doctrine, tacttics, operations and strategy

[Screeny]

Ok here goes for all you grogs out there who love to talk about WW2.

After a couple of years reading the usual popular WW2 "literature",playing the standard PC war games and reading a lot on this forum I slowly getting grasp of the in rth etitle mentioned subjects.

However I still not really can tell the differences between the different nations (Germany, UK, France, Russia, USA, ...) in relations to the above mentioned themes.

For example, this whole poeha about Panzer divisions..in any semi-serious docu on tv these are displayed as invincible units, you know the usual wawawa about how the Germans concentrated their armor in division while the others nations spread their armor over several units...However I have read here and in several other sources (liek for instance a small look at the OoB's) that other nations had their armoured divisions as well...So what is teh differences between a Panzer division and a UK armour division or US or USSR Armour division.? This is just an example of some of the things I don't understand. Smae for" germany->Blitzkrieg/combined arms, USSR -> excell in operational planning (?)

So basically what I'm asking is whether some one can summarize teh basics for teh above themes per nation?

gr

Screeny

[Sergei]

First you have to realize that doctrines and tactics didn't stay the same throughout the war. Late in the war Blitzkrieg was an obsolete concept.

[Sgt AA]

I'm not a "grog" and I have a hard time myself to keep track of the different formations. The size and the OoB also changes over time.

But I can give you "A russian tank brigade (as of 1942):

Brigade HQ

HQ Battalion

Rec. Comp. (tank)

Enginner Comp.

AA-Comp.

Machine Pistol Company

Military Police Platoon

1st Tank Battalion HQ (at all 21 tanks, T34s)

1st Comp. (1+3x3)

2nd Comp. (1+3x3)

2nd T B "

3rd T B "

Mechanized Infantry Battalion

HQ Comp.

1st Infantry Comp.

2nd "

3rd "

MG Comp.

Trench Mortar Comp.

ATG Comp.

and

Repair Comp.

Transport Comp.

Sanitary Comp.

Hope it´s of some use anyway.

Regards/

[Alexei]

Originally posted by Sergei:

First you have to realize that doctrines and tactics didn't stay the same throughout the war. Late in the war Blitzkrieg was an obsolete concept.

Not that sure ... What about Manchuria campaign in 1945?

[Andreas]

Deep Operations were rather better thought through then Blitzkrieg campaigns.

[Sergei]

Even mounted archers could have taken Manchuria in 1945, I don't think it was a matter of doctrine. I'm not sure what happened there, though.

[Sergei]

Andreas, if you have time for sarcasm, then I'm sure you'll have time to send me your turn!

[Screeny]

Deep Operations were rather better thought through then Blitzkrieg campaigns...

I'm the first to believe you..if soem one good start explaining me the difference....please?

[Sergei]

You see the Red Army Studies link in Andreas' sig line? By following that link you probably won't get your question answered, but it's worth having a look.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Even mounted archers could have taken Manchuria in 1945, I don't think it was a matter of doctrine. I'm not sure what happened there, though.

That much is obvious. Mounted archers probably would not have managed to do it in two weeks though. Give some credit to Pliev.

Turn to follow. Did you get my card? are you not scared yet?

[Sergei]

Scared? Not at all. As Peppone would have said, I could kill you any time but then you wouldn't send your turn. We should play TCP/IP...

[flamingknives]

A late war British armoured division consists of 246 cruiser tanks (Shermans or Cromwells - I don't have the details for infantry type tanks i.e.the Churchill, but I presume that these are largely similar)

44 light tanks (Stuarts)

100 scout cars (daimler dingo, humber)

and over 2000 auxilary vehicles.

Units included 3 tank regiments, an armoured recce regiment, 3 lorried infantry battalions plus one mechanised (halftracks) battalion, an independent MG company, two regiments of field artillery, one of anti-tank guns and one of anti-aircraft guns, for a total of 4 Royal Artillery (RA) regiments. There are also numerous engineer, signals and medical detachments.

(all from G. Forty, British Army Handbook)

What the German Panzer divisions really had going for them was the combat power of their vehicles and the skill of their crews. Later in the war they were fighting a defensive battle, which always skews the results in favour of the defender.

[Dandelion]

Screeny

I'll have a go at this, hope I find the level of answer you are looking for. And if I don't we can try again.

The "Blitzkrieg" term is used in many differing ways and I guess there is no one correct understanding of it. It appears however that the initial German meaning was simply that of speedy mobilisation, going imemdiately from mobilisation to attack.

The German army opened the war with semi-novel doctrine. That doctrine was combined arms, deep penetration operations.

Combined arms simply means a collection of different weapon systems, sort of like a mini-army. The Panzerdivision was such a mini-army. Deep penetration means that such a group strikes a hole in the enemy line and pour in through it, deep into enemy rear. In order to be able to strike that hole, you need to concentrate, e.g. create Panzerdivisions. The effect of the latter for the defender is that highly vulnerable units are destroyed and communication and control is lost, units are isolated and surrounded and coherent defence becomes impossible. Ideally for the attacker, it would all end in a huge enemy formation encircled and forced to surrender. The Germans rather improperly refered to these battles as Cannae battles, and were quite obsessed with trying to create them.

As the Germans assaulted other nations, they made heavy use of diversionary warfare, bluff and "vertical envelope" (i.e. paradrops behind enemy lines). All of these methods yielded impressive results against enemies still mobilising or otherwise unprepared, but proved quite useless against prepared and determined enemy armies. The methods are also often associated with the "Blitzkrieg" term.

The effective countermeasure against combined arms deep penetration operations was the arranging of defenses in depth, with positions capable of defense in all directions and able to sustain isolation at least for shorter periods. The French found effective such methods - sort of proto-hedgehog positions - in june 1940, alas too late to make a difference. It is also questionable if antitank weaponry was potent enough to provide effective such defenses, but that is a hotly contested issue.

The rival doctrine dominating the enemies of Germany in the early war was - grossly simplified - that of straight line defense. The idea was to form a continous line of defense and concentrate all firepower evenly along it (that's why they parceled out tanks all along the line), hopefully making it impenetrable. There was no depth to speak of, all barrels were up front.

You might compare with shields and arrows. A very thin and hard metal shield might deflect the arrow but if it does not, the wearer will get hit behind it. A thick and much softer wooden shield will consume the energy of the arrow so that even if it does poenetrate, it will not do so with enough power to hurt the wearer of the shield. Again, grossly simplified.

As the war progressed, all nations by and large adopted the same general type of doctrines. All nations formed combined arms groups, concentrated their offensive firepower and sought the same type of breakthroughs. They all tended to create defensive lines consisting of strongpoints with great depth and focus all mobile assets on concentrated local counterattack.

That's not saying there was no difference at all. Especially not as we play in CM, an extremely detailed level of wargame. And a nations ability of developing her doctrine is of course dependent on her situation. E.g. deep penetration operations proved very difficult, though not impossible, to perform in the face of absolute enemy air supremacy.

I know the Germans are almost always portrayed as semi-invincible on Anglo-Saxon TV. This odd fact - odd considering that the Germans were soundly beaten - only ever gave me one thought.

The fiercer the vanquished appears to have been, the greater the victor must be.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Screeny]

Ah now we are talking, thx mate...basically all were more or less doing the same thing only some did it better in a certain period/theatre then others in a certain period/theatre.

All differnce bog down to the real fine print/details I guess

[Zarquon]

There's a quite comprehensive article you might find interesting: "German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War II,

Prewar to March 1943".

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#blitz

This is only a short excerpt:

[...]

To avoid the dissipation of a two-front war, the German High Command expected to "crush Soviet Russia in a lightning campaign" during the summer of 1941 (see map 1). The key to this rapid victory lay in destroying "the bulk of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia... by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armored spearheads." To achieve this goal, the Germans planned to trap the Soviet armies in a series of encircled "pockets."1 Not only would this strategy chop the numerically superior Soviet forces into manageable morsels, but it also would prevent the Soviets from prolonging hostilities by executing a strategic withdrawal into the vast Russian interior.

In the campaign's opening battles, the Germans used Keil und Kessel (wedge and caldron) tactics to effect the encirclement and destruction of the Red Army in western Russia (see figure 5). After penetrating Soviet defenses, rapidly advancing German forces--their Keil spearheads formed by four independent panzer groups--would enclose the enemy within two concentric rings. The first ring would be closed by the leading panzer forces and would isolate the enemy. Following closely on the heels of the motorized elements, hard-marching infantry divisions would form a second inner ring around the trapped Soviet units. Facing inward, these German infantry forces would seal in the struggling Russians, containing any attempted breakouts until the caldron, or pocket, could be liquidated. Meanwhile, the mobile forces in the wider ring faced outward, simultaneously parrying any enemy relief attacks while preparing for a new offensive lunge once the pocket's annihilation was complete.2

Generally, in offensive maneuvers, the Germans sought to place their units in a position from which they could conduct tactical defensive operations.3 This way, the Germans could enjoy both the advantages of strategic or operational initiative and the benefits of tactical defense. True to this principle, the encirclement operations conducted during Barbarossa contained major defensive components. Once a Kessel was formed, the temporary mission of both the panzer and the infantry rings was defensive: the inner (infantry) ring blocked enemy escape, while the outer (armored) one barred enemy rescue. The defensive fighting that attended the formation and liquidation of these pockets revealed serious problems in applying German defensive doctrine, however.

Fearsome in the attack, German panzer divisions were ill-suited for static defensive missions due to their relative lack of infantry.4 Prewar German defensive doctrine had envisioned using infantry for defensive combat and reserving panzer units for counterattacks, a role commensurate with their supposedly offensive nature. Panzer divisions were neither trained nor organized to fight defensively without infantry support. However, during the deep, rapid advances of Barbarossa, the German panzers routinely ranged far ahead of the marching infantry and were therefore on their own in defensive fighting.

During their deep encirclements, panzer divisions found even their own self-defense to be a problem. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, when describing his experiences as a panzer corps commander in Russia during the summer of 1941, observed that "the security of a tank formation operating in the enemy's rear largely [depended] on its ability to keep moving. Once it [came] to a halt, it [would] be immediately assailed from all sides by the enemy's reserves." The position of such a stationary panzer unit, Manstein added, could best be described as "hazardous."5 To defend itself, a halted panzer unit would curl up into a defensive laager called a hedgehog, These hedgehogs provided all-around security for the stationary panzers and were used for night defensive positions as well as for resupply halts.

[...]

Don't get me wrong, it's not that *I* read all of this stuff...

[Chelco]

Is it true that inspecting the composition of a division (personnel and materiel) you get a grasp of its army's doctrine at the tactical and operational levels?

[flamingknives]

You can get a rough idea of how that division is used and what sort of combat power it carries. Further insight can be gained by finding out how the units that compose a division work together - but you have to know what those units are first.

Commonwealth armoured divisions typically had a company of infantry in armoured carriers supporting each armoured regiment.

[Sergei]

To add to what flamingknives just said, organization of the division and subordinations (like what kind of support can the Corps give) help to understand better.

[Chelco]

Thanks guys!

So let's compare German and Russian divisions at June 41.

[Andreas]

What sort of divisions?

[Chelco]

A German Panzer division during the early stages of the war in the eastern front and a Russian division used to counter the former. You guys pick them and let's see what comes out. Well, I could pick two, but I need my books. I am at work now.

[Grisha]

Screeny,

The differences between 1941-42 German and 1944-45 Soviet operational theories are very real, but not apparent at first glance, perhaps.

German offensive operations were mainly focused on salients where two pincers of armor formations would be positioned at the base of either side of the salient. The armor would break through, then close off the retreat while the infantry holding the "sack" would slowly squeeze the pocket until enemy surrender.

Soviet offensive operations had more of a slice and dice character, making use of salients as often as not. Rather than deploying only two breakthrough points, the Soviets would conduct many points for breakthrough. The result was many smaller pockets. Not only that, Soviet exploitation was generally in two waves: a tactical and an operational. Tactical exploitation was responsible for the many smaller pockets along the frontline, whereas operational exploitation struck deep at operational chokepoints, such as river crossing points. The effect was twofold: first, the German line would have several huge holes in its frontline as pockets were formed from Soviet tacitical exploitation, then Soviet operational exploitation (the mobile groups, i.e. tank armies) would thrust deep for operational centers and chokepoints.

The two styles were direct results of their respective operational theories. The Germans relied heavily on initiative and versatility to create operations of high tempo, but their complexity or depth was sacrificed to a degree. The Soviets took full advantage of their excellent abilities in deception and intelligence to plan elaborate operations that capitalized on German weakpoints. Because of their ability to "set the table" as they pleased, the Soviets could also set a very high tempo in the initial phases. Once operational exploitation began, Soviet tank armies conducted their mission much like the panzer corps, and with roughly equal skill and experience by 1944-45.

[White Phosphorus]

This paper gives a good overview of how doctrines evolved starting with WWI up to end of Cold War.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/house.pdf

Originally posted by Sergei:

Even mounted archers could have taken Manchuria in 1945, I don't think it was a matter of doctrine.

Lets not exaggerate now. Mounted archers vs barbed wire, bunkers, breech loading artillery and machine guns wouldn't work too well.

I'm not sure what happened there, though.

You mean you haven't read David Glantz's opuses on the matter?

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz4/glantz4.asp

In the paper edition of the strategic one he even claims:

"More recently, Western study of 'August Storm' provided inspiration, concrete guidance and a virtual model for its namesake Operation 'Desert Storm', the US-led coalition that crushed the Iraqi Army in 1991, US Military planners in the Gulf War initially intended to name the offensive phase of the war against Iraq 'Desert Sword' to match the defensive phase 'Desert Shield'. However, planning cells sent to the Gulf from Fort Leavenworth's School of Advance Military Studies, which had studied the Soviet Manchurian offensive in detail, developed an offensive operational plan that replicated the Soviet offensive and named it "desert Storm'."

Mounted archers indeed.

[ May 15, 2004, 07:35 PM: Message edited by: White Phosphorus ]

[Sergei]

Archers mounted in IS III turrets. What did you think I was meaning???

Thanks for the links, WP. I would suspect that Japan was not particularly capable of defending Manchuria vs. Soviets nor cared to concentrate her resources that way when the home islands were threatened, but I think I will read more to become less of an idiot and more...now what's the word for that... informed.