Kursk

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Really, so the Soviets managed to "put" their strongest Defensive army versus the weaker German Army group north. I’m Sorry, would it not be more logical to have greater reserves earmarked for the Soviets Oral counter attack while the stronger defences faced south to increase attrition of German Panzer Divs? Without actual proof

These arguments are all starting to sound like Monty's “Normandy Plans by hindsight”: ‘No really Normandy went exactly to (my) plan, we meant to fight an enemy quater of our size while they held us in the bridgeheads for three months.’

Look, it may not be entirely clear but I'm not arguing anything. I'm just trying (with little success apparently) to point out that the soviets planned the initial counter-offensive in Model's sector. This gave Model additional grief (without which he might have been more succesfull).

[Ex Bellator]

Originally posted by Bastables:

Soviets Oral counter attack...

[coe]

Ok so in blitzkriegs where the armour does bypass the strongpoints leaving it for the infantry, isn't that something that will cause the infantry heavy casualties (kind of like using the infantry to assault the main defensive zone in preparation for a break through?).

[Grisha]

Originally posted by coe:

So the major difference it appears is that in the initial break through stages, the tanks are subordinate to the infantry (that is in breaking the defensive zone) but after that it changes (exploitation)....?

Not sure if you're talking about Soviet or German, but I'll assume Soviet

It was Soviet practice to have two groups of armor: infantry support and exploitation. Thus, Soviet armor formations were typically organized between separate regiments/brigades for penetration, and tank and mech corps for exploitation. The use of armor for the penetration phase has been described above. Exploitation forces, which were usually either individual tank or mech corps, or entire tank armies, were kept just to the rear of the penetration forces. Once the main defensive belt was penetrated (the main defensive belt was generally a series of defensive positions, often three, each comprising around 2-3 actual supporting trench lines. Total depth of the main defensive belt was from 5-8kms) the exploitation forces, or mobile groups, would be committed into battle. There were usually 2nd and 3rd defensive belts and the mobile groups would have to deal with these on their own, but if the penetration had been swift enough, these defensive belts were often lightly manned.

By 1944, Soviet main attack sectors could have tactical densities of 6-8 rifle battalions, 200-250 guns/mortars, and 20-30 tanks/SUs per kilometer of frontage. As you can see, the infantry was well supported.

[Simon Fox]

Originally posted by coe:

Tried finding this info, but can anyone tell me why the northern pincer kinda went no-where as opposed to the southern one?

It's all perfectly simple. Zhukov was correct, the Soviets mistakenly anticipated the heaviest German attacks in the North. Crudely speaking the Central Front (North) comprised 42 Rifle Div whereas the Voronezh Front (South) comprised 35 Rifle Div. Exacerbating this disparity was the dispositions made within the respective fronts. Rokossovski (North) adopted a more defensive posture putting more of his force 'up front' in his first echelon and reserving only the 2nd Tank Army for the counterattacking role, in contrast Vatutin arranged his forces differently reserving a stronger second echelon comprising 1st Tank Army and 69th Army. I haven't mentioned the disparity between the German dispositions North vs. South as I am sure one of the coterie of Wehrmacht idolisers can quote the entire OOB of the top of their heads

As a consequence the MLR in the North was considerably stronger than that in the South. This was compounded by the fact that Rokossovski correctly anticipated the location of the main German effort whereas Vatutin expected it somewhat to the south of where it actually occurred.

To consider this in more detail, the 13th Army bore the main brunt of the German attack in the North. It defended a 32km frontage with 12 Rifle Divisions (some sources say 11), 3 Tank Brigades, 5 Tank Regiments, 2 AT Brigades, 1 SU Regiment and 1 Tank Destroyer Div. It was further bolstered by an entire Artillery Corps of 2 Artillery Divisions and 1 Guards Mortar Division. The estimated density of heavy weapons in the 13 Army sector was 23 AT guns and 91 artillery guns (Guns and mortars) per kilometre of front.

In the South the 6th Guards Army which faced the attack of 4th Panzer Army defended a front of 60km with 7 Rifle Divisions, 1 Tank Brigade, 2 Tank Regiments, 3 AT Brigades and 1 SU Regiment. Additional artillery was 2 Hvy Howitzer Regiments and a Cannon Brigade. The estimated density of heavy weapons in the 6th Guards sector 9 AT guns and 26 artillery guns (Guns and mortars) per kilometer of front.

The arithmetic is simple and compelling. The relative progress of the two pincers reflects generally the forces assigned to them and those they fought.

Now let's move along the rather mistaken characterisation of Model's infantry attack vs. Manstein's armoured juggernauts or as the consumers of pop history would have it: Model's Somme offensive vs. Manstein's "Blitzkrieg". Firstly, let's consider Model's dilemma: realistically speaking he just doesn't have enough Panzer Divisions use them to bash through the Soviet MLR and keep going. In reality, both North and South "pincers" were combined arms offensives with, on a unit by unit basis, fairly similar weight of armour.

For example in the North the 86th and 292nd Infantry Div were supported by 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Abteilung (45 Ferdinands), 654th Heavy Panzerjäger Abteilung (44 Ferdinands), 216th Heavy Panzer Abteilung (45 Brummbars), 177th Assault Gun Abteilung (36? StuGs) and 244th Assault Gun Abteilung (36? StuGs). In terms of supporting AFVs this compares quite favourably with the typical Panzer Divs complement of around 80-120 tanks at Kursk. In fact the Soviet defenders considered they were under attack by Panzer Div. Some may quibble with specific figures here but the basic point remains the same: Model's infantry divisions were hardly less well supported by armour than the Panzer grenadiers in the south and by organisation they were better able to absorb the kind of casualties the infantry suffer in this kind of assault.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

It's all perfectly simple. Zhukov was correct, the Soviets mistakenly anticipated the heaviest German attacks in the North.

[more useful stuff snipped]

Very good - thanks a lot Simon. Also good to see that Zhukov's memoirs are correct on that point.

[Hortlund]

Simon, these are the numbers I have for the north and the south, do you agree with these:

NORTH

Central front

712 000 men

1 785 tanks and SP guns

12 453 guns and mortars

SOUTH

Voronezh front

626 000 men

1 704 tanks and SP guns

10 000 guns and mortars

RESERVE

(Primarely Steppe front)

573 000 men

1 639 tanks and SP guns

9 200 guns and mortars

[Simon Fox]

Andreas,

Thanks. The level of knowledge from the German perspective is high and that from the Soviet perspective is poor. In the case of Kursk that's rather mystifying because it's rather easy to get a hold of. Even within the area of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies themselves the progress made by the 2nd SS Pz Corps relative to the 48th and 3rd Pz Corps isn't very mysterious when you look at Red Army dispositions.

Hortlund,

To be quite honest I haven't given much attention to overall numbers. Given that most Red Army units were pretty much up to strength at the time I find units, their type and deployment to be altogether more informative. Raw numbers can also be somewhat deceptive. The Central Front seems to have adopted a somewhat different posture than the Voronezh Front as I have already alluded to. This applies not just linearly across the front (ie correctly anticipating the point of main German effort) but also in depth between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defensive Belts. The Central Front had a greater proportion of it's armour in independent brigades and regiments operating in support of rifle corps in the 1st and 2nd defensive belts. In contrast the Voronezh Front had more of it's armour in the 3rd defensive belt.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

To consider this in more detail, the 13th Army bore the main brunt of the German attack in the North. It defended a 32km frontage with 12 Rifle Divisions (some sources say 11), 3 Tank Brigades, 5 Tank Regiments, 2 AT Brigades, 1 SU Regiment and 1 Tank Destroyer Div. It was further bolstered by an entire Artillery Corps of 2 Artillery Divisions and 1 Guards Mortar Division. The estimated density of heavy weapons in the 13 Army sector was 23 AT guns and 91 artillery guns (Guns and mortars) per kilometre of front.

It does give pause for thought if anyone would try a CMBB scenario of a map with 1-km width (frontage) and comparable density in units, fielded AT guns, and artillery support.

[ January 15, 2003, 10:40 PM: Message edited by: Spook ]

[Simon Fox]

These densities are intended as a basis for comparisons of army sectors only and may not be relevant to CMBB. These deployments should be seen in the context that they are echeloned in depth of up to 30km, although of course greater strength is generally found in the first defensive belt. It is not entirely clear from the source whether they represent first echelon units and their assigned support only or the entire depth of the first three belts. Even if they did the depth of the first belt might be 5 or more km. For CMBB you would need to delve into divisional and regimental frontages to get a more accurate estimate. The available artillery support may be more relevant as supprting arty may have been deployed forward to support the first defensive belt. You would also of course have to add in the very considerable obstacles including 1-2,000 AT mines per km.

[ January 16, 2003, 02:11 AM: Message edited by: Simon Fox ]

[Michael Emrys]

This post is going to be more than usually vague, for which I apologize in advance. Glantz and some other writer (sorry...) have published the Soviet staff study on Kursk. From the information contained in that, you could probably gain some notion of what was contained in each defensive belt and its distribution. The maps are mostly in Russian, which I found a hindrance, and the text was sufficiently dry to discourage me from reading past the first quarter or so of the book when I got it a couple of years ago. I have not yet returned to it and its present location is lost to me in the confusion of my belongings, but I am confident that there are other members of the board with greater familiarity with the book who would be able to provide useful information.

Michael

[Fetchez la Vache]

/me comes back after being AWOL for far too long (damn real life)

Interesting thread guys, good contributions by everyone. Although Bastables made the best by far: Russian Oral counter attack. I'm trying very hard not to conjure up mental images of that.

Although I'm not a grog by any means, I've always been interested in Kursk ever since I had to write a history essay on it when I was 13-14. Some thoughts that arose in my mind whilst reading this thread:

1) I always thought Hoth was more operationally in control of the German southern advance rather than Manstein. I mentally think of Model/Hoth being the two main German commanders, not Model/Manstein.

2) I thought that although Model did use more infantry 'upfront', this was at least initially partly due to him trying to negate the effect on the Russian minefields by trying to get engineers to lift as many as possible before throwing in the panzers.

Tigers were critically important for spearheading the panzer thrusts. I seem to remember that Model had less than Hoth (and maybe didn't use them as effectively?).

The northern pincer still managed to initially penetrate the Russian MLR but got caught up trying to clear a major east-west ridgeline. After 3 days of very heavy mixed tank/infantry fighting the Germans still hadn't made the high ground and were effectively too weakened to advance further and lost the offensive momentum. Again this is just my impression. Currently at work atm (late lunch before you ask ), so don't have any books at hand to give more details (curse my non-photographic memory).

3) Ultimately though I personally don't see how the Germans could have ever succeeded operationally without the Northern Group significantly penetrating the Russian defences. Even if IISS had made Obojan (sp?) that would have only meant they'd penetrated about 1/4 into the Kursk salient?

Couple this with the fact that the Russians had already identified the Orel salient as a target for a counter-offensive. What would have been the German options if they'd continued the southern advance only to have a major Russian offensive breaking through to Orel? So instead of Kursk being the target they'd have to aim for Orel instead. Ouch.

4) The 'what if' scenario worth thinking about imo is what would have happened if the Germans had attacked in May as first envisaged.

Anyway, good thread. Proof of why this is such an active and interesting forum.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Fetchez la Vache:

Tigers were critically important for spearheading the panzer thrusts.

Where did you get this idea? FE II SS-Corps had only 15 Tigers on 11 July...

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Fetchez la Vache:

Tigers were critically important for spearheading the panzer thrusts.

Where did you get this idea? FE II SS-Corps had only 15 Tigers on 11 July...</font>

[Hortlund]

Where did you get this idea? FE II SS-Corps had only 15 Tigers on 11 July...

Which, incidentally, is the day before they stopped advancing, not?

No, II SS Pz Corps stopped advancing on the 15/16 July. (After SSDR connected with III Pz)

If you are looking for northeastern movement, SSTK stopped advancing on the 14th of July while preparing to shift axis of advance north.

[Spook]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

These densities are intended as a basis for comparisons of army sectors only and may not be relevant to CMBB. These deployments should be seen in the context that they are echeloned in depth of up to 30km, although of course greater strength is generally found in the first defensive belt. It is not entirely clear from the source whether they represent first echelon units and their assigned support only or the entire depth of the first three belts. Even if they did the depth of the first belt might be 5 or more km. For CMBB you would need to delve into divisional and regimental frontages to get a more accurate estimate. The available artillery support may be more relevant as supprting arty may have been deployed forward to support the first defensive belt. You would also of course have to add in the very considerable obstacles including 1-2,000 AT mines per km.

Correct, which is why I only cited "width" and not "depth" in my earlier post.

To which yes, one should delve into specific battalion/regimental accounts if one truly wanted to do a CMBB historical scenario of the northern attack on the Kursk salient, instead of "frontal averages". But it's my GENERAL impression that very few present CMBB scenarios attempt to approach the kind of noted "density" for a 1-km map width, even allowing to 5-km depth.

It was similar with the earlier TalonSoft game "East Front." With some notable exceptions, most original scenarios were devised as to provide fast-paced games than to attempt historical unit concentrations.

[JRRRT]

Regarding the "Hiwi's" and SS "cannon fodder". The German army employed approximately 200,000 "hilfsfreiwillige" (aka "hiWi's). The use of these "voluntary" auxiliaries was never approved by Hitler or the high command, but was improvised by Heer units desperately short of manpower. HiWi's were employed entirely (perhaps with very,very, rare exceptions) as rear-echelon supply line troops, and they were generally not armed. On the other issue, before the war and early in the war, the SS were not allowed to seek volunteers subject to the draft in the homeland, lest they compete with the Heer for "the best and brightest". Therefore, they actively recruited "Ost" and "Volk" Germans from conquered or cooperating countries. Ethnic Germans had been deliberately settled throughout the Austro-Hungarian empire by the empress Maria Therese, as "pioneers" to "civilize" less efficient 'natives". These Germans clung to their German identity in the Czech Sudetenland, Hungary, Rumania and even Western Poland. Having been isolated,and thus defensive of their ethnicity, they were "more German than the Germans" and flocked to the SS banner. They were not cannon fodder, but valuable elite troops with a hypernationalist zeal. They were never "thrown away", but carefully employed. Later, "Charlemagne" was recruited from French and (mostly) Alsatian volunteers, "Wiking" was composed of volunteer Swedes, Norwegians and Finns, etc. Late in the war, so-called SS units (Dirlewanger, SS-polizei, and others)were not

truly elite units, but stopgaps, barrel-scrapings or formed for propaganda purposes.

[Fetchez la Vache]

Re: Tigers as 'critical' spearheads.

I should have worded that better since I didn't mean to imply that the lack of Tigers would have meant that the Germans couldn't advanced. But I think that their presence was an important factor at the tactical level.

From what I read it seems that the Tigers were used to spearhead (where-ever possible?) the panzer thrusts and the tactic seemed to have worked, if they could get through the minefields (which don't respect frontal armour thickness ). There is some question I guess about the suitability of letting the Tigers engage at close range though. It pretty much negates it's inherent advantage of firepower and thick armour when they are used at 'stand off' distances.

Another aspect I remember is that the Russian infantryman had overcome, to some extent, his "panzer fear". Often the panzers would push through a Russian defensive line, only for the following German grenadiers to be engaged by the Russians popping out of their foxholes/trenches. Before this the Russian infantry used to pull back to keep away from the dreaded panzers (gross generalization, but what the heck...).

All in all I find the 'Kursk' series of operations to be a very interesting part of the Ost history. So many factors.

[JRRRT]

The leutnant is well-named. Ever since the war it has been a mantra of the German officer corps that "We would have won but for Hitler". I'm not sure that that is the case. Had it been left to the General Staff,the combined-arms concept later named "Blitzkreig", might never have been tried, Manstein would not have struck France through the Ardennes, etc. etc. etc. In the case of Kursk, the allied invasion gave Hitler a face-saving reason for cancelling what was obviously by that time, a failed offensive. Quoting Soviet casualty figures to create a German victory seems ingenuous, a bit like Churchill claiming Dunkirk as a victory.

[Keke]

Originally posted by JRRRT:

Ever since the war it has been a mantra of the German officer corps that "We would have won but for Hitler". I'm not sure that that is the case. Had it been left to the General Staff,the combined-arms concept later named "Blitzkreig", might never have been tried, Manstein would not have struck France through the Ardennes, etc. etc. etc.

Hmmm...Manstein didn´t struck through the Ardennes, although the plan was his. Hitler just took all the credits of the plan and its succesful execution.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Keke:

[Hmmm...Manstein didn´t struck through the Ardennes, although the plan was his. Hitler just took all the credits of the plan and its succesful execution.[/QB]

The 1940 plan was Manstein's the 1944 plan was not Manstein's.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Bastables:

The 1940 plan was Manstein's the 1944 plan was not Manstein's.

So what´s your point? :confused:

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bastables:

The 1940 plan was Manstein's the 1944 plan was not Manstein's.

So what´s your point? :confused: </font>