One more time....russians misvaloured??

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by JasonC:

61k dead Russian tanks from 1943 to the end of the war.

Soviet tank/SU losses 1943 - May 1945:

1943 - 23,500

1944 - 23,700

1945 - 13,700

Total 60,900.

German AT systems 43-45, with typical German claim rates assigned -

1350 Tigers @ 15 = 20K

6000 Panthers @5-10 = 30-60K

15000 Pz IV and StuG @2-3 = 30-45K

7500 TDs @2-4 = 15-30K

26000 75mm PAK @ 1 = 26K

4500 88mm PAK or army FLAK @ 2-4 = 9-18K

16000 tank killer awards = 16-32K by faust etc

equals 146-231k dead AFV, leaving nothing to 21 million AT mines, arty, air, breakdowns and maintenance losses - and claiming every dead AFV 2-4 times over.

And how were these numbers derived Jason, how did you seperate Westren front claims from Eastren Front claims?. Ie, lets look at your data, you state 20K claims, for Tigers yet Actual Heer Tiger Abt, claims for the war on all fronts Ie, was:

501(424) - 450

502(511) - 1400

503(FHH) - 1700

504 - 250

505 - 900

506 - 400

507 - 600

508 - 100

509 - 500

510 - 200

301(FKL) - 70

316(FKL) - 0

Total Heer Tiger FKL/Abt destruction claims = 6,570, thats a far cry from the 20,000 you attribute them. SS. Co/ Abt averaged about the same so Herr/SS total Tiger claims were around 10 - 12,000 on all fronts. Stugs alone on the Eastren Front, claimed 20,000 AFV destructions

You can apply this to the rest of your theoretical data as well. Until you can provide actual claim totals for each weapons stystem, by Co/BN, Regt etc, as well as seperation by front, your numbers are meaningless. I'd also like to see the source you derived your destruction by AT mine numbers etc, as well.

Any statistical assessment of AFV operational losses vs claims on the Eastren Front, would need you to provide Soviet AFV, losses by operational date, vs German claims for AFV destruction down to the same level.

Ie, II SS PzKorps consisting of 1st SS Pz.Gren. Div LAH, 2nd Pz.Gren.Div Das Riech, & 3rd SS Pz.Gren. Div Totenkopf had a combined operational tank strength, on the evening of July 11 1943 of 273 tank/AG broken down as follows:

90 PzKpfw III 5. cm Kw.K L/60

80 PzKpfw IV 7.5 cm Kw.K L/43/48

15 T-34-76

16 Tiger E

72 Sturmgeschuetz 7.5 cm L/43/48

Soviet tank strength on July 12 1943 for 5th Guards Tank Army alone, was 793 tanks broken down as follows:

501 T-34-76

261 T-70

31 Churchill.

This doesnt even include the about 200 tanks operateing with 2nd Guards Tank Corps, & 2nd Tank Corps. 5th Guards Tank Army losses alone, on July 12 @ Prokhorovka were 503 tanks. II. SS.Pz Korps losses were 60 - 70 AFVs.

This does not cover claims but it does show strenth vs actual losses in one engagement. & this is the type of data one would need as well as claims to make any statistical anlyss of AFV claims vs actual losses

Regards, John Waters

[ April 12, 2003, 03:00 PM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Andreas - it is completely silly that two plates are treated as better than 1. Everyone else's formulas for combined plates shows lowered resistence, not increased. When I discussed this with Rexford in the past, his views seemed to have been based on a report of 30+30 armor resistence that was probably a figure for 30+50, with someone along the way having mistaken a single printed or written "5" for a "3".

British test in North Africa show that 3cmFH +3cmFH armour plates were stronger aka non penetrable by 2pdr shot. Test firing on PIV side armour resulted in 2cmRHA +2cmRHA failing at 500yds with the 2pdr round continuing on to penetrate the other side, another 2cmRHA +2cmRHA plate resulting in 8cm total penetration in optimal conditions. 30FH+30FH PIII H also proved to be stronger than single 50FH armour of the late PIV Ds, in contradiction that a single FH plate is better than comparable bolted FH plate.

Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:

I don't know about the 2-plates issue as I'm not an authority on this stuff, but I do know that when Charles found out (from Rexford, ironically) that part of the Sherman Jumbo's front armor consisted of 2 separate plates, he downgraded the armor value in the next patch (CMBO, of course). I could even dig up the thread if I had to.

The downgrading of the Sherman Jumbo is in line with understanding that RHA bolted armour will preform less well than similar sized single plate RHA armour. The Germans carried out bolting of FH plates not RHA plates.

[gorgias]

Well.......

--------------------------------------------------

REPORT ABOUT OPERATIONS OF THE 71ST INDEPENDENT GUARDS HEAVY TANK REGIMENT FROM 14 JULY TO 31 AUGUST 1944

In the morning of 13 August 1944, the Regiment, in cooperation with 289th Infantry Regiment of 97th Infantry Division began an advance towards Oglendov. The enemy tanks, which were on the outskirts, blocked the infantry attack. At that moment, the tank platoon of Guards Senior Lieutenant Klimenkov was advancing from his previously prepared position and opened fire on the enemy tanks. As a result, after a short engagement, Klimenkov destroyed one tank and damaged another (these were the first King Tiger's to be destroyed) and the infantry entered Ogledov without facing any serious resistance.

Simultaneously, from the height 272.1, seven King Tigers attacked our positions. Concealed in the bushes to the east of Mokree, the tank of Guards Senior Lieutenant Udalov let the enemy approach within 700-800 metres and then opened fire on the leading tank. After several accurate shots, one tank was destroyed and another one damaged. When the enemy started to retreat, Udalov drove his tank along the forest road towards the enemy and, from the edge of the forest, opened fire again. Leaving one more tank on fire, the enemy retreated.

Soon, the King Tigers attacked again. This time they were advancing towards Ponik, where the Guards Lieutenant Beliakov's was in laying in ambush. He opened fire from the distance of 1000 metres. By the third round, he had set fire to one tank and forced others to retreat.

During the day the tankers, in co-operation with artillery, repulsed 7 armored attacks and inflicted heavy human and technical losses on the enemy.

Enemy losses from 14 July to 31 August 1944

Burnt out:

Tiger - 4,

King Tiger - 4,

Panther - 3,

Ferdinand self-propelled gun - 1,

128mm self-propelled gun - 1,

Armored cars - 3.

Damaged:

Tiger - 1,

King Tiger - 2,

Panther - 3.

Guns destroyed of different calibres: 23,

Machine-guns destroyed: 22,

Soldiers and officers killed: 600.

Regimental losses:

JS-122’s destroyed - 3.

JS-122’s damaged - 7. (Three were repaired by the Regiment and four were sent for rebuilding by the Repair Center.)

Killed In Action:

Officers - 3, These included the Regimental Commander Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Judin,

sergeants and solders - 10.

Wounded:

Officers - 8,

Sergeants and privates - 36.

............................

Conclusions:

1. The main armament of the JS-122 remains the most powerful of all existing types of tanks. The 122 mm round has great armor-piercing capability and this makes these tanks the best solution against other heavy enemy tanks.

2. The large quantity of smoke from the gun when fired reveals the tank’s position.

3. The experience of defensive combat in the bridgehead, revealed that enemy tanks avoid areas defended by JS-122's. As a result, this situation often results in a change of the attack's direction, looking for the less well defended areas.

71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment Commander

Guards Lieutenant-Colonel

Shapar'.

--------------------------------------------------

I Know this doesnt mean anything but.... it doesnt seem the soviets IS evited the direct confrontation with tigers and germans heavies...

The document is a lot of larger than i traslate here......

About the rest of things said here... well JasonC knows a lot of more than me and i agree with him again...

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by gorgias:

Well.......

--------------------------------------------------

REPORT ABOUT OPERATIONS OF THE 71ST INDEPENDENT GUARDS HEAVY TANK REGIMENT FROM 14 JULY TO 31 AUGUST 1944

In the morning of 13 August 1944, the Regiment, in cooperation with 289th Infantry Regiment of 97th Infantry Division began an advance towards Oglendov. The enemy tanks, which were on the outskirts, blocked the infantry attack. At that moment, the tank platoon of Guards Senior Lieutenant Klimenkov was advancing from his previously prepared position and opened fire on the enemy tanks. As a result, after a short engagement, Klimenkov destroyed one tank and damaged another (these were the first King Tiger's to be destroyed) and the infantry entered Ogledov without facing any serious resistance.

Gorgias, the first Tiger II lost on the Eastren front occured on 12.08.44 when a lone T-34-85 from the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade, commanded by Lt. Aleksandr P. Oskin ambushed 3, Tiger II from the newly re-equipped s.H.Pz. Abt 501 as they were moveing through the village of Ogledow.

Its also interesting to note that Oskin reported that BR-365P sub-calibre rounds richoched from 200m of the side hull & side turret of the Tiger II's.

Also the refrence to 7 Tiger II, as of the 12.08.44 501 had 8 operational Tiger II, 3 of these were lost @ Ogledow. leaving 5 Tiger II operational on 13.08.44 one of these, Tiger II "002" was captured intact on this day.

Theirs also a few other things in that report I have questions about Ie, refences to Tiger E, 501 had no Tiger E, as well as 'Ferdinands', far as I know no Ferdinands were even on the Eastren front in July - August 1944?.

Regards, John Waters

[ April 12, 2003, 10:05 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Andreas]

John, I believe the Soviets had a habit of calling ordinary Stugs Ferdinands, for whatever reason. It is the only explanation I have for the repeated mention of Ferdinands in the Soviet officer memoirs I own.

[White Phosphorus]

The Stugs were called Artshturm. All other assault guns were called Ferdinands, kind of how all cannons were called 88s on the Western Front.

[rexford]

The resistance of homogeneous armor plates is much weaker on the surfaces, where material may be pushed out of the way easier than in the interior. Surface material is not held in place by as much adjacent armor.

So when two 30mm homogeneous plates are stacked together there is much more surface material than with a single 60mm plate. And two stacked homogeneous plates of 30mm resist like less than a single 60mm homogeneous plate.

The resistance of face-hardened plates comes from the ability of the thin surface layer to damage the projectile nose so the round uses its energy to tear itself apart.

Two 30mm face-hardened plates have a greater total thickness of face-hardened layers than a 60mm face-hardened plate.

So it is reasonable to find that 30mm-over-30mm face-hardened is better than 60mm face-hardened.

[ April 12, 2003, 02:02 PM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[rexford]

Hulldown face-to-face shoot out, Tiger vs IS-2 Model 1944, at ranges of 1000m, 1500m and 2000m.

Analysis uses a statistical method where both tanks had a 10% first shot range estimation error and then use bracketing to home in on the target after initial misses.

Hit probabilities are pessimistic since they assume every shot takes place after a miss.

Analysis ignores cupola on both tanks, which favors IS-2 since it has a very large cupola compared to Tiger.

Penetration data:

Tiger 88L56 APCBC

138mm at 1000m

126mm at 1500m

116mm at 2000m

IS-2 122mmL46 AP

155mm at 1000m

138mm at 1500m

124mm at 2000m

Following figures average the first, third and fifth shot probability of hitting and penetrating the turret of the opposing hulldown tank:

Tiger firing on IS-2 Model 1944:

1000m, 20%

1500m, 13%

2000m, 07%

IS-2 Model 1944 firing on Tiger:

1000m, 31%

1500m, 13%

2000m, 04%

Looking at the curved mantlet and turret front on IS-2, Tiger hits at 1500m have to land within the center half of the total height to be able to penetrate. The IS-2 mantlet height is 2.25', which means Tiger hits at 1500m have to land within 0.56' of the centerpoint, or 0.2m, to penetrate. A very small target, indeed.

Given the higher rate of fire from Tigers compared to IS-2 Model 1944, which might be 7 to 2 per minute, one Tiger against one IS-2 would probably be slanted towards the Tiger.

Regarding the penetration data which I originally used in my book, it turns out that the figures were not against medium hardness rolled homogeneous armor. Miles Krogfus will be presenting an article in the May AFV News on what type of armor the Russian penetration numbers were based on.

My latest figures for 122mm AP are:

173mm at 500m

155mm at 1000m

138mm at 1500m

124mm at 2000m

[Vanir Ausf B]

Originally posted by rexford:

My latest figures for 122mm AP are:

173mm at 500m

155mm at 1000m

138mm at 1500m

124mm at 2000m

Current CMBB data for 122mm AP is only 136mm at 1000m. Unless your numbers are against a different type of armor than the CMBB numbers, I hope these changes make it into the latest patch.

Rexford, can you comment on why the Germans went to a single FH plate on the later Stugs? Was it to reduce cost despite the reduction in protection, as Andreas suggested?

[JasonC]

John you are essentially claiming that unless we know everything we know nothing, but you know better. We can put bounds on kill ratio claims from a rough overall accounting without pretending any certainty exists on each figure. We can falsify high ratio claims by seeing whether they imply more dead tanks than we know actually died.

To see this, all you have to do is take any set of claim figures you (provisionally) believe and extend them to the other large weapon categories to get a basically full accounting, and see if you go over the known enemy dead AFVs by a huge amount or not. The ratio of one weapon should be comparable to the ratio of another weapon of similar effectiveness.

If you do this and go over the dead AFVs known, all the ratios are high. All weapon systems cannot be above average. And claims that 1 or 2 had huge ratios and others, simply not discussed, had tiny ones, are wildly implausible. Thus if you believe the average kills per StuG were 2.5, a figure at least that high would be implied for the average Panther.

Lets take your 10-12 K tiger estimate and the 20 K StuG claim and apply the procedure. That is 7-9 kills per Tiger and 2-3 per StuG - without pretending any minute accuracy. Half the known Russian losses 43-45 have already been claimed by just the Tigers and the StuGs - 10K heavy weapon systems out of 60K fielded.

Well then, will Pz IVs and Panthers underperform StuGs, taken together? Pz IVs might by a modest amount. Panthers should outperform. There are 15K of these, so the implied kill claim for them is bounded below by 30K (and could be 38k).

Well, we just hit the actual dead Russian AFV level - 60-70 vs. 61K - without yet counting 7.5K TDs, 5K 88s, 26K 75mm PAK, and 16K infantry tank killer medals. There is no particular reason to think StuGs are better than Jagdpanzers, but suppose they are, with TDs and 88s only worth 1 apiece. Count the 75 PAK as only 1/3.

As for the portion of AT systems for the west front, and of losses there, it is safe to say it is bounded above by 1/5th the size of the eastern front, since the front was in existence only 11 months compared to 28, was smaller, etc.

I am deliberately lowballing everything besides the Tiger and StuG figure, trying to make them seem as plausible as possible. I still get 81-91K claims against 61K actual, high by 20-30K. The hypothetical ratios are falsified.

"But maybe the problem is on the estimated categories, not the reported claim ones". Let's consider it. You've got to find 20-30K to pare out of the accounting without touching the half attributed to just the Tigers and StuGs. The infantry claims don't leave much room for quibbling.

You are reduced to forcing a total of 13-15K claims onto the shoulders of 6K Panthers, 9K Pz IVs, 7.5K TDs, and over 30K towed PAK. The Panthers have to dramatically underperform StuGs or they account for the whole remainder. The Pz IVs and TDs have to be well below unity when the comparable StuGs are far above it. The PAK have to be almost entirely ineffectual. None of these clear implications of believing the reported claims are plausible.

Nor is there any particular reason to expect one side's claims of the other side's losses to be exact. If you examine particular periods, you find that they often are high by a factor of 2. Sometimes they may be accurate (own the battlefield afterward for a long period, small battle area, etc).

Own side claims really only tell you the real number is probably somewhere in a range of half the claim figure and all of it. An overall loss accounting can often narrow that range by putting upper bounds on kill ratios.

As for the source on the number of German AT mines, the Panzerfaust site covers them.

As for 80mm front StuGs being partial penetrable at under 100m, I already noted that (occasional partials at 100m while the most common is still shell broke up). The problem is Russian tactical doctrine reports effectiveness at 500m, not 100m, and no German AARs contradict this. CMBBs own penetration numbers agree; I don't see any problem with those as written.

When AFVs are invunerable from the front, people notice. And they didn't here. Outrange, they noticed and comment about, invunerable until point blank, they do not.

But riddle me this - how on earth did the Germans manage to kill only 1 (likely) or 2.5-3 (upper bound from their own kill claims) Russian AFVs per StuG lost, when they were supposedly invunerable from the front for a year and a half, and continued to be vs. the most common Russian weapons for the rest of the war?

The rawest green CMBB player can manage that in a single 30 minute firefight, often without loss. How stupid did the StuG drivers have to be to have frontal invunerability for a year and a half and only score 2-3 per loss? If they even did, which I doubt.

Rexford - you claim that due to hardness effects it is "believable" that 30+30 is better than 60. To you perhaps, but is it true as opposed to "believable"? What resistence do you claim 30+30 has? What resistence do you claim 30+50 has? What does the naval formula give on the same questions? What actual test reports or AARs say 30+30 was stronger than 60 (not 50, which pace Bastables I agree it can marginally outperform)? What failure ranges for 2 pdr and US 37mm do your figures imply for 30+30? What failure ranges for Russian 76mm and US 75mm vs. 30+50? Do you have any tactical evidence, as opposed to theoretical calculations, that it was so? And why were the Germans so stupid as to increase weight and lower protection by always going to a uniform plate on the next model change, after every field expediant period of using bolted armor?

I simply don't believe it. 30+30 FH may be better than 50, and 30+50 FH may be better than 70. But not than 60 and 80 respectively. Multiple plates weaken the overall armor effect according to every other formula I've ever seen. Hardness may mitigate that weakening as to amount, but you are the only person I know who thinks it changes the sign of the effect. Do you think that 8 plates 10mm thick would dramatically outperform an 80mm plate? Why aren't battleships made in layer cakes?

When we discussed this before, you mentioned one report of about 70mm effectiveness from a pair of plates, and it seemed to me a lot of your conclusions were fitted to that reported result. You thought it was a 30+30 case. I think it was probably a figure for 30+50, and that is the source of the confusion.

Anyway, I've now had my say on this subject and will let the faithful return to their slumbers or labors as the case may be. I end by reiterating that I can live with every item of the grog minutae covered here, but would be much happier if I just saw a reduction in tank cower behavior - to cases where a tank was threatened (within 30 degrees facing) and no ready round was in the tube.

[ April 12, 2003, 04:30 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by JasonC:

John you are essentially claiming that unless we know everything we know nothing, but you know better. We can put bounds on kill ratio claims from a rough overall accounting without pretending any certainty exists on each figure. We can falsify high ratio claims by seeing whether they imply more dead tanks than we know actually died.

No Jason what I'm saying is before you start bantying numbers around, you use actual claim

numbers, as the basis, as we see you have overstimated Tiger claims by a huge margin, by your numbers the Heer Tiger Abt if anything underclaimed. That in itself brings the rest of your thesis into question on its own.

Stick to what you actualy know you can prove,

their is a difrence between what we think we know, compared to what we actualy know, no credible researcher bases his work on what he thinks he knows, he bases it on wqhat he does know useing the facts, he does know, & goes from their & if he branches off from facts to present an off the wall theory, he uses refrence data to support each and every part of it.

We do not need to falsify or put artificial bounds on claim ratio numbers etc, we have the actual claim numbers in this instance. To get the Panther's claims you search Pz.Div/Regt/Abt war diaries same with the PzKpfw III/IV etc. Each unit etc maintained a war diary with this data by date etc. Then you search Russian records etc. Then you compile it Ie, How many StuG were lost on the Eastren Front in WW2, how many Panther, T-34, what was cause of loss etc.

How many AT guns were lost, vs tanks killed?

the Soviets did an anlyss of this, & gauged the effectiveness of their AT guns by how many tanks an single AT gun averaged KO'd before being destroyed Ie,* :

57mm - 3

76mm - 2.5

122mm - 2

45mm - 0.25

*See: Dunn Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis p.201

& please Jason these statistical theories, ppl are so fond of spouting on wargame forums are generly based on the premise, that the actual data, can't be disputed because the data doesn't exist, or is so obscure, that no casual history buff will take a hard loook at it, or examine it in detail, or even dispute the numbers, to begin with, because of the misleading way its presented in.

Basicly I, can make any claim I want, useing any numbers I choose to, and make the math fit thats the easy part. But it meens absolutely nothing, unless its backed up by hard data. I haven't seen you list one refrence, etc supporting your statements here, nor any refrences at all that your data was derived from.

Below is an example of how this research should be done useing 8th AF vs LW actual losses vs claims as an example:

German Fighter, & persnell losses Nov 2 1944:

I/JG3 - 9 BF 109 G-14 (Aschersleben)

II/JG3 - 13 BF 109 G-14 (Dessau, Halle)

Total JG 3 Losses - 22 AC, 15 KIA/MIA, 7 WIA.

I/JG4 - 2 BF 109 G-14 (Dessau)

III/JG4 - 3 BF 109 G-10/G-14 (Kothen)

IV/JG4 - 6 BF 109 G-14 (Zerbst)

Total JG4 losses - 11 AC, 8 KIA/MIA, 3 WIA.

I/JG27 - 11 BF 109 G-14 (Dessau)

II/JG27 - 3 BF 109 G-14 (Kothen, Lepzig)

III/JG27 - 9 BF 109 G-14 (Leune)

IV/JG27 - 15 BF 109 G-14 (Merseburg, Zerbst)

Total JG27 losses - 38 AC, 27 KIA/MIA, 11 WIA.

I/JG400 - 3 Me 163B (Brandis, Lepzig)

IV/JG3 - 15 FW 190 A-8/R2/R6 (Bitterfeld, Eisleben)

Total JG3 Losses - 15 AC, 11 KIA/MIA, 4 WIA.

IV/JG4 - 9 FW 190 A8/R2/R6 (Kothen. Zerbst)

Total JG4 losses - 9 AC, 6 KIA/MIA, 3 WIA.

Total Luftywaffe losses on Nov 2 1944 were:

- 98 Aircraft, 70 pilots, KIA/MIA, 28 pilots WIA.

Luftwaffe claims filed were 34, 4 engined bombers, 11 P-51s. German AA defences filed claims for an additional 32, 4 engine bombers.

8th AF records state 44, 4 engined bombers were lost (26 to German fighters), & 8 P-51s. 8th AF claims from fighters & bombers was 134 German aicraft destroyed, 25 damaged, & 3 probables. Ie, the 352nd FG claimed 38 German fighters, the 20th FG claimed 28 kills.

US claims vs actual German losses 1 Jagdkorps records state 120 fighters were lost on Nov 2, which compare favoribly to US FG & Bomber gunner claims of 134.

German Aircraft & Persnell losses January 14, 1945:

1./JG1 - 11, Fw 190A-8/A-9, 10 KIA/MIA, 1 MIA. (Enschede, Twenthe, Venlo)

I./JG2 - 2 Fw 190D-9, 1 KIA/MIA. 1 WIA. (Altenstadt, Lich, Hagenau).

III.JG3 - 1 Bf 109K-4, 1 KIA/MIA. (Arnheim, Deelen)

IV/JG3 - 8 Fw 190A-8/A-9, 4 KIA/MIA, 4 WIA. (Gutersloh, Lippstadt).

I/JG4 - 3 Bf 109G-14/K-4 1,KIA/MIA, 2 WIA. (Gemmeldingen)

IV/JG4 - 1 Bf 109G-10, 1 WIA. (Neustadt, Oppau).

III/JG7 - 1 Me 262, 1 KIA/MIA. (Wittstock).

II/JG11 - 3 Bf 109G-14, 2 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Gemmerldingen, Kaiserslautern).

1/JG26 - 3 Fw 190D-9, 2 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Cologne, Bonn).

II/JG26 - 9 Fw 190D-9, 8 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Lengerich).

III/JG26 - 3 Bf 109G-14/K-4, 3 KIA/MIA. (Steinbeck, Overath).

I/JG27 - 1 Bf 109G-14, 1 KIA/MIA. (Ibbenburen)

II/JG27 - 1 Bf 109G-14, 1 KIA/MIA.

IV/JG53 - 3 Bf 109G-14, 2 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Bad Durrheim, Kandel).

IV/JG54 - 10 Fw 190A-8/A-9, 8 KIA/MIA, 2 WIA. (Bramsche, Hesepe, Vorden).

1/JG77 - 2 Bf 109G-10/K-4, 2 KIA. (Dusseldorf).

II/JG77 - 5 Bf 109G-10/K-4, 3 KIA/MIA, 2 WIA. (Krefeld, Warendorf, Zuptphen).

1/JG 300 - 6 Bf 109G-10/G-14, 5 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Brandenburg)

II/JG300 - 7 Fw 190A-8, 5 KIA/MIA, 2 WIA. (Havelberg)

III/JG300 - 12 Bf 109G-10/G-14, 11 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Perleberg, Nauen).

IV/JG 300 - 14 Bf 109G-10, 11 KIA/MIA, 3 WIA. (Salzwedel, Stendal).

Stab JG 301 - 1 Fw 190D-9, 1 KIA/MIA. (Barenthin)

1/JG 301 - 12 Fw 190A-9/R11, 7 KIA/MIA, 5 WIA. (Haverberg).

II/JG 301 - 11 Fw 190A-9/D-9, 10 KIA/MIA, 1 WIA. (Gumtow, Kyritz).

III/JG301 - 6 Fw 190A-8, 4 KIA/MIA, 2 WIA. (Perleberg, Pritzwalk).

Total Luftwaffe losses 139 aircraft, 107 KIA/MIA, 32 WIA. 41% of the sorties commited were lost.

Luftwaffe claims filed for January 14th were for 37 bombers & fighters, actual 8th AF losses were 25 aircraft, 9 bombers, 13 P-51s & 3 P-47s.

US fighter & bomber claims filed were 161 kills vs the actual 139 with the 357th filing claims for 56 of this total. Actual LW fighter losses on November 14th for the entire day were 150 aircraft, and the claims may have represented all 8th AF claims made for Jan 14.

*See: Girbig: Six Months To Oblivionpp.23 - 28., pp 174 - 180

To validate your data, you would, as I said need exact claim numbers from each system vs actual losses, from the OPFOR for any credible statistical anlysss. Ie, from July 5 - Sept 30th 1943 Fremde Heer Ost recieved tank destruction claims from tank, AT, Inf, & the LW for 20,434 destroyed Soviet tanks, FMH as was SOP to prevent duplicate claims, reduced this total by 50% to 10,217 tanks destroyed, actual Soviet tank losses in this time period was 11,703 tanks.

Regards, John Waters

[ April 13, 2003, 02:28 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I simply don't believe it. 30+30 FH may be better than 50, and 30+50 FH may be better than 70. But not than 60 and 80 respectively. Multiple plates weaken the overall armor effect according to every other formula I've ever seen. Hardness may mitigate that weakening as to amount, but you are the only person I know who thinks it changes the sign of the effect. Do you think that 8 plates 10mm thick would dramatically outperform an 80mm plate? Why aren't battleships made in layer cakes?

You can choose to believe what ever you want, there are no boundaries on imagination. British experience with German FH and RHA bolted/single piece armour say otherwise though.

The problem is you?re the one that has to change the ascendant argument that FH+FH does not operate in a similar weakened manner as RHA+RHA and therefore weaker than a single plate of equivalent thickness.

If layered armour were to automatically equal weaker protection then Modern body armour, Cobham tank armour and all the interesting appliqué armour of the Russian AFV has been a complete and utter waste of time.

[ April 12, 2003, 07:28 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

But riddle me this - how on earth did the Germans manage to kill only 1 (likely) or 2.5-3 (upper bound from their own kill claims) Russian AFVs per StuG lost, when they were supposedly invunerable from the front for a year and a half, and continued to be vs. the most common Russian weapons for the rest of the war?

The rawest green CMBB player can manage that in a single 30 minute firefight, often without loss. How stupid did the StuG drivers have to be to have frontal invunerability for a year and a half and only score 2-3 per loss? If they even did, which I doubt.

Irrelevant, to come up with a meaningful ratio one should only include StuGs killed by T-34s Versus T-34s killed by StuGs. Your riddle is a red herring.

The Panther was also just as invulnerable from the front (for much longer) and yet had much lower loss/kill ratio. There are other factors besides frontal invulnerability.

[ April 13, 2003, 02:18 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for 80mm front StuGs being partial penetrable at under 100m, I already noted that (occasional partials at 100m while the most common is still shell broke up). The problem is Russian tactical doctrine reports effectiveness at 500m, not 100m, and no German AARs contradict this. CMBBs own penetration numbers agree; I don't see any problem with those as written.

No they don?t CMBB figures seem to be penetration versus RHA armour. StuGs in game with RHA single plate are permeable at a little over 500m to 7,62cm. Problem is StuGs were manufactured with different armour throughout the war 30FH+50FH bolted and welded, 80FH and 80 RHA. What?s the date on Soviet tactical doctrine? After all not all PIVs/StuGs were created equal.

[gorgias]

Pz. do u mean this episode??

--------------------------------------------------

At midnight on August 13th, a growing noise of tank engines was heard coming from the German side. Before dawn, the commander of the 53rd GTBn returned from the headquarters to his tank, which was employed as an observation post between the tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion, which were hidden between low sand dunes. In the front and on the right side of the Soviet positions, there was a valley with a road to Staszów. On the left hand side, there was a field with stacks of hay, where Ivushkin's tanks were camouflaged. Near the entry of the valley stood Lieutenant A. P. Oskin's "thirty-four" (T-34). A. Stetzenko was the driver, A. Merkhaidarov was the gunner, A. Grushin was the radio operator, and A. Khalychev was the loader. Colonel Arkhipov and Ivushkin hid the tank in the haystacks, and ordered Oskin to hold his fire until given a special order.

The next morning was covered in mist, which obstructed the view. From the observation point of the 53rd GTBr commander, neither the village of Ogledów, nor the valley, nor the tanks hidden in the haystacks were visible. The morning silence was broken by a growing hum of tank engines, and soon the incoming noise of tanks' tracks was heard. From the sky, one could hear Junkers planes approaching Staszów. German artillery began to fire. The rounds passed high above the brigade's forward line. Enemy reconnaissance neither located the brigade's front line, nor spotted the ambush positions.

On August 13th, at 07:00 a.m. under the cover of the mist, the Germans started to advance on the unnamed hill with eleven King Tigers and a few armored personnel carriers with infantry.

Ivushkin's voice was heard on the radio: "The tanks are gone. I can't see them, but I can hear them. They are moving through the valley."

................................

It is worth mentioning that the Russian 6th GTC did not have significant numerical superiority. Ready for the German assault were nine T-34-76's from the 53rd GTBr, and nine T-34-76's and ten T-34-85's from the 52nd GTBr. The 51st GTBr, positioned to the north, had eleven T-34-76's and four T-34-85's. At Staszów there were eleven IS-2 heavy tanks, and one IS-85 heavy tank from the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment.

..........................

--------------------------------------------------

Do u want to know the rest of this story??

T34/76s confronting panthers V, King tigers and StuG and no numerical superiority..... this soviets must be really stupid or maybe heroes..??

[gorgias]

THIS GERMANS WERE ABSOLUTELY INCOMPETENT OR STUPIDS.....

Yes after reading everythig here said is my conclusion.

I dont know why the germans can loose the war in east front...

Perhaps do they loose it to operational level?? And What does mean this??

More tanks maybe..... well the russian tanks have more or less the same cost than germans in game so they couldnt have a great superiority in number of tanks in battlefield....

Better tanks?? Imposible when any stug (the cheaper german armor unit the most of time) is unpenetrable in front to any usual soviet ATG and to the main soviet battle tank to summer of 44 (the T34 /76).

More infantry...better infantry... well the soviet cost for infantry is very similar to german and it hasnt good AT weapons or better light weapons....

More support or better?? well maybe the soviets had a lot of mechanized divisions that i dont know....

Aircraft or artillery?? Is the soviet artillery cheaper than german in game?? I think no... included a lot of slower too, Aircraft then, maybe??

Well at this point i only can think in a thing.... the soviet strategy was absolutely superior and smarter than german..... worse and poor units... no significant numerical superiority (o maybe yes?) a lot of civilians killed... i dont know how they could win the war... so the the german generals were the most incompetent soldiers in the human history....

What do u think... how could to loose the german the war in the east front??

Maybe all and every soviet soldier was an hero??

[Bastables]

Originally posted by gorgias:

THIS GERMANS WERE ABSOLUTELY INCOMPETENT OR STUPIDS.....

Yes after reading everythig here said is my conclusion.

I dont know why the germans can loose the war in east front...

Perhaps do they loose it to operational level?? And What does mean this??

More tanks maybe..... well the russian tanks have more or less the same cost than germans in game so they couldnt have a great superiority in number of tanks in battlefield....

Better tanks?? Imposible when any stug (the cheaper german armor unit the most of time) is unpenetrable in front to any usual soviet ATG and to the main soviet battle tank to summer of 44 (the T34 /76).

More infantry...better infantry... well the soviet cost for infantry is very similar to german and it hasnt good AT weapons or better light weapons....

More support or better?? well maybe the soviets had a lot of mechanized divisions that i dont know....

Aircraft or artillery?? Is the soviet artillery cheaper than german in game?? I think no... included a lot of slower too, Aircraft then, maybe??

Well at this point i only can think in a thing.... the soviet strategy was absolutely superior and smarter than german..... worse and poor units... no significant numerical superiority (o maybe yes?) a lot of civilians killed... i dont know how they could win the war... so the the german generals were the most incompetent soldiers in the human history....

What do u think... how could to loose the german the war in the east front??

Maybe all and every soviet soldier was an hero??

Casulties 1941-1944 (KIA,MIA,WIA)

1941: 831,050 German vs 4,473,820 Soviet

1942: 1,080,950 German vs 7,369,278 Soviet

1943: 1,601,445 German vs 7,857,503 Soviet

1944: 1,947,106 German vs 6,878,600 Soviet

figures are those reported by their own militaries. Even when the Germans were losing ground and involved in a 3ish front war they still inflicted more casulties.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by gorgias:

I dont know why the germans can loose the war in east front...

Perhaps do they loose it to operational level?? And What does mean this??

This means that the soviets were able to obtain a significant amount of local superiority (5-1 or 10-1, even) at critical locations.

The point values you seen in CM are designed to help you set up a "fair fight." Real war is about avoiding a fair fight. Of course, no one wants to game a battalion of infantry and company of IS-2s vs. two platoons of Germans...it would be no fun. But you win wars by being able to obtain those kinds of local odds...not by sending 6 IS-3s to fight 4 Tigers.

[PzKpfw 1]

Gorgias, the Soviet Mechanized forces as well as the USSR paid a horrible price for victory.

*Tank/SU Crew losses by year, total crews, & total men, & total repair crews KIA/WIA/MIA:

1941:

Total crews - 5,152

Total men - 15,749

1942:

Total crews - 41,193

Total men - 83,205

1943:

Total crews - 38,404

Total men - 96,877

1944:

Total crews - 44,818

Total men - 126,004

1945:

Total crews - 30,027

Total men - 81,437

Total tank/SU/Repair crews lost - 159,594

Total men KIA/WIA/MIA - 403,272

See: Dunn Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis p.152

Regards, John Waters

[rexford]

"Rexford - you claim that due to hardness effects it is "believable" that 30+30 is better than 60. To you perhaps, but is it true as opposed to "believable"? What resistence do you claim 30+30 has? What resistence do you claim 30+50 has? What does the naval formula give on the same questions? What actual test reports or AARs say 30+30 was stronger than 60 (not 50, which pace Bastables I agree it can marginally outperform)? What failure ranges for 2 pdr and US 37mm do your figures imply for 30+30? What failure ranges for Russian 76mm a

nd US 75mm vs. 30+50? Do you have any tactical evidence, as opposed to theoretical calculations, that it was so? And why were the Germans so stupid as to increase weight and lower protection by always going to a uniform plate on the next model change, after every field expediant period of using bolted armor?"

I was explaining why face-hardened plate combo's performed better than a single plate, and it is not theoretical.

British firing tests in North Afrika list penetration ranges of 37mm (APCBC), 2 pdr (AP), 6 pdr (AP) and 75mm guns (AP and APCBC) against PzKpfw IIIH front 32mm/30mm. There is no side angle.

Given the penetration ranges I looked up the face-hardened penetration of the ammo at the listed range, and in every case it was 69mm face-hardened after correcting for plate slope.

So 32mm face-hard bolted on top of 30mm face-hard resisted like 69mm face-hard.

Bolted combo plates are one big maintenance problem because angled hits tend to shear the bolts. Cutting holes in face-hard plates is a chore, and welding face-hard plates requires quite a bit of special work anyway you do it (and there are several).

Going to one 50mm plate instead of 32mm/30mm saves weight, materials and maintenance headaches. And most importantly IT SAVES TIME, so more PzKpfw III can be created in a given time frame. It is quite a bit easier to make one 50mm face-hard plate than two 30mm face-hard plates.

PzKpfw IIIH came out during late 1941, and Germans followed up with MANY PzKpfw III and IV that only carried 50mm frontal armor (face-hard). The Wittman in the East CMBB scenario has PzKpfw IVG with 50mm face-hard frontal armor at a time when lots of T34/76 were being met. Why did they go with lesser resistance?

T34/76 firing BR-350B APBC can penetrate:

81mm face-hard at 0m

72mm at 500m

64mm at 1000m

56mmm at 1500m

50mm at 2000m

PzKpfw IIIH 32mm/30mm face-hard driver plate would be penetrated at 500m, PzKpfw IIIJ with 50mm face-hard would be penetrated at 1900m.

The odd thing is that while PzKpfw IIIH hull front gets added armor, turret front and mantlet gets nothing. T34/76 can penetrate PzKpfw IIIH turret front/mantlet at close to infinity.

(Also note that 80mm face-hard on StuG IIIG or PzKpfw IVH front is enough to rule out T34/76 penetrations beyond very close range.)

So it doesn't make sense to go from 32mm/30mm to 50mm face-hard in terms of a calculation with known data when T34/76 is the main opponent, if penetration resistance is the only consideration.

But the Germans did make the change, which appears to be based on other than penetration resistance issues.

[ April 13, 2003, 05:11 AM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[rexford]

The use of 20mm spaced with 50mm face-hard main armor on PzKpfw III is another case that deserves attention, since it points out that superior armor resistance may have serious drawbacks.

Russian tests with 122mm ammo showed that the 20mm spaced plate on PzKpfw III turret and driver plate areas could detonate the HE burster so the round blew up before it reached the 50mm face-hard main armor.

British tests with 75mm APCBC showed the same result. And British tests further showed that the spaced plate would dull solid AP noses and decrease the face-hardened penetration. And 20mm spaced plate would tear off the armor piercing cap, reducing penetration chances against the 50mm face-hard main armor.

If 20mm spaced and 50mm main face-hard armor is so great as to defeat 122mm hits, why wasn't every panzer equipped with those wonderful combo's?

The 20mm spaced plate was often high hardness homogeneous armor, over 400 Brinell like T34 armor. Or it was about 350 Brinell, machineable quality plate but hard and somewhat brittle when overmatched.

How many complete penetrations can a spaced 20mm plate take before it disintegrates? How many angled hits before the supporting structure falls apart. If the spaced armor on the turret front is hit and the plate shifts position, it may very well block the sighting holes for the gun!

Someone who fought for the British in Nord Afrika pointed out that many pictures of PzKpfw III with spaced armor show missing sections, the turret is often missing the spaced plate.

Now, changing subjects, if layered face-hard armor is superior to single plates, why did the Germans go to a single 80mm FHA plate instead of sticking with 30mm/50mm combo's.

1. time involved in preparing and welding the plates together, and field maintenance when problems with welds appear

2. time involved in making two face-hard plates instead of one

3. if 30mm/50mm FHA provides 11% more penetration resistance than 80mm FHA, is it worth the added trouble?

German high-carbon armor plate is difficult to weld, and some Tiger welds were sensitive to hammer blows. So does one weld two time consuming to make face-hard plates on PzKpfw IVG or go with a single plate and build more IVG?

Switching to another neat aspect of German tank design, how about the added armor resistance on the rear hull of many PzKpfw III compared to the side hull. Tactical theory must have been that tanks would push through British and Russian fronts and then would have to defeat hits on tank rear as they sped through the defeated ranks and headed to enemy HQ.

Anyway, 45mm anti-tank guns were a primary threat against PzKpfw III and IV and 50mm face-hard would defeat those guns at 500m or so.

So, the big question is why did Germans continue with face-hardened armor after Americans and British went in for armor piercing capped ammo (APC and APCBC), which renders face-hardened armor more vulnerable than homogeneous in many cases (75mm APCBC on Sherman penetrates much more face-hardened than homogeneous):

Because the Russians continued to use AP and APBC rounds without armor piercing caps, which made face-hardened armor a good bet.

German use of face-hardened armor on Panther ended September 1943, probably to speed up production. Face-hardened armor use on PzKpfw IVH,J and StuG IIIG ends June 1944, probably to increase production.

[ April 13, 2003, 11:10 AM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[rexford]

The face-hardened glacis on Panther is a neat issue.

At the time that Panther came out, there were no enemy guns that were going to defeat the 85mm/55 degree Panther glacis at long range. Only a 122mm AP hit at very close range would defeat the glacis on Panther, and face-hardening would eliminate that probability (there were 122mm guns at Kursk which were reported to have knocked out Panthers and Tigers).

So face-hardening the Panther glacis made some sense if 122mm AP hits were going to be made on a regular basis. By September 1943 the need for a face-hardened 85mm glacis probably was seen as a low benefit affair compared to the problems involved in making such a large face-hardened plate.

The Germans stuck with face-hardened plates on the Panther nose and side hull until late 1943, when face-hardening was dropped on that tank.

Tiger II with the 100mm curved turret front use face-hardened 100mm plates, according to info that Jentz found. Probably an attempt to increase the resistance against Russian ammo, although many were sent to France where British and Americans fired rounds with armor piercing caps. 17 pdr APCBC penetrates more face-hardened armor than homogeneous at all ranges.

[ April 13, 2003, 05:49 AM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by rexford:

The face-hardened glacis on Panther is a neat issue.

At the time that Panther came out, there were no enemy guns that were going to defeat the 85mm/55 degree Panther glacis at long range. Only a 122mm AP hit at very close range would defeat the glacis on Panther, and face-hardening would eliminate that probability (there were 122mm guns at Kursk which were reported to have knocked out Panthers and Tigers).

So face-hardening the Panther glacis made some sense if 122mm AP hits were going to be made on a regular basis. By September 1943 the need for a face-hardened 85mm glacis probably was seen as a low benefit affair compared to the problems involved in making such a large face-hardened plate.

Panther fun did not stop there. In Nov/Dec of 1942 Saur and Hitler were very enamoured with the idea of 3cm or 5cm spaced plates similar to the PIII L-M being mounted on the Panther. 3 Jan 1943 attempts by Wapruf 6 and MAN to mount spaced armour failed. Hitler then decided on the Panther II with 10cm glacis armour and 6cm side armour.

The Panther I was to be produced until Panther II production could start at the end of 1943. Panther II was then dropped in May 1943 in favour of skirt armour/steel road wheels (If the Panther I armour skirts failed and/or was unable to use steel road wheels Panther II production would have pushed forward), mounted on the A and then the G. Henschel only came to know that their pet project (Panther II) had been axed on the 3 June 1943 and that they were now required to build Panther Is.

[ April 13, 2003, 05:40 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[rexford]

"Panther fun did not stop there. In Nov/Dec of 1942 Saur and Hitler were very enamoured with the idea of 3cm or 5cm spaced plates similar to the PIII L-M being mounted on the Panther. 3 Jan 1943 attempts by Wapruf 6 and MAN to mount spaced armour failed. Hitler then decided on the Panther II with 10cm glacis armour and 6cm side armour.

The Panther I was to be continued to produced until Panther II production could start at the end of 1943. Panther II was then dropped in May 1943 in favour of skirt armour/steel road wheels (If the Panther I armour skirts failed and/or was unable to use steel road wheels Panther II production would have pushed forward), mounted on the A and then the G. Henschel only came to know that their pet project (Panther II) had been axed on the 3 June 1943 and that they were now required to build Panther Is."

That's interesting, would Panther II have carried the 88L71?

Imagine the problems with the overstressed engine/transmission system when the weight was increased on the front hull and the hull sides! Panther breakdown rate would have skyrocketed!

Do you think Panther II would have been a good idea?

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by rexford

:

That's interesting, would Panther II have carried the 88L71?

No Lorrin, the Panther II was to use the 7.5 cm L/70, the difrences would have been mainly in armor protection increases Ie,

Turret roof (fore & Aft) - 30mm

Gun mantlet 150mm

Turret Front - 120mm

Hull Roof - 30mm @ 90^

Glacis - 100mm @ 55^

Turret Sides - 60mm @ 25^

Pannier sides - 60mm @ 40^

Hull Side - 60mm @ 0^

Turret Rear - 60mm

Regards, John Waters

[ April 13, 2003, 11:43 AM: Message edited by: PzKpfw 1 ]