Karelia '44

[Sergei]

As everyone seems to be focusing on liberation of France, let's have a couple of words about what was happening on the Finnish front 60 years ago!

Stalin had promised his western allies to start an offensive in the east to coincide with the invasion of France, but I think it was cunning of the Soviets to target that against Finland, which meant less for Germans but was an easier target that could be knocked out of the war for good (Finnish leadership had already realized how ill-considered the decision to jump into German war train had been, but was unwilling to submit to the Soviet conditions). Meanwhile, after Germans would be tied in the west, the Red Army could later in June launch another offensive, this time in Belorus.

But as to the situation between Finland and Soviet Union until June 9th and thereafter, have a look at this map (blue line):

Here is a quote from Matti Yrjölä's description of Finnish WW2 history:

Source

Soviet Union started an all-out attack on the Finnish front on the Karelian Isthmus (again) on June 9, 1944 (it was timed to to accompany the Allied attack on Normandy). The massive attack was able to breach the Finnish defence in Valkeasaari on June 10, and the front retreated rapidly on to secondary defence line (Vammelsuu-Taipale -line). The fighting was furious as Soviet tanks and infantry supported by massed artillery and ground-attack airplanes pounded the Finnish defenders who tried to keep the defensive line intact and stop the attack.

As the fighting continued the VT-line was breached in Sahakylä and Kuuterselkä on 14.6 and after a major counter attack in Kuuterselkä by the Finnish armored division failed the defense had to be pulled back again. After this followed roughly two week period of retreat and delaying battles. Major loss (psychologically) during this period was the capture of the city of Viipuri by the Soviets on June 20.

Finnish troops were able to stop the Soviet attack on Tali-Ihantala area where the largest military battle in Nordic history was fought from June 25 to July 6. By this time Finnish army had been able to concentrate enough artillery and troops equipped with new german anti-tank weapons and were able to ground the attack down in favorable defensive positions. Soviet losses in tanks and manpower on this killing ground were enough to break off the attack.

At the same time Soviets tried to bypass the Finnish defence by crossing Viipurinlahti (a bay on the Gulf of Finland) through a chain of islands but did not manage to get a beach-head on the mainland. This attack began on July 4 and fierce amphibious attacks and close range battles continued until July 10.

Third major effort by the Soviet armed forces began July 4, on Vuosalmi (crossing the Vuoksi river) but it was not able to expand the beach-head which was pounded by Finnish artillery together with the bombers of Finnish Air Force and German aircraft from the "Kuhmley unit" and counter attacks by the Finnish infantry. Soviet attack ceased on July 11 as Soviet high-command ordered troops on Karelian isthmus to re-organize on defence.

At the end of the summer the front was stabilized but Finland saw that peace with Soviet Union was the only possibility to avoid going down with the Germans. The truce (cease-fire) with the Soviet Union began officially 07:00 AM on September 4, 1944 although Soviet forces continued firing until the next morning 07:00 AM.

Here is another view (with a bit more pathos, IMHO) on the events of the summer '44, this time by Pasi Kuoppamäki:

Source

The immediate target for advance of the Soviet forces through Karelian isthmus was the river Kymi, well beyond the 1940 border close to the border of 1743. The massive strategic attack was able to breach the Finnish outer defenses and the front retreated rapidly on to secondary defense line, but Finnish army kept the line effective in slowing down the Soviet masses of men, guns, planes and armor (possibly 1/10 of total Soviet strength). A major loss was the capture of the city of Viipuri by the Soviets on June 20; an infantry brigade responsible for the defense of Viipuri did not really try to keep the city against several Soviet divisions in full swing, a piece of military history that led to a lot of discussion and accusations against the colonel in charge. Finnish army was better armed than it had been in 1939 but it lacked especially modern antitank weapons because Germany had earlier cut the exports due to Finland's separate negotiations with the SU. Moreover, the Finnish army had not seen really hard fighting for over two years, the soldiers needed time to sharpen up and the Red Army had significantly improved in quality since 1939.

The front line was now stiffened by new troops and well led Finnish artillery fire, Finnish troops were able to stop the Soviet attack on Tali-Ihantala area where the largest military battle in Nordic history was fought from June 25 to July 6. In contrast with some 300,000 men in the whole Winter War operations tiny Finland was now able to deploy a field army about 500,000 soldiers alongside the long frontier, out of population of less than four million. German help was asked in form of ammunition and troops, these were granted against President Ryti's written promise of staying in war with SU (a deal made with Ribbentrop who visited Helsinki in an attempt to stop Finland from making a separate peace). As a result, USA cut the diplomatic relations as it thought this was moving Finland closer to German camp. Neither Germans nor Allies understood that from the Finnish point of view it was just a personal promise by the President, not legally binding international agreement, it had not gone through the constitutional chain of legislation. Germans supplied ammunition, state of the art anti-tank weaponry, an airforce unit, and a division and an assault-gun brigade for Finnish use. Soon Soviet losses in tanks and manpower were enough to break off the attack. At the same time Soviets tried to bypass the Finnish defense by crossing the bay of Viipurinlahti through a chain of islands but did not manage to get a beach-head on the mainland. Finally, a third major effort by the Soviet armed forces began July 4, crossing the river Vuoksi, but it was not able to expand the beach-head, which became a killing ground. Soviet attack effectively ended on July 11 as Soviet high-command ordered troops on the Karelian isthmus to re-organize on defense. Continuation of the Soviet onslaught would have demanded far too much new troops that were needed against the Germans for drive to Berlin before Western Allies, in fact, much troops from the Finnish front were needed for that purpose too. Finnish forces initially retreated, partly voluntarily for strategic reasons, in Eastern Karelia and north of Ladoga too, but eventually stopped and in some areas threw back the tired Soviet Karelian front. These battles are sometimes called the "last lesson of the old motti (encirclement) master".

By the end of summer 1944 Finland naturally saw that separate peace with SU was the only possibility to avoid going down with the Germans, as soon as Germans were dealt with the Soviets could turn back to Finland with the mass of their total strength. Thus, President Ryti resigned giving up the promise to stand beside Germany, Mannerheim was appointed as the President by the Parliament. SU did not demand capitulation any more, the amount of reparations Finland would have to pay was halved compared to earlier demands and a cease-fire began officially 07:00 AM on September 4, 1944. Stalin may have considered it to be too expensive to try to occupy Finland and wished for an internal revolution after the War. The Parliament accepted the armistice terms with votes 108-45. The terms included that all diplomatic relations with Germany are cut, and all German troops are required to withdraw by the 15th September, or they will be interned and given to Soviet Union as POW's. The front line at the time of the armistice was well in front of the current border, the miracle of the Winter War was renewed in a summer clothing. The hopefully last of the multiple long wars during several centuries with Russia was over.

Here's an interview of a Finnish veteran of Tali-Ihantala, Matti Hyry. It should be interesting to anyone.

Here is a large map that shows the Soviet advance in the Isthmus until June 20th: map

And this map shows the retreat from River Svir to the U-line: map

What was the importance of the battles of 1944? After signing truce Finland was in an awkward position, having to take orders from the Allied Control Commission led by A. Zhdanov - BUT, very importantly, the battles had proven that Finland still fielded an army capable of fighting back. Defeated armies don't surround and drive back two attacking divisions like happened in Ilomantsi in July. Whatever Stalin might have wished to do with Finland, after that summer he had no illusions that Finland could be just swallowed without having to bite. Even today that same idea is the main principle of Finnish defence in the case of a major offensive. So, to the men who guaranteed peace!

(Well, there still were those German buggers in Lapland who had to be expelled... so no total peace until 1945)

Oh, and I will later try to write something Combat Mission related, so stay tuned.

[Glider]

Can you tell us what happened to the German units in northern Finland, web sources concerning this (at least those I was able to find) are scarce.

[Grisha]

Sergei,

Finnish strategy in WWII was well thought out, and the Finns had the tactical and operational abilities to meet those strategic ends. The Vuoksi line as the main defensive line was crucial to Finnish survival in summer/fall of 1944. I don't believe the Soviets realized just how transitory the initial Finnish defenses between Vyborg and Leningrad really were. Similar situations against the Germans where tactical defenses collapsed quickly often resulted in an extensive operational advance for the Soviets. Not so with the Finns whose initial defense turned out to be more of an operational 'listening post'. Proper Soviet operational art called for going over to the defense at the Vuoksi line, then plan another assault operation for winter of 1944/45. This was not politically agreeable however to Soviet state leadership (Berlin, not Helsinki, was the target), so every effort had to be made to force a negotiation ASAP.

It is, indeed, an impressive achievement that Finland was able to retain its sovereignty from such unfavorable circumstances, and from one as ruthless as Stalin.

[Sergei]

Actually, the frontmost line was officially the main line of resistance, even though it makes no sense. At the beginning of the offensive, the initial thought was to counter-attack and take the lines back, but the gravity of the situation was soon realized and a withdraw ordered. The second line, the Vammelsuu-Taipale line, was the one where most fortifying efforts had been made in the Isthmus, but it was unfinished especially at Sahakylä-Kuuterselkä sector and Finns hadn't yet had time to strengthen their lines, so Red Army breached it quickly. The Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale line was hardly existing, but it had superb natural obstacles and also now Finnish Army had had two weeks time to react. So it's not totally correct to say that the initial line was a 'listening post', but because of the events in June that surely was the only function it had!

I'll also mention that during 1942 and 1943 most fortification works had been done in the occupied Soviet Karelia in the Maaselkä isthmus and in the River Svir area. Why there and not in the Karelian Isthmus? Because Leningrad was still under German siege and no attack was coming from that direction, that's why.

[Sergei]

Lapland war in brief: Soviets had ordered Finns to take care that Germans evacuate from Lapland within weeks, after which Finnish Army would have to use force to take those still in the country as prisoners. Germans retreated slowly towards Norway (the only more sudden move being the Finnish seabourne invasion of Tornio on the Swedish border, in the German rear), burning towns, blowing up bridges and roads, and leaving mines. Excepting that move to take Tornio, there were only a few battles worthy mentioning. Germans held a minuscule corner of Finland until spring of 1945.

[Bartokomus]

I shudder at thinking of Finns with toothpicks; they must have been the stuff of Russian nightmares when they had guns...

[undead reindeer cavalry]

i can't say i could feel very good about it all. especially about the first couple of chaotic weeks. i guess they did well if one would apply, for example, German standards, but in my opinion Finland doesn't have the luxury for such lower levels of performance. it was damn close that we all didn't get shipped to Siberia.

of course it looks marvellous on paper, with all those Guards divisions with heavy tanks, but in reality Finns could have done a lot better. one can't emphasize the chaos that reigned supreme for the first couple of weeks. all the insane counterattacks, some of which were succesful only because they were so insane (e.g. a regiment attacks an entire Guards division and is successfull only because Soviets didn't know how to act in such an absurd situation). mobile Soviet units roaming fields free for days, only stopped when mistakenly attacking other Soviet units. awgh, i don't want to think about it any longer.

[Sergei]

Meanwhile, though, preparations were being made, preparations without which the Red Army would have marched to Saimaa. Of course, preparations should have been done before 9th of June - some were, but the signs of a gathering storm were not given enough value. In the end, the defence in depth worked well - the problem is, that wasn't the Finnish GHQ intentions. If it had been the plan in such a situation, and the size of the Soviet onslaught would have been recognized, and Panzerfausts had been distributed faster (1700 Pf's and 300 Psch's were delivered in April, but the troops received them only as Russians had already broken through the VT line), many Finnish lives could have been saved. But that's hindsight. Demonstrates the importance of effective military intelligence AND a good connection between the intelligence and the leadership.

[Metto]

Now, that you have written about the continuation war, you could also write about the winterwar. I quess many foreigners here could be interested to hear about the last, desperate days(in Kannas).

[Sergei]

Why not just go to www.winterwar.com ? There's also plenty of literature on Winter War written in English and other languages, unlike about the final phases of the Continuation War. In the Matti Yrjölä's site (link above) is also a coverage of the whole 1939-1945 period. But I'd rather discuss the battles of 1944, for the anniversary's sake.

Here's another Finnish war history link: http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/

[Sergei]

Okay, now to the CM content... I have created a list of CMBB scenarios covering the battles 60 years ago, that I know of. Some are not finished (WIP=Work in progress, TPG=available at The Proving Grounds), otherwise they should be available at the Depot. If any of you know something to add, please tell.

<u>VT line</u>

June 11th - Polviselkä

June 13th - Siiranmäki (Keke has pulled this one from Scenario Depot and is rumoured to be working on a new operation on it, I wonder when we get to test it?)

June 14th - JR 48 at Kuuterselkä (op.)

June 15th - Kuuterselkä

June 15th - Maelstrom of Kuuterselkä (Op.)

June - T-Thirtysomethings

<u>VKT line</u>

June - Portinhoikka Boogie

June - Fist of Lagus

June 24th - Tali (TPG, op.)

June 25th - Marskin Nyrkki (I'm not sure what is the fate of this WIP op.)

June 25th - Clearing the Bushes (TPG, Op.)

June 26th - Bull by the Horns

June 26th - Road Patrol

June 27th - Alfthan Attacks!

June 28th - Saarela (op.)

June 29th - Farewell to Portinhoikka (op.)

July - Road to Ihantala (TPG, Op.)

July - Continuation War

July - A Road to Nowhere (TPG)

July - Vuosalmi Operation (TPG, Op.)

July - Vuosalmi Bridgehead (TPG)

<u>East and Ladoga Karelia</u>

July - The Strait And Narrow Path

July 15th - A Walk On The Beach (Op.)

July 16th - Niet Molotoff!

<u>Other Battles</u>

August - Partisan Waltz

<u>Maps</u>

QB maps at Der Kessel

Bigger maps for scenario designers at Scenario Depot

Original Finnish maps of Karelia at http://mapy.mk.cvut.cz/data/Finsko-Finlandia/Karjala/

[ July 09, 2005, 11:56 PM: Message edited by: Sergei ]

[Mikko H.]

Actually, the frontmost line was officially the main line of resistance, even though it makes no sense.

Indeed, one can argue that designating the front-line the main defence position was one of the greatest mistakes of the Finnish military leadership. The front-line was just that, the line where the Finnish advance had stopped in the Fall 1941, and consequently far from ideal for defence.

Had the second VT-line been designated the main defence position, summer 1944 could have been different. If the VT-line had been properly fortified and manned by the main body of Finnish forces, Finns could have reacted much better to the Soviet offensive. In fact Mannerheim was urged to do just that, but the front-line commanders assured him that they can repel any Soviet offensive just where they were.

Also at the beginning of the Soviet offensive there was no unified Finnish command in place in the Isthmus. Until March 1944 there had been Lt. Gen. Harald Öhquist's Isthmus Group HQ, but Mannerheim disbanded it and took the Isthmus forces directly under GHQ command. Whatever the motives for this move, it complicated the Finnish command structure. After the start of the Soviet offensive Mannerheim recognized this himself and made Lt. Gen. Karl Lennart Oesch Commander of the Isthmus Forces.

[Frenchy]

Nearly 1/3 of this book covers action up north, specifically actions of the 6th SS Mountain Division (Nord), specifically pages 5 through 72.

http://www.aberjonapress.com/catalog/7dij/index.html

[Sardaukar]

Some mistakes made by Finnish GHQ was to have too many units in Eastern Karelia area. If Soviet AF interdiction would have been in place, those units would have never arrived to crucial parts of Isthmus battles in time. In occasions, they were thrown into battle almost straight from railroad cars as it was.

Also, the Finnish front line in Valkeasaari was very unfavourable for defense, being very sandy terrain, thus making proper entrenchment very difficult, which resulted to most of the trenches caving in under Soviet artillery attack.

Cheers,

M.S.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sardaukar:

Some mistakes made by Finnish GHQ was to have too many units in Eastern Karelia area.

I wonder if it was a mistake. IMO it was by design.

If Soviet AF interdiction would have been in place, those units would have never arrived to crucial parts of Isthmus battles in time. In occasions, they were thrown into battle almost straight from railroad cars as it was.

One of the most serious mistakes the Soviets made was they did not use their overwhelming aerial superiority to interdiction. Then again they may have thought they could take out the reinforcements as they were fed in after they had annihilated the original forces in place. This would have been a sound strategy if the Finnish army had commited itself to a more rigid defensive tactic and had been ground up at or near the MLD. It is fair to assume the Soviet planners thought the Finnish army would have acted like the German army in a similar situation.

[Mikko H.]

It is fair to assume the Soviet planners thought the Finnish army would have acted like the German army in a similar situation.

Wasn't Finnish Army supposed to act like Germans in this respect? At least the GHQ's initial reaction in the first week or so after the start of the offensive was to order immediate counter-attacks to recapture the lost positions (which in hindsight can be seen to have little or no chanches of success). It seems to me the Finnish tactics were flexible not by design but by force of circumstances.

Also, the Finnish front line in Valkeasaari was very unfavourable for defense, being very sandy terrain, thus making proper entrenchment very difficult, which resulted to most of the trenches caving in under Soviet artillery attack.

This part of front was held by Maj. Gen. Jussi Sihvo's 10th Division, which had been transferred there just previous May. Gen. Sihvo had been appalled by the state of the defenses and asked his superior, CO of the IV Army Corps Lt. Gen. Taavetti Laatikainen, for permission to shorten his division's front by withdrawing. Laatikainen refused. As is well known, Sihvo's division was overwhelmed by the Soviet assault and just barely managed to escape. Sihvo was relieved of his duties on 17 June.

Sihvo wasn't the only commander to be relieved of his duties by Laatikainen. CO of the Cavalry Brigade Maj. Gen. Lars Melander got the boot on the same date as Sihvo, Col. Armas Kemppi, CO of the unfortunate 20th Brigade who lost Viipuri on 20 June, was court-martialled and Maj. Gen. Paavo Paalu, CO of the 18th Division, was relieved on 26 June. All but Melander saw their careers essentially finished.

I sometimes wonder how Laatikainen was able to keep his post. He had been foremost among the generals who assured Mannerheim that the front-line can be held against any Soviet offensive, and his leadership during the Battle of Tali-Ihantala left much to be desired. And there was this incident in August 1941 when Laatikainen went AWOL after being made temporary CO of the II Army Corps during Lt. Gen. Oesch's illness -- yet Laatikainen got the Mannerheim Cross 2nd Class for this perfomance. He was held in high regard in GHQ and retired post-war a full general.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Mikko H.:

Wasn't Finnish Army supposed to act like Germans in this respect? At least the GHQ's initial reaction in the first week or so after the start of the offensive was to order immediate counter-attacks to recapture the lost positions (which in hindsight can be seen to have little or no chanches of success). It seems to me the Finnish tactics were flexible not by design but by force of circumstances.

The force of circumstance brought on the flexibility by design.

If you look at the Winter War tactics they were essentially the same. Hold the line at all costs and widraw to another position when it is time to do so. The widrawal bit is what threw the monkey wrench into the Red engine. They had to fight all the way to Viipuri whereas if they had been fighting a standard German defensive play they would have been free to roam among the fleeing defenders once the breach in the defences had been made and the defending force utterly gutted.

Success (the seeming lack thereof) of the initial counter attacs does not lie in the "success" but in the way they bought time to move the reinforcements on site. The attacker also wears down so any further developments do not depend only on the defensive forces and how they fare but also how fit the attackers are and how often they have to rotate back.

The widrawal has been called the "run across the isthmus" when in fact it was a decently conducted rear guard action. The way I see it the summer of 1944 campaign was a "directors cut" remake of the Winter War, only in a much grander scale.

[Sergei]

Definately Germans were capable of working delay operations when they had the forces and favourable terrain. Just look at Italy, Lapland or the bocage area. While the retreat from VT to VKT gave a lot of terrain to Russians in a week's time, no battalions were lost and the army remained capable of fighting. I doubt this could have been pulled off in Belorus, though.

What I've always wondered is why the old Mannerheim line wasn't used. The old fortifications had been destroyed, but I think it would have been easier to improve and the lakes and swamps would have restricted tanks better in summer. VT line was shorter because of the Viipuri Bay, of course, but then defending Viipuri was going to be impossible.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sergei:

Definately Germans were capable of working delay operations when they had the forces and favourable terrain.

Indeed.

Just look at Italy, Lapland or the bocage area.

IMO Italy and bocage area are not relevant as they were not delaying actions but holding actions from the start.

On the other hand Lapland is a good example, so is AG North actions in the Baltics. I am also inclined to include the moving pockets of the AG Center in this list.

While the retreat from VT to VKT gave a lot of terrain to Russians in a week's time, no battalions were lost and the army remained capable of fighting. I doubt this could have been pulled off in Belorus, though.

Based on the Finnish "ability" in avoiding massive losses due to capture I have always guestioned the inclusion of POW's in any force tactical effectivness comparisons and studies in general.

What I've always wondered is why the old Mannerheim line wasn't used. The old fortifications had been destroyed, but I think it would have been easier to improve and the lakes and swamps would have restricted tanks better in summer. VT line was shorter because of the Viipuri Bay, of course, but then defending Viipuri was going to be impossible.

The Winter War experience may have been a factor in it. Or the number of available forces was not enough to conduct the defence, form a reserve AND prepare for what comes next.

That is no excuse for the overall lack of preparation though.

[Grisha]

Many thanks, Sergei and company. I'm learning a lot about this operation. I had been under the assumption that the retrograde action to the Vuoksi had been planned, which gave me the impression of very sound, even brilliant, operational planning by the Finnish forces there. I know a lot about why the Soviets did things the way they did, but much of that was conditioned by their war experience with the Germans. Hearing the Finnish side of this operation makes me want to find more Soviet historical data on this offensive operation now.

I think I'll save this discussion for reference as well.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Tero:

IMO Italy and bocage area are not relevant as they were not delaying actions but holding actions from the start.

Some aspects of the Italian campaign, e.g. the initial withdrawal after the Salerno landings, were clearly a holding action, designed only to give time to prepare the Winter, and then Gustav lines.

The moving pockets in AG Centre are not holding actions on the other hand. They are just a desperate bid for survival by encircled forces, mostly operating without a connection to each other, or higher HQ. Most of these pockets were destroyed very quickly.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Some aspects of the Italian campaign, e.g. the initial withdrawal after the Salerno landings, were clearly a holding action, designed only to give time to prepare the Winter, and then Gustav lines.

As I said. Or do you mean delaying action ?

The moving pockets in AG Centre are not holding actions on the other hand. They are just a desperate bid for survival by encircled forces, mostly operating without a connection to each other, or higher HQ. Most of these pockets were destroyed very quickly.

True. I used them as an example of a mobile defensive action by the Germans. Apart from the ones already mentioned and the 1st and the 2nd Kharkov and the latter part of the African campaings there were not too many deliberate even semi-voluntary, let alone voluntary defensive widrawals made by the German forces.

[Sardaukar]

Battles on Karelia Isthmus during summer 1944 were remarkable in few aspects..at least.

First, it was the only "strategic strike" made by Soviet Union during WW II that failed to achieve it's objectives (it did achieve some of it's political objectives, though).

Secondly, battles were about size of El Alamein, and everyone knows that, but very few knows about Tali-Ihantala for example. Soviets were of course not too eager to publicize that they were stopped.

Third, it was first time Finnish forces used truly massive artillery "fire groups", enabling them to achieve artillery parity (and in some instances, artillery superiority) over Soviet forces. Soviets had lot more guns, but Finns were able to use theirs lot more efficiently. Artillery was *the* main factor in success.

Fourth (albeit it was north of Isthmus), there was the operation where 2 Soviet divisions were encircled and almost annihilated in early August around Ilomantsi area. That wasn't happening very often to late 1944 Soviet forces. It was called "mottimestarin viimeinen oppitunti" (encirclement master's last lesson)

Cheers,

M.S.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

my recollection is that the first attacks weren't too powerful & were very limited in size (something like a couple infantry companies supported by a handful of tanks). most attacks were repelled, and the succesful attacks were pushed back with counterattacks. didn't the front brake when in one case the counterattack came too late (something like 12 hours later) and the Soviet infantry was already dug in? if so, i wonder if Finns had any reserves right behind the very front?

[Sergei]

There were some reserves right there, but they were commenced to repulse the initial attacks as it was not seen that those might have been just a diversion.