the war in Italy, Field Marshal Lord Carver.

Was the Field Marshal there? I mean with the Death Or Glory boys, not just in Italy....

Good quote.

[Ant]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Well, I just found a nice example of what cab ranks could do when they worked.

22nd April 1945, near Segni. Unit is 17/21st Lancers. 'A Squadron on the right lost two tanks to German Panther tanks and the Hurribomber - Roger David - was called in. This resulted in a direct hit one Panther and the other badly crippled.'

Treat that as as reliable as any eye-witness account.

This is from the IWM book on the war in Italy, Field Marshal Lord Carver.

I thought that hurricanes had long since been retired before 1945. Were they still being used in Italy up until the end?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Was the Field Marshal there? I mean with the Death Or Glory boys, not just in Italy....

Good quote.

He was busy commanding 4th Armoured Brigade in NWE at the time, after its commander had become a casualty (or been relieved), during the Odon battles. I do believe he was in Italy as well.

[FROM MEMORY]Famous for his stand-up row about whether or not his tanks should go in at Maltot. He first refused the order, then selected 'The Scots Greys' to lead the charge, knowing full well that the annihilation of the only professional Scottish cavalry regiment was not an option for his higher-ups. So that got the order rescinded. [/FROM MEMORY]

Don't know if it is true, but a great story anyway. I think it is in Steel Inferno.

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Ant:

I thought that hurricanes had long since been retired before 1945. Were they still being used in Italy up until the end?

The Hurricane remained in production until September 1944 and remained in active service until the end of the war. After the war some continued to be used as trainers by the RAF, I'm not sure when the other nations who bought them stopped using them.

Here's the Smithsonian's page on the IIc if you're interested.

[ September 21, 2003, 03:12 PM: Message edited by: Firefly ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Firefly:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Ant:

I thought that hurricanes had long since been retired before 1945. Were they still being used in Italy up until the end?

The Hurricane remained in production until September 1944 and remained in active service until the end of the war. After the war some continued to be used as trainers by the RAF, I'm not sure when the other nations who bought them stopped using them.

Here's the Smithsonian's page on the IIc if you're interested. </font>

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Wouldn't surprise me that Hurricanes were used in Italy to the end; Fireflies and the US 76mm variants were also rare in-theatre, no? They really were a backwater after D-Day in Normandy.

D-Day Dodgers